In Re: Adoption of: M.M.L.R., a Minor

J-S01041-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: M.M.L.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

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APPEAL OF: K.L.A. & P.O.R., :

NATURAL PARENTS : No. 1322 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree Entered July 27, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 2017-0072

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: C.J.I.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

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APPEAL OF: K.L.A. AND P.O.R., :

NATURAL PARENTS : No. 1323 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree Entered July 27, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 2017-0084

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED FEBRUARY 06, 2018

Appellant’s, K.L.A. (“Mother”) and P.O.R. (“Father”), appeal from the

decrees entered in the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans

Court Division, which granted the petitions of the York County Offices of

Children Youth and Families (“CYF”) for involuntary termination of Mother

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and Father’s parental rights to their minor children, M.M.L.R. and C.J.I.R.

(“Children”) and changed the goal for M.M.L.R. to adoption. We affirm.

In May 2016, Children Youth and Families (“CYF”) received a referral

about M.M.L.R. At birth, M.M.L.R. was placed on a feeding tube and hospital

staff immediately had concerns about parents’ ability to feed and care for

the child. CYF obtained an emergency protective custody order on May 23,

2016, and the court ordered M.M.L.R. placed in foster care when released

from the hospital. CYF visited the home, which was in deplorable condition.

On May 26, 2016, the court held a shelter care hearing and awarded

legal and physical custody of M.M.L.R. to CYF. The court adjudicated

M.M.L.R. dependent on July 27, 2016. While the proceedings were ongoing,

Mother became pregnant and gave birth to parents’ second child, C.J.I.R.

C.J.I.R. was immediately placed in the same foster home as M.M.L.R. and

adjudicated dependent on May 5, 2017. CYF filed a petition for a goal

change and for involuntary termination of parents’ parental rights to

M.M.L.R. on May 4, 2017; on June 1, 2017, CYF filed a petition for

involuntary termination of parents’ parental rights to C.J.I.R. The court held

a termination hearing on July 19, 2017. At the conclusion of the hearing,

the court entered separate decrees (filed July 27, 2017) granting involuntary

termination of parents’ parental rights to Children. On August 2, 2017, the

court changed the goal of M.M.L.R. to adoption. The initial goal for C.J.I.R.

was adoption, so there was no goal change ordered for C.J.I.R. Parents

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timely filed notices of appeal from the termination decrees at No. 1322 MDA

2017 regarding M.M.L.R. and at No. 1323 MDA 2017 regarding C.J.I.R.

Parents also filed Rule 1925 statements on August 23, 2017. On August 24,

2017, Parents timely filed a notice of appeal from the goal change order

regarding M.M.L.R. at No. 1329 MDA 2017, with a Rule 1925 statement. On

September 14, 2017, this Court sua sponte consolidated the termination

appeals at Nos. 1322 and 1323 MDA 2017, at journal number J-S01041-18,

and listed the related goal-change appeal consecutively at journal number J-

S01042-18. Nevertheless, Parents raise identical issues in both cases.

Parents raise four issues for our review:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CHANGING THE

GOAL FROM REUNIFICATION TO ADOPTION?

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING THE

PARENTAL RIGHTS OF MOTHER AND FATHER PURSUANT

TO SECTIONS 2511(A)(1), (2), (5) AND (8) OF THE

ADOPTION ACT?

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING

THAT TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WOULD BEST

SERVE THE NEEDS AND WELFARE OF THE CHILDREN

PURSUANT TO SECTION 2511(B) OF THE ADOPTION ACT?

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING THE

PARENTAL RIGHTS OF MOTHER AND FATHER IN LIGHT OF

THE AGE OF THE MINOR CHILDREN?

(Parents’ Brief at 14).

On appeal, goal change decisions are subject to an abuse of discretion

standard of review. In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822 (Pa.Super. 2006).

In order to conclude that the trial court abused its

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discretion, we must determine that the court’s judgment

was manifestly unreasonable, that the court did not apply

the law, or that the court’s action was a result of partiality,

prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the record. We are

bound by the trial court’s findings of fact that have support

in the record. The trial court, not the appellate court, is

charged with the responsibilities of evaluating credibility of

the witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the testimony.

In carrying out these responsibilities, the trial court is free

to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. When the

trial court’s findings are supported by competent evidence

of record, we will affirm, even if the record could also

support an opposite result.

Id. at 822-23 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

The Juvenile Act controls the disposition of dependent children. In re

R.P., 957 A.2d 1205, 1217 (Pa.Super. 2008). Section 6351 provides in

relevant part:

§ 6351. Disposition of dependent child

* * *

(f) Matters to be determined at permanency

hearing.—At each permanency hearing, a court shall

determine all of the following:

(1) The continuing necessity for and

appropriateness of the placement.

