Opinion

Sewell v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans

  • 697 F. App'x 288
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Aug 28, 2017
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Graves, Per Curiam, Prado, Reavley
Nature of suit
Private Civil Federal
Cited by
14 cases
Authority
More cited than 68.6%

The opinion

Case: 17-30089 Document: 00514133655 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/28/2017

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

No. 17-30089 August 28, 2017

Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

ELIZABETH SEWELL, wife of; WILLIAM SEWELL; JAMES FENNER;

BETH DUESSING, wife of; GEORGE DUESSING; ET AL,

Plaintiffs–Appellees,

v.

SEWERAGE AND WATER BOARD OF NEW ORLEANS,

Defendant–Third Party Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.

BOH BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, L.L.C.; CAJUN

INDUSTRIES, L.L.C.; CAJUN CONSTRUCTORS, L.L.C.; B&K

CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, L.L.C.; LINFIELD, HUNTER AND JUNIUS,

INCORPORATED; BLUE IRON FOUNDATION AND SHORING, L.L.C.;

JAY DISPOSAL, INCORPORATED; LEXINGTON INSURANCE

COMPANY; RSUI INDEMNITY COMPANY; ARCH INSURANCE GROUP,

improperly named Arch Insurance Company; BRIDGEFIELD CASUALTY

INSURANCE COMPANY; CANAL INDEMNITY INSURANCE; BARRIERE

CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, L.L.C.; AMERICAN GUARANTEE &

LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY; HALLMARK SPECIALTY

INSURANCE COMPANY, improperly named Hallmark Specialty Insurance;

BELLA TRUCK SERVICE, INCORPORATED, also known as Jay Trucks

Service, Incorporated,

Third Party Defendants–Appellees.

************************************************************************

LEON GREENBLATT,

Plaintiff–Appellee,

Case: 17-30089 Document: 00514133655 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/28/2017

No. 17-30089

v.

SEWERAGE AND WATER BOARD OF NEW ORLEANS,

Defendant–Appellant.

************************************************************************

ANNE LOWENBURG; JUDITH LOWENBURG, wife of/and; TOM

LOWENBURG; SARAH LOWMAN; JACK STOLIER; WILLIAM B.

TAYLOR, III, M.D.; BARBARA WEST; NANETTE COLOMB; ANA KURT,

Wife of; CHARLOTTE LINK, Wife of; PARKE ELLIS; JERRY OSBORNE;

NANCY ELLIS, Wife of; MARK KURT; ROBERT LINK; JOSEPHINE S.

BROWN, M.D.; LAURIE MCDIARMID, Wife of; ROSS MCDIARMID; MARK

HAMRICK,

Plaintiffs–Appellees,

v.

SEWERAGE AND WATER BOARD OF NEW ORLEANS,

Defendant–Appellant.

************************************************************************

ARIYAN, INCORPORATED, doing business as Discount Corner,

Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.

SEWERAGE AND WATER BOARD OF NEW ORLEANS,

Defendant–Appellant.

************************************************************************

AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.

2

Case: 17-30089 Document: 00514133655 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/28/2017

No. 17-30089

SEWERAGE AND WATER BOARD OF NEW ORLEANS,

Defendant–Appellant.

************************************************************************

K&B LOUISIANA CORPORATION, doing business as Rite Aid Corporation,

Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.

SEWERAGE AND WATER BOARD OF NEW ORLEANS,

Defendant–Appellant.

************************************************************************

M. LANGENSTEIN & SONS, INCORPORATED; PRYTANIA LIQUOR

STORE, INCORPORATED; WEST PRYTANIA, INCORPORATED, doing

business as Prytania Mail Service; BARBARA H. WEST; FINE ARTS

MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., doing business as Prytania Theatre; PASCAL’S

MANALE RESTAURANT, INCORPORATED; SUPERIOR SEAFOOD &

OYSTER BAR, L.L.C.; SUPERIOR BAR & GRILL, INCORPORATED;

FRESH MARKET, INCORPORATED; BRITISH ANTIQUES, L.L.C.;

BENNETT POWELL; MAGIC BOX, LIMITED; DAT DOG ENTERPRISES,

L.L.C.; DAT DOG PROPERTIES, L.L.C.,

Plaintiffs–Appellees,

v.

