Fast Horse v. United States

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FILED

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No. 17-1776C (Pro Se) U.S. COURT OF

(Filed: February 6, 2018 | Not for Publication) FEDERAL CLAIMS

Keywords: Pro Se Plaintiff; Subject

LAVERN CHARLES FAST HORSE, Matter Jurisdiction; 42 U.S.C. $ 1983;

Clarton Antitrust Act: RICO.

Plaintiff,

THE T'NITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

Lavern Charles Fast Horse,Indiart Springs, NV, pro se.

Mark E. Porada, Trial Attomey, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S.

Department of Justice, Washington, DC, with whom were Claudia Burke, Assistant

Dtrector, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, ard Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant

Attomey General, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

KAPLAN, Judge.

Plaintiff Lavem Charles Fast Horse is a member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe and an

inmate at the Southem Desert Correctional Center in Nevada. In this case, acting pro se,

Mr. Fast Horse has filed a complaint which asserts, among other things, that the Vatican

"provides the United States . . . with fi:nds" that Mr. Fast Horse believes belong to hirn

and also that he is owed money on unspecified bonds issued pursuant to the protocols

established by the Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures (CUSIP).

See Compl. at 3, Docket No. 1. He requests "a complete forensic auditing" ofhis bonds,

id. at 4, and asserts claims against the United States tnder 42 U.S.C. g 1983; section 4 of

the Clalton Antitrust Act, 15 U .S.C. $ 15; and the Racketeer Influenced and Comrpt

Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. $$ 1961-68. See Compl. at 3. In addition, citing

United States v. Brienoni-Ponce,422 U.5.873 (197 5), he requests an award of

compensatory damages against the federal govemment for being "part ofthis Ponce

scheme." Compl. at 3. Finally, Mr. Fast Horse asks for awards of compensatory and

punitive damages against any previous penal institution in which he has been

incarcerated. Id. at 4.

The govemment has filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Fast Horse's complaint for lack

ofjurisdiction in accordance with Rule 12(b)(1) ofRules of the Courr ofFederal Claims

(RCFC). For the reasons set forth below. the qovemment's motion is GRANTED.

70t h 3Bl,E 0000 trl08 36b0

DISCUSSION

In deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court

accepts as true all undisputed facts in the pleadings and draws all reasonable inferences in

favor ofthe plaintiff. Trusted Integration. Inc. v. United States,659 F.3d 1159, I 163

(Fed. cir. 201 1). The court may "inquire into jurisdictional facts" to determine whether il

has jurisdiction. Rocovich v. United States,933 F.2d991,993 (Fed. Cir. l99l). It is well

established that complaints that are filed by pro se plaintiffs, like this one, are held to

"less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kemer,

404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Nonetheless, even pro se plaintiffs must persuade the court

that jurisdictional requirements have been met. Bemard v. United States,59 Fed,. C|.497

499,af?d,98 F. App'x 860 (Fed. Cir.2004).

Pursuant to the Tucker Act, the United States Court ofFederal Claims has

jurisdiction to "renderjudgment upon any claim against the united States founded either

upon the Constitution, or any Act ofCongress or any regulation ofan executive

department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for

liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.',28 U.S.C. $ 1491(a)

(2012). The Tucker Act serves as a waiver of sovereign immunity and ajurisdictional

grant, but it does not create a substantive cause ofaction. Jan's Helicopter Serv.. Inc. v.

Fed. Aviation Admin. , 525 F .3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008). A plaintiff, therefore, must

establish that "a separate source of substantive law . . . creates the right to money

damages." Id. (quoting Fisher v. United States ,402F.3d 1167, It72 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en

banc in relevant part)).