(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of

compliance with the permanency plan developed for

the child.

(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating

the circumstances which necessitated the original

placement.

(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the

current placement goal for the child.

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(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for

the child might be achieved.

(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to

finalize the permanency plan in effect.

(6) Whether the child is safe.

* * *

(9) If the child has been in placement for at least

15 of the last 22 months or the court has determined

that aggravated circumstances exist and that

reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need

to remove the child from the child’s parent, guardian

or custodian or to preserve and reunify the family

need not be made or continue to be made, whether

the county agency has filed or sought to join a

petition to terminate parental rights and to identify,

recruit, process and approve a qualified family to

adopt the child unless:

(i) the child is being cared for by a relative

best suited to the physical, mental and moral

welfare of the child;

(ii) the county agency has documented a

compelling reason for determining that filing a

petition to terminate parental rights would not

serve the needs and welfare of the child; or

(iii) the child’s family has not been provided

with necessary services to achieve the safe

return to the child’s parent, guardian or

custodian within the time frames set forth in the

permanency plan.

* * *

(f.1) Additional determination.—Based upon the

determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant

evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall

determine one of the following:

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(1) If and when the child will be returned to the

child’s parent, guardian or custodian in cases where

the return of the child is best suited to the safety,

protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of

the child.

(2) If and when the child will be placed for

adoption, and the county agency will file for

termination of parental rights in cases where return

to the child’s parent, guardian or custodian is not

best suited to the safety, protection and physical,

mental and moral welfare of the child.

(3) If and when the child will be placed with a legal

custodian in cases where the return to the child’s

parent, guardian or custodian or being placed for

adoption is not best suited to the safety, protection

and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.

(4) If and when the child will be placed with a fit

and willing relative in cases where return to the

child’s parent, guardian or custodian, being placed

for adoption or being placed with a legal custodian is

not best suited to the safety, protection and physical,

mental and moral welfare of the child.

* * *

(f.2) Evidence.—Evidence of conduct by the parent that

places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk,

including evidence of the use of alcohol or a controlled

substance that places the health, safety or welfare of the

child at risk, shall be presented to the court by the county

agency or any other party at any disposition or

permanency hearing whether or not the conduct was the

basis for the determination of dependency.

(g) Court order.—On the basis of the determination

made under subsection (f.1), the court shall order the

continuation, modification or termination of placement or

other disposition which is best suited to the safety,

protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the

child.

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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f), (f.1), (f.2), (g).

“When the child welfare agency has made reasonable efforts to return

a [dependent] child to [the child’s] biological parent, but those efforts have

failed, then the agency must redirect its efforts towards placing the child in

an adoptive home.” In re N.C., supra at 823 (citing In re G.P.-R., 851

A.2d 967, 973 (Pa.Super. 2004)).

Although the agency has the burden to show a goal change

would serve the child’s best interests, “[s]afety,

permanency, and well-being of the child must take

precedence over all other considerations” under Section

6351. In re D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1227 (Pa.Super. 2009),

appeal denied, 601 Pa. 702, 973 A.2d 1007 (2009)

(emphasis in original); In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 978

(Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 782, 959 A.2d

320 (2008). “[T]he parent’s rights are secondary” in a

goal change proceeding. In re D.P., supra.

Because the focus is on the child’s best interests, a goal

change to adoption might be appropriate, even when a

parent substantially complies with a reunification plan. In

re N.C., supra at 826-27. Where a parent’s “skills,

including her judgment with regard to the emotional well-

being of her children, remain problematic[,]” a goal change

to adoption might be appropriate, regardless of the

parent’s compliance with a permanency plan. Id. at 825.

The agency is not required to offer services indefinitely,

where a parent is unable to properly apply the instruction

provided. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa.Super.

2002). See also In re S.B., supra at 981 (giving priority

to child’s safety and stability, despite parent’s substantial

compliance with permanency plan); In re A.P., 728 A.2d

375, 379 (Pa.Super. 1999), appeal denied, 560 Pa. 693,

743 A.2d 912 (1999) (holding where, despite willingness,

parent cannot meet “irreducible minimum parental

responsibilities, the needs of the child must prevail over

the rights of the parent”). Thus, even where the parent

makes earnest efforts, the “court cannot and will not

subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and

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stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the

future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513

(Pa.Super. 2006).

In re R.M.G., 997 A.2d 339, 347 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 608 Pa.

648, 12 A.3d 372 (2010) (some internal citations and quotation marks

omitted).

Appellate review of termination of parental rights cases implicates the

following principles:

In cases involving termination of parental rights: “our

standard of review is limited to determining whether the

order of the trial court is supported by competent

evidence, and whether the trial court gave adequate

consideration to the effect of such a decree on the welfare

of the child.”

