Opinion

L. Valenta v. WCAB (Abington Manor Nursing Home and Rehab and Liberty Ins. Co.)

Court
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Dec 7, 2017
Status
Published
On the bench
McCullough, J.
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 4.1%

affirming a WCJ’s decision which determined that some of the job referrals in the LMS/EPA were appropriate to demonstrate earning power while others were not

How later courts described this case

  • affirming a WCJ’s decision which determined that some of the job referrals in the LMS/EPA were appropriate to demonstrate earning power while others were not

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Laurie Valenta, :

Petitioner :

: No. 1302 C.D. 2016

v. :

: Submitted: September 13, 2017

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (Abington Manor Nursing :

Home and Rehab and Liberty :

Insurance Company), :

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge

OPINION BY

JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: December 7, 2017

Laurie Valenta (Claimant) petitions for review of the July 1, 2016 order

of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) affirming the decision of the

Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) modifying wage loss benefits paid to Claimant

by Abington Manor Nursing Home and Rehab (Employer) and Liberty Insurance

Corporation (Insurer).

Facts and Procedural History

Claimant had been receiving total disability benefits pursuant to the

Workers’ Compensation Act (Act)1 for a work injury sustained on October 2, 2010, in

which a prior WCJ, by decision circulated September 27, 2012, found she had

aggravated a pre-existing calcific tendinitis with chronic tendinopathy of the left

shoulder, and sustained disc herniations at C5-C6 and C6-C7 with radiculopathy, a left

trapezial strain, left medial scapular strain, and a left posterior shoulder strain. (WCJ’s

Finding of Fact No. 2.)

On January 2, 2014, Insurer commissioned a labor market survey and

earning power assessment (LMS/EPA) pursuant to section 306(b) of the Act.2

(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 342a.) The LMS/EPA listed six jobs with weekly pay

ranging from $320.00 to $420.00. (R.R. at 297a-319a.)

Employer filed a modification petition seeking to reduce Claimant’s wage

loss benefits because of an alleged earning capacity. Claimant filed a timely answer

denying all material allegations.

In a deposition taken on September 15, 2014, Employer submitted the

medical testimony of Eugene Chiavacci, M.D. Board-certified in orthopedic surgery,

Dr. Chiavacci testified that he examined Claimant twice on behalf of Employer, on

March 29, 2011, and October 1, 2013. Dr. Chiavacci obtained a history of Claimant’s

work injury and surgery, and he testified that he reviewed records, reports, and studies

concerning Claimant’s treatment since the work injury. Among the records he

reviewed was an x-ray of August 19, 2011, which he stated demonstrated a stable

1

Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§1-1041.4; 2501-2708.

2

Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, added by the Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350, 77

P.S. §512.

2

cervical fusion. After performing a physical examination on Claimant at the 2013

examination, he testified that he believed she was capable of standing between one and

three hours at a time; sitting five to eight hours at a time; alternating sitting and standing

between five and eight hours at a time; walking one to three hours at a time; driving

one to three hours at a time; and occasionally bending, squatting, climbing stairs,

reaching up, kneeling, crawling, and frequently using her feet for foot controls. He

testified that he did not believe Claimant could climb ladders, but that she had no

restrictions as to grasping or fine manipulation. He stated that Claimant could

occasionally lift up to twenty pounds and more frequently lift lesser weights. (WCJ’s

Findings of Fact Nos. 7-8.)

Employer also submitted the testimony of Robert Smith, the author of the

LMS/EPA. Mr. Smith testified that he had been a rehabilitation specialist since 1989

and that he had been approved pursuant to the applicable regulations 3 to conduct

interviews for earning power under section 306(b) of the Act. Mr. Smith testified that

he coordinated an initial interview with Claimant and identified reports from Dr.

Chiavacci indicating that Claimant was capable of returning to sedentary to light-duty

work. He noted Claimant’s educational background, which included a high school

diploma and some course work at Keystone Community College. He stated that

Claimant also had training to become a licensed practical nurse (LPN), and once

qualified as an LPN, she worked as a charge nurse and a private duty LPN. He testified

that he performed a transferable skills analysis and calculated that work as an LPN

would be a medium-duty position, and that with Claimant’s background, she was

capable of working in a semi-skilled to skilled area. Mr. Smith then identified six

positions he believed were appropriate for Claimant. (WCJ’s Finding of Fact No. 9.)