SEWERAGE AND WATER BOARD OF NEW ORLEANS,

Defendant–Appellant.

************************************************************************

ELIZABETH CASEY; THOMAS CASEY,

Plaintiffs–Appellees,

v.

3

Case: 17-30089 Document: 00514133655 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/28/2017

No. 17-30089

SEWERAGE AND WATER BOARD OF NEW ORLEANS,

Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:15-CV-3117

Before REAVLEY, PRADO, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This case arises out of the Southeast Louisiana (“SELA”) Drainage

Project, a federally funded enterprise cosponsored by the Sewerage and Water

Board of New Orleans (“SWB”) and the United States Army Corps of Engineers

(“Corps”). The SELA Project involves extensive construction at multiple sites

in Southeast Louisiana and is intended to improve flood control and drainage

in these areas. The instant case involves eight consolidated lawsuits

implicating seven phases of the SELA Project in Uptown New Orleans, where

the Plaintiffs own of homes and businesses. Each Plaintiff sued SWB alleging

various forms of damage resulting from the construction. SWB then filed third-

party claims against three contractors who were selected to construct SELA

projects in Uptown New Orleans: B&K Construction Company, LLC; Boh Bros.

Construction Company, LLC; and Cajun Constructors, LLC (collectively, the

“Contractors”). The Contractors removed to federal court pursuant to the

federal officer removal statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

4

Case: 17-30089 Document: 00514133655 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/28/2017

No. 17-30089

In September 2016, the Contractors moved for summary judgment,

raising government contractor immunity as a defense to all remaining claims.

The district court heard oral argument on the Contractors’ motions for

summary judgment on September 28, 2016. At that time, the district court

“believed the Contractors had established their immunity defense, at least in

part, on six of the [SELA Project] phases and, in whole, on the seventh phase.”

Nevertheless, pursuant to SWB’s motion under Federal Rule of Procedure

56(d) and in the interest of fairness, the district court granted SWB an

additional thirty days of discovery “to persuade the Court that there . . . exist[s]

a genuine dispute of fact concerning the second and third prongs of the Boyle

test.” SWB was unable to convince the court, however, and in December 2016,

the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Contractors on

the basis of government contractor immunity. On January 5, 2017, the district

court issued an order declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

state law claims remaining in the litigation and remanding the case to state

court. This appeal followed. 1

“We review a summary judgment de novo, ‘using the same standard as

that employed by the district court under Rule 56.’” In re Katrina Canal

Breaches Litig., 620 F.3d 455, 459 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kerstetter v. Pac.

Sci. Co., 210 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 2000)). Summary judgment is appropriate

“if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

We use an abuse of discretion standard, however, when reviewing a district

court’s discovery-related rulings, such as a denial of a Rule 56(d) motion or a

decision to limit discovery. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Singing River Health Sys., 850 F.3d

1 Cases removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442 are expressly excepted from the general

rule that a remand order is not reviewable on appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).

5

Case: 17-30089 Document: 00514133655 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/28/2017

No. 17-30089

187, 194 (5th Cir. 2017); Crosby v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 647 F.3d

258, 261 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Fed R. Civ. P. 56(d) (allowing a court to defer

a motion or grant additional discovery when the movant can show, “by affidavit

or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to

justify its opposition”).

Contractors hired by the federal government are shielded from liability

subject to certain conditions. This defense is “derived from the government’s

immunity from suit where the performance of a discretionary function is at

issue.” Kerstetter, 210 F.3d at 435 (citing Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S.

500, 511 (1988)). To establish government contractor immunity, a contractor

must meet the test set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Boyle: “(1) the

government must have approved ‘reasonably precise’ specifications; (2) the

equipment must have conformed to these specifications; and (3) the

supplier/contractor must have warned of those equipment dangers that were

known to the supplier/contractor, but not to the government.” Id. (citing Boyle,

487 U.S. at 512). Although this appeal is nominally about whether the district

court erred in applying government contractor immunity, SWB’s argument on

appeal relates mainly to discovery. Specifically, SWB argues that its due

process rights were violated by the brevity of the pre-trial discovery process,

that the district court should have afforded it more time to conduct discovery

pursuant to Rule 56(d), and that the district court’s summary judgment ruling

was premature in light of SWB’s specific requests for further discovery.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing or making its

discovery rulings. This case was first removed to federal court on July 30, 2015.