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J., 972

A.2d 5, 8 (Pa.Super. 2009)).

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or

insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s

decision, the decree must stand. … We must

employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record

in order to determine whether the trial court’s

decision is supported by competent evidence.

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en

banc), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004)

(internal citations omitted).

Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the

finder of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility

of witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be

resolved by the finder of fact. The burden of proof is

on the party seeking termination to establish by

clear and convincing evidence the existence of

grounds for doing so.

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In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super.

2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

The standard of clear and convincing evidence means

testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing

as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,

without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

In re J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). We

may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis

exists for the result reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197,

1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). If the court’s findings

are supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the

court’s decision, even if the record could support an

opposite result. In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191-92

(Pa.Super. 2004).

In re Z.P., supra at 1115-16 (quoting In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d

1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d

1165 (2008)).

CYF filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Parents’ parental

rights to Children on the following grounds:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General Rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to a

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the

following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of

at least six months immediately preceding the filing

of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose

of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has

refused or failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child

to be without essential parental care, control or

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental

well-being and the conditions and causes of the

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will

not be remedied by the parent.

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* * *

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement

with an agency for a period of at least six months,

the conditions which led to the removal or placement

of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or

will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable

period of time, the services or assistance reasonably

available to the parent are not likely to remedy the

conditions which led to the removal or placement of

the child within a reasonable period of time and

termination of the parental rights would best serve

the needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed

from the date of removal or placement, the

conditions which led to the removal or placement of

the child continue to exist and termination of

parental rights would best serve the needs and

welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating

the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to

the developmental, physical and emotional needs and

welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be

terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors

such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing

and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the

parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). “Parental rights

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may be involuntarily terminated where any one subsection of Section

2511(a) is satisfied, along with consideration of the subsection 2511(b)

provisions.” In re Z.P., supra at 1117.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The

party seeking termination must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the

statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section

2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s

conduct warrants termination of [the parent’s] parental

rights does the court engage in the second part of the

analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best

interests of the child.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

Termination under Section 2511(a)(1) involves the following:

To satisfy the requirements of [S]ection 2511(a)(1), the

moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence

of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to

the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a

settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a

refusal or failure to perform parental duties. In addition,

Section 2511 does not require that the parent

demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing

parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to

perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights

may be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if

the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of

relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to

perform parental duties.

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights,

the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the

parent’s explanation for [the parent’s] conduct; (2) the

post-abandonment contact between parent and child; and

(3) consideration of the effect of termination of parental

rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).

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In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations

omitted). Regarding the six-month period prior to filing the termination

petition:

[T]he trial court must consider the whole history of a given

case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory

provision. The court must examine the individual

circumstances of each case and consider all explanations

offered by the parent facing termination of [the parent’s]

parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the

totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the

involuntary termination.

In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa.

718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted).

The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section

2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not

limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include

acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re

A.L.D., supra at 337. “Parents are required to make diligent efforts

towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.”

Id. at 340. The fundamental test in termination of parental rights under

Section 2511(a)(2) was long ago stated in the case of In re Geiger, 459 Pa.

636, 331 A.2d 172 (1975), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

announced that under what is now Section 2511(a)(2), “the petitioner for

involuntary termination must prove (1) repeated and continued incapacity,

abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal

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caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or

subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or

refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In Interest of Lilley, 719 A.2d

327, 330 (Pa.Super. 1998).

“Termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(5) requires

that: (1) the child has been removed from parental care for at least six

months; (2) the conditions which led to removal and placement of the child

continue to exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the

needs and welfare of the child.” In re Z.P., supra at 1118.

“[T]o terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8), the following

factors must be demonstrated: (1) [t]he child has been removed from

parental care for 12 months or more from the date of removal; (2) the

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to

exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and

welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76

(Pa.Super. 2003). “Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12–month time frame for a

parent to remedy the conditions that led to the children's removal by the

court.” In re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa.Super. 2003). Once the 12–

month period has been established, the court must next determine whether

the conditions that led to the child's removal continue to exist, despite the

reasonable good faith efforts of the Agency supplied over a realistic time.

Id. Termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to

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evaluate a parent’s current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions

that initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of Agency

services. In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 396 (Pa.Super. 2003);

In re Adoption of M.E.P., supra.

Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination

will meet the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520

(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability

are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The

court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond,

paying close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the

bond.” Id. Significantly:

In this context, the court must take into account whether a

bond exists between child and parent, and whether

termination would destroy an existing, necessary and

beneficial relationship.

When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not

required to use expert testimony. Social workers and

caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally,

Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding

evaluation.

In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted).

