The opinion
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-10870 October 12, 2005
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 04-80042-CV-DTKH
KAREN KINGDOM,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RIVERA BEACH, CITY OF,
a Florida Municipal Corporation,
Defendant,
CLAUDE COSBY, III,
individually and as police officer
for the City of Riviera Beach, FL,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(October 12, 2005)
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant/Defendant, Claude Cosby, III (“Officer Cosby”), appeals from the
district court’s order denying his motion for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity in an action brought by Appellee/Plaintiff, Karen Kingdom
(“Kingdom”), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
We review a district court’s order denying summary judgment based on
qualified immunity de novo. Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir.
1999).
After reviewing the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we conclude that
the district court correctly denied summary judgment to Officer Cosby because
Officer Cosby had notice that his actions toward Kingdom violated her clearly
established Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure. In
Broward v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 109 S. Ct. 1378, 103 L. Ed. 2d 628
(1989), the United States Supreme Court defined a “seizure” within the Fourth
Amendment context as a “governmental termination of freedom of movement
through means intentionally applied.” Id. at 597, 109 S. Ct. at 1381. In Inyo, the
Supreme Court held that a police road block intentionally created to stop a fleeing
felon met this definition, where the physical obstacle of the road block had the
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intended effect. Id. at 598-99, 109 S. Ct. at 1382. In the present case, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Kingdom, we agree with the district court
that sufficient evidence exists from which a jury could find that officer Cosby
commanded innocent motorists to stop through display of his police authority and
that his conduct constituted a “means intentionally applied” to seize Kingdom and
others. We also agree with the district court’s finding that Kingdom’s Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure was clearly established in
May, 2002.
In sum, because we see no merit to any of the arguments Cosby makes in
this appeal, we affirm the district court’s order denying his motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity.
AFFIRMED.
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