Laurie Wellington v. Nancy Berryhill

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LAURIE L. WELLINGTON, No. 16-15188

Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v. 1:14-cv-01207-

SMS

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting

Commissioner Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee. OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Sandra M. Snyder, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 14, 2017

San Francisco, California

Filed December 29, 2017

Before: Ronald M. Gould and Paul J. Watford, Circuit

Judges, and W. Louis Sands, * District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Gould;

Dissent by Judge Watford

*

The Honorable W. Louis Sands, United States District Judge for

the Middle District of Georgia, sitting by designation.

2 WELLINGTON V. BERRYHILL

SUMMARY **

Social Security

The panel affirmed the district court’s order affirming

the Social Security Administration Commissioner’s denial

of a claimant’s application for Social Security Disability

Insurance benefits and partial denial of the claimant’s

application for Supplemental Security Income benefits.

The panel rejected claimant’s contention that Social

Security Ruling (“SSR”) 82-30 required the administrative

law judge (“ALJ”) to call a medical advisor at the hearing to

help determine claimant’s disability onset date. The panel

held that under ordinary circumstances, an ALJ was

equipped to determine a claimant’s disability onset date

without calling on a medical advisor. The panel held that

because the record was adequate even before claimant saw a

mental health specialist and no reasonable medical expert

could have inferred that her disability began before May

2010, SSR 83-20 did not require the ALJ to consult a

medical advisor before determining claimant’s disability

onset date.

Judge Watford dissented. Because the evidence was

ambiguous as to when claimant’s impairments became

disabling, Judge Watford would hold that the ALJ erred in

determining that the record conclusively supported May 26,

2010 as the date claimant’s impairments became severe

enough to prevent her from engaging in substantial gainful

**

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

WELLINGTON V. BERRYHILL 3

activity; and he would remand for the ALJ to appoint a

medical advisor in the case.

COUNSEL

Lawrence D. Rohlfing (argued), Santa Fe Springs,

California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Elizabeth Firer (argued) and Marcelo Illarmo, Special

Assistant United States Attorney; Deborah Lee Stachel,

Regional Chief Counsel, Region IX; Phillip A. Talbert,

Acting United States Attorney; Social Security

Administration, San Francisco, California; for Defendant-

Appellee.

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Laurie Wellington appeals from the district court’s order

affirming the Social Security Administration

Commissioner’s denial of her application for Social Security

Disability Insurance benefits and partial denial of her

application for Supplemental Security Income benefits. The

Administrative Law Judge concluded that Wellington was

not disabled until May 26, 2010, after both the period in

which she was insured for SSDI benefits and the date on

which she applied for SSI benefits. On appeal, Wellington

contends that the ALJ erred by not calling a medical advisor

at the hearing to help determine the onset date of her

disabilities. We reject this contention and we affirm.

4 WELLINGTON V. BERRYHILL

I

Wellington experienced psychological trauma

throughout her life. As a child, she suffered chronic sexual

abuse and shielded her younger siblings from domestic

violence at home. As an adult, she was regularly beaten by

an ex-boyfriend over the course of eight years, was

emotionally abused by her ex-husband during their twelve-

year relationship, and was stalked by this ex-husband after

their divorce. Wellington has been diagnosed with post-

traumatic stress disorder and an unspecified anxiety

disorder.

Wellington has several physical ailments as well. She

primarily suffers from chronic muscle pain, and she was

diagnosed with fibromyalgia in 2009. She also has a history

of back pain and chest pain, and some less serious

conditions.

Despite her psychological and physical impairments,

Wellington was able to lead a productive life for many years.

She dropped out of high school and apparently did not work

in her 20s, but she obtained her GED at age 32. She then

completed a nine-month college program in medical

assisting and worked as a certified nursing assistant for three

years until she hurt her back. The extent of this injury is not

clear from the record, but Wellington stayed out of the work

force for six years. In 2005, she returned to work as a cashier

at a convenience store, where she worked for two and a half

years. Wellington kept this job until she was required to

work 50-hour weeks, which aggravated her back pain. She

then worked part-time at a department store for eight

months.