“The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines

certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide

for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements

within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be

considered unfit and have [the parent’s] rights terminated.” In re B.L.L.,

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787 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001). This Court has said:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties.

Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of

a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and

support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be

met by a merely passive interest in the development of the

child. Thus, this [C]ourt has held that the parental

obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative

performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a

genuine effort to maintain communication and association

with the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental

duty requires that [parent’s must exert themselves] to

take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively

with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every

problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship

to the best of [the parent’s] ability, even in difficult

circumstances. A parent must utilize all available

resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must

exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed

in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship.

Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more

suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental

responsibilities while others provide the child with his or

her physical and emotional needs.

In re B.,N.M., supra at 855 (internal citations omitted). “[A] parent’s basic

constitutional right to the custody and rearing of [the parent’s] child is

converted, upon the failure to fulfill [the parent’s] parental duties, to the

child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential

in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” Id. at 856.

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the

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applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Kathleen J.

Prendergast, we conclude Parents’ issues merit no relief. The Orphans Court

opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions

presented. (See Orphans’ Court Opinions, filed July 27, 2017, at 1-13 and

September 21, 2017, at 2-7) (finding: (1) in deciding to change M.M.L.R.’s

goal to adoption, court considered number of factors including child’s need

for stability, consistency, and permanency to best serve child’s needs; for all

reasons that follow regarding termination of parents’ parental rights,

changing goal to adoption was proper; (2) court focused on Sections

2511(a)(2), (5), and (8); notwithstanding their best efforts, parents are

unable to care for Children; both parents were incapable of caring for

Children when common events occurred, such as Children becoming sick,

and parents required constant supervision; testimony from multiple

witnesses indicated parents most likely cannot ever reach point where they

could care for Children without supervision; parents have below average

capacity to parent; CYF has provided services for over one year but parents

have been unable to show significant improvement in their parenting

abilities; conditions which led to M.M.L.R.’s removal continue to exist, such

as severe environmental issues, parenting skills, and ability to meet

Children’s needs on regular basis; M.M.L.R. has special needs that parents

cannot address and which require early intervention; C.J.I.R. has been in

foster care since birth; Mother has been unable to reach point where she can

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be unsupervised with Children for specific period of time; parents were

unable to handle incident where one child was vomiting; becoming sick is

common and foreseeable circumstance; parental inability to address that

issue without supervision indicates to court that Children are without

essential parental care and control; parents’ decisions regarding housing and

pets in home creates questions about their ability to provide ongoing,

appropriate environment for Children; despite best efforts of Catholic

Charities team, parents were unable to make significant progress with issues

they needed to address; continued services will unlikely aid parents; parents

lack basic skills such as changing diapers without prompting and engaging in

appropriate activities with Children; M.M.L.R. has been in care for over 12

months; conditions which led to her removal continue to exist; C.J.I.R. has

been in care almost 12 months, since three weeks after her birth; court will

not find Section 2511(a)(8) applies to C.J.I.R. since she has not been in

foster care for more than 12 months, but court can glean from record that

parents will be unable to remedy conditions which led to removal of C.J.I.R.

as well; based on parents’ intellectual limitations, they cannot meet

Children’s needs at this point in time; (3) parents are living in maternal

grandmother’s home which is in poor condition; Catholic Charities tried to

address some hygiene issues such as pet feces on floor, urine in bottles, and

sewage everywhere; Children have developed close bond with foster

parents, who have become Children’s primary caretakers; familiarity bond

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between M.M.L.R. and Mother is similar to bond between M.M.L.R. and

caseworker; it would be detrimental to pull M.M.L.R. from foster parents’

care; Children are bonded to foster parents; foster parents have been

primary caregivers for both Children; termination of parents’ parental rights

will serve Children’s best interests (4) given young age when Children were

placed into foster care, Children have developed close bond only with their

foster parents; M.M.L.R. has some bond of familiarity with Mother; Father

has even less bond with M.M.L.R. due to Father’s unwillingness or inability to

interact with her). Accordingly, we affirm based on the Orphans’ Court’s

opinions.

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 02/06/2018

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Circulated 01/30/2018 11:16 AM

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In re: Adoption of:

M.M.L.R. No. 2017-0072

C.J.I.R. No. 2017-0084

Minors Termination of Parental Rights

OPINION IN SUPPORT OF ORDER PURSUANT TO Pa.R.A.P. No. 1925(a)

Appellants, � ("Mother") and }

("Father"), appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania the Judgment entered by this

Court on July 27, 2017. On August 23, 2017, pursuant to Pa.RAP. No. 1925(a)(2)(i),

Mother and Father filed a Statement of f-r"V"'oV-6 Complained of on Appeal ("Statement").

Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. No. 1925(a)(2)(ii), the Court issues the following Opinion.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 25, 2017, a Petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of the

parents over the children, · (M.M.L.R) and c

(CJ.LR.), was ordered by this Court. On July 31, 2017, the

Court granted the York County Office of Children Youth and Families' (hereinafter

"CYF" or "the Agency") Petition to change the court-ordered goal from reunification

with a parent to placement for adoption for M.M.L.R. Mother and Father filed a Notice

of Appeal for both orders on August 23 and 24, 2017. This Opinion follows.

DISCUSSION

The reasons for this Court's Order granting the Petition to change the court-

ordered goal from reunification with a parent to termination of parental rights and

placement for adoption and petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of the

parents of the Children already appear of record in the July 27, 2017 Opinion and Order

("Opinion"). The Court's decision is consistent with the weight of the evidence provided

at trial and now it supplements its Opinion with the following to address each issue

raised.

1. The first issue raised is whether there was an error in changing the goal from

reunification to adoption.

The standard of review for a challenge to a trial court's order changing the goal of

a dependent child to adoption is abuse of discretion. In re N.C., 2006 PA Super 285, � 11,

909 A.2d 818, 822 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) citing In re G.P.-R., 2004 PA Super 205, 851

A.2d 967, 973 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). The trial court must be upheld unless the "court's

judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that the court did not apply the law, or that the

court's action was a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the

record." Id. at 823. The reviewing court is "bound by the trial court's findings of fact that

have support in the record." Id.

On review, the Superior Court has stated that, "[t]he trial court must focus on the

child and determine the goal with reference to the child's best interests, not those of the

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parents." In re S.B., 208 Pa.Super. 21, 943 A.2d 973, 978 (2008). The "safety,

permanency, and well-being of the child must take precedence over all other

considerations." In re N.C., 909 A.2d at 823. "Further, at the review hearing for a

dependent child who has been removed from the parental home, the court must consider

the statutorily mandated factors." Id.

In reaching the determination to change the Court Ordered Goal to adoption, the

Court cited a number of factors, including the need for the child to have stability,

consistency, and permanency to serve the best interest of the child who the Court ruled

for a change of goal, M.R. While this factor was listed first on the 1925(a) form filed, it

really should be considered last. All of the reasons stated for the termination below relate

to the change of goal and do not need to be repeated. It does not make sense to have a

goal as anything other than adoption when the children have been in a stable foster home

and the rights of the parents have been terminated.

2. The second issue raised was whether the court erred in terminating the parental

rights of Mother and Father pursuant to Sections 251 l(a)(l), (2), (5), and (8) of the

Adoption Act.

The standard of review by the Superior Court of an appeal from a decree

terminating parental rights is limited to determining whether the decision of the trial court

is supported by competent evidence. In re K.C.W., 456 Pa.Super. 1, 689 A.2d 294, 298

(1997). Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support

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for the trial court's decision, the decree must stand. Id. Where a trial court has granted a

petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, the Superior Court must accord the trial

judge's decision the same deference given to a jury verdict. In re Child M., 452 Pa.Super.

230, 681 A.2d 793, 800 (1996). The Superior Court employs a comprehensive review of

the record to determine whether the trial court's decision is supported by competent

evidence. In re Matsock, 416 Pa.Super. 520, 611 A.2d 737, 742 (1992). The

"[p]ermissible grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights are specified in 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511," as discussed above. In re C.S., 2000 PA Super 318, ,r,r 8-9, 761 A.2d

1197, 1199-200 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).

Under 23 Pa.C.S. §2511, the court may terminate the rights of a parent if any one

of the eleven factors exist. This Court stated that they were going to focus primarily on

§251 l(a)(2),(5), and (8). (Opinion, page 3.) As discussed in the Opinion, this case was

not a case of the parents willfully neglecting their children, but rather a case where,

despite the best efforts of the services being provided, the Mother could not care for the

children. (Id.) Section 251 l(a)(2) discusses a reason for the termination of parental

rights to be the repeated and continued incapacity of a parent that has caused the child to

go without essential parental care needed for the child's physical or mental wellbeing that

cannot be remedied by the parent. Both parents were incapable of caring for the children

when common events, such as the child becoming sick, occurred and needed constant

supervision. (Id.) There was testimony by many of the caregivers that the parents will

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most likely never be able to get to the point where they can sufficiently care for the

children without supervision. (Id. at 5.) Therefore, this Court feels as though the

necessary grounds exist under this section to terminate the parental rights in regards to

both children.