3

34 Pa. Code §§123.201-123.205.

3

The first was a position at A. Rifkin as a customer service representative,

which had light duties and lifting up to 20 pounds rarely, along with periods of sitting.

This was a full-time position paying between $10.00 and $13.00 per hour and an ideal

candidate would have three years of customer service experience, communication and

organization skills, multi-tasking ability, attention to detail, and computer and typing

skills.

The second was a full-time position at Telerex as an account

representative, paying $9.00 per hour, which required a high school diploma and

familiarity with computer programs. Helpful but not required was some customer

service experience and an ability to type 35 words per minute.

The third was a full-time position at Navient as a customer service

specialist, which paid $11.00 per hour. The job was sedentary in nature and required

one year of customer service experience. A college degree was preferred but not

required, along with good communication, analytical, and computer skills.

The fourth was a full-time position at Bank of America as a customer

service associate, paying $10.50 per hour. The job was sedentary in nature, with

prolonged sitting, and required no lifting above 10 pounds. The job required

communication, organizational, and computer skills.

The fifth was a position at Hampton Inn as a guest service agent, also full-

time, which paid $8.00 per hour. The job required a high school diploma and included

on-the-job training. It was light-duty and was a front desk clerical job involving

greeting guests, checking them in and out, and processing monetary transactions.

Sixth and finally was another full-time position at Hampton Inn as a night

auditor, paying $8.50 per hour. The job was sedentary in nature with no lifting above

20 pounds. The job required a high school diploma and a “customer service mentality”

4

and it included on-the-job training. All six positions were approved by Dr. Chiavacci,

who stated that Claimant was physically capable of performing them. Mr. Smith

concluded that Claimant’s weekly earning power was $320.00 to $420.00. (WCJ’s

Finding of Fact No. 9.)

Claimant testified at a hearing before the WCJ on January 15, 2015. She

explained that she was working as an LPN for Employer on October 2, 2010, when she

injured her neck. She described ongoing problems since the work injury, with pain

radiating from her neck to a midpoint in her back, as well as left arm pain and pain and

numbness in both hands. She stated that the pain in her back takes her breath away and

that her left shoulder is limited as far as being able to lift. She testified that she takes

medications, including Oxycontin, Oxycodone, Flexeril, Lyrica, and Cymbalta, and

that she has undergone injections to her arm, neck, and back. She noted that she has

not returned to work but would be interested in working if she were physically able.

She stated, however, that even light tasks, such as making dinner or folding clothes,

cause her extreme pain, requiring her to take her prescription medications, which in

turn makes her drowsy and feel the need to sleep. (WCJ’s Findings of Fact Nos. 4-5.)

Concerning the LMS/EPA, Claimant testified that she attempted to apply

to all six positions, but that she was not offered any position. Regarding the customer

service representative position with A. Rifkin, Claimant testified that, although she

lacked a customer background and was unable to type 35 words per minute while

talking on the telephone, she called the number listed in the LMS/EPA on May 28,

2014. She subsequently submitted an online application on June 4, 2014, and received

an email the following day informing her that she would be contacted if more

information was needed or to schedule an interview; however, she never received any

follow up. With respect to the account representative position with Telerex, she

5

testified that, beginning on May 28, 2014, she attempted to phone Telerex nine times,

but the line was always busy. Regarding the customer service position with Navient,

she testified that, although she felt she lacked the necessary skills for the position, she

reached out to the employer on May 28, 2014, and spoke with a representative in human

resources, but did not submit an application until June 2, 2014. Claimant stated that

she received an email advising her that she was not hired around June 9, 2014.

Regarding the customer sales position with Bank of America, Claimant testified that,

on June 2, 2014, she tried to contact the designated contact person listed on the

LMS/EPA, B.J. Berrettini, but was told there was no such person there. She stated that

she gave her contact information but did not receive a call back. Id. Concerning the

customer service and night auditor positions at Hampton Inn, Claimant testified she

initially reached out on May 28, 2014, but was told that the contact person no longer

worked there. The following day, a woman named Staci Borgia called her back and,

according to Claimant, told her that the two positions were no longer available but that

Hampton Inn did have two other positions available: breakfast host and housekeeper.

