United States v. Robert Ranjel

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

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No. 15-3778

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROBERT RANJEL,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 02 CR 720-1 — Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 1, 2016 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 29, 2017

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. In 2002 Robert Ranjel was indicted

for participating in a Latin Kings drug-trafficking conspiracy

operating in Aurora, Illinois. He fled to Mexico and re-

mained there for nearly a decade. He surrendered in 2011

and a jury later convicted him of conspiracy and related

drug crimes. The district judge imposed a sentence of

235 months in prison followed by a five-year term of super-

vised release.

2 No. 15-3778

Ranjel raises several claims of sentencing error. He ar-

gues that the judge (1) miscalculated the drug quantity;

(2) misapplied a guidelines enhancement for his role as a

manager or supervisor in the conspiracy; (3) misapplied a

guidelines enhancement for obstruction of justice; (4) erro-

neously considered evidence of his involvement in a gang-

related murder; and (5) failed to explicitly note that the

guidelines recommended a three-year term of supervised

release or explain why he opted for a five-year term.

We affirm. Ranjel waived the fifth claim of error. The oth-

ers are meritless.

I. Background

Ranjel was a member of the Latin Kings gang and was

deeply involved in its drug-trafficking operation in Aurora,

Illinois. In 2002 he was indicted for conspiracy to distribute

controlled substances, see 21 U.S.C. § 846, and three counts of

distributing cocaine, see id. § 841(a)(1). When the arrest

warrant issued, Ranjel fled to Mexico and remained there for

almost a decade. In 2011 he turned himself in to the

U.S. Consulate in Monterrey, Mexico, and was returned to

the United States. His case proceeded to trial the following

year. The government’s evidence included testimony from

federal agents, a confidential informant, and several cocon-

spirators, as well as recordings of wiretapped phone calls

among the coconspirators. The jury convicted Ranjel on all

counts.

The judge ordered a presentence report (“PSR”) and spe-

cifically directed the probation office to “release the sentenc-

ing recommendation portion of the PSR” to both counsel.

The judge also ordered counsel to file any objections or

No. 15-3778 3

corrections in writing, together with sentencing memoranda

and position statements on the recommended conditions of

supervised release.

The PSR estimated that the drug quantity attributable to

Ranjel as relevant conduct was approximately 2.06 kilo-

grams of cocaine. That translated to a base offense level of

26. As relevant here, the probation office recommended

application of a three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 3B1.1(b) for Ranjel’s role as a manager or supervisor in the

conspiracy. The probation office also recommended applica-

tion of a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice

based on Ranjel’s flight to Mexico and nearly ten years as a

fugitive. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Finally, the PSR noted that the

guidelines term of supervised release was three years but

recommended that the judge impose a five-year term in-

stead. The PSR also included specific recommendations for

mandatory, discretionary, and special conditions of super-

vised release.

Ranjel’s attorney filed a sentencing memorandum raising

several objections to the PSR, but he did not object to any of

the recommendations regarding supervised release. Moreo-

ver, in a separate filing entitled Position on Conditions of

Supervised Release, Ranjel’s attorney acknowledged that he

had reviewed the PSR’s recommendations and “makes no

objection thereto.”

At sentencing the judge ruled on counsel’s objections, ul-

timately accepting the PSR’s recommendations. The gov-

ernment then presented witnesses who testified about

Ranjel’s involvement in a gang-related murder. Ranjel had

been charged with the murder but was acquitted. The judge

nonetheless credited the testimony of the government’s

4 No. 15-3778

witnesses and took the murder into account in weighing the

sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The judge

imposed a sentence of 235 months in prison, the top of the

guidelines range, and a five-year term of supervised release

as recommended by the PSR. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Ranjel limits his appeal to sentencing issues. Most are at-

tacks on the judge’s factual findings. That’s a steep hill to

climb. We will not disturb a sentencing court’s factual

findings unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v.

Austin, 806 F.3d 425, 430 (7th Cir. 2015) (drug-quantity

calculations reviewed for clear error); United States v. Etchin,

614 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 2010) (credibility determinations

warrant “especially deferential” review); United States v.

Arceo, 535 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2008) (obstruction-of-justice

findings are reviewed for clear error); United States v.

Hankton, 432 F.3d 779, 793 (7th Cir. 2005) (a finding that the

defendant had the role of a manager or supervisor is re-

viewed for clear error). Under the deferential clear-error

standard, we will reverse only if “after reviewing the entire

record, we are left with the firm and definite conviction that

a mistake has been made.” United States v. Marty, 450 F.3d

687, 689–90 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted).