Section 251 l(a)(S) indicates that if the conditions that which lead to the removal

or placement of a child with an agency exists for a period of at least six months after the

child has been removed, and the parents cannot remedy those conditions within a

reasonable time, then termination may be best to serve the needs of the children. The

Opinion outlines and points to example after example of services and reports that indicate

that Mother and Father have below the average capacity as parents. (Id.) The parents

have had over a year worth of services that have not been able to yield to any significant

improvement in their parenting abilities. (Id. at 5-6.) Therefore, this Court feels as

though the necessary grounds exist under this section to terminate the parental rights in

regards to both children.

Section 251 l(a)(S) indicates that if the children have been removed or have been

place with an agency for a period of 12 months or more and the conditions which led to

the removal or placement continue to exist, then termination of parental rights would best

serve the needs and welfare of the child. In regards to child, M.R., the conditions that

have led to her removal continue to exist, such as severe environmental issues, parenting

skills issues, and the ability to have her needs met on a regular basis. (Id. at 7.) M.R.

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also has special needs that are not being addressed at home and require Early

Intervention. (Id.) Child, C.R., has been placed with the agency since birth, which has

not quite been 12 months. (Id.) Therefore, this Court feels it has met the necessary

grounds for child, C.R., but not child, M.R. under this factor.

Since 23 Pa.C.S. §2511 only requires that one of the factors is met, this Court

feels as though it has successfully moved in the best interests of the child and did not err

in terminating the parental rights.

3. The third issue raised was whether there was an error in concluding that

termination of parental rights would best serve the children under Section 2511 (b) of the

Adoption Act. As outlined in the Opinion on page 8, the Court believes that terminating

the parental rights would be the best option for the children at this time.

Under 23 Pa.C.S. §251 l(b), the court must give primary consideration to the

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the children, and the rights

of the parents cannot be terminated solely on a basis of environmental factors if they are

beyond the control of the parent. In this case, the parents are living in maternal

grandmother's home which is in poor condition, to say the least. (Id. at 8-9.) Services,

such as Catholic Charities tried to address some of the hygiene issues, but only so much

could be done when, throughout the entire home, there were pet feces on the floor, urine

in bottles, and sewage everywhere. (Id. at 9.) Furthermore, the children have developed

a close bond with the foster parents, as the foster parents have become their primary

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caretakers. (Id.) M.R. 's bond with Mother is nothing more than the bond M.R. has with

the caseworker. (Id. at 10.) Therefore this Court feels as ifit would be detrimental to

pull her from such a close bond.

4. The fourth issue raised was whether there was an error in terminating the parental

rights of Mother and Father in light of the age of the children. It is precisely the child's

age that makes this Court feel as though the child's best interests are termination of

parental rights. Due to the very young age that the children began their time with the

foster family, both children have developed a very close bond with their foster parents.

(Id.) The bond that the caseworker has described between the M.R. and Mother, in

particular, is nothing more than a familiarity bond. (Id.) Father and M.R. have even less

of a bond due to Father's unwillingness or inability to interact with her. (Id.)

CONCLUSION

In changing the dependent Children's permanency goals to adoption and

terminating the parental rights of AppellantsJthe Court respectfully submits that there was

no abuse of discretion or error as a matter oflaw. This Court relies on its ruling from

July 19, 2017. This Court respectfully requests that the Superior Court find the matters

Appellanscomplain of meritless and affirm this Court's Order.

BY THE COURT:

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Dated: September 1,\, 2017 KATHLEEN J. PRENDERGAST, JUDGE

The Prothonotary is directed to serve copies of this order on Counsel for the

parties and the Agency, as required by law.

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Circulated 01/30/2018 11:16 AM

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YORK COUNTY,

PENNSYLVANIA

In the Interest of CP-67-DP-0000155-2016

2017-0072

[M.R.] and

[C.R.]' CP-67-DP-0000138-2017

2017-0084

Minors

York, Pa., Wednesday, July 19, 2017

Before the Honorable Kathleen J. Prendergast, Judge

APPEARANCES:

MARTIN MILLER, Esquire .....,

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KATHERINE DOUCETTE, Esquire -;:Q

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ALSO PRESENT:

MARLA SPEIR, caseworker

* * *

ORDER AND OPINION

25 There are two issues before the court

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3 today as well as two children, we have a termination of

4 parental rights and change of goal for [M.R.], we have a

5 termination of parental rights for [C.R.] but not a

6 change of goal, as her goal is already adoption, and we

7 have a status conference with regard to both children.

8 I will be addressing each of those issues at this point.

9 Also, with regard to the termination of

10 parental rights, that relates to the termination of

11 rights of Mother as well as the termination of rights of

12 Father for both children. I just want to be sure that I

13 touch on all of those issues. I'm going to start with

14 termination of parental rights, as that will affect all

15 of the other issues the court is going to address.

16 The court has no question that both

17 parents love both of these children. The question

18 before the court though is are they now or would they be

19 at some reasonable point in the future able to care for

20 these children full time.

