Opinion

Brenda Diedrich v. Nancy Berryhill

  • 874 F.3d 634
  • 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 21266
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Oct 26, 2017
Status
Published
On the bench
Tashima, Gould, Rawlinson
Nature of suit
Civil
Cited by
504 cases
Authority
More cited than 81.1%

holding that a fiancé’s “personal relationship with [the claimant was] not a valid reason to discount his observations,” and noting that “to do so contradicts our insistence that, regardless of whether they are interested parties, friends and family members in a position to observe a claimant’s symptoms and daily activities are competent to testify as to his or her condition”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that a fiancé’s “personal relationship with [the claimant was] not a valid reason to discount his observations,” and noting that “to do so contradicts our insistence that, regardless of whether they are interested parties, friends and family members in a position to observe a claimant’s symptoms and daily activities are competent to testify as to his or her condition”
  • holding the 12 ALJ erred by rejecting plaintiff’s testimony about symptoms and activities of daily living, 13 observing that mental health symptoms may wax and wane; and even if the plaintiff is 14 able to perform some of the daily activities of living, they are “likely not doing them with 15 the consistency and persistence that a work environment requires
  • finding that an orthopedist’s lack of reporting on claimant’s mental health impairments “says little about the extent to which [claimant] may in fact have been suffering from such symptoms” because one would not necessarily expect an orthopedist to note them in their report
  • holding that lay testimony is evidence unless the ALJ “expressly determines to 4 disregard such testimony and gives reasons germane to each witness for doing so.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRENDA M. DIEDRICH, No. 14-36070

Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v. 6:13-cv-01501-

CL

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting

Commissioner Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee. OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Owen M. Panner, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 5, 2017

Portland, Oregon

Filed October 26, 2017

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, Ronald M. Gould,

and Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Gould;

Dissent by Judge Rawlinson

2 DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL

SUMMARY *

Social Security

The panel affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the

district court’s order affirming the Commissioner of Social

Security’s denial of claimant’s application for Social

Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits under Title

II of the Social Security Act.

Unlike Supplemental Security Income benefits under

Title XVI of the Social Security Act, SSDI benefits are

limited to a certain period of insurance determined by the

amount of claimant’s previously taxed earnings. The

Commissioner determined that claimant had become

disabled but an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that

her disability did not begin during the period in which she

was insured for SSDI benefits.

The panel held that the ALJ erred by not calling a

medical advisor at the hearing, by giving too little weight to

the observations of claimant’s fiancé, and by finding that

claimant was only partially credible. Specifically, the panel

held that pursuant to Social Security Ruling 83-20, the

Commissioner erred by not calling a medical advisor at the

hearing to help determine the precise onset date of

claimant’s disability under the circumstances – namely,

there were large gaps in the medical records documenting a

slowly progressive impairment, and an ALJ’s assessment of

the disability onset date would be mere speculation without

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL 3

the aid of a medical expert. Concerning the ALJ’s finding

that claimant’s fiancé’s observations merited “little weight,”

the panel held that none of the ALJ’s three reasons for

discounting the observations were germane. Concerning the

ALJ’s finding that claimant was only a “partially credible

witness,” the panel held none of the ALJ’s given reasons –

that reports by an orthopedist and therapist did not mention

mental health symptoms, that there were no observations of

claimant’s different personalities, and that claimant’s daily

activities involved a wide range of activities – was clear and

convincing.

The panel concluded that none of the ALJ’s errors were

harmless. The panel remanded for further proceedings with

instructions that the ALJ’s decision be vacated, and that the

district court remand to the ALJ with instructions that the

ALJ should call a medical advisor and proceed in a manner

consistent with this opinion.

Judge Rawlinson dissented because, applying the

deferential substantial evidence standard of review, she

agreed with the magistrate judge and the district court that

the ALJ’s decision was free of legal error and supported by

substantial evidence.

4 DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL

COUNSEL

Max Rae (argued), Salem, Oregon, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

David Burdett (argued) and John C. Lamont, Special

Assistant United States Attorneys; Adrian Lee Brown,

Assistant United States Attorney; David Morado, Regional

Chief Counsel, Region X; Office of the General Counsel,

Social Security Administration, Seattle, Washington; for

Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Brenda M. Diedrich appeals the district court’s order

affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s (the

“Commissioner”) denial of Diedrich’s application for Social

Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits under Title

II of the Social Security Act. The Commissioner determined

that Diedrich had become disabled, but an Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that her disability did not begin

during the period in which she was insured for SSDI

benefits. We hold that the ALJ erred in its assessment (1) by

not calling a medical advisor at the hearing; (2) by giving too

little weight to the observations of Diedrich’s fiancé; and

(3) by finding that Diedrich was only partially credible. We

reverse in part on these grounds, and remand. In a separately

filed memorandum disposition, we reject several other

challenges Diedrich raises related to the ALJ’s decision,

affirming in part the ALJ’s decision.

DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL 5

I

We consider a claimant with a troubled past and serious

medical conditions. Brenda Diedrich had a rough childhood:

Her upbringing was marred by drug addiction, sexual and

emotional abuse from her father, suicide attempts, and a

marriage at seventeen that resulted in domestic violence.