(R.R. at 188a-91a, 203a-11a; WCJ’s Finding of Fact No. 6.)4

In support of her position, Claimant submitted the deposition testimony of

her treating physician, Dean Mozeleski, M.D. Board-certified in physical and

rehabilitation medicine, Dr. Mozeleski testified that he first treated Claimant in

February of 2011. He testified that because the LMS/EPA was based upon an

examination in September of 2013, he based his testimony on his own examination in

August of 2013. Dr. Mozeleski testified that Claimant’s condition, for which she took

a variety of medications, had progressively worsened since he began treating her. Dr.

4

Throughout her testimony, Claimant relied upon written notes documenting her experience

in applying for the six positions. These notes were admitted into evidence without objection. (R.R.

at 206a.)

6

Mozeleski testified that, as of August of 2013, Claimant’s range of motion in her neck

had decreased in both directions with rotation. He stated that she had maximum

foraminal encroachment, which placed pressure on the neck nerves and radiated pain

into her left arms. He noted that Claimant had a decreased range of motion in her left

shoulder and numbness and tingling in her left arm, extending into the fourth and fifth

digits of her left hand. He testified that he reviewed a cervical MRI from April 24,

2013, which indicated findings consistent with the C-5-7 two-level fusion. He stated

that there was no evidence of disc herniation because it had been surgically corrected

and that the MRI indicated some reversal of cervical lordosis but no intrinsic cord

abnormality. (WCJ’s Finding of Fact No. 10.)

Dr. Mozeleski then testified about an October of 2013 evaluation of

Claimant which indicated decreased rotation in her neck in both directions. He stated

that Claimant also had left arm weakness and some numbness in both hands. He

testified that he saw Claimant in December of 2013, and on April 2, 2014, and, because

she had been suffering from these problems for some time, he labelled it “chronic neck

and left shoulder pain, chronic cervical radiculitis, and chronic neck and upper thoracic

scapular pain.” (R.R. at 26a.) Claimant returned for an office visit on April 25, 2014,

at which time Dr. Mozeleski released Claimant to light, sedentary work with

restrictions because Claimant was only able to sit, stand, or walk for up to a combined

total of two hours, with change in position as tolerated. According to Dr. Mozeleski,

Claimant was able to lift no more than ten pounds, and then, only occasionally. He

stated Claimant would be able to tolerate occasional bending, reaching, squatting,

rotating, twisting, or kneeling, but no climbing. He believed Claimant was capable of

performing simple grasping, pushing, pulling, and fine manipulation, but only for short

7

periods. He did not believe she was capable of returning to work on a full-time basis.

(WCJ’s Finding of Fact No. 11.)

Dr. Mozeleski testified that he examined Claimant most recently on

November 12, 2014, and she presented with persistent neck and mid-back pain, pain

into the left shoulder and mid-back into the left upper arm, and pain into her fingers

and the inside part of her hand. As of that last appointment, Dr. Mozeleski testified

that Claimant continued taking Oxycontin and Oxycodone. Regarding the six positions

on the LMS/EPA, he stated that he reviewed each position and found that Claimant

was not capable of performing any of the positions, noting that all were full-time. He

concluded that these positions were not suitable because they included repetitive

movements even when sitting, which Claimant could not perform. (WCJ’s Finding of

Fact No. 11.)

Claimant also submitted the deposition testimony of Carmine Abraham,

who testified that she was certified to perform vocational assessments under the Act.

She stated that after Claimant’s case was assigned to her in April of 2015, she reviewed

materials from Mr. Smith, including the LMS/EPA, along with medical records and

reports. Ms. Abraham stated that she was aware of Claimant’s formal schooling, which

included a high school diploma and some business courses at Keystone Community

College, and that she believed the business courses Claimant had taken in 1978 and

1979 had no vocational relevance to Claimant’s employability in 2014. She found that

Claimant’s LPN position was considered a medium-skilled position, requiring skills

that were medical in nature. Ms. Abraham also found that Claimant did not have “a

whole lot of skills in regard to working with computers or in regard to supervisor skills

in regard to hiring or firing people or interviewing people.” (R.R. at 77a; WCJ’s

Finding of Fact No. 12.)

8

Ms. Abraham was able to personally meet with employees from four of

the five companies identified in the LMS/EPA in March and April of 2015, and upon

review, she rejected each of them. Ms. Abraham determined that, in her opinion, the

A. Rifkin position would not have been appropriate for Claimant because she would

have been unable to perform the job duties by typing with one finger at a time while

looking at the keyboard. Ms. Abraham explained that, because Claimant would have

to simultaneously attend to customers and provide them with the information they

needed, the call would take too long. Additionally, based on Claimant’s educational

and vocational history, Ms. Abraham believed Claimant would not have been qualified

for the position.