In December 2008, however, Wellington repeatedly took

medical leave and was fired from her department store job

WELLINGTON V. BERRYHILL 5

when she did not return to work. In the month before she

was fired, Wellington went to the emergency room eight

times, and on one occasion admitted herself for a three-day

inpatient stay. She appeared anxious or complained of

anxiety-related symptoms in half of these visits, while the

other visits involved treatment for vertigo, migraine

headaches, or abdominal pain.

In the month after losing her job, Wellington went back

to the emergency room four times, again exhibiting or

complaining of anxiety in half of these visits while seeking

unrelated treatment—for vertigo, ringing in her ears, and

arm numbness—in the rest. An emergency doctor gave

Wellington a prescription for Xanax to manage her anxiety,

and she did not return to the ER for a month afterward. In

the next visit she said her anxiety was “better now” and she

was treated for acute vomiting. Wellington returned a week

later requesting more Xanax and appearing anxious. She ran

out of medication three weeks later and again went back to

the emergency room, where she was prescribed a different

drug.

On March 16, 2009, Wellington went to a health center

for the first time on record and was given a two-month

Klonopin prescription. Subsequent medical records show

routine treatment of her anxiety disorder. Wellington

received a one-month refill of Klonopin in May, but the

prescription was not renewed at her appointment the

following month. Wellington requested and received

another one-month refill in July. But the prescription again

was not renewed the following month. Wellington

complained of increased life stressors and anxiety in

September, so she received a stronger prescription that was

increased once more in October. The prescription was

decreased in December when Wellington had no complaints

6 WELLINGTON V. BERRYHILL

of anxiety, and it was not renewed in January 2010, the last

record from this office. These treatment notes indicate that

Wellington “doesn’t like taking medication,” though she

recognized that her prescriptions did “help with the pain and

the anxiety.”

Wellington first saw a specialist for her mental health

troubles on May 26, 2010. Dr. Cushman described

Wellington as moderately anxious, but he noted that she last

took a leftover Klonopin a month ago and that “[s]he does

find it helpful in managing her anxiety.” He concluded that

Wellington will “have difficulties with regular attendance

and consistent participation at this time, with complaints of

pain, anxiety and malaise.” Still, Dr. Cushman assigned

Wellington a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”)

score of 55, indicating that he believed Wellington had only

moderate psychological symptoms. 1 Dr. Cushman also

noted that Wellington would benefit from counseling.

Wellington took a turn for the worse over the next

several months. She began seeing a therapist in June, and in

July she reported that she was having more panic attacks

because her ex-husband was trying to contact her. In

August, Wellington was tearful during most of her

counseling session, and she described being emotionally

overwhelmed because her father had developed terminal

cancer, other family members were not getting along, and

she recently had to put her dog down. Wellington was

advised to restart Klonopin and was given a new

1

The Social Security Administration has said that GAF scores

“should be considered as medical opinion evidence under 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1527(a)(2) and 416.927(a)(2) if they come from an acceptable

medical source.” Soc. Sec. Disab. Claims Handbook § 2:15 n.40 (citing

AM-13066 REV).

WELLINGTON V. BERRYHILL 7

prescription. Her father passed away the following month.

At her next counseling appointment, Wellington showed up

in a robe, pajamas, and hospital slippers, and she would not

make eye contact. In December, Wellington reported that

“everything got worse” after her father died. The next

month, January 2011, the therapist observed that

Wellington’s depression was only getting worse and that her

anxiety had reached new heights.

Wellington filed for SSDI and SSI benefits on December

24, 2009, alleging a disability onset date of December 24,

2008. Her date last insured for SSDI was December 31,

2008. Wellington’s claims were initially denied, but after an

appeal and voluntary remand, an ALJ issued a partially

favorable decision. The ALJ found that Wellington’s

disability onset date was May 26, 2010, making her

ineligible for SSDI but eligible for SSI from that date

forward. The ALJ determined Wellington’s disability onset

date without calling a medical expert at the hearing. He

reasoned that medical records beginning on this date—with

Dr. Cushman’s psychological examination—showed that

Wellington became unable to complete a normal workday up

to seven days a quarter due to pain and anxiety. The district

court affirmed the ALJ’s decision, and Wellington appeals.