Since 2002, Diedrich has been arrested at least six times, and

has been jailed twice. This background doubtless plays

some role in her medical conditions.

Diedrich has applied for disability benefits several times.

At issue in this appeal is her third application, filed on

August 26, 2009, seeking both SSDI benefits under Title II

of the Social Security Act and Supplemental Security

Income (“SSI”) benefits under Title XVI of the act. See

42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (Title II), 1381 et seq. (Title XVI).

SSI benefits are based on needs. To be eligible, a

claimant must be “aged, blind or disabled,” and must have

income and resources under certain thresholds. See id.

§ 1382(a). In contrast, SSDI benefits are based on earnings.

The claimant must be disabled, and must have contributed to

a federal insurance trust fund through deductions in his or

her wages. See id. § 401(b); see generally Bowen v.

Galbreath, 485 U.S. 74, 75 (1988). Unlike SSI benefits,

SSDI benefits are limited to a certain period of insurance.

The length of this insured period is determined by the

amount of the claimant’s previously taxed earnings. See

42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1). The definition of “disability” for SSI

benefits is the same as for SSDI benefits. Compare

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (Title II), with id.

§ 1382c(a)(3)(A) (Title XVI).

On January 29, 2010, a Disability Determination

Services (“DDS”) psychological consultant concluded that

6 DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL

as of the date of Diedrich’s third application, August 26,

2009, Diedrich was disabled due to bipolar and anxiety

disorders. This entitled Diedrich to SSI benefits. But

Diedrich had not been insured for SSDI benefits since June

30, 2008. Because the psychological consultant concluded

that Diedrich’s disability began after June 30, 2008,

Diedrich’s application for SSDI benefits was denied.

Diedrich sought administrative review of this denial of

SSDI benefits. She argued that the psychological consultant

determined the wrong onset date of her disability.

Specifically, she claimed that her disability began not on

August 26, 2009, but much earlier, on October 1, 2002.

Diedrich asserted that because her disability began before

her Title II insurance expired on June 30, 2008, she was

entitled to SSDI benefits.

On December 14, 2011, an ALJ held a hearing on

Diedrich’s benefits denial. The relevant evidence at the

hearing included medical records from several of Diedrich’s

treating physicians. These records showed that, in addition

to certain physical conditions, as early as July 2003 Diedrich

suffered serious mental health symptoms. These symptoms

included periods of extreme hyperactivity and recklessness,

volatile moods, weeks-long bouts of depression,

hallucinations, memory problems, trouble concentrating,

panic attacks, social anxiety, and blackouts during which

Diedrich would experience personality changes. At various

points, Diedrich’s doctors have diagnosed her with bipolar

disorder, depression, attention deficit disorder, post-

traumatic stress disorder, agoraphobia, and split

personalities, among other conditions.

Diedrich testified at the hearing. She described how her

mental health symptoms hampered her functioning in daily

life. Diedrich’s fiancé, David Niebaum, also testified. He

DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL 7

explained that he had known Diedrich since the end of

September 2008 and saw her every day. He described how

Diedrich would experience manic-depressive cycles and

take on alternate personalities. Niebaum also submitted a

third-party function report, in which he explained how

Diedrich’s inability to maintain a routine, mood swings, poor

memory, trouble concentrating, anxiety, and other

symptoms left her dependent on him for daily help. A

vocational expert testified at the hearing as well, but the ALJ

did not call a medical advisor.

The ALJ denied SSDI benefits for Diedrich. The ALJ

gave “little weight” to Niebaum’s observations, and found

that Diedrich was merely a “partially credible witness.” The

ALJ concluded that Diedrich was “not under a disability . . .

at any time from October 1, 2002, the alleged onset date,

through June 30, 2008, the date last insured.” Diedrich filed

this action in the district court, seeking review of the

Commissioner’s final decision that denied Diedrich SSDI

benefits. A magistrate judge recommended that the

Commissioner’s decision be affirmed. The district court

adopted the Findings and Recommendations of the

magistrate judge, affirmed the Commissioner’s decision,

and dismissed the case. Diedrich timely appealed.

II

We have jurisdiction to decide this appeal under

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s

decision affirming the Commissioner’s denial of benefits.

Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th

Cir. 2006). We may set aside the Commissioner’s benefits

denial if the ALJ committed legal error or reached a decision

not supported by substantial evidence. Id.

8 DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL

III

A

Diedrich contends that the ALJ committed legal error by

not calling a medical advisor at the hearing. She argues that

a medical advisor was necessary to help the ALJ sift through

her voluminous medical records and determine the correct

onset date of her disability.

The ALJ is responsible for studying the record and

resolving any conflicts or ambiguities in it. Treichler v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir.