With regard to the Telerex position, Ms. Abraham explained that the

contact person listed on the LMS/EPA indicated that the position was in a call-center

type of environment where employees make and receive calls. Ms. Abraham noted

that the calls were very time sensitive and were monitored by supervisors.

Additionally, she testified, Telerex was looking for a candidate with computer skills in

programs such as Windows OS, Internet, Microsoft Word, and the like. Ms. Abraham

concluded that this position would have been outside Claimant’s vocational and

physical capabilities because it would not have allowed Claimant to physically change

positions.

Ms. Abraham testified that the Navient position was also in a call-center

environment, which was very similar to the Telerex position because the calls were

monitored by supervisors and very time sensitive. The skills necessary for this

position, Ms. Abraham testified, included navigating the internet and working with two

computer screens simultaneously while typing. Further, Ms. Abraham testified that the

position required the candidate to be literate in Word and Windows programs, and that

9

the position would not have allowed Claimant to continuously get up and move around.

Ms. Abraham concluded that Claimant lacked the necessary skills for this position.

(WCJ’s Finding of Fact No. 13.)

With regard to the Bank of America position, Ms. Abraham stated that, on

March 6, 2015, she went to the employer’s address but was only able to speak to a

security guard employed by a third party company, who indicated that there was no

human resource or recruiting department at that facility and, upon searching the

computer system, stated that there was no employee in the system with the name of the

recruiter listed in the LMS/EPA. Ms. Abraham then called Bank of America’s

corporate headquarters and was told that all hiring was done online, that the company

could not give out contact information for recruiters or human resource employees, and

that a recruiter only becomes available once an online application is submitted.

Although she was unable to obtain further information about the position, based on her

review of the LMS/EPA materials, Ms. Abraham testified that Claimant lacked the

qualifications for this position.

Finally, Ms. Abraham described the customer service position with

Hampton Inn as a guest service agent or front desk clerk, which required the ability to

use a computer and proficiency in typing. Ms. Abraham doubted whether Claimant

would have been able to stand or sit as needed during the shift because the employer

had indicated that it could not accommodate her, since being on one’s feet was an

essential function of that job. The other position with Hampton Inn was as a night

auditor, which Ms. Abraham described as having the same duties as the guest service

agent, with a significant difference being that the employee would have to complete

the paperwork over the night hours. Ms. Abraham explained that, because the positions

required the employee to stand for prolonged periods, Claimant would not have been

10

capable of performing either of the positions with Hampton Inn. (WCJ’s Finding of

Fact No. 13.)

The WCJ found Dr. Chiavacci and Mr. Smith more credible than Dr.

Mozeleski and Ms. Abraham. He noted that both physicians found Claimant capable

of returning to some type of work. The WCJ found it significant that Claimant

“candidly admitted” to applying to some positions that she found on her own via

newspaper ads, including a position at True Horse, which involved twelve-hour shifts,

a cleaning position at Sovereign Bank, a nursing position at Comfort Keepers, and a

position as a crossing guard. (WCJ’s Finding of Fact No. 15.)

Although the WCJ did not make a specific credibility finding regarding

Claimant’s testimony about her experience in applying for the six positions, he did

find: “Any testimony therefore from [C]laimant at [the] hearing that she did not believe

that she was capable of working is indeed not at all consistent, even with Dr. Mozeleski

finding [C]laimant capable of returning to some type of work.” (WCJ’s Finding of

Fact No. 15.) Further, the WCJ found that it was “disingenuous” for Claimant to

maintain that she had no transferable skills given her long career in the medical field,

“where [C]laimant had abundant responsibilities in attending to patients’ daily care for

many years,” which included “previous experience overseeing, training and instructing

other individuals.” (WCJ’s Finding of Fact No. 15.)

The WCJ specifically rejected the conclusion of Ms. Abraham that

Claimant lacked the skills necessary for any of the six jobs, finding that “[C]laimant

nevertheless credibly acknowledged during her work as a nurse performing a variety

of tasks in a high pressure environment including reading medical orders and

dispensing medications to patients.” (WCJ’s Finding of Fact No. 15). Accordingly,

the WCJ found that Claimant had a weekly earning capacity of $320.00 which resulted

11

in a weekly wage loss of $886.71, thereby entitling Claimant to partial disability

benefits of $591.14 per week, effective June 10, 2014, the date the six positions were

approved by Dr. Chiavacci. (WCJ’s Findings of Fact Nos. 14-15.)

