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Supreme Court Date: 2018.03.02
14:50:51 -06'00'
People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958
Caption in Supreme THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
Court: MATTHEW GRAY, Appellee.
Docket No. 120958
Filed September 21, 2017
Decision Under Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that
Review court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon.
Nicholas Ford, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed and remanded.
Counsel on Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez,
Appeal State’s Attorney, of Chicago (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General,
Michael M. Glick and Katherine M. Doersch, Assistant Attorneys
General, and Alan J. Spellberg, Michelle Katz, Eric Leafblad, and
Annette Collins, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the
People.
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Mysza, Deputy
Defender, and Christofer R. Bendik, Assistant Appellate Defender, of
the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee.
Benjamin C. Weinberg, of Dentons US LLP, of Chicago, for amici
curiae LAF et al.
Justices JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, Garman,
Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Matthew Gray, was
convicted of, inter alia, aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3 (West 2010) (as
amended by Pub. Act 96-1551, § 5 (eff. July 1, 2011))). The appellate court held that the
statutory definition of “family or household members” violated substantive due process as
applied to defendant. 2016 IL App (1st) 134012. This court allowed the State’s petition for
leave to appeal as a matter of right. Ill. S. Ct. R. 317 (eff. July 1, 2006). We now reverse the
judgment of the appellate court and remand the cause to that court for further proceedings.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On November 1, 2011, defendant and the victim, Tina Carthron, spent the evening together
drinking. On the morning of November 2, Carthron sustained knife wounds to her chest and
back. Defendant was charged by information with two counts of attempted first degree murder
(720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a) (West 2010)) and two counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS
5/12-3.05(a)(5), (f)(1) (West 2010)). Defendant was also charged with three counts of
aggravated domestic battery, alleging great bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a) (West 2010)),
permanent disfigurement (id.), and strangulation (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5) (West 2010)). In
September 2013, defendant was tried before a jury on all counts.
¶4 In the State’s case-in-chief, Carthron testified in pertinent part as follows. Carthron was 51
years old. She was born in Chicago and had lived there her entire life. Carthron had known
defendant for approximately 20 years. She began to spend time with defendant based on the
friendship between their families. Fifteen years ago, they dated for approximately two years.
They dated each other exclusively, and they slept over at their respective residences.
¶5 In early October 2011, Carthron saw defendant outside of his new apartment. Several times
thereafter she visited defendant at his apartment. On one visit, she brought some clothes and
left them at defendant’s apartment when she went to work. Carthron was not interested in
rekindling their romantic relationship, but rather, they remained “just friends.”
¶6 On November 1, 2011, defendant telephoned Carthron, and she went to his apartment. It
consisted of a single room, which included a kitchenette, and a bathroom. Carthron brought
whiskey and beer, and she and defendant spent the evening drinking together. Carthron drank
approximately a pint of whiskey and 40 ounces of beer. During that evening, defendant’s
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girlfriend, Laura Moore, telephoned defendant. Carthron became upset, believing that it was
disrespectful for defendant to talk to another woman in Carthron’s presence. After the call,
Carthron and defendant argued, but they eventually listened to music, watched television, and
had sex. Defendant went to bed. Carthron continued drinking.
¶7 Carthron did not remember whether defendant explicitly invited her to sleep over that
night. However, defendant “never had a problem” with her sleeping over, and the reason she
went to defendant’s apartment was to spend the night.
¶8 Carthron testified that she “still was drunk” the next morning. At approximately 7:00 a.m.,
as she and defendant lay in bed, they argued about the telephone call from Moore. Defendant
then climbed on top of Carthron, placed his hands on the front of her neck, and began to
strangle her. She passed out. When Carthron regained consciousness, she saw defendant
standing in the bathroom holding a knife. Defendant told Carthron to leave because he had
called the police. Carthron began to gather her clothes to get dressed. As she grabbed her coat,
Carthron saw that the left side of her chest was bleeding and said “oh no, you didn’t stab me.”
According to Carthron, defendant said in response: “Get out.” Carthron testified: “He just kept
saying get out. He had called the police on me.” On cross-examination, Carthron testified that
she did not remember defendant stabbing her. She also acknowledged that she was “kind of
drunk” that morning and did not remember biting defendant.
¶9 Carthron left defendant’s apartment dressed in only her jeans and a leather jacket, leaving
behind her cell phone, eyeglasses, and underwear. Carthron saw police officers outside of
defendant’s apartment building. However, she did not approach them because she did not
know what defendant had told them.
¶ 10 Carthron had two daughters, Marie and Suzette. Although Carthron was living with Marie,
Carthron went to Suzette’s home because Carthron knew that Suzette would be at home.