2014). But in circumstances where the ALJ must determine

the date of disability onset and medical evidence from the

relevant time period is unavailable or inadequate, Social

Security Ruling (“SSR”) 83-20 states that the ALJ should

call a medical advisor. “Social Security Rulings [] do not

carry the ‘force of law,’ but they are binding on ALJs

nonetheless. They reflect the official interpretation of the

[Social Security Administration] and are entitled to some

deference as long as they are consistent with the Social

Security Act and regulations.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d

1104, 1113 n.5 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

In relevant part, SSR 83-20 states:

With slowly progressive impairments, it is

sometimes impossible to obtain medical

evidence establishing the precise date an

impairment became disabling. Determining

the proper onset date is particularly difficult,

when, for example, the alleged onset and the

date last worked are far in the past and

adequate medical records are not available.

DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL 9

In such cases, it will be necessary to infer the

onset date . . . .

....

At the hearing, the [ALJ] should call on the

services of a medical advisor when onset

must be inferred.

Relying on SSR 83-20, we have held that where a record is

lacking and ambiguous as to the onset date of disability, “the

ALJ must call a medical expert to assist in determining the

onset date.” Armstrong v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

160 F.3d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 1998); see also DeLorme v.

Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 848 (9th Cir. 1991) (“In the event

that the medical evidence is not definite concerning the onset

date and medical inferences need to be made, SSR 83-20

requires the administrative law judge to call upon the

services of a medical advisor and to obtain all evidence

which is available to make the determination.”); Morgan v.

Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam)

(reversing in part an ALJ’s determination of the onset date

of mental disorders because the ALJ did not receive the

assistance of a medical advisor).

This requirement makes sense. Sometimes, the onset of

disabilities occurs all at once, and the date of onset is clear.

For example, when a claimant is permanently injured in a car

wreck, there is rarely a dispute over the date of the crash.

But sometimes conditions build slowly over time. In such

cases, it helps to have medical expertise to determine when

the symptoms became severe enough so that the claimant

became disabled under Title II. See Morgan, 945 F.2d at

1081.

10 DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL

Here, the record shows that Diedrich did not see a

psychologist until years after her alleged onset date; there are

no mental health records for nearly two years surrounding

her date last insured, and the next available records

supported a finding of disability; and she suffered

inconsistent but increasingly severe symptoms over the

seven years between her alleged onset date and the disability

onset date found by the Commissioner. Because “the alleged

onset and the date last worked are far in the past and

adequate medical records are not available,” determining the

precise date on which Diedrich became disabled required an

informed inference. “Such an inference is not possible

without the assistance of a medical expert.” Id. at 1083.

The Commissioner relies on Sam v. Astrue to argue that

SSR 83-20 is inapplicable. 550 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2008) (per

curiam). In Sam, we held “that SSR 83-20 does not require

a medical expert where the ALJ explicitly finds that the

claimant has never been disabled.” 550 F.3d at 809. But the

ALJ here did not find that Diedrich was never disabled. In

fact, the ALJ could not have made such a finding because

Diedrich was already found disabled as of her SSI and SSDI

application date, August 26, 2009. Rather, the ALJ

concluded that Diedrich was “not under a disability . . . at

any time from October 1, 2002, the alleged onset date,

through June 30, 2008, the date last insured.” This differs

from the case in Sam, where the ALJ concluded that the

claimant “was not under a ‘disability’ . . . at any time

through the date of [the ALJ’s] decision.” Id. at 810 (internal

quotation marks omitted). We conclude that Sam does not

control here.

Finally, the district court held that the ALJ did not need

to call a medical advisor because psychological consultants

examined Diedrich’s medical records in reaching Diedrich’s

DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL 11

initial denial of SSDI benefits. But SSR 83-20 states that the

ALJ should call a medical advisor “[a]t the hearing.” It does

not say that the ALJ should rely on the previous work of

DDS consultants. Moreover, if analysis from DDS

consultants was a sufficient substitute for the testimony of a

medical advisor, then SSR 83-20 would be superfluous.

Applications for benefits are ordinarily reviewed by a

consultant long before an ALJ gets involved. Relying on the

initial review of DDS consultants also presents the practical

problem that those consultants do not have before them the

same record as the ALJ. In particular, such consultants do

not have access to the later-in-time testimony given at the

hearing. The consultant here, for example, did not have

access to the hearing testimony of either Diedrich or of

Niebaum because that testimony had not yet been given.

We hold that the Commissioner erred by not calling a

medical advisor at the hearing to help determine the precise

onset date of Diedrich’s disability under these

circumstances—that is, where there are large gaps in the

medical records documenting a slowly progressive

impairment and an ALJ’s assessment of the disability onset

date would be mere speculation without the aid of a medical

expert. Even with a medical advisor, the date of onset of

disability in this challenging case might have remained

somewhat debatable and mysterious. But with testimony

from a medical advisor, at least the ALJ could exercise an

informed judgment based on medical science.

B

We next address Diedrich’s contention that the ALJ

erred by giving “little weight” to Niebaum’s observations.

“Lay testimony as to a claimant’s symptoms is competent

evidence that an ALJ must take into account, unless he or

she expressly determines to disregard such testimony and

12 DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL

gives reasons germane to each witness for doing so.” Lewis

v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ listed

three reasons for giving Niebaum’s observations “little

weight”: (1) Niebaum had a close relationship with Diedrich,

which “likely influenced his opinion;” (2) the “overall

medical evidence” did not support Niebaum’s observations;

and (3) Niebaum’s observations did not begin until

September 2008, three month after Diedrich’s insurance for

SSDI benefits expired. We conclude that each of these

reasons is not germane as a reason to disregard Niebaum’s

observations.