In light of the above, the WCJ granted Employer’s modification petition.

The WCJ noted that Employer and/or Insurer remained responsible for payment of

Claimant’s reasonable and necessary medical expenses related to the work injury.

(WCJ’s Findings of Fact Nos. 15-16; Conclusions of Law Nos. 2-3.)

Claimant appealed the decision to the Board, arguing that the six jobs

could not be considered actually open and available if Claimant tried to apply and was

unsuccessful. She also questioned how she could have any earning capacity given that

she had tried to apply but could not obtain any of the positions. By opinion and order

dated July 1, 2016, the Board rejected Claimant’s arguments and affirmed the WCJ,

applying the decision of our Supreme Court in Phoenixville Hospital v. Workers’

Compensation Appeal Board (Shoap), 81 A.3d 830 (Pa. 2013).

Claimant filed a petition for review with this Court,5 raising the same

arguments and emphasizing that the WCJ’s “reliance on the assertion that the positions

were open and available at the time [] the [LMS/EPA] was conducted,” (Claimant’s

brief at 29), was misplaced since Claimant’s testimony established that the jobs “were

not actually open to [Claimant] when she applied,” (Claimant’s brief at 30), and thus

the WCJ’s finding was not in accordance with the standards set forth in Phoenixville

Hospital.

5

Our scope of review is limited to determining whether Findings of Fact are supported by

substantial evidence, whether an error of law has been committed, or whether constitutional rights

have been violated. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. §704; Meadow Lakes

Apartments v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Spencer), 894 A.2d 214, 216 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2006).

12

Discussion

In a workers’ compensation proceeding, the WCJ is the ultimate fact

finder and is the sole authority for determining the weight and credibility of evidence.

Lombardo v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Topps Company, Inc.), 698 A.2d

1378, 1381 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). “As such, the WCJ is free to accept or reject the

testimony of any witness, including medical witnesses, in whole or in part.” Id. The

WCJ’s findings will not be disturbed on appeal when they are supported by substantial,

competent evidence. Greenwich Collieries v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board

(Buck), 664 A.2d 703, 706 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). “Substantial evidence is such relevant

evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a finding.”

Berardelli v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Bureau of Personnel, State

Workmen’s Insurance Fund), 578 A.2d 1016, 1018 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990).

Moreover, where both parties present evidence, it is irrelevant that the

record contains evidence which supports a finding contrary to that made by the WCJ;

rather, the pertinent inquiry is whether evidence exists that supports the WCJ’s

findings. Hoffmaster v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Senco Products, Inc.),

721 A.2d 1152, 1155 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).

Additionally, on appeal, all inferences drawn from the evidence shall be

taken in favor of the party prevailing before the WCJ. Krumins Roofing and Siding v.

Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Libby), 575 A.2d 656, 659 (Pa. Cmwlth.

1990).

This is a case of first impression regarding the rights of claimants and

employers under section 306(b) of the Act after our Supreme Court’s decision in

Phoenixville Hospital. Claimant argues that if she applies for a position listed on the

LMS/EPA but does not get the job, the employer has not proven an earning capacity,

13

and so a modification petition must be denied. Conversely, Employer argues that a

claimant’s testimony that she applied unsuccessfully to the position is relevant but not

dispositive, that is, the WCJ shall admit evidence of the claimant’s unsuccessful efforts

but he or she is not automatically compelled to reject the earning capacity found in the

LMS/EPA.

Section 306(b)(1) allows wage loss benefits to be reduced to two-thirds of

the difference between a claimant’s average weekly wage and his or her “earning

power,” and the resulting partial disability rate shall be capped at 500 weeks.6 Section

306(b)(2) provides in pertinent part:

‘Earning power’ shall be determined by the work the

employee is capable of performing and shall be based upon

expert opinion evidence which includes job listings with

agencies of the department, private job placement agencies

and advertisements in the usual employment area. Disability

partial in character shall apply if the employee is able to

perform his previous work or can, considering the employee’s

residual productive skill, education, age and work experience,

engage in any other kind of substantial gainful employment

which exists in the usual employment area in which the

employee lives within this Commonwealth . . . . If the

employer has a specific job vacancy the employee is capable

of performing, the employer shall offer such job to the

employee.