Carthron rode two city buses for about 30 minutes to reach Suzette’s home. She climbed the
stairs to Suzette’s third-floor apartment slowly because she was in pain. Once inside, Carthron
sat on a chair and told Suzette that defendant had stabbed her. As Suzette was removing
Carthron’s jacket, Carthron noticed that her back hurt also. Once the jacket was off, they
discovered that Carthron had also been stabbed in the back. Suzette called 911, and Carthron
was taken by ambulance to a hospital for treatment.
¶ 11 Carthron spoke with Chicago police personnel while she was at the hospital, and after she
was discharged, she went to the police station and was interviewed a second time. Officers then
drove her home, stopping along the way at defendant’s apartment, where they retrieved
Carthron’s eyeglasses.
¶ 12 The State’s case-in-chief included DNA evidence, which established the presence of
Carthron’s blood on a knife recovered from defendant’s apartment. In addition, the State
presented other-crimes evidence pertaining to two prior incidents between defendant and
Laura Moore. In September 2010, police responded to a domestic battery call by Moore. She
reported that defendant kicked her down a flight of stairs and hit her in the eye. They were both
very intoxicated. Moore was hospitalized for a left ankle fracture and a facial contusion.
However, she did not want to sign a criminal complaint. In February 2011, police responded to
another domestic battery call, where both Moore and defendant appeared to be intoxicated.
Moore told police that she and defendant were watching the Super Bowl when defendant
became angry and began choking Moore. She declined to have an ambulance called.
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¶ 13 Defendant’s theory of the case, as indicated by his trial counsel’s opening statement and
closing argument, was that defendant did not intend, and never attempted, to kill Carthron.
Rather, defendant wounded her in self-defense.
¶ 14 As his first witness, defendant called Detective Rapunzel Williams, who interviewed
Carthron at the hospital on November 2, 2011. Carthron told Williams that she had been
sleeping at defendant’s apartment the previous night and awoke in the early morning hours.
Williams believed Carthron indicated the time was approximately 1:30 a.m. As Carthron
prepared to leave the apartment, she saw that she was bleeding from her left side and that
defendant was holding a knife. Carthron did not initially state that she was awakened because
defendant was choking her or that he had choked her until she passed out. However, Williams
again interviewed Carthron at the police station later that day. During the second interview,
Carthron stated that she had been choked by defendant. In addition, Williams observed
defendant that day and saw that he had an oval-shaped red mark below his chest.
¶ 15 Testifying on his own behalf, defendant stated in relevant part as follows. He and Carthron
had known each other for approximately 20 years, and they had a prior romantic relationship
that ended approximately 15 years earlier. Though they no longer dated, he and Carthron had
remained friends and occasionally saw each other in the neighborhood. During the first week
of October 2011, defendant was outside his new apartment building and saw Carthron as she
walked by. Later that month, defendant agreed to keep a bag of clothing for Carthron, and she
brought him some wine when she returned to collect the bag later that night.
¶ 16 On the afternoon of November 1, 2011, defendant went to the store and purchased
whiskey, cigarettes, and juice for Carthron, as she had requested. Defendant also bought
himself some wine. At about 7 p.m., defendant called Carthron and told her how much she
owed him for the items he purchased for her. During that conversation, he invited Carthron to
come to his apartment because she sounded depressed. When she arrived, Carthron asked if
she could have a cocktail before leaving. Defendant agreed, and he and Carthron began
drinking while they were listening to music and talking.
¶ 17 At about 11 p.m., defendant received a telephone call from Moore, whom he had dated for
15 years and considered to be his common-law wife. Defendant turned the music off and spoke
to Moore, telling her that he would go see her after he took a short nap. He gave Carthron the
remote control for the television and told her that he would walk her home after his nap. When
defendant went to sleep, Carthron was fully dressed, sitting in a chair, and having a drink. He
and Carthron did not argue that night, and they did not have sexual relations.
¶ 18 Defendant awoke at about 7 a.m. because Carthron was biting his lower chest. Carthron,
who was 5 feet, 4 inches tall and weighed about 125 pounds, had him pinned to the bed with
her arm around his waist and her leg on top of him. When defendant tried to push her head
away, she bit him harder. He yelled and told her to let him go, but she bit him harder still.
Though defendant, who was 6 feet tall and weighed about 165 pounds, put his hands on
Carthron’s shoulder in an attempt to push her off, she would not let go. Defendant did not put
his hands around Carthron’s neck, but he may have scratched her neck with his long
fingernails. In addition, defendant believed that the photograph of marks on Carthron’s neck
on November 2, 2011, depicted “old wounds.”
¶ 19 After repeatedly telling Carthron to let go, defendant tried to find something he could use
to hit her. The lights were out, and the room was illuminated solely by the television. The only
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item defendant could reach was a knife that he kept near his bed for security. Defendant
touched Carthron’s back once with the knife but she continued biting him. When he touched
her back with the knife a second time, he cut her, and she released her bite. Defendant then
pushed Carthron off the bed. It was possible that the knife touched Carthron’s chest when he
pushed her off of him, but he did not know at that time that her chest was bleeding. Although
defendant touched Carthron’s back with the knife, he did not intend to stab or hurt her.