In January 2016, SWB declined to participate in a discovery conference with

the Plaintiffs, contending that a conference would be premature. From April

through August 2016, the magistrate and district court judges held a series of

discovery scheduling and status conferences, eventually extending the

6

Case: 17-30089 Document: 00514133655 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/28/2017

No. 17-30089

deadline for the Contractors’ motions for summary judgment to September 6,

2016. Following oral argument on September 28, the district court granted

SWB an additional thirty days to conduct discovery on the second and third

prongs of the Boyle test.

It appears that the district court reasonably responded to SWB’s

discovery requests while also trying to move the case along and accommodate

the numerous parties in the litigation. From the time the case was removed to

federal court, SWB had fourteen months to conduct discovery relating to the

Contractors’ government contractor immunity defense. The district court

ultimately made its summary judgment ruling with the benefit of hundreds of

pages of detailed designs and specifications produced by the Corps regarding

all of the SELA projects at issue, as well as the deposition testimony of John

Fogarty, the Corps’s resident engineer and administrative contracting officer.

Even without addressing the Contractors’ arguments that SWB was dilatory

in performing discovery, we find that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in setting discovery deadlines, nor did it rule prematurely.

Regarding the substantive issue of government contractor immunity,

SWB only meaningfully challenges summary judgment on the first Boyle

prong. “The first Boyle step requires that the government approved reasonably

precise specifications. That entails both the existence of reasonably precise

specifications and the approval of those specifications by the government.” In

re Katrina, 620 F.3d at 461. “The requirement that the specifications be precise

means that the discretion over significant details and all critical design choices

will be exercised by the government.” Trevino v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d

1474, 1481 (5th Cir. 1989). While the “government need not prepare the

specifications to be considered to have approved them,” Kerstetter, 210 F.3d at

435, government approval requires more than a “rubber stamp”; the first Boyle

prong requires “substantive review or evaluation” of the design specifications

7

Case: 17-30089 Document: 00514133655 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/28/2017

No. 17-30089

by the government, Trevino, 865 F.2d at 1480. The crux of the first prong is

that the contractor cannot have been delegated all discretionary design

decisions and reap the benefit of the immunity defense. See id. at 1480–81; In

re Katrina, 620 F.3d at 465 (“The relevant inquiry . . . is whether the Corps

approved sufficiently precise specifications, such that it is evident that the

government was the primary agent of decision over the compaction method.”).

The district court did not err in determining that the plans and

specifications for each construction feature implicated by the plaintiffs’ claims

were reasonably precise and approved by the government. According to the

district court, the Corps “considered each offending feature and had in place

specifications that effectively removed all critical design choices from the

Contractors’ discretion.” The district court further determined that the Corps

“meaningfully reviewed and approved the specifications prior to construction,”

a process that “typically began with a years-long design period, during which

design firms retained by the government developed hundreds of pages of plans

and specifications.” And the Corps’s involvement was such that the district

court was convinced that the Corps “was the agent of decision on all critical

features of the work.” We agree that the government’s level of participation

and the specificity of the plans satisfies the first Boyle prong. SWB argues that

the specifications lacked detail regarding the composition of materials on

certain construction features, and that its own consultants’ involvement in the

design process indicates that the Corps “may have abdicated some or all of” the

review of the specifications to SWB. We find these arguments meritless in light

of the record evidence supporting the district court’s decision. Accordingly, we

affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the basis of

government contractor immunity.

Lastly, “a federal district court has discretion to remand a properly

removed case to state court when all federal-law claims have been eliminated

8

Case: 17-30089 Document: 00514133655 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/28/2017

No. 17-30089

and only pendent state-law claims remain.” Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc.,

936 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1991). The district court thoughtfully expressed its

reasoning for remanding the case, and the decision to remand was not an abuse

of discretion.

We AFFIRM.

9

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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