21 Specifically, grounds for involuntary

22 termination are found at 23 Pa.c.s. section 2511, and

23 the court may terminate rights of a parent if they find

24 only one of any of the following grounds that may exist

25 in this case. The court is going to specifically

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3 address section (a)(2), (5) and (8).

4 section (2) says the repeated and

5 continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of a

6 parent has caused the child to be without essential

7 parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his

8 physical or mental well-being and the conditions and

9 causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal

10 cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

11 Especially in the case of Mother, the

12 court commends her for her efforts. This is not a case,

13 especially with Mother, of will not but perhaps a case

14 of cannot. Despite the services that have been

15 provided, Mother has not been able to get to a position

16 where she could be unsupervised with the children for

17 any specific period of time.

18 The court especially finds the testimony

19 with regard to when the child vomited to be disturbing

20 from a point of view of the ability of the parents to

21 move forward with substantial, unsupervised time. A

22 child being physically ill is a common and foreseeable

23 circumstance in which a child may find themselves. The

24 parents' inability to address that issue without

25 supervision indicates to the court that their current

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3 incapacity that they cannot address or have not been

4 able to address affects their ability to parent and

5 provides a situation where the children are without

6 essential parental care and control in those

7 circumstances.

8 other circumstances relate to the housing

9 issue, their ability to address their relationship

10 issues as it affects their parenting, decisions to have

11 pets, like bunn,es and snakes, at a time when they may

12 not be able to meet their own needs creates questions

13 about their ability to provide an ongoing, appropriate

14 environment for the children.

15 Therefore, the court does find that the

16 conditions to terminate parental rights under (a)(2)

17 exist at this time.

18 section (5) indicates that a child has

19 been removed from the care of a parent by the Court

20 under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period

21 of at least six months, the conditions which led to the

22 removal or placement of the child continues to exist,

23 the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions

24 within a reasonable period of time, the services or

25 assistance reasonably available to the parents are not

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3 likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal

4 or placement of the child within a reasonable period of

5 time and termination of the parental rights would best

6 serve the needs and welfare of the child.

7 As previously noted in the report by

8 Dr. Gransee on page 10 of Exhibit 6, he notes that with

9 regard to Father "his capacity to parent seems

10 compromised and well below average and it is likely the

11 case that he will continue to make immature judgments

12 and to evince immature emotional and behavioral

13 functioning regardless of any interventions."

14 while that report was done in 2016,

15 catholic charities was put in place to attempt to

16 provide such interventions. Despite the best efforts of

17 the catholic charities team, unfortunately the parents

18 were not able to make significant progress with regard

19 to the issues they needed to address. Additionally, it

20 is unlikely that continued services are unlikely to do

21 so.

22 The catholic charities team opened

23 May 20th of 2016. Ms. Ohl was there six hours a week

24 working with the parents and has been unable to even

25 bring them to the point where they can be unsupervised

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3 for any significant period of time. It is unlikely that

4 her continued involvement will bring them to a point

5 where within a reasonable time they will be able to

6 address the issues that led to the placement.

7 Specific examples were noted during her

8 testimony with regard to again the relationship issues

9 between the parents, inability to address issues

10 relating to basic parenting skills, like diaper changes,

11 without prompting, and engaging in other appropriate

12 activities with the children.

13 Therefore, the court finds that grounds

14 also exist under (a)(5).

15 (A)(B) indicates that a child has been

16 removed from the care of a parent by the court or under

17 a voluntary agreement with the agency, 12 months or more

18 have elapsed from the date or removal of placement, the

19 conditions which led to the removal or placement of the

20 child continue to exist and termination of parental

21 rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the

22 child.

23 With regard to [M.R.], she has been in

24 care for a period of 12 months. The conditions which

25 led to her removal continue to exist based on the

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3 testimony. specifically, those conditions were pretty

4 severe environmental issues at the grandmother's house,

5 parenting skills issues with regard to the parents and

6 the ability to have her needs met on a regular basis.

7 Additionally, with [M.R.], she has some

8 special needs that required Early Intervention that were

9 not being appropriately addressed at the time that she

10 came into care and the court questions whether the

11 parents have the ongoing ability to meet her special

12 needs going forward.

13 with regard to [C.R.], she came into care

14 basically upon her birth. while she has not been in

15 care for the 12-month period, the court can glean from

16 the situation with [M.R.] that the parents �re not going

17 to be in a position to address her needs either. she's

18 even younger and therefore more vulnerable. However,

19 given that she has not been in care for 12 months, the

20 court cannot find that (8) applies to [C.R.]'s case.

21 The court can, however, find that (8) applies to

22 [M.R.]'s case.