¶ 20 When Carthron fell to the floor, defendant got up and turned on the light. He then went to
the bathroom and saw that he had a bite mark on his lower chest. He used a wet face towel to
put some witch hazel on the wound, which was not bleeding. He then returned to the bedroom
where Carthron was sitting in her underwear and drinking whiskey. Defendant told Carthron
that he had cut her, and he used the towel to dab her back with the witch hazel, but he did not
bandage her wound. Carthron stood up but refused to speak to him. After finding her clothes,
defendant told Carthron to leave before he called the police on her. Defendant then went back
into the bathroom for a moment and, when he came out, he saw Carthron dressed and standing
by the door. He escorted her out of the building and then called 911.
¶ 21 Defendant also testified, however, that an ambulance was already outside when Carthron
left the building but she declined to get in it. Defendant did not remember telling a 911 operator
that his girlfriend had attacked him with a knife, that she bit him, or that he stabbed her. In
addition, he did not remember telling the 911 operator that Carthron may have been hurt badly.
¶ 22 Defendant acknowledged that, when he spoke to Detective Williams and Detective Steven
Scott at the police station on the day of the altercation, he told them that the ambulance had
taken Carthron to the hospital. However, defendant denied telling the detectives that he and
Carthron argued about the telephone call from Moore and that he had put a bandage on
Carthron’s back.
¶ 23 Upon being questioned about prior incidents involving Moore, defendant acknowledged
she had called the police on two occasions. Defendant stated that he and Moore were drinking
in the afternoon of September 2, 2010, when Moore slipped on the stairs. According to
defendant, the police happened to be passing by and asked what had happened. Moore, who
was drunk, said that defendant had pushed her down the stairs. At trial, defendant denied
punching Moore in the face or kicking her down the stairs. Defendant also testified that Moore
called the police on another occasion when he pushed her during an argument. Defendant
acknowledged that he and Moore were both intoxicated at the time of the argument.
¶ 24 As part of the State’s case in rebuttal, Chicago 911 operator Mark Coit testified as follows.
On the morning of November 2, 2011, Coit received an emergency call from a person who
identified himself as defendant. The caller stated that his girlfriend attacked him with a knife,
that he took the knife and stabbed her, and that “she may be hurt bad.”
¶ 25 Detective Scott testified that he and Detective Williams spoke to defendant at the police
station on November 2, 2011. During that conversation, defendant stated that he had a verbal
altercation with Carthron about his girlfriend and that, after the altercation became physical, he
put a “patch” on Carthron’s back.
¶ 26 At the close of the evidence, the jury found defendant guilty of two counts of aggravated
domestic battery and one count of aggravated battery, based on his strangling and stabbing of
Carthron. The circuit court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial and proceeded to
sentencing. At the close of the sentencing hearing, the court sentenced defendant to concurrent
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five-year prison terms on the aggravated domestic battery convictions and a concurrent
three-year prison term on the aggravated battery conviction.
¶ 27 On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against him and claimed
that section 112A-3(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code of Criminal
Procedure) (725 ILCS 5/112A-3(3) (West 2010)), which defined family or household
members,1 is unconstitutional as applied to him and his relationship to Carthron. The appellate
court held that, because the relationship between defendant and Carthron was no longer under
the effect of the prior romantic intimacy that had existed 15 years earlier, the definition of
household or family member is unconstitutional as applied to defendant. 2016 IL App (1st)
134012, ¶¶ 31, 46-47. The appellate court also determined that the admission of other-crimes
evidence relating to defendant’s acts of domestic battery against Moore warranted a new trial
on the charge of aggravated battery. Id. ¶¶ 48-49.
¶ 28 Lastly, so as not to subject defendant to double jeopardy, the appellate court found that the
evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. ¶¶ 51-53.
Accordingly, the appellate court vacated defendant’s convictions for aggravated domestic
battery and remanded the cause to the trial court for a new trial on his aggravated battery
conviction. Id. ¶¶ 48, 55-56.
¶ 29 The State appeals. We granted LAF (formerly the Legal Assistance Foundation) et al.
leave to submit an amici curiae brief in support of the State. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20,
2010).
¶ 30 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 31 The State assigns error to the appellate court’s holding that the domestic battery statute’s
definition of family or household members violates substantive due process as applied to
defendant. Seeking cross-relief, defendant assigns error to the appellate court’s holding that
the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions. We address defendant’s contention first.
See, e.g., People v. Sledge, 25 Ill. 2d 403, 404 (1962) (addressing sufficiency of evidence prior
to addressing constitutional claims).