As described above, Mr. Fast Horse seeks unspecified damages based on section

1983, the clayton Act, and RICO. But this court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate

claims brought under g 1983. Johnson v. United States, No. 9Z-5107, 1988 WL 39162, at

*2 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 3 1998) (per curiam); Lowe v. United

States, 76 Fed. CI.262,266

(2007) ("[T]he United States Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over

claims arising under 42 U.S.c.$ 1983 and may not adjudicate plaintiff s claims arising

thereunder."). Nor does this court possess jurisdiction over antitrust claims brought

under the clayton Act because that Act specifically provides that a plaintiff may hle such

a claim only "in any district court of the United States in the district in which the

defendant resides or is found or has an agent.,, 15 U.S.C. g l5(a); see also Estate of Grant

v. unired stares, 134 Fed. Cl. 348, 357-58 (2017) (.,[C]laims under the clayton Act are

outside the Court's jurisdiction because they are committed to the district courts.,,);

Kabando v. United States, No. 14-562C, 2014 WL 4ZSL54B, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 28,

2014) (dismissing antitrust claims for lack ofjurisdiction).

Mr. Fast Horse's claims predicated on RICO are also not within this Court's

jurisdiction. Rather, subject matter jurisdiction over RICo claims is vested in united

States district courts. See l8 u.s.c. $ 1965(a) ("Any civil action or proceeding under this

chapter against any person may be instituted in the district court ofthe united states for

any district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his

affairs."); see also Barth v. United States, No. l7-635C, 2017 WL 2572379, at *3 (Fed.

cl. Jnne 14,2017) ("[T]his court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims related to

violations ofthe Racketeer Influenced and comrpt organizations Act. . . . Stanwvck

);

v. United States,l27 Fed. cl. 308, 315 (2016) ('tpllaintiff s claims based on RICO and

other criminal code provisions are not within our subject-matter jurisdiction.").

Fast Horse's apparent allegation

,United

. Y.states implicates the Supreme

that the RICO conspiracy involving the

court's decision in Brignoni-ponce is of io help in

establishing this court's jurisdiction. That case involved a Fourth Amendment challenee

to motor vehicle stops by border patrol agents made without suspicion ofwrongdoing.

See 422 U.S. at87415. This court does not possess jurisdiction over claims seeking-

damages based on the Fourth Amendment. see Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621,

623 (Fed. cir. 1997) ("Because monetary damages are not available for a Fourth

Amendment violation, the court of Federal claims does not have iurisdiction over a such

a violation.").

Mr' Fast Horse's complaint also contains what appear to be claims against several

popes and other vatican officials, as well as private parties and state and local

entities

that he identifies as "previous penal institutions" in which he was apparently previously

incarcerated. The court does not possess jurisdiction to consider cliims based on

allegations ofmisconduct by foreign govemments and their agents, because the court

only has jurisdiction to hear claims against the united States. See. e.g., Gharb v. united

States, No. 13-89C, 2013 WL 6383083, at *l n.l (Fed. Cl. Dec. e, ZOif y a*,

1"O.,..*rt

not have jurisdiction over . . . claims against foreign govemments.',). It similarly lacks

jurisdiction over claims brought against private parties. See e.g., Thomoson

v. united

States, 99 Fed. cl. 21,25 (201 1) (the court "does not have iurisdiction orr", plaintiff.'

breach ofcontract and llaud allegations against private parties"). And claims against

state

and local governrnent entities are also outside of this court,s jurisdiction. See irukowski

v. united states, 129 Fed. c|.440,443 (2016) (dismissing complaint ass.rtl"g-tuir -

against local govemment officials for lack ofjurisdiction).

Finally, as discussed above, Mr. Fast Horse requests a forensic accounting of the

unidentified bonds. The court of Federal claims, howiver, lacks jurisdiction to g-rant

such equitable reliefabsent a "concurrent colorable claim for monetary recovery.',

Wheeler v. United States, 1l F.3d 156, 159 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting bobula v. U.S.

Dep't ofJustice,970 F.2d 854, 859 (Fed. Cir. tl92;;; see aiso

lqrqe5 vJgaklgla, 159 F.ld

573' 580 (Fed. cir. 1998) (holding that the "court ofFederal claims has no po*er to

grant affirmative non-monetary reliefunless it is tied and subordinate to a money

judgment" (quotation omitted)).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the govemment's motion to dismiss is GRANTED and

the complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ELAINE D. KAPLAN

Judge