First, Niebaum’s personal relationship with Diedrich is

not a valid reason to discount his observations. To do so

“contradicts our insistence that, regardless of whether they

are interested parties, friends and family members in a

position to observe a claimant’s symptoms and daily

activities are competent to testify as to his or her condition.”

Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694

(9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1289 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The

fact that a lay witness is a family member cannot be a ground

for rejecting his or her testimony. To the contrary, testimony

from lay witnesses who see the claimant every day is of

particular value; such lay witnesses will often be family

members.” (citation omitted)). Niebaum’s close relationship

with Diedrich is not a germane reason to discount the weight

of his observations.

Second, a lack of support from the “overall medical

evidence” is also not a proper basis for disregarding

Niebaum’s observations. See Bruce v. Astrue, 557 F.3d

1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Nor under our law could the

ALJ discredit [the witness’s] lay testimony as not supported

by medical evidence in the record.”). The fact that lay

DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL 13

testimony and third-party function reports may offer a

different perspective than medical records alone is precisely

why such evidence is valuable at a hearing. See Smolen,

80 F.3d at 1289 (holding that ALJ erred where the ALJ

rejected the testimony of claimant’s family members about

claimant’s symptoms because the medical records did not

corroborate those symptoms). A lack of support from

medical records is not a germane reason to give “little

weight” to those observations.

Third, although Niebaum’s observations began three

months after Diedrich’s insured period ended, his

observations are still relevant to show Diedrich’s symptoms

during that period. Absent a reason to think Diedrich

experienced a major symptom change in the three months

before she met Niebaum, it is a fair and reasonable inference

that the symptoms Niebaum observed were substantially

similar to the symptoms Diedrich experienced before June

30, 2008. See Tobeler v. Colvin, 749 F.3d 830, 833 (9th Cir.

2014) (“[Lay witness’s] statement that [claimant] was

incapable of working in 2001 is relevant to his ability to

work in 1999, at least in the absence of any evidence that

[claimant’s] condition worsened between 1999 and 2001.”);

cf. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 832 (9th Cir. 1995)

(“[M]edical evaluations made after the expiration of a

claimant’s insured status are relevant to an evaluation of the

preexpiration condition.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)), as amended (Apr. 9, 1996). That Niebaum’s

observations began three months after Diedrich’s insured

period ended is not a germane reason to give those

observations “little weight.”

We conclude that none of the ALJ’s three reasons for

discounting Niebaum’s observations is germane. We hold

14 DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL

that the ALJ erred by giving “little weight” to Niebaum’s

observations.

C

Finally, we address Diedrich’s contention that the ALJ

erred in finding that she was a “partially credible witness.”

In assessing the credibility of a claimant’s

testimony regarding subjective pain or the

intensity of symptoms, the ALJ engages in a

two-step analysis. First, the ALJ must

determine whether there is objective medical

evidence of an underlying impairment which

could reasonably be expected to produce the

pain or other symptoms alleged. If the

claimant has presented such evidence, and

there is no evidence of malingering, then the

ALJ must give specific, clear and convincing

reasons in order to reject the claimant’s

testimony about the severity of the

symptoms.

Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). The ALJ gave four reasons for finding

Diedrich’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms

only “partially credible”: (1) Dr. Terri Robinson, an

orthopedist who treated Diedrich, did not mention any

mental health symptoms in her February 2008 report;

(2) Melissa Buttars, a therapist who treated Diedrich, did not

mention particular mental health symptoms in her May 2005

report; (3) in the ALJ’s view of the record, there were no

observations of Diedrich’s different personalities and there

was no report mentioning multiple personalities before

Diedrich’s date last insured; and (4) the ALJ viewed

Diedrich’s daily life as involving a wide range of activities.

DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL 15

Based on our review of the record in this case, we conclude

that none of these reasons is “clear and convincing.” Id.

Regarding Dr. Robinson’s report, the ALJ said that Dr.

Robinson “did not make any observations about the claimant

being anxious, flighty, depressed, or manic, which would

suggest that [] the claimant’s mental health symptoms were

not as severe as she testified to at the hearing.” But even if

Diedrich were suffering from such symptoms, we would not

necessarily expect Dr. Robinson to note them in her report.

Dr. Robinson was an orthopedist, not a mental health

professional. She might have thought it beyond her capacity

to inquire or comment about mental health symptoms. In

line with her specialty, Dr. Robinson reported the pain that

Diedrich said she was feeling in her back, shoulder, neck,

hand, and wrist. Still, under the heading “Chief

Complaints,” Dr. Robinson noted “Multiple psychiatric

history; bipolar disorder, ADHD, borderline personality

disorder, panic disorder, agoraphobia.” It is unsurprising

that Dr. Robinson did not also mention Diedrich’s specific

mental health symptoms. That she did not do so, in our view,

says little about the extent to which Diedrich may in fact

have been suffering from such symptoms.