¶ 32 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 33 Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS
5/12-3.3(a), (a-5) (West 2010)), which alleged that he caused great bodily harm to Carthron,
who was a family or household member, by stabbing her (count III) and that he strangled her
(count V). Defendant was also convicted of one count of aggravated battery (720 ILCS
1
Before this court, the parties agree that they and the appellate court cited the wrong statutory
provision for the definition of family or household members for the crime of domestic battery. Prior to
July 1, 2011, section 112A-3(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which pertains to orders of
protection, provided the definition of “family or household member” as that term appeared in the
domestic battery statute. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West 2010). However, effective July 1, 2011, Public
Act 96-1551 amended the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) to add a new section 12-0.1, which
defines family or household members for purposes of article 12 of the Criminal Code. Pub. Act
96-1551, § 5 (eff. July 1, 2011) (adding 720 ILCS 5/12-0.1). The definitions are the same. Although the
parties continue to refer to section 112A-3(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, we will hereinafter
refer to section 12-0.1 of the Criminal Code.
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5/12-3.05(f)(1) (West 2010)), which alleged that he caused bodily harm to Carthron through
the use of a deadly weapon by stabbing her with a knife (count VIII).
¶ 34 On cross-appeal, defendant claims that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt because Carthron’s testimony was not credible and her version of events was
improbable. Specifically, defendant claims that Carthron’s intoxication at the time of the
altercation renders her testimony “utterly implausible.” Defendant contends that Carthron’s
“level of intoxication alone eviscerates [her] credibility” and that this court “cannot trust
anything she has said about the events” that transpired in defendant’s apartment on the
morning of November 2, 2011. He also argues that the State failed to prove that he was not
acting in self-defense when he cut Carthron with a knife.
¶ 35 The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of an offense.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1979); People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213,
224 (2009). When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, a court of review
must determine “whether, [after] viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
‘ “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67 (quoting
People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (2015), quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). It is not the
role of the reviewing court to retry the defendant. In re Q.P., 2015 IL 118569, ¶ 24. Rather, it is
the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence,
and draw reasonable inferences from the facts. People v. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 12.
Therefore, a court of review will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on
questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. Id. A
criminal conviction will not be reversed for insufficient evidence unless the evidence is so
unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt of the
defendant’s guilt. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67. Although a fact-finder’s determination of
witness credibility is entitled to great deference, it is not conclusive and does not bind the
reviewing court. People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004).
¶ 36 The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to convict if the testimony is positive and
credible, even where it is contradicted by the defendant. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d at 228.
Where the finding of the defendant’s guilt depends on eyewitness testimony, a reviewing court
must decide whether a fact-finder could reasonably accept the testimony as true beyond a
reasonable doubt. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 279. Under this standard, the eyewitness
testimony may be found insufficient “only where the record evidence compels the conclusion
that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 280. A conviction
will not be reversed simply because the evidence is contradictory or because the defendant
claims that a witness was not credible. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d at 228.
¶ 37 Here, it is undisputed that defendant and Carthron were the only two people in the
apartment on November 1 and 2, 2011, and that, based on her prior dating relationship with
defendant, Carthron was a family or household member. See 720 ILCS 5/12-0.1 (West 2010).
Carthron testified at trial that at about 7 a.m. on November 2, she and defendant argued about
the telephone call he had received from Moore the previous night. During that argument,
defendant put his hands around her neck and choked her until she passed out. When she
regained consciousness, she saw defendant holding a knife and also saw that she was bleeding
from a stab wound on her chest. Carthron further testified that, when she arrived at her
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daughter’s apartment, she discovered that she also had a stab wound on her back. Carthron’s
trial testimony as to these essential facts was clear and positive. If believed by the jury,
Carthron’s testimony was sufficient to prove that defendant had strangled her and caused her
great bodily harm by stabbing her with a knife. Accordingly, this evidence was sufficient to
prove him guilty of two counts of aggravated domestic battery and one count of aggravated
battery beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 38 Defendant asserts, however, that the State failed to carry its burden of proof because none
of Carthron’s testimony can be believed. In support, he points to the fact that Carthron was
intoxicated at the time of the altercation, having consumed a pint of whiskey and 40 ounces of
beer during the previous 12 hours. According to defendant, “[Carthron’s] level of intoxication
alone renders her entire version of the events incredible.” In defendant’s view, nothing about
Carthron’s description of what occurred in his apartment on November 1 and 2, 2011, can be
believed. This assertion is without merit.