77 P.S. §512(2).

In Phoenixville Hospital, our Supreme Court addressed the situation of a

claimant who was the subject of two LMS/EPAs, and who alleged that she had applied

to all the jobs set forth in each LMS/EPA, and was not offered any position from any

of the employers. The WCJ held that all the jobs were compatible with the claimant’s

working restrictions and relevant geographic area, and even though the WCJ rejected

6

77 P.S. §512(1).

14

the claimant’s medical and vocational witnesses, he denied employer’s modification

petition because the claimant “ha[d] established that in good-faith [sic], she followed

through on all the jobs referred to her by [e]mployer and that none of the referrals

resulted in an offer of employment.” Id. at 834. The Board affirmed, but was reversed

by this Court, which held that what was decisive under section 306(b) was not whether

the claimant applied for and received a job offer; rather, the question was whether the

jobs identified in the LMS/EPA were actually open and available at the time of the

LMS/EPA. Phoenixville Hospital v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Shoap),

2 A.3d 689, 697-98 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), reversed, 81 A.3d 830 (Pa. 2013).

On appeal from this Court, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the

key to understanding section 306(b) was what the legislature meant by the phrase,

“substantial gainful employment that exists.” 81 A.3d at 842. Thus, although

“[s]ection 306(b) does not require that the claimant be offered a job,” an employer may

prevail on a modification petition under section 306(b) only if it proves “the existence

of meaningful employment opportunities, and not the simple identification of jobs

found in want ads or employment listings.” Id. at 842-43 (emphasis in original).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court reasoned, “evidence regarding the claimant’s actual

experience with the employers identified in the employer’s labor market surveys may

lend support for establishing contentions along these lines [that is, along the lines of

proof of substantial gainful employment].” Id. at 844. Further, “[t]he jobs identified

by the employer’s expert . . . must thus be those jobs that are actually open and

potentially available, not simply jobs that are already filled with existing employees.”

Id. at 843. The phrase “actually open and potentially available” is overcome by a

claimant if he or she has a “reasonable opportunity” to apply for the job on the

LMS/EPA, but the job is no longer available; “[i]f the job is already filled, it does not

15

‘exist,’ to afford [s]ection 306(b)’s language its commonly understood meaning.” Id.

at 846. Therefore, the Supreme Court not only reversed but also remanded, so that the

claimant could be afforded the opportunity “to submit evidence regarding her or his

experience in pursuing the jobs identified” in the LMS/EPA. Id. at 845. Such evidence,

concluded the Court, “is undeniably relevant” in a case involving section 306(b),

although “not dispositive of the earning power inquiry.” Id. at 846.

Generally, the employer or insurer has a threshold burden in cases under

section 306(b) to prove: (1) disability partial in character; and, (2) no specific job

vacancy with the date-of-injury employer.7 Once an employer or insurer proves these

prerequisites, the burden of proof in a modification petition based on section 306(b)

remains with the employer to establish a claimant’s “earning power,” that is, whether

“the employee is able to perform his [or her] previous work or can, considering the

employee’s residual productive skill, education, age and work experience, engage in

any other kind of substantial gainful employment which exists in the usual employment

area in which the employee lives within this Commonwealth.” 77 P.S. §512(2). Under

the Act, such proof must be established by a “vocational expert who is selected by the

department [of Labor and Industry] through regulation.”8 77 P.S. §512(2). That

vocational expert establishes a claimant’s earning power.9

If the employer meets the prerequisites and proffers the report and

testimony from the vocational expert, the WCJ must consider the qualifications of the

7

In section 123.301 of its regulations, 34 Pa. Code §123.301, the Department of Labor and

Industry outlines what the employer must prove to establish a job vacancy and/or job offer.

8

The protocols for vocational experts have been established by the Department of Labor and

Industry in the regulations set forth at 34 Pa. Code §§123.201-123.205.

9

The requirements for “evidence of earning power” have been delineated by regulations set

forth at 34 Pa. Code §123.302, which restates section 306(b)(2) of the Act in substantial form.