23 As stated previously, the court only

24 needs to find one ground to terminate, so clearly that

25 exists for both children as it relates to both parents

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3 at this point in time.

4 Again, the court stresses that this is

5 not about love, as the court believes that the parents

6 love the children, and this is not, especially ,n

7 Mother's case, about a lack of effort because the court

8 believes that Mother has made or used significant

9 effort, it is about their limitations creating a case

10 where they cannot meet the needs of the children at this

11 point in time.

12 Moving on to Section (b), the court must

13 also give primary consideration to the developmental,

14 physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.

15 The rights of a parent cannot be terminated solely on a

16 basis of environmental factors, such as inadequate

17 housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care,

18 if found to be beyond the control of the parent.

19 one thing that the Court finds may have

20 been difficult for both parents is that they have not

21 had the best role models themselves in terms of

22 parenting. To describe the conditions of maternal

23 grandmother's house indicates to the court that not only

24 are those the conditions that the parents were more or

25 less economically trapped in to raise their children,

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3 those are the conditions in which maternal grandmother

4 felt it was appropriate to raise Mother.

5 The court appreciates that the catholic

6 charities team has tried to address hygiene issues, but

7 that is very difficult when her role model was raising

8 her in an environment where it was okay to have pet

9 feces on the floor, urine in bottles around the house,

10 sewage throughout the house and other environmental

11 issues.

12 while parents were limited to start, the

13 court does not feel that maternal grandmother's house in

14 particular created an effective role model for Mother

15 which only further complicated what she needed to know

16 in order to raise her children in a different

17 environment.

18 Nonetheless, while the court is

19 sympathetic to mother's position at this point and the

20 substantial burdens that she has faced and continues to

21 face, the court must be concerned about the best

22 interests of her children.

23 The children have bonded with the foster

24 parents. In fact, both of them throughout their lives

25 have been primarily in the care of the foster parents.

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3 Notably, the caseworker described [M.R.]'s bond with

4 Mother as a familiarity bond that may not be

5 significantly different from the one that [M.R.] has

6 with the caseworker herself. The caseworker indicated

7 that the most significant relationships are with the

8 foster family, that that is the family with whom she has

9 an extremely strong bond and the court believes that it

10 would be detrimental to pull her from that situation at

11 this point in time.

12 Because of the age of the children when

13 they began living with the foster parents, if the

14 children have a significant bond, at this point it is

15 with the foster parents. The court believes that the

16 caseworker's description of a familiarity bond is

17 credible as it relates to Mother's bond.

18 The caseworker further testified that the

19 child may not even have that level of a bond with Father

20 given his unwillingness or inability to interact with

21 [M.R.] even in a supervised setting and his deference to

22 Mother's responsibilities in that situation.

23 Therefore, it does appear to be , n the

24 best interests of the children considering their bonds

25 with the foster parents as well as a lack of anything

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3 beyond a familiarity bond with the parents to move

4 forward with the termination.

5 Therefore, at this time the court will

6 find that it is in the best interests of the children to

7 terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father

8 as it relates to [C.R.] and to [M.R.].

9 Moving next to the issue of the change of

10 goal for [M.R.], having found that termination of

11 parental rights is appropriate at this time as well as

12 for the reasons previously stated, the court finds that

13 it is in the best interests of [M.R.] for her goal to be

14 changed to adoption. Again, her strongest bond is with

15 her foster family. That is the only family she has

16 known at this point.

17 Despite the committed efforts of catholic

18 charities, they have been unable to assist the parents

19 in moving beyond the supervised visits and the court

20 finds that further services would be unlikely to move

21 the parents in a reasonable time to the point that they

22 could care for these children 24/7.

23 Therefore, at this point the court finds

24 that [M.R.]'s goal is changed to adoption.

25 Moving next to the status for both

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3 children, having changed the goal and terminated the

4 parental rights of the parents, further services will no

5 longer be needed with regard to addressing the goal of

6 reunification.

7 It is clearly in the best interests of

8 the children to remain in their current foster home.

9 Therefore, the status quo in the foster home with the

10 services that they have will be maintained going

11 forward.

12 while these situations are very

13 emotional, and the court notes that it has been a very

14 emotional hearing for Mother especially, the court hopes

15 that they can take some comfort in knowing that their

16 children are in a good place.

17 The court has no doubt, and again hopes

18 the parents take comfort, that the foster parents have

19 provided a loving and stable environment and will

20 continue to do so going forward.

21 sometimes giving up children can be a

22 very loving act and knowing that they have landed

23 someplace hopeful for them, while not ideal, should

24 provide some comfort.

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BY THE COURT:

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7/21/17

In the Interest of [M.R.] & [C.R.]

No. DP-155-2016 & DP-138-2017

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