¶ 39 Initially, we reject defendant’s claim that all of Carthron’s testimony is entirely incredible
for the simple and obvious reason that several aspects of her testimony are corroborated by
defendant’s own version of events. Defendant and Carthron both testified that she came over at
about 7 p.m. on November 1, they consumed alcoholic beverages and listened to music
together until about 11 p.m., when defendant received a telephone call from Moore, the
physical altercation occurred at about 7 a.m. on November 2, and Carthron had a stab wound
on her back when she left defendant’s apartment. Also, defendant admitted that he cut
Carthron’s back with a knife but claimed he did so in self-defense, and he acknowledged that
he may have cut her chest with the knife as he was pushing her onto the floor. Given that
defendant corroborated these facts, we consider whether the remaining portions of Carthron’s
testimony are unworthy of belief and must be disregarded because she was intoxicated.
¶ 40 Evidence that a witness was drinking near the time of an event about which she testifies is
probative of the witness’s sensory capacity (People v. Di Maso, 100 Ill. App. 3d 338, 343
(1981)) and affects the weight to be given her testimony (People v. McGuire, 18 Ill. 2d 257,
259 (1960)). However, the fact that a witness had been drinking alcohol or was drunk does not
necessarily preclude the trier of fact from finding the witness credible. People v. Bradford, 194
Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1046-47 (1990); People v. Vandiver, 127 Ill. App. 3d 63, 67 (1984).
¶ 41 Here, the jury was well aware of the amount of alcohol Carthron had consumed at
defendant’s apartment and that she was still drunk at 7 a.m. The assessment of Carthron’s
credibility was properly a question for the jury, which had the opportunity to view her
testimony first hand at trial.
¶ 42 Contrary to defendant’s argument, this court’s decision in People v. Pellegrino, 30 Ill. 2d
331 (1964), does not mandate that the jury’s determination of Carthron’s credibility be
overturned. In Pellegrino, the evidence indicated that the defendant and two other men were
present during the beating of the deceased. Id. at 332-34. One eyewitness identified both of the
two other men, in turn, before finally naming defendant as the person responsible for the fatal
beating, and she did so only after being informed that she was to be charged as an accessory to
the murder. Id. at 332-33. A second eyewitness also identified defendant as the person who
beat the deceased. Id. at 333. However, she further admitted that on the night of the murder she
was in the fourth week of a seven-week period of drunkenness and that, although she had not
consumed alcohol that night, her prior drunkenness had affected her ability to walk a distance
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of five feet and her ability to recognize a person who was standing three feet away. Id. at
333-34. This court found that the evidence of the defendant’s participation in the fatal beating
of the deceased was so unsatisfactory as to require reversal of his conviction. Id. at 334-35.
¶ 43 In this case, it is undisputed that defendant and Carthron were the only two people present
in the apartment, and defendant admitted that he cut Carthron’s back with the knife and that he
may have cut her chest while pushing her to the floor. Given that Pellegrino involved a
question of identification and was premised on facts that are vastly different from those
presented here, it does not require that defendant’s conviction be reversed.
¶ 44 In asserting that Carthron’s version of events cannot be credited, defendant claims that her
intoxication caused her not to remember being stabbed by defendant or whether she had bitten
him on the chest. However, neither of these memory lapses mandates that Carthron’s
testimony be wholly disregarded. Carthron testified that defendant choked her until she passed
out and that she discovered the knife wound on her chest after she regained consciousness and
discovered the wound on her back later at her daughter’s apartment. This evidence would
support a reasonable inference that defendant stabbed Carthron while she was unconscious,
causing her to have no memory of the stabbing. Also, Carthron acknowledged that she was
“kind of drunk” and did not remember biting defendant or what was said on November 2. The
jury found Carthron’s testimony credible even though she acknowledged that she did not recall
certain portions of what transpired that morning.
¶ 45 Defendant further asserts that Carthron did not remember whether defendant choked her or
whether they had an argument that morning. However, these assertions are not supported by
the record. Carthron testified clearly and positively that defendant put his hands around her
neck and choked her until she passed out, and she reported the choking to Detective Williams
on the same day that it occurred. The fact that Carthron conveyed that information to Williams
during their second interview at the police station, and not during the first interview at the
hospital, does not support the contention that she did not recall being choked by defendant.
Carthron’s trial testimony that she and defendant argued about Moore’s telephone call was
similarly clear and positive. Moreover, Carthron’s version of events was supported by the
photographic evidence showing scratches and nail marks on her neck and by Detective Scott,
who interviewed defendant on November 2, 2011. During that interview, defendant stated he
had a verbal altercation with Carthron about his girlfriend and that the verbal altercation then
became physical.
¶ 46 Defendant also points to the fact that certain portions of Carthron’s testimony were
inconsistent with her prior statements. In particular, defendant asserts that Carthron’s
recollection of the timing of the altercation was confused because she told Williams that she
woke up at 1:30 a.m. and was bleeding from her side and saw defendant with a knife. Yet
Williams’s testimony in this regard was tentative, and she qualified her account of Carthron’s
statement with the phrase “I believe it was.” Defendant further relies on the fact that Carthron
testified during a preliminary hearing that she did not know whether she and defendant had
argued before “the incident.” Given that Carthron and defendant were together for
approximately 12 hours and that the reference to “the incident” was never specifically defined
at trial, Carthron’s prior testimony at the preliminary hearing was not directly inconsistent with
her trial testimony.