16

vocational expert and evaluate the contents of the LMS/EPA as well as the testimony

of the vocational expert. Altoona Wholesaler Distributors v. Workers’ Compensation

Appeal Board (Bell), 841 A.2d 651, 653-54 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). The WCJ may accept

in whole or in part the evidence of the vocational expert. Marx v. Workers’

Compensation Appeal Board (United Parcel Service), 990 A.2d 107, 110 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2010) (affirming a WCJ’s decision which determined that some of the job referrals in

the LMS/EPA were appropriate to demonstrate earning power while others were not).

In the present case, the WCJ chose to find the testimony of Employer’s

vocational expert, Mr. Smith, more credible than the testimony of Claimant’s

vocational expert, Ms. Abraham.

Now, under the direction of our Supreme Court in Phoenixville Hospital,

if the WCJ accepts the evidence of the vocational expert, the WCJ’s inquiry is not over

if the claimant “submits evidence regarding her or his experience in pursuing the jobs

identified by the employer’s vocational expert witness.” 81 A.3d at 845. Evidence of

unsuccessful employment applications “is undeniably relevant to rebut the employer’s

argument that the positions identified were proof of the potentiality of a claimant’s

substantial gainful employment.” Id. at 846. In other words, a claimant may offer

evidence that the position was “filled by the time the claimant had had a reasonable

opportunity to apply for it. If the job is already filled, it does not ‘exist,’ to afford

[s]ection 306(b)’s language its commonly understood meaning.” Id.

In the present case, Employer met the prerequisites of section 306(b) and

the accompanying regulations, and also offered vocational evidence in the form of an

LMS/EPA and the testimony of Mr. Smith. The WCJ then allowed testimony from

Claimant to address the vocational expert’s evidence of job availability and earning

power. As the Board noted, “[t]he claimant may attack a labor market survey by

17

showing that the survey was based on faulty, false, or misleading information, and

evidence regarding the claimant’s experience in applying for the jobs may support such

a contention.” (Board op. at 7.) However, under Phoenixville Hospital, such evidence

from Claimant was “relevant,” but “not dispositive.” 81 A.3d at 846.

As the WCJ noted here, Claimant’s work injury “date[d] back to 2010.”

(WCJ’s Finding of Fact No. 15.) The WCJ assessed the credibility of Claimant and

her vocational expert, and rejected their testimony as to earning power and transferable

skills, finding Claimant’s testimony contradictory and disingenuous, particularly since

Claimant admitted to applying for jobs more difficult than those listed on the

LMS/EPA, which she contended she could not perform. (WCJ’s Finding of Fact No.

15.) Despite the surgery and treatment, the WCJ emphasized that both Dr. Mozeleski

and Dr. Chiavacci “found [C]laimant capable of returning to some type of work.”

(WCJ’s Finding of Fact No. 15.) The WCJ assessed the credibility of the medical

experts and found Dr. Chiavacci, who approved the six jobs on the LMS/EPA, more

credible. He further found Mr. Smith credible and so found that the six positions on

the LMS/EPA were vocationally appropriate for Claimant. Moreover, the WCJ found

that, to the extent that Ms. Abraham concluded otherwise, testifying that Claimant was

not a good candidate for any of the positions, he rejected her testimony as not credible.

(WCJ’s Finding of Fact No. 15.)

Consequently, the WCJ found that Claimant had an earning power of

$320.00 weekly, on the low end of the earning capacity identified by Mr. Smith.

(WCJ’s Finding of Fact No. 15, Conclusion of Law No. 2.) We see no error on the part

of the WCJ in reaching this finding.

However, Phoenixville Hospital states that,

The statutory concept of “substantial gainful employment

which exists” would be meaningless with respect to a

18

claimant’s actual medical and vocational circumstances

unless the jobs identified by the employer’s expert witness,

which are used as the employer’s proof of earning power

under Section 306(b), remain open until such time as the

claimant is afforded a reasonable opportunity to apply for

them.

Phoenixville Hospital, 81 A.3d at 845.

Here, the WCJ accepted Employer’s evidence regarding the positions

identified in the LMS/EPA. As noted above, Claimant testified that she was only able

to contact three of the employers, and, of those three, she was only able to apply to two,

since the positions at Hampton Inn had been filled when she applied, which was 25

days, and in some cases, 27 days, after the receiving the LMS/EPA.10 Claimant’s

expert, Ms. Abraham, however, was able to get in touch and meet with two of the listed

contacts that Claimant testified she could not reach nearly a year after Claimant

attempted to contact them. (R.R. at 178a-79a, 188a-89a.) We note that this is precisely

the sort of testimony that Phoenixville Hospital mandated claimants be permitted to

present. The Court stated:

Evidence that the claimant pursued but failed to obtain

gainful employment with the employers identified by the

expert witness is undeniably relevant to rebut the employer's

argument that the positions identified were proof of the

potentiality of a claimant's substantial gainful employment.