II

We review de novo the district court’s order affirming

the Commissioner’s denial of benefits. Berry v. Astrue,

622 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2010). We will affirm the

Commissioner’s decision unless it is not supported by

substantial evidence or is based on a legal error. Id.

8 WELLINGTON V. BERRYHILL

III

On appeal, Wellington contends that the ALJ erred by

finding that her disability began the day she was examined

by Dr. Cushman. She argues that Social Security Ruling

(“SSR”) 82-30 required the ALJ to call a medical advisor at

the hearing to help determine her disability onset date. We

disagree.

A

The onset date of a disability can be critical to an

individual’s application for disability benefits. A claimant

can qualify for SSDI only if her disability begins by her date

last insured, and these benefits can be paid for up to

12 months before her application was filed. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(a)(1), (c)(2), (d)(1)(A). In contrast, a claimant is

eligible for SSI once she becomes disabled, but she cannot

receive benefits for any period before her application date.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382(c)(2), (c)(7), 1382c(a)(3)(A). For

both programs, the onset date is the date when the claimant

is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity due to

physical or mental impairments that can be expected to last

for at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(A).

As we recently explained in Diedrich v. Berryhill, “[t]he

ALJ is responsible for studying the record and resolving any

conflicts or ambiguities in it.” 874 F.3d 634, 638 (9th Cir.

2017) (citing Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin,

775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014)). “But in circumstances

where the ALJ must determine the date of disability onset

and medical evidence from the relevant time period is

unavailable or inadequate, Social Security Ruling (“SSR”)

83-20 states that the ALJ should call a medical advisor.” Id.

SSR 83-20 provides:

WELLINGTON V. BERRYHILL 9

Medical reports containing descriptions

of examinations or treatment of the

individual are basic to the determination of

the onset of disability. The medical evidence

serves as the primary element in the onset

determination. . . .

With slowly progressive impairments, it

is sometimes impossible to obtain medical

evidence establishing the precise date an

impairment became disabling. Determining

the proper onset date is particularly difficult,

when, for example, the alleged onset and the

date last worked are far in the past and

adequate medical records are not available.

In such cases, it will be necessary to infer the

onset date from the medical and other

evidence that describe the history and

symptomatology of the disease process.

....

In some cases, it may be possible, based

on the medical evidence to reasonably infer

that the onset of a disabling impairment(s)

occurred some time prior to the date of the

first recorded medical examination, e.g., the

date the claimant stopped working. How

long the disease may be determined to have

existed at a disabling level of severity

depends on an informed judgment of the facts

in the particular case. This judgment,

however, must have a legitimate medical

basis. At the hearing, the administrative law

10 WELLINGTON V. BERRYHILL

judge (ALJ) should call on the services of a

medical advisor when onset must be inferred.

SSR 83-20, 1983 WL 31249, at *2–3.

Although Social Security Rulings do not carry the “force

of law,” they are nevertheless binding on ALJs. Molina v.

Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 n.5 (9th Cir. 2012). These

Rulings “reflect the official interpretation of the [Social

Security Administration] and are entitled to some deference

as long as they are consistent with the Social Security Act

and regulations.” Id. (citation omitted).

Our cases have given some guidance as to situations in

which SSR 83-20 requires an ALJ to seek a medical

advisor’s help before determining a claimant’s disability

onset date.

In DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1991),

we considered the case of a man with long-term disabling

depression. Id. at 844. Although DeLorme’s incapacitating

depression was not diagnosed until he belatedly saw a

mental health specialist, it was “possible that the depression

diagnosed [then] might be found to have an onset date at

some other time prior to the expiration of insured status” two

years earlier. Id. at 847–49. We held that on these facts,

“SSR 83-20 requires the administrative law judge to call

upon the services of a medical advisor and to obtain all

evidence which is available to make the determination.” Id.

at 848.

Similarly, in Morgan v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.