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¶ 47 Moreover, even contradictory testimony does not necessarily destroy the credibility of a
witness, and it is the task of the trier of fact to determine when, if at all, she testified truthfully.
Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 283 (citing Sparling v. Peabody Coal Co., 59 Ill. 2d 491, 498-99
(1974)). Thus, the fact-finder is charged with deciding “how flaws in part of the testimony
affect the credibility of the whole.” Id. Minor discrepancies in testimony affect only its weight
and will not render it unworthy of belief. People v. Burgos, 243 Ill. App. 3d 993, 1001 (1993).
In addition, where inconsistencies in testimony relate to collateral matters, they need not
render the testimony of the witness as to material questions incredible or improbable. Id. at
1001-02. Here, there is nothing in the record indicating that the alleged inconsistencies cited by
defendant render the whole of Carthron’s testimony unworthy of belief. See Cunningham, 212
Ill. 2d at 284.
¶ 48 We similarly reject defendant’s claim that Carthron’s actions immediately after the
altercation rendered her entire story “utterly implausible.” Defendant argues that Carthron’s
conduct in walking past police officers without requesting help and traveling 30 minutes on
two buses to reach her daughter’s apartment was “contrary to the laws of nature or universal
human experience.” See People v. Coulson, 13 Ill. 2d 290, 297 (1958). Yet Carthron’s reasons
for taking these actions were fully explored at trial. Carthron explained that she did not request
help from the police because she knew they had been called by defendant and she did not know
what story he had told them. She further explained that she was thinking only about getting to
her daughter’s house so she could get help and that she was not aware of the full extent of her
injuries. In light of this evidence, Carthron’s conduct after the altercation does not undermine
her credibility or render her version of events incredible on its face. Consequently, the jury
reasonably could have accepted Carthron’s explanation, and the record does not compel the
conclusion that her testimony is entirely unworthy of belief.
¶ 49 Finally, defendant argues that the State failed to prove that he was not acting in
self-defense when he stabbed Carthron with a knife. We disagree.
¶ 50 Self-defense is an affirmative defense, and once it is raised, the State has the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense, in addition to
proving the elements of the charged offense. People v. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d 218, 224 (2004).
Self-defense includes the following elements: (1) unlawful force threatened against a person,
(2) the person threatened was not the aggressor, (3) the danger of harm was imminent, (4) the
use of force was necessary, (5) the person threatened actually and subjectively believed a
danger existed that required the use of the force applied, and (6) the beliefs of the person
threatened were objectively reasonable. 720 ILCS 5/7-1 (West 2010); accord Lee, 213 Ill. 2d at
225 (enumerating elements). If the State negates any one of these elements, the defendant’s
claim of self-defense necessarily fails. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d at 225.
¶ 51 In deciding a claim of self-defense, it is the function of the jury to assess the credibility of
the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the
evidence. Id. It is also incumbent on the jury to resolve conflicts or inconsistencies in the
evidence. Id. The standard of review is whether, after considering the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. Id.
¶ 52 Defendant admitted that he cut Carthron’s back with a knife, but he claimed that he did so
in self-defense because she was biting him. Defendant claims that, because he was not
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obligated to measure the precise amount of force he used to protect himself from Carthron, the
State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting in self-defense. This
argument is unavailing where defendant admitted that Carthron’s bite never broke the skin and
that she never attacked him with a knife. Based on these admissions and the undisputed
evidence that defendant was 6 feet tall and weighed about 165 pounds, while Carthron was 5
feet, 4 inches tall and weighed about 125 pounds, the jury reasonably could have drawn the
inference that the force used by defendant was not necessary. Accordingly, the jury could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not acting in self-defense when he
stabbed Carthron with a knife.
¶ 53 Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, coupled with the
reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, we conclude that a rational trier of fact
could have found defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. For the foregoing reasons, we
hold that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove defendant guilty of two counts of
aggravated domestic battery and one count of aggravated battery beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 54 B. As-Applied Substantive Due Process
¶ 55 The appellate court agreed with defendant that the definition of family or household
members provided by section 12-0.1 of the Criminal Code violated substantive due process as
applied to him. Before this court, the State contends that the application of this statutory
definition to defendant’s circumstances constituted a reasonable exercise of the State’s police
power.