A. Drug Quantity

The judge adopted the PSR’s estimate that Ranjel’s of-

fense conduct encompassed transactions totaling about

2.06 kilograms of cocaine. That figure was largely based on

the trial testimony of Juan Corral, Ranjel’s supplier, and

frequent recorded phone calls between the two.

No. 15-3778 5

Corral described three distinct but overlapping groups of

drug sales, each covering multiple weeks during the first

half of 2002. The first series occurred from February 1 to

March 31 and totaled 507 grams of cocaine. The second

series started in the spring and continued through the end of

June. Corral testified that during this period he sold Ranjel

quarter-kilogram quantities of cocaine a “few times.” The

PSR estimated that a “few times” meant at least three, for a

total of 750 grams. Finally, Corral testified that he sometimes

sold Ranjel additional one-eighth kilogram quantities of

cocaine. The recorded phone calls backed up this testimony,

capturing sales of this quantity roughly every other week

between April 1 and June 24, for a total of not less than

750 grams. The three subtotals sum to 2.007 kilograms (507 +

750 + 750 = 2007 grams). In addition to these transactions,

Ranjel also sold approximately 49 grams of cocaine to confi-

dential informants in three separate transactions, bringing

the combined total to 2.06 kilograms.

Ranjel challenges these calculations, arguing that the

750-gram subtotal was double-counted. Not so. The PSR

made clear that the identical subtotals were based on two

separate sets of transactions with Corral, and the frequency

and amounts of these separate sales were corroborated by

recorded phone calls.

Ranjel argues more generally that the drug-quantity cal-

culations were based on unreliable or imprecise evidence. In

particular, he attacks Corral’s testimony, which he says was

vague and marred by poor memory given the passage of

time. Ranjel can hardly seek refuge in the passage of time,

for which he is solely responsible. Regardless, calculating

drug quantities is “often difficult, and district courts may

6 No. 15-3778

make reasonable though imprecise estimates based on

information that has indicia of reliability.” United States v.

Bozovich, 782 F.3d 814, 818 (7th Cir. 2015); see also United

States v. Araujo, 622 F.3d 854, 863–64 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding

that the extrapolation of drug amounts “is permissible so

long as it is based on reliable data regarding the size and

frequency of the defendant’s transactions”). Corral was

Ranjel’s main supplier, and his testimony was corroborated

by more than 75 recorded phone calls between the two. And

on this record the 2.06-kilogram total is a conservative

estimate. The evidence showed that Ranjel used other co-

caine suppliers in addition to Corral and also that he sold

marijuana and prescription pills, neither of which was

added to the total drug quantity. We find no error.

B. Sentencing Enhancements

Ranjel next challenges the application of the guidelines

enhancement for his role as a manager or supervisor in the

conspiracy. The guidelines recommend a three-level upward

adjustment to the base offense level “[i]f the defendant was a

manager or supervisor … and the criminal activity involved

five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.”

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). The judge applied this adjustment based

on trial testimony establishing that Ranjel personally di-

rected at least three other coconspirators to package, distrib-

ute, or sell cocaine to various buyers. Other testimony

established that the Latin Kings drug-trafficking conspiracy

involved far more than five people.

Ranjel argues that the judge erroneously found that he

“managed five participants in a criminal activity.” But the

judge made no such finding; nor was he required to. The

enhancement applies if the defendant managed or super-

No. 15-3778 7

vised “one or more other participants” in criminal activity

that involved five or more people. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2. Trial

evidence established that Ranjel directed one coconspirator

to hold drugs, another coconspirator to sell drugs, and a

third coconspirator to deliver cocaine to various retailers,

collect payment, and deliver the money to him. In other

words, Ranjel “exercised some control over others involved

in the commission of the offense,” which is enough to apply

the § 3B1.1(b) enhancement. United States v. Pagan, 196 F.3d

884, 892 (7th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted).

Nor was it error to hold Ranjel accountable for obstruc-

tion of justice. See § 3C1.1. His flight to Mexico and nearly

ten years as a fugitive easily qualifies as obstruction of

justice, drawing a two-level enhancement under § 3C1.1.

Ranjel argues that the government was not prejudiced by his

fugitive status because federal drug agents knew where he

was and could have extradited him if they wanted to. He

also argues that his flight to Mexico did not impose addi-

tional costs on the government or otherwise affect the gov-

ernment’s case in any concrete way. Actual prejudice is not

needed. “[S]ection 3C1.1 applies to those defendants who

attempt to obstruct or to impede the administration of justice,

as well as to those who actually succeed in doing so.” United

States v. Porter, 145 F.3d 897, 904 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis

added).