Moreover, the same month that Diedrich saw Dr.

Robinson, she also saw a psychologist, Dr. Nick Dietlein.

Dr. Dietlein concluded that Diedrich presented “symptoms

consistent with a Major Depressive Disorder and PTSD. It

is very possible that she has Attention Deficit Disorder.” Dr.

Dietlein’s conclusions reinforce that the absence of mental

health symptoms from Dr. Robinson’s report does not tend

to prove, let alone prove persuasively, that Diedrich lacked

such symptoms. Dr. Robinson’s report does not provide a

clear and convincing reason for discounting Diedrich’s

testimony.

16 DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL

Regarding therapist Buttars’s May 2005 assessment, the

ALJ noted that Buttars found “no indication of

hallucinations, delusions, obsessions, phobias, or perceptual

disturbances”; that Diedrich described her mood to Buttars

as “good”; and that Buttars found Diedrich’s social

judgment, intellectual functioning, and memory all normal.

However, the fact that Diedrich was not exhibiting certain

symptoms at the time of her appointment on a particular day

does not indicate that Diedrich was not experiencing those

symptoms generally or at other pertinent times. As the Ninth

Circuit has explained:

[Regarding] mental health issues, it is error to

reject a claimant’s testimony merely because

symptoms wax and wane in the course of

treatment. Cycles of improvement and

debilitating symptoms are a common

occurrence, and in such circumstances it is

error for an ALJ to pick out a few isolated

instances of improvement over a period of

months or years and to treat them as a basis

for concluding a claimant is capable of

working . . . . While ALJs obviously must

rely on examples to show why they do not

believe that a claimant is credible, the data

points they choose must in fact constitute

examples of a broader development to satisfy

the applicable “clear and convincing”

standard.

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017–18. Here, the absence of certain

symptoms from Buttars’s report is insufficient to show a

“broader development” that Diedrich did not experience

those symptoms. Id. at 1018. Indeed, Buttars’s report noted

that Diedrich’s mental health disorders were in partial

DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL 17

remission. It was improper for the ALJ to discount

Diedrich’s testimony by “cherry pick[ing]” the absence of

certain symptoms from this report. Attmore v. Colvin,

827 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Scott v. Astrue,

647 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2011)). Buttars’s report does not

provide a clear and convincing reason to find Diedrich’s

claims regarding the extent of her symptoms unreliable.

Next, we address the ALJ’s comments that nobody

observed Diedrich’s different personalities and that no report

mentioned multiple personalities before Diedrich’s last date

insured. We disagree with the ALJ that the record supports

this characterization. At the hearing, Niebaum testified in

detail about his observations of Diedrich’s split personality

symptoms. He also mentioned those symptoms in his third-

party function report. And, though Niebaum’s observations

began three months after Diedrich’s date last insured, they

still to a degree support the notion that Diedrich’s split

personality symptoms during the insured period were as she

described them. See Tobeler, 749 F.3d at 833. In addition,

a counseling progress report from May 2007 mentioned that

Diedrich had a history of “blackouts” that were triggered by

arguments or events that “evoked intense feelings.” It also

noted that a previous therapist had diagnosed Diedrich with

split personality disorder. The ALJ’s characterization of the

record does not survive scrutiny. We conclude that the

ALJ’s assertions related to Diedrich’s split personality

disorder are not clear and convincing reasons to find

Diedrich only partially credible.

Finally, we address the ALJ’s argument that Diedrich’s

“activities of daily living are wide.” The ALJ took note of

certain daily activities that Diedrich could perform, such as

bathing, cooking, taking care of her cat, chores around the

house, shopping, paying bills, and using a checkbook. But

18 DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL

the ALJ ignored other evidence showing the difficulties

Diedrich faced in everyday life. See Gallant v. Heckler,

753 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1984) (ALJ may not justify a

credibility finding “by ignoring competent evidence in the

record that suggests an opposite result”). This evidence

included going three to five days without sleeping; weeks-

long bouts of depression; overspending and

promiscuousness during manic periods; hallucinations;

difficulty paying attention; inability to follow through on

activities; difficulty remembering things; severe panic

attacks; anxiety about, and aversion to, social situations;

blackouts and alternate personalities; needing reminders to

take medicine; forgetting appointments; getting sidetracked

when outside the house; frustration and confusion when

reading; trouble following and remembering instructions;

trouble with changes to routine; trouble handling stress; and

“extreme difficulty” staying focused on a task. That

Diedrich could participate in some daily activities does not

contradict the evidence of otherwise severe problems that

she encountered in her daily life during the relevant period.

The sorts of daily activities Diedrich could perform are

also not readily “transferrable to a work environment.”

Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1165 (9th Cir. 2014)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Smolen, 80 F.3d

at 1284 n.7 (“The Social Security Act does not require that

claimants be utterly incapacitated to be eligible for benefits,

and many home activities may not be easily transferable to a

work environment . . . .”). House chores, cooking simple

meals, self-grooming, paying bills, writing checks, and

caring for a cat in one’s own home, as well as occasional

shopping outside the home, are not similar to typical work

responsibilities. See, e.g., Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1453

(ordering award of benefits for leg and back pain despite

claimant’s daily activities of cooking meals and washing

DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL 19

dishes). We note that even though Diedrich was performing

these tasks, she was likely not doing them with the

consistency and persistence that a work environment

requires. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir.