¶ 56 We initially observe that the appellate court did not indicate whether its holding was based
on the state due process clause, the federal due process clause, or both. Before this court, the
State makes the same omission in its argument. Although defendant cites both the federal and
state due process clauses, he does not argue that the state due process clause provides greater
protection than that provided by the federal constitution. Absent any argument to the contrary,
we find no compelling reason to construe the state due process clause independently of its
federal counterpart with regard to defendant’s substantive due process claim. See In re M.A.,
2015 IL 118049, ¶ 53.
¶ 57 Our review of this issue is guided by familiar principles. Statutes are presumed
constitutional, and the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of
clearly establishing its invalidity. A court must construe a statute so as to uphold its
constitutionality if reasonably possible. The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law
subject to de novo review. Id. ¶ 21; People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 595-96 (2006).
¶ 58 We further observe that defendant did not challenge the facial constitutionality of the
statutory definition of family or household members but rather only as that definition was
applied to his case. A statute is facially invalid only if there is no set of circumstances under
which the statute would be valid. In contrast, an “as-applied” challenge protests against how a
statute was applied in the particular context in which the challenging party acted or proposed to
act. Accordingly, in an as-applied challenge, the challenging party’s particular facts and
circumstances become relevant. M.A., 2015 IL 118049, ¶¶ 39-40; Napleton v. Village of
Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 305-06 (2008). “An as-applied challenge requires a showing that the
statute violates the constitution as it applies to the facts and circumstances of the challenging
party.” People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 36; see Hegwood v. City of Eau Claire, 676
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F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2012) (“When we are confronted with an as-applied challenge, we
examine the facts of the case before us exclusively, and not any set of hypothetical facts under
which the statute might be unconstitutional.”). While a successful facial attack voids the statute
in its entirety and in all applications, a successful as-applied challenge enjoins enforcement of
the statute only against the challenging party. M.A., 2015 IL 118049, ¶¶ 39-40; Napleton, 229
Ill. 2d at 305-06.
¶ 59 Pursuant to the State’s police power, the legislature has broad discretion to define offenses
and prescribe aggravating factors and penalties for offenses. People v. Coleman, 111 Ill. 2d 87,
96 (1986); accord People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 205 (1984) (“The legislature has the power
to declare and define conduct constituting a crime and to determine the nature and extent of
punishment for it.”). However, this legislative discretion is limited by the constitutional
guarantee of substantive due process, which provides that a person may not be deprived of
liberty without due process of law. People v. Madrigal, 241 Ill. 2d 463, 466 (2011); People v.
Reed, 148 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1992).
¶ 60 In the case at bar, defendant does not claim that the statutory definition of a family or
household member deprives him of a fundamental constitutional right. When a challenged
statute does not affect a fundamental constitutional right, the appropriate test for determining
its constitutionality is the rational basis test. A statute will be upheld under the rational basis
test if the statute bears a reasonable relationship to the public interest to be served and the
means adopted are a reasonable method of achieving the desired objective. Madrigal, 241 Ill.
2d at 466; People v. Williams, 235 Ill. 2d 178, 205 (2009). In other words, a statute will be
upheld if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose and is neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory. Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d 106, 122 (2004).
¶ 61 While not “toothless,” the rational basis test is highly deferential. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 596.
A court is not concerned with the wisdom of the statute or with whether it is the best means to
achieve the legislature’s desired result. Village of Lake Villa, 211 Ill. 2d at 125-26. “The
judgments made by the legislature in crafting a statute are not subject to courtroom fact-finding
and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”
Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003). If there is any conceivable basis for
determining that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, the law must be
upheld. Village of Lake Villa, 211 Ill. 2d at 126; People ex rel. Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d
117, 124 (1998).
¶ 62 In applying the rational basis test, a court must first ascertain the purpose of the statute to
determine whether the statute’s provisions reasonably implement that purpose. M.A., 2015 IL
118049, ¶ 55. In the case at bar, the appellate court observed that “the State has an interest in
preventing abuse between persons who share an intimate relationship.” 2016 IL App (1st)
134012, ¶ 47. This observation has generated argument before this court as to the scope of the
statutory purpose. However, the legislative purpose is manifest. “The legislature’s obvious
concern in enacting the domestic battery statute was in curbing the serious problem of
domestic violence.” People v. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d 394, 402-03 (2005). Also, the parties agree,
as the defendant in Wilson conceded, that “the threat of domestic violence does not end when a
relationship ends.” Id. at 403.
¶ 63 We must next determine whether the domestic battery statute bears a rational relationship
to the public interest in curbing domestic violence. As noted earlier, the statutory scheme under
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which defendant was charged was amended effective July 1, 2011. Pub. Act 96-1551, § 5 (eff.