1991), we reversed the ALJ’s determination of the onset date

of the claimant’s mental disorders because the ALJ did not

consult a medical advisor. Id. at 1082–83. While the

claimant’s mental disability may have been triggered by a

WELLINGTON V. BERRYHILL 11

hernia operation in 1977, the “first unambiguous evidence in

the record of a mental impairment” occurred only in January

1980, when he was treated at a clinic for anxiety and then

referred to a counselor. Id. at 1081–82. Then in March 1980

a rheumatologist characterized the claimant as “nearly

incapacitated by severe depression and chronic anxiety.” Id.

at 1082. Examinations in 1984 revealed possible

schizophrenia, which was confirmed in 1985. Id. On this

record the panel thought hospital visits in 1979 showed

“perhaps early evidence of progressive mental illness,” and

that there were “indications that Morgan’s mental condition

was disabling prior to December 31, 1979,” his date last

insured for SSDI. Id. at 1082.

Next, in Armstrong v. Commissioner of Social Security,

160 F.3d 587 (9th Cir. 1998), we held that the ALJ was

required to call a medical advisor to assist in determining the

onset date where “Armstrong’s depression could have been

disabling long before” it was diagnosed. Id. at 590. After

his wife left him in 1986, Armstrong began drinking alcohol

excessively, living in his truck, and recycling aluminum cans

to gain income. Id. at 588. In 1991 or 1992, he began

suffering crying spells. Id. at 590. So even though

Armstrong was not diagnosed with mental health disorders

until 1994, a medical expert could have helped the ALJ infer

a disability onset date before Armstrong’s date last insured

in 1992. Id. at 588–89.

Finally, in Diedrich v. Berryhill we held that the Social

Security Commissioner erred by not calling a medical

advisor at the hearing to help determine the precise onset

date of Diedrich’s disability under the circumstances there

presented. 874 F.3d at 639. The majority reasoned that SSR

83-20 required a medical advisor because there were large

gaps in the medical records documenting slow progress of

12 WELLINGTON V. BERRYHILL

illness; “the alleged onset and the date last worked are far in

the past”; and the ALJ’s assessment of the disability onset

date would have been “mere speculation without the aid of a

medical expert.” Id. at 638–39.

Throughout our cases, we have observed that “SSR 83-

20 only requires that the ALJ assist the claimant in creating

a complete record . . . which forms a basis for [the] onset

date.” Armstrong, 160 F.3d at 590; see also DeLorme,

924 F.2d at 849. The ALJ must develop an incomplete

record by calling on a medical advisor when “medical

evidence from the relevant time period is unavailable or

inadequate.” Diedrich, 874 F.3d at 638. This requirement

most readily applies when an incomplete record clearly

could support an inference that a claimant’s disability began

when there were no contemporaneous medical records. See,

e.g., DeLorme, 924 F.2d at 847, 851 (holding that “the ALJ

must fully develop the record” when the first examination by

a psychiatrist documented a “long term functional

nonpsychotic disorder” preventing the claimant from

working). Because SSR 83-20 applies when “it may be

possible” to infer disability onset during a significant gap in

the medical records, the ALJ should also enlist a medical

expert’s help when “the evidence is ambiguous regarding the

possibility that the onset of her disability occurred” at that

time. Grebenick v. Chater, 121 F.3d 1193, 1201 (8th Cir.

1997).

In those circumstances, “an ALJ’s assessment of the

disability onset date would be mere speculation without the

aid of a medical expert.” Diedrich, 874 F.3d at 639. “The

requirement that, in all but the most plain cases, a medical

advisor be consulted prior to inferring an onset date is merely

a variation on the most pervasive theme in administrative

law—that substantial evidence support an agency’s

WELLINGTON V. BERRYHILL 13

decisions.” Bailey v. Chater, 68 F.3d 75, 80 (4th Cir. 1995).

Under SSR 83-20, “medical advisors are the prescribed

mechanism for reaching the required evidentiary threshold.”

Id.

B

Although in our prior cases we concluded that a medical

advisor’s appointment was necessary, we decline to do so

here. Under ordinary circumstances, an ALJ is equipped to

determine a claimant’s disability onset date without calling

on a medical advisor. We conclude that this case does not

present the unusual circumstances envisioned by SSR 83-20,

and so the ALJ did not err by determining Wellington’s onset

date without calling on a medical advisor.