1989) (“[M]any home activities are not easily transferable to

what may be the more grueling environment of the

workplace, where it might be impossible to periodically rest

or take medication.”). Diedrich’s symptoms also included

anxiety related to social interactions, making a task easy to

perform inside the home potentially very difficult to perform

outside the home. Diedrich’s ability to perform certain daily

activities is not a clear and convincing reason to find her less

than fully credible.

We conclude that none of the ALJ’s given reasons for

finding Diedrich only partially credible is clear and

convincing. We hold that the ALJ erred in its credibility

finding related to Diedrich.

IV

In summary, we hold that the ALJ erred (1) by not calling

a medical advisor to help determine the precise onset date of

Diedrich’s disability; (2) by giving “little weight” to

Niebaum’s observations; and (3) by finding Diedrich only

“partially credible.” We also conclude that none of these

errors is harmless. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115. On the

grounds listed, we reverse in part the district court’s

decision. In a separately filed memorandum disposition, we

otherwise affirm in part the district court’s decision. We

remand for further proceedings with instructions that the

ALJ’s decision be vacated, and that the district court shall

remand to the ALJ with instruction that it should call a

medical advisor and otherwise proceed in a manner

consistent with our opinion.

20 DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL

The Commissioner shall bear all costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and

REMANDED.

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ conclusions

that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) “erred in its

assessment (1) by not calling a medical advisor at the

hearing; (2) by giving too little weight to the observations of

[Plaintiff-Appellant Brenda M.] Diedrich’s fiancé; and

(3) by finding that Diedrich was only partially credible.”

Majority Opinion, p. 4.

It is unquestioned and unquestionable that the claimant

suffered from significant physical and mental impairments.

The issue raised in the proceedings was whether those

impairments rendered the claimant disabled under the Social

Security Act. The ALJ ruled that they did not. Our task is

to examine whether the ALJ’s determination is supported by

substantial evidence, not whether we disagree with the

ALJ’s determination. See Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872,

875 (9th Cir. 2016).

1. Failure To Call A Medical Advisor

The majority concludes that the ALJ committed legal

error by failing to call a medical advisor to assist in

determining the disability onset date. See Majority Opinion,

p. 11. The majority acknowledges that we have consistently

ruled that a medical advisor is required only if there is

ambiguity in the record and the onset date must be inferred.

See id., p. 9; see also Armstrong v. Comm’r, 160 F.3d 587,

DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL 21

589 (9th Cir. 1998). However, the majority opinion points

to no real ambiguity in the record regarding the onset date of

the claimant’s disability. Indeed, the ALJ, without

objection, accepted the alleged onset date of October 1,

2002, when evaluating the evidence offered to support a

finding of disability. The majority seeks to manufacture an

ambiguity by selectively referring to portions of the record.

See Majority Opinion, p. 10. But the fact remains that the

parties did not dispute the onset date alleged by Diedrich and

accepted by the ALJ. There is absolutely no ambiguity in

this record regarding the asserted onset date.

More importantly, we have ruled that no medical advisor

is required if the ALJ determines that the claimant was never

disabled. See Sam v. Astrue, 550 F.3d 808, 809 (9th Cir.

2008). This ruling makes perfect sense because if there was

never a disability, the onset date no longer has relevance. In

concluding that this precedent does not apply, the majority

inexplicably ignores at least four explicit findings of non-

disability made by the ALJ.

On page 1 of her decision, the ALJ stated:

After careful consideration of all the

evidence, the undersigned concludes the

claimant was not under a disability within the

meaning of the Social Security Act. . .

On page 12 of the decision, the ALJ determined:

A finding of “not disabled” is therefore

appropriate under the framework of the

above cited rule.

...

22 DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL

The claimant was not under a disability, as

defined in the Social Security Act, at any

time from October 1, 2002, the alleged

onset date, through June 30, 2008, the date

last insured . . .

In her conclusion on page 13 of the decision, the ALJ

reiterated:

Based on the application for a period of

disability and disability insurance benefits

. . ., the claimant was not disabled under

sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social

Security Act . . .

In view of the ALJ’s repeated findings of no disability,

it cannot credibly be gainsaid that the ALJ found the

claimant was not disabled. That finding placed this case

within our holding in Sam that no medical advisor was

required. No legal error occurred. See Sam, 550 F.3d at 810

(“Because the ALJ found that Sam was not disabled at any

time through the date of the decision, the question of when

he became disabled did not arise and the procedures

prescribed in SSR 83-20 did not apply.”) (citation omitted)

(emphases in Sam). In Sam, we clarified that “SSR 83-20

addresses the situation in which an administrative law judge

makes a finding that an individual is disabled as of an

application date and the question arises as to whether the

disparity arose at an earlier time.” Id. (citation omitted).

