Dyous v. Psychiatric Security Review Board

17-465-cv

Dyous v. Psychiatric Sec. Review Bd.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A

DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC

DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A

COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall

United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of

New York, on the 10th day of January, two thousand eighteen.

PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,

REENA RAGGI,

CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,

Circuit Judges.

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Anthony Dyous,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

-v.- 17-465

Psychiatric Security Review Board, an

independent agency of the State of

Connecticut,

Defendant-Appellee.

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FOR APPELLANT: Robert E. Byron, Robert E.

Byron, LLC, Hartford,

Connecticut.

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FOR APPELLEE: Jo Anne Sulik, Office of the

Chief State’s Attorney, Rocky

Hill, Connecticut.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District

Court for the District of Connecticut (Chatigny, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED

AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be

AFFIRMED.

Anthony Dyous appeals from the judgment of the United

States District Court for the District of Connecticut

dismissing the case. 1 We assume the parties’ familiarity

with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the

issues presented for review.

Dyous was committed to a mental institution in

Connecticut on March 22, 1985, for a term not to exceed 25

years, having been declared insane after he hijacked a bus

in Hartford to spread the gospel of an impending nuclear

conflagration. The state moved to continue Dyous’

commitment beyond his original term, and the court granted

multiple extensions on the basis of Dyous’ clinical

condition. Dyous remains institutionalized. He challenges

his detention as unlawful and seeks a declaratory judgment

that his continued confinement by the Psychiatric Security

Review Board (“the Board”) violates his constitutional

rights. The district court granted the Board’s motion to

dismiss on the ground that Dyous could not contest his

confinement by way of an action for declaratory judgment.

The single issue raised on appeal is whether Dyous can

pursue a declaratory judgment action contesting his

continued confinement as a violation of his constitutional

rights or whether he must seek relief via a writ of habeas

corpus.

1 While the district court did not specify whether its

dismissal was pursuant to Federal Rule of civil Procedure

12(b)(1) or (6), we construe the dismissal as without

prejudice to Dyous’ ability to subsequently file a habeas

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2554.

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Whenever an individual attacks the “very fact or

duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he

seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate

release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his

sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser

v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). In Preiser, the

respondents alleged that deprivation of good conduct time

credits “was causing or would cause them to be in illegal

physical confinement.” Id. at 487. The Court held that

the allegation “fell squarely within th[e] traditional

scope of habeas corpus.” Id.

Following Preiser, a number of circuits have directly

held that the Declaratory Judgment Act may not be used as a

substitute for a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

See, e.g., Rooney v. Secretary of the Army, 405 F.3d 1029,

1031 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v. Guitierrez, 116

F.3d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Mills v. Poole,

2008 WL 141729, 06-cv-842A, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2008)

(“Where, as here, an alternative remedy was expressly

created by statute to provide the relief sought, a

declaratory judgment should not be granted.”). This result

is also mandated by Wilkinson v. Dotson, where the Supreme

Court emphasized that habeas corpus is the only avenue

available to confined individuals who “seek to invalidate

the duration of their confinement—either directly through

an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly

through a judicial determination that necessarily implies

the unlawfulness of the State’s custody.” 544 U.S. 74, 81

(2005).

Rather, a declaratory judgment action may only lie

where the plaintiff seeks monetary damages or other relief

that would not directly impact his or her sentence or

duration of commitment. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.

539, 554-55 (1974) (holding that declaratory judgment as a

predicate to a damages award would not be barred, but that

a civil rights claim that would affect the duration of

incarceration is foreclosed by Preiser); see also Burnell

v. Whidden, 3:05CV825(MRK), 2005 WL 2739085, at *3-4 (D.

Conn. Oct. 19, 2005).

Because each of Dyous’ constitutional claims would

impact his confinement if adjudicated in his favor on the

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merits, a writ of habeas corpus is his only potential

avenue of relief. The prayer for relief in Dyous’

complaint seeks a declaration that “the continuing

confinement of the plaintiff by the defendant violates the

rights of the plaintiff guaranteed” by the Constitution.

J. App’x at 15. His causes of action under the due process

and equal protection clauses can only be construed as

contentions that his detention in the mental facility is

“contrary to the Constitution or fundamental law.”

Preiser, 411 U.S. at 485; cf. Griffin v. Alexander, 9:09-

CV-1334(PJM/DEP), 2011 WL 4402119, at *8, *13 (N.D.N.Y.

Aug. 25, 2011)(determining that civil rights claims

requesting order directing defendant’s release to parole

supervision not appropriate for resolution by declaratory

judgment but must be brought by habeas petition), report

and recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 4343199 (N.D.N.Y.

Sep. 14, 2011); Curro v. Myers, CV-86-1304, 1987 WL 12032,

at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 5, 1987)(“[I]nsofar as plaintiff seeks

a declaration that his conviction was obtained without due

process of law, he challenges the fact of his

confinement.”).

The distinctions Dyous draws between “equity” and “law”

or “writ” and “judgment” are of no moment. Dyous is not

pursuing monetary damages; he seeks a judicial ruling that

his confinement is contrary to law. No matter how narrowly

Dyous now asks us to construe his claims, he is directly

and unambiguously challenging his confinement. See Judge,

2009 WL 928134, at *8 (declaratory judgment relief that

would “necessarily invalidate Plaintiff’s current

confinement” barred). This rule is not just a formality.

Congress “clearly required exhaustion of adequate state

remedies as a condition precedent to the invocation of

federal judicial relief” for a confined individual and it

would “wholly frustrate explicit congressional intent to

hold that [Dyous] could evade this requirement by the

simple expedient of putting a different label on [his]

pleadings.” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489-490.

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For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in

Dyous’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of

the district court.

FOR THE COURT:

CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK

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