Wellington contends that SSR 83-20 applies under our

case law because her onset date could be retroactively

inferred before the date of Dr. Cushman’s examination. The

first hospital visit that could potentially cast a shadow of

disability back in time is the first relevant examination by a

qualified examiner. See Morgan, 945 F.2d at 1081–82;

DeLorme, 924 F.2d at 843–44, 849. Accordingly, the date

of Dr. Cushman’s psychological examination could trigger

SSR 83-20’s requirements because this was the first

examination by a doctor with expertise in mental health

problems. Although Wellington was previously seen many

times by emergency room physicians and health center

medical providers, none of these doctors was specially

trained to evaluate mental health, nor did any of these

doctors rigorously evaluate Wellington’s psychological

impairments.

Here, the ALJ did not violate SSR 83-20 by finding that

Wellington’s disability onset date coincided with the date of

Dr. Cushman’s examination. An ALJ need not call on a

14 WELLINGTON V. BERRYHILL

medical advisor when the available evidence clearly could

not support an inference of disability onset during a gap in

the medical records. After all, “[t]he Ruling’s language does

not expressly mandate that the ALJ consult a medical

advisor in every case where the onset of disability must be

inferred.” Bailey, 68 F.3d at 79.

SSR 83-20 does not apply when the record has no

meaningful gaps. A medical advisor is not required when,

despite some inadequacies, “a relatively complete medical

chronology” of the claimant’s condition during the relevant

time period is available. Pugh v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 1271,

1278 & n.9 (7th Cir. 1989). In these situations, the ALJ’s

duty to develop the record is discharged. See Armstrong,

160 F.3d at 590; DeLorme, 924 F.2d at 849.

Also, a medical advisor is unnecessary when, based on

“the nature of the impairment (i.e., what medical

presumptions can reasonably be made about the course of

the condition),” an ALJ can reasonably and confidently say

that no reasonable medical advisor could infer that the

disability began during a period for which the claimant

lacked medical documentation. SSR 83-20, 1983 WL

31249, at *3.

Both of those exceptions from to SSR 83-20 apply here.

The available records, tracking about three dozen encounters

with medical providers, give an adequate chronology of

Wellington’s mental health during the seventeen-month

period between her alleged onset date and first psychological

examination. These visits occurred at least once every two

months, except for a three-month gap from February to April

2010 that ended with visits in which Wellington reported and

displayed no anxiety. Although her medical providers were

not mental health professionals, they recognized and treated

her anxiety. Despite the lag between Wellington’s alleged

WELLINGTON V. BERRYHILL 15

onset date and the date she was examined by a specialist,

there are not so few relevant medical records on file as to

evoke the ALJ’s duty to develop the record under SSR 83-

20.

Moreover, the nature of Wellington’s anxiety disorder is

such that a medical expert could not reasonably infer that she

became disabled for the purposes of SSDI or SSI before May

2010. To be eligible for SSDI, a claimant’s disability must

“be continuously disabling from the time of onset during

insured status to the time of application for benefits.” Flaten

v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1460 (9th

Cir. 1995). Eligibility for SSI similarly requires continuous

disability after a claimant’s onset date. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1382c(a)(3)(A). The record at the time of Wellington’s

application reflected that her lifelong chronic anxiety

disorder was exacerbated by stress and responded well to

treatment. Her disability finding was based on record

evidence, beginning with Dr. Cushman’s consultative

psychological evaluation, the first examination showing

significant mental limits. After that examination her

disorder got worse so that even with treatment, unmitigated

pain and anxiety were expected to keep her from completing

a normal workday up to seven days a quarter. But the

available evidence before then contradicts the possibility

that Wellington’s anxiety was so severe and persistent as to

keep her out of work continuously before May 2010.