July 1, 2011). Defendant was charged with aggravated domestic battery, which requires the
commission of the predicate offense of domestic battery. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a), (a-5) (West
2010). In turn, a person commits domestic battery if he or she knowingly, without legal
justification, and by any means causes bodily harm to, or makes insulting or provoking
physical contact with, “any family or household member.” 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West
2010). Further, section 12-0.1 of the Criminal Code provides, in relevant part, the following
definition: “ ‘Family or household members’ include *** persons who have or have had a
dating or engagement relationship. *** For purposes of this Article, neither a casual
acquaintanceship nor ordinary fraternization between 2 individuals in business or social
contexts shall be deemed to constitute a dating relationship.” (Emphasis added). 720 ILCS
5/12-0.1 (West 2010). By its plain language, “[t]he statute is very clear that there is no time
limit.” Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d at 402.
¶ 64 Unable to identify “any objective that would be furthered by treating Carthron as
defendant’s family or household member,” the appellate court concluded that treating Carthron
as defendant’s family or household member was not reasonably related to a public interest.
2016 IL App (1st) 134012, ¶ 47. We disagree with this conclusion. Rather, we agree with the
State and supporting amici that the absence of a time limit on former dating relationships, as
applied to the instant case, was reasonable and rationally related to the statutory purpose of
curbing domestic violence.
¶ 65 The legislature could rationally have believed that persons who have had a dating
relationship are more likely to batter a former partner even after their dating relationship ends.
The absence of a time limit on former dating relationships recognizes that such relationships
may render persons more vulnerable to abuse by former romantic partners. Indeed, not only is
this rational basis conceivable, it is generally recognized. See Jennifer L. Hardesty & Grace H.
Chung, Intimate Partner Violence, Parental Divorce, and Child Custody: Directions for
Intervention and Future Research, 55 Fam. Rel. 200, 201 (2006) (stating that violence often
continues and sometimes escalates after women leave abusive partners and that separation is
linked with a woman’s risk of being killed by an intimate partner); Ruth E. Fleury, Cris M.
Sullivan, & Deborah I. Bybee, When Ending the Relationship Doesn’t End the Violence:
Women’s Experiences of Violence by Former Partners, 6 Violence Against Women 1363,
1364 (2000) (same). As one scholar has explained:
“One reason violence in a relationship differs from random violence between
strangers is that the perpetrator takes advantage of the relationship to gain access to the
victim. Relationships built on close personal interactions inevitably involve parties
gaining information about each other. *** Such knowledge enables the accessibility
that makes domestic violence most harmful, as it increases the victim’s exposure and
vulnerability to the abuser. Therefore, accessibility and familiarity between abuser and
victim can make violence between the two particularly problematic. *** Also, when
the relationship comes to an end, the abuser may still exploit the relationship,
continuing to access the victim, carrying on the abusive and controlling behavior.”
Orly Rachmilovitz, Bringing Down the Bedroom Walls: Emphasizing Substance Over
Form in Personalized Abuse, 14 William & Mary J. Women & L. 495, 500-01 (2008).
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In other words, accessibility and familiarity enable domestic violence to be ongoing and to
effectively intimidate and control the victim. Id. at 501.
¶ 66 Applying this generally accepted rational basis to the circumstances of the case at bar, it is
reasonable to regard defendant and Carthron as family or household members for purposes of
the domestic battery statute. Defendant and Carthron had known each other for 20 years, and
their families were neighbors. Even though their two-year dating relationship had ended 15
years earlier, they continued to see each other, and their relationship remained close. Carthron
left her clothes at defendant’s apartment and sometimes spent the night with defendant. The
night before the stabbing, defendant and Carthron spent the evening drinking and talking.
Indeed, the argument that led to the stabbing began when defendant accepted a telephone call
from another woman in Carthron’s presence, which she considered to be “disrespectful.” That
night, defendant and Carthron spent the night together. Further, defendant referred to Carthron
as his “girlfriend” to the 911 operator. The record demonstrates a level of accessibility and
familiarity between Carthron and defendant such that it is reasonable to place Carthron within
the protection of the aggravated domestic battery statute.
¶ 67 We conclude that the legislature’s decision not to include a time limit on former dating
relationships, when applied to the facts of the instant case, was reasonable and rationally
related to the statutory purpose of curbing domestic violence. Accordingly, we hold that the
definition of family or household members in section 12-0.1 of the Criminal Code did not
violate substantive due process as applied to defendant.2
¶ 68 Finally, we observe that the appellate court did not address all of the issues that defendant
presented to that court because it considered the substantive due process issue to be dispositive.
2016 IL App (1st) 134012, ¶ 49. Therefore, we remand the cause to the appellate court for
consideration of defendant’s remaining contentions. See, e.g., People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d
311, 339 (2010).
¶ 69 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 70 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the cause is
remanded to the appellate court for further proceedings.
¶ 71 Reversed and remanded.
In light of our holding, we need not address the State’s alternative argument that defendant’s
2
aggravated domestic battery convictions should be reduced to aggravated battery. See, e.g., In re M.M.,
2016 IL 119932, ¶ 31.
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