We distinguished our earlier decisions in Armstrong and

Morgan v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1991), as

applying when “there was either an explicit ALJ finding or

substantial evidence that the claimant was disabled at some

point after the date last insured, thus raising a question of

DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL 23

onset date.” Sam, 550 F.3d at 811 (emphasis added). In

contrast, the ALJ in Sam, like the ALJ in the case before us,

“found that [the claimant was not disabled at any time.” Id.

In light of that finding, “the ALJ was not required by SSR

83-20 to introduce a medical expert into the process.” Id.

2. Giving Too Little Weight To The Testimony Of

Claimant’s Fiancé

This issue may be resolved by reviewing the claimant’s

testimony because we have ruled that where the ALJ

provides germane reasons for giving less weight to

subjective testimony from one witness, similar testimony by

a different witness may also be given less weight. See

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012)

(“[B]ecause the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons

for rejecting the claimant’s own subjective complaints, and

because the lay witness’s testimony was similar to such

complaints, it follows that the ALJ also gave germane

reasons for rejecting the lay witness’s testimony.”) (quoting

Valentine v. Comm’r, 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009)

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

As discussed below, the ALJ gave “clear and

convincing” reasons for only partially crediting the

claimant’s testimony. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995,

1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting standard). As a result, the

testimony of claimant’s fiancé fares no better. See Molina,

674 F.3d at 1114.

3. Partially Crediting Claimant’s Testimony

The ALJ provided the following reasons for only

partially crediting the claimant’s testimony:

24 DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL

(1) Although the claimant testified that she suffered

from “severe mania, depression, anxiety, and agoraphobia,”

the “orthopedic consultative examiner . . . did not make any

observations about the claimant being anxious, flighty,

depressed, or manic.” In addition, mental health treatment

notes support a conclusion that the claimant was capable of

functioning.” A mental health examination reflected “no

indication[s] of hallucinations, delusions, obsessions,

phobias, or perceptual disturbances.” Indeed, the claimant

herself “described her mood as ‘good’ and her social

judgment, intellectual functioning, and memory were all

normal.” Despite the claimant’s testimony regarding

multiple personalities and disassociative disorder,” there

were no reported observations of multiple personalities in

the record.

(2) The claimant engaged in a wide range of daily living

activities that were inconsistent with her asserted disability.

The claimant lived alone with her cat, dressed herself, bathed

herself, enjoyed cooking, fed her cat, cleaned the cat’s litter

box, cleaned her home, washed dishes, vacuumed and

cleaned her bathrooms. She sometimes walked and

sometimes traveled by car to various destinations. She

shopped for groceries and clothes, and was able to pay bills,

count change, and use a checkbook. She also managed a

savings account.

We have consistently held that similar findings

constituted substantial evidence to support a partial

credibility determination made by an ALJ. See, e.g., Lewis

v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001) (“One reason for

which an ALJ may discount lay testimony is that it conflicts

with medical evidence.”) (citation omitted); see also id. at

512 (“The absence of any mention of fatigue, along with the

‘no side effects’ observations in [claimant’s] medical

DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL 25

reports, supported the ALJ’s rejection of . . . testimony that

[claimant] had suffered chronic fatigue . . .”).

The majority takes issue with the partial credibility

finding of the ALJ, specifically challenging the bona fides of

the reasons articulated by the ALJ to support her finding.

In addressing the ALJ’s reliance on the lack of any

reference to the claimant being “anxious, flighty, depressed

or manic,” in Dr. Robinson’s report, the majority observes

that Dr. Robinson was an orthopedist rather than a mental

health professional. Majority Opinion, p. 15. However, an

orthopedic physician is an acceptable medical source upon

whose observations the ALJ properly relied. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.902(a) (defining “acceptable medical source”). The

listing of complaints referenced by the majority, see

Majority Opinion, p. 15, merely represented claimant’s

summary of her condition rather than observations of the

physician. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041

(9th Cir. 2008) (permitting an ALJ to “reject a treating

physician’s opinion if it is based to a large extent on a

claimant’s self-reports . . .”) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

The majority also refers to the claimant’s visit to a

psychologist, Dr. Dietlein. See Majority Opinion, p. 15.

Nevertheless, the bottom line of Dr. Dietlein’s opinion does

not support a claim of mental disability. In Dr. Dietlein’s

Summary of Findings, he concluded: “Today’s evaluation

revealed that Ms. Diedrich is able to understand and

remember instructions, is able to sustain her concentration

and attention and is able to persist. She was able to engage

in social interactions successfully. I believe she would be

able to adequately manage any funds that might be given to

her.”

26 DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL

Addressing the lack of mental health symptoms observed

by therapist Buttar, the majority offers the following

equivocation:

[T]he fact that Diedrich was not exhibiting

certain symptoms at the time of her

appointment on a particular day does not

indicate that Diedrich was not experiencing

those symptoms generally or at other

pertinent times. . . .

Majority Opinion, p. 16.

The majority also isolates therapist Buttar’s observations

to argue the absence of a “broader development” of mental

health issues. Majority Opinion, p. 16 (quoting Garrison v.

Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2014)). The flaw

in the majority’s argument is that Buttar’s observations were

buttressed by the similar observations of Drs. Robinson and

Dietlin, reflecting a “broader development” of the absence

of a disabling mental disability. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017.

More fundamentally, the majority’s reliance on Garrison

is singularly misplaced because the facts in Garrison are

almost the polar opposite of the facts in this record. In

Garrison, the “diagnoses of [post-traumatic stress disorder]

and bipolar disorder remained constant across all treatment

records.” Id. at 1017. In this case, in contrast, the absence

of any observed disabling mental impairment “remained

constant across all treatment records.” Id. (emphasis added).

At best, the majority’s view is an alternative

interpretation of the evidence presented at the hearing.

However, we have repeatedly held that if there are two

permissible views of the evidence, the view taken by the ALJ

must stand. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679

DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL 27

(“Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be

upheld. . . .” (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010 (“Where the evidence can

reasonably support either affirming or reversing a decision,

we may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ. . . .”)

(citation and alteration omitted); Holohan v. Massanari,

246 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 2001) (same).

The majority also takes issue with the ALJ’s discounting

of the “split personality” disorder evidence. See Majority

Opinion, p. 17. As an initial matter, the reference to a

previous diagnosis of split personality was based entirely on

the claimant’s own reporting, and may be discounted on that

basis. See Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194,

1206–07 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that “an ALJ may discount

a medical opinion that relies on subjective statements rather

than clinical findings”). In addition, reliance on the

observations of claimant’s fiancé to support the diagnosis of

“split personality” is problematic for two reasons: 1) the

observations were made after the date last insured and 2) the

observations were not consistent with the medical evidence

of record. See Dale v. Colvin, 823 F.3d 941, 944 (9th Cir.

2016) (describing after-the-fact observations of the

claimant’s impairments as “marginally relevant,” especially

where the evidence differed from the opinion of the doctors);

see also Batson v. Comm’r, 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir.

2004) (approving ALJ discrediting of claimant’s testimony

that was inconsistent with the medical evidence); Bayliss v.

Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (approving

ALJ discrediting of family member testimony that was

inconsistent with the medical evidence); Vincent on behalf

of Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984)

(same). In sum, the ALJ’s discounting of the fiancé’s

testimony was supported by substantial evidence.

28 DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL

We have regularly defined substantial evidence as “more

than a scintilla [but] less than a preponderance.” Holohan,

246 F.3d at 1201, quoting Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094,

1097 (9th Cir. 1999). We have emphasized that the

substantial evidence standard is “very deferential . . . even

more so than the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard.” Brault v.

Social Sec. Admin., 683 F.3d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 2012)

(citation omitted). We have clarified that “[t]he substantial

evidence standard means once an ALJ finds facts, we can

reject those facts only if a reasonable factfinder would have

to conclude otherwise.” Id. (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted) (emphasis in the original).

Unfortunately, the majority failed to adhere to this

standard throughout the majority opinion, but most

especially when reviewing the ALJ’s determination that the

claimant’s daily activities were inconsistent with the

asserted level of impairment.

The ALJ noted that the claimant lived alone with her cat,

cared for her cat, bathed and dressed herself, enjoyed

cooking, and cleaned her home. She shopped for groceries

and clothing, paid bills, counted change, used a checkbook,

and managed a savings account.

We have recognized and affirmed findings of an ALJ

that similar “daily activities [of a claimant] are inconsistent

with [her] allegations of disability.” Carmickle v. Comm’r,

533 F.3d 1155, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008).

More precisely, we have upheld similar credibility

findings in cases involving facts virtually identical to those

in this case. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1196 (upholding a

partial credibility determination where the claimant

“tend[ed] his animals, walk[ed] outdoors, [went] out for

coffee, and visit[ed] with neighbors”); see also Morgan v.

DIEDRICH V. BERRYHILL 29

Comm’r, 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming that

the ALJ “provided specific and substantial reasons that

undermine [claimant’s] credibility,” including the

claimant’s “ability to fix meals, do laundry, work in the yard,

and occasionally care for his friend’s child”).

In Burch, 400 F.3d at 680–81, the ALJ noted that the

claimant was “able to care for her own personal needs, cook,

clean and shop. She interact[ed] with her nephew and her

boyfriend. She [was] able to manage her own finances and

those of her nephew.” In upholding the ALJ’s partial

rejection of the claimant’s testimony, we emphasized:

Although the evidence of [the claimant’s]

daily activities may also admit of an

interpretation more favorable to [the

claimant], the ALJ’s interpretation was

rational, and we must uphold the ALJ’s

decision where the evidence is susceptible to

more than one rational interpretation.

Id. (alteration omitted).

After applying the deferential substantial evidence

standard of review, I agree with the magistrate judge and the

district court that the decision of the ALJ was free of legal

error and supported by substantial evidence. In my view, the

majority reaches a different result by reweighing the

evidence, something we are not permitted to do. See Brault,

683 F.3d at 447 (“[I]t is not our function to determine de

novo whether a [claimant] is disabled. . . .) (citation and

alteration omitted).

I respectfully dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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