Fleeing to another country is always “likely to burden a

criminal investigation or prosecution significantly—likely to

make the investigation or prosecution significantly more

costly or less effective than it would otherwise have been.”

United States v. Nduribe, 703 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 2013).

Moreover, although proof of actual prejudice is not required,

8 No. 15-3778

here the government established that Ranjel’s Mexican

sojourn imposed some real costs: A cooperator who pur-

chased cocaine from Ranjel died while Ranjel was at large;

drugs had to be retested because the crime lab kept its notes

for only ten years; and government agents and law-

enforcement witnesses retired or were no longer with their

agencies by the time Ranjel faced trial, making them more

difficult to locate. The judge properly applied the enhance-

ment for obstruction of justice.

C. Ranjel’s Involvement in a Gang-Related Murder

At sentencing the government called three witnesses who

testified to Ranjel’s involvement in a 1990 murder of a rival

gang member. According to these witnesses, Ranjel and two

fellow Latin Kings drove to the victim’s home, and each

fired a gun into the house, killing the victim. Ranjel was

tried for this murder and acquitted. Even so, an acquittal

does not preclude the judge from considering the underlying

conduct for sentencing purposes as long as the government

proves the conduct by a preponderance of the evidence.

United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156–57 (1997).

Ranjel does not contest the legal point. Rather, he argues

that the government relied in part on a written proffer from

a coconspirator, which is hearsay, and its witnesses “were

admitted perjurers.” But hearsay is permissible at sentenc-

ing. See United States v. Grigsby, 692 F.3d 778, 787 (7th Cir.

2012). And the judge acknowledged that “[a]ll three witness-

es are convicted felons” who “told lies at times to the gov-

ernment officials, police officers and others.” He also recog-

nized that the witnesses “eventually cooperated with the

government and received reduced sentences based on those

No. 15-3778 9

cooperations.” Nonetheless, the judge found their testimony

credible.

A sentencing judge’s credibility determinations are enti-

tled to exceptional deference. United States v. Johnson,

342 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2003). It was the judge’s job to take

the measure of the government’s witnesses, accounting for

the various reasons to doubt their testimony. The judge did

so here. He found the witnesses believable and considered

this evidence in weighing the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.

There was no error.

D. Supervised Release

Finally, Ranjel argues that the judge committed a proce-

dural error by failing to expressly calculate and state for the

record that the guidelines term of supervised release was

three years. He also contends that the judge did not ade-

quately explain his decision to impose an above-guidelines

term of five years. The government responds that Ranjel

waived these arguments by failing to raise them in the

district court when he was explicitly invited to object.

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known

right. United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 873 (7th Cir. 2016).

We have encouraged judges to provide advanced notice to

the parties of the contemplated term and conditions of

supervised release. See United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828,

842–44 (7th Cir. 2015). Notice eliminates surprises at the

hearing and allows the defendant to “present an informed

response” to the proposed term and conditions. Id. at 843.

The sentencing hearing is the “main event,” and when notice

is given before the hearing, the parties can “prepare and

10 No. 15-3778

identify the issues they wish to address” ahead of time.

United States v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016).

Ranjel faced a statutory minimum three-year term of su-

pervised release and a maximum of life. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846,

841(b)(1)(C). The PSR gave him ample notice that the guide-

lines recommended the minimum three-year term. See

U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2. The probation office expressly recommend-

ed that the judge impose a five-year term instead, and this

part of the PSR was released to Ranjel’s counsel. The judge

ordered the parties to file written objections in advance of

the sentencing hearing. Ranjel did so, raising several objec-

tions. But he did not object to the calculation of the guide-

lines term of supervised release or the specific recommenda-

tion of an above-guidelines term of five years. And in a

separate filing specifically responding to the proposed

conditions of supervised release, counsel expressly acknowl-

edged that he had reviewed the recommendations and

“makes no objection thereto.”

At the sentencing hearing, the judge asked Ranjel’s attor-

ney if he had any further objections to the PSR other than

those in his sentencing memorandum. Counsel confirmed

that he did not. Near the end of the hearing, the judge asked

Ranjel’s attorney if he—the judge, that is—had “considered

all of [his] arguments.” Counsel confirmed this as well. After

imposing sentence, the judge asked if Ranjel’s attorney

wanted to raise any other issues. Counsel said, “no.”

In short, “[t]here were no surprises” at this sentencing

proceeding—certainly not on any aspect of supervised

release. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1082. The judge gave Ranjel multi-

ple opportunities to object to the recommended term of

supervised release; he never did. We have no difficulty

No. 15-3778 11

concluding that Ranjel waived any procedural or substantive

challenge to the five-year term of supervised release.

AFFIRMED.