However, such evidence is, of course, not dispositive of the

earning power inquiry. Moreover, a claimant must be

afforded the opportunity to submit evidence that she or he

did not obtain employment because the position identified by

the employer's expert witness was already filled by the time

the claimant had had a reasonable opportunity to apply for it.

If the job is already filled, it does not “exist,” to afford

10

The LMS/EPA is dated May 8, 2014. (R.R. at 304a.) Claimant’s notes indicated that she

called five of the employers on May 28, 2014, and one on June 2, 2014, and that she submitted

applications to two of them on June 2, 2014, and June 4, 2014. (R.R. at 188a-91a.)

19

Section 306(b)'s language its commonly understood

meaning.

Id. at 846.

Although the Phoenixville Hospital Court did not further develop the

concept of “a reasonable opportunity to apply,” the Court made clear that “[t]he WCJ

is charged with finding the facts necessary to support her or his decision that disposes

of the motion to be decided. Whether a claimant had a ‘reasonable opportunity’ to apply

and did, in fact, apply for an identified position (and whether the job was already filled

by the relevant time) are factual matters that the WCJ is fully qualified to determine.”

Id.

Here, the Claimant presented evidence attempting to show that the

LMS/EPA was based upon incorrect information in that the jobs were not open and

available because she attempted to apply to all of the positions but was either turned

down, told the position was unavailable, or unable to reach the contact person. The

WCJ evaluated Claimant’s testimony but did not find it was sufficient to demonstrate

that Employer had not met its burden. Thus, while Employer maintains an ongoing

burden to show that the jobs remained open and available, under Phoenixville Hospital,

a claimant can present evidence to the contrary. As Employer stated in its brief, “The

fact that [C]laimant did not secure a position with one of the potential employers does

not negate the findings of the WCJ, which found the positions were within her

capabilities and were open and available to her, specifically finding that [C]laimant

was not credible about her incapacity to work at each of these jobs.” (Employer’s brief

at 34.)

Hence, the WCJ found that the Employer met its burden and specifically

stated,

20

After having made a careful review of the evidence of

record[,] this Judge has accepted as more credible and

convincing the findings and opinions of both Dr. Chiavacci

as well as Mr. Smith and . . . to the extent that either Dr.

Mozeleski or Ms. Abraham finds the [C]laimant either not

capable of physically performing the positions nor the

positions being vocationally suitable for the [C]laimant, their

testimony is less credible and less persuasive.

(WCJ’s Finding of Fact No. 14.) In conclusion, the WCJ stated, “Clearly therefore

there being positions relied upon by the [E]mployer herein that were physically and

vocationally appropriate for [C]laimant and open and available to her[,] the

[E]mployer’s [m]odification [p]etition should be granted . . . .” (WCJ’s Finding of Fact

No. 15) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, accepting the WCJ’s credibility determinations as outlined

above, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the WCJ’s finding

that Employer established “meaningful employment opportunities” under section

306(b) of the Act. Id.

Conclusion

We reject Claimant’s argument that the mere presentation of evidence of

unsuccessful application to jobs listed in a LMS/EPA mandated a finding that the

positions were not open and available and that she lacked any earning capacity. Rather,

as our Supreme Court stated in Phoenixville Hospital, such evidence from Claimant

was “relevant” but not “dispositive” with regard to the earning power inquiry. 81 A.3d

at 846.

Furthermore, although the Claimant’s testimony on the application

process is the sort of evidence that Phoenixville Hospital now requires a claimant be

21

permitted to present, in this case, the WCJ found that it failed to show that the jobs

were not vocationally suitable or actually open and available.

Accordingly, the Board did not err in affirming the decision and order of

the WCJ.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

22

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Laurie Valenta, :

Petitioner :

: No. 1302 C.D. 2016

v. :

:

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (Abington Manor Nursing :

Home and Rehab and Liberty :

Insurance Company), :

Respondents :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 7th day of December, 2017, the July 1, 2016 order of

the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board is hereby affirmed.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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