The existing medical record does not support the need

for a medical advisor because SSR 83-20 states that even

when onset of a disability can be inferred, that judgment

requires a “legitimate medical basis.” SSR 83-20, 1983 WL

31249, at *3. We recognize that Wellington had experienced

several distressing panic attacks in December 2008. But just

a few months later, the record shows that Wellington’s

16 WELLINGTON V. BERRYHILL

disabling symptoms had all but disappeared. In March 2009,

Wellington began treatment at a health center and stopped

going to the emergency room. From this time until the end

of her treatment records in January 2010, Wellington’s

medical provider prescribed anti-anxiety medication and

commented in their records about her good progress on the

drug. The provider renewed the prescription as needed,

discontinuing the medication three times when Wellington’s

symptoms faded to the point that she did not need it

anymore. In January 2010, after Wellington’s last

prescription ended, she did not complain of anxiety or appear

to be anxious at her regular appointment or at two visits to

the emergency room that month for neck pain and bronchitis.

The next medical records in May 2010 indicate muscle pain

without anxiety early in the month, followed by an anxiety

attack on May 23 and Dr. Cushman finding her anxious three

days later. Given the increasing severity of Wellington’s

symptoms and their resistance to treatment in subsequent

months, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that

May 2010, when Dr. Cushman examined Wellington and

when the ALJ determined disability onset, stands as an

important change in the course of her disorder, after which

she could no longer attend work reliably.

Symptoms may wax and wane during the progression of

a mental disorder. See, e.g., Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d

995, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014). Those symptoms, however, may

also subside during treatment. “With adequate treatment

some individuals with chronic mental disorders not only

have their symptoms and signs ameliorated, but they also

return to a level of function close to the level of function they

had before they developed symptoms or signs of their mental

disorders.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (2014). Such

evidence of medical treatment successfully relieving

symptoms can undermine a claim of disability. See

WELLINGTON V. BERRYHILL 17

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(1), 416.920a(c)(1). That is what

happened here until May 2010.

Because the record was adequate even before Wellington

saw a mental health specialist and no reasonable medical

expert could have inferred that her disability began before

May 2010, we conclude that SSR 83-20 did not require the

ALJ to consult a medical advisor before determining

Wellington’s disability onset date.

IV

We hold that the ALJ did not err by finding Wellington’s

disability onset date without calling on a medical advisor at

the hearing.

AFFIRMED.

WATFORD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I agree with the court’s discussion of the legal principles

that govern resolution of this appeal, but I disagree with the

ultimate disposition in this case. As the court explains in

section III.A, SSR 83-20 requires an ALJ to appoint a

medical advisor to assist in determining a claimant’s

disability onset date in either of two situations: (1) when

there is a meaningful gap in the medical records; or (2) when

the medical records are complete, but the available evidence

is nonetheless ambiguous as to the onset date. While there

is no significant gap in Nancy Wellington’s medical records,

in my view the evidence is ambiguous as to when her

anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder

became disabling. As a result, I think the ALJ was required

to appoint a medical advisor here.

18 WELLINGTON V. BERRYHILL

Evidence in the record supports a disability onset date

before May 26, 2010. In the six weeks leading up to

December 24, 2008, when Wellington contends she became

disabled, she visited the emergency room 11 times. In all of

those visits, Wellington complained of, exhibited signs of,

or was diagnosed with anxiety. During 2009, Wellington

visited the emergency room six more times due at least in

part to her anxiety and other mental disorders. During at

least eight additional medical visits in 2009, doctors also

noted and treated her anxiety. Her doctors increased her

anxiety medication dosage at least three times over the

course of that year. And on May 4, 2010, Wellington was

admitted for a multi-day inpatient hospital stay related to

anxiety, followed by an anxiety attack on May 23 and Dr.

Cushman’s examination on May 26. This evidence

demonstrates that Wellington continually struggled with her

mental impairments for at least a year and a half before the

date the ALJ determined her disability began.

Because the evidence is ambiguous as to when

Wellington’s impairments became disabling, I think the ALJ

erred in determining that the record conclusively supports

May 26, 2010, as the date Wellington’s impairments became

severe enough to prevent her from engaging in substantial

gainful activity. See SSR 83-20, 1983 WL 31249, at *3. I

would remand for the ALJ to appoint a medical advisor in

this case.