Englum v. City of Charleston

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Appellate Court Date: 2017.07.25

08:43:19 -05'00'

Englum v. City of Charleston, 2017 IL App (4th) 160747

Appellate Court STEVEN C. ENGLUM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE CITY OF

Caption CHARLESTON, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Fourth District

Docket Nos. 4-16-0747, 4-16-0748 cons.

Filed June 13, 2017

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Coles County, Nos. 14-CH-5,

Review 14-CH-6; the Hon. Brien J. O’Brien, Judge, presiding.

Judgment No. 4-16-0747, Reversed.

No. 4-16-0748, Dismissed.

Counsel on William B. Isaly, of Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, DiCianni &

Appeal Krafthefer, PC, of Chicago, for appellant.

Christopher L. Wetzel, of Charleston, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Justices Harris and Knecht concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 In December 2008, plaintiff, Steven C. Englum, was employed as a police officer by

defendant, the City of Charleston (City)—a non-home-rule municipality—when he was

injured while exiting his police cruiser. Englum was eventually awarded line-of-duty pension

benefits because of the injury. Englum v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, 2013

IL App (4th) 120982-U (reversing the pension board’s decision denying Englum line-of-duty

pension benefits).

¶2 In November 2013, Englum sent the City a letter requesting health insurance benefits

under section 10 of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (Safety Benefits Act) (820 ILCS

320/10 (West 2012)). In December 2013, the City enacted an ordinance establishing local

administrative procedures to determine applicants’ eligibility for section 10 benefits. The City

sent Englum notice of a hearing pursuant to those procedures, at which Englum’s eligibility

would be determined.

¶3 In February 2014, Englum filed two actions in the trial court. The first (case No. 14-CH-5)

was a complaint for declaratory relief, asking the court, instead of the City’s administrative

entity, to determine Englum’s eligibility for section 10 benefits. The second (case No.

14-CH-6) was a complaint for injunctive relief, seeking to enjoin the City from conducting an

eligibility hearing under the City’s ordinance.

¶4 The trial court determined that the proper procedure for determining section 10 benefits

eligibility was for the court to decide Englum’s complaint for declaratory relief. The court later

held a hearing on Englum’s complaint for declaratory relief and determined that he was

entitled to section 10 benefits.

¶5 The City appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) deciding Englum’s eligibility

based on his complaint for declaratory relief instead of allowing the City to determine

eligibility under its procedural scheme and, alternatively, (2) concluding on the merits that

Englum qualified for section 10 benefits. We agree with the City on its first point. We therefore

reverse the trial court’s judgment denying the City’s motion to dismiss Englum’s complaint for

declaratory relief (case No. 14-CH-5; appeal No. 4-16-0747). We dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction the City’s appeal in No. 4-16-0748 (case No. 14-CH-6).

¶6 I. BACKGROUND

¶7 A. Englum’s Injury

¶8 On December 7, 2008, Englum was on duty as a patrol officer for the City. Around 12:30

p.m., he received a dispatch informing him that the chief of police had requested an officer to

respond immediately to the Casey’s gas station. Dispatch did not provide Englum any other

information. Englum responded and arrived at Casey’s approximately one minute later. He

noticed nothing suspicious at Casey’s; nor did he see the chief of police. Unable to determine

why he was dispatched, Englum returned to the police station in hopes of speaking to the chief.

On his way into the station, Englum slipped and fell on ice in the parking lot, injuring his hand

and shoulder.

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¶9 B. Proceedings on Englum’s Claim for a Disability Pension

¶ 10 In February 2010, Englum applied to the Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund of

the City of Charleston (Board) for a disability pension under the Illinois Pension Code (40

ILCS 5/3-101 to 3-152 (West 2008)). The Board denied him a line-of-duty disability pension

but awarded him a not-on-duty disability pension. In May 2013, this court determined that the

Board’s decision to deny Englum a line-of-duty pension was clearly erroneous. Englum, 2013

IL App (4th) 120982-U, ¶ 25.

¶ 11 C. Proceedings on Englum’s Claim for Health Insurance Benefits

Under Section 10 of the Safety Benefits Act

¶ 12 In November 2013, Englum sent the City a letter asserting that his injuries entitled him to

health insurance benefits under section 10 of the Safety Benefits Act (820 ILCS 320/10 (West

2012)) and requesting the City to award him those benefits.

¶ 13 1. The City’s Ordinance

¶ 14 In December 2013, the City enacted title I, chapter 11, section 7, of the Charleston City

Council Code, entitled “Administrative Hearings To Determine Eligibility Under the Public

Safety Employee Benefit Act” (Ordinance). The Ordinance established administrative

procedures to determine whether City employees, such as Englum, were eligible for section 10

health insurance benefits under the Safety Benefits Act. The Ordinance provided for an

administrative hearing procedure overseen by a hearing officer appointed by the mayor of the

City.

¶ 15 In January 2014, the City sent Englum notice of a February 2014 hearing pursuant to the

Ordinance, where Englum’s eligibility for benefits under section 10 of the Safety Benefits Act

would be determined.

¶ 16 2. Englum’s Complaints

¶ 17 a. Englum’s Complaint for Declaratory Relief (Case No. 14-CH-5)

¶ 18 In February 2014, Englum filed a complaint requesting the trial court to enter a declaratory

judgment deeming him eligible for section 10 benefits.

¶ 19 b. Englum’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief (Case No. 14-CH-6)

¶ 20 On the same day, Englum filed a complaint for injunctive relief, arguing that the City’s

administrative scheme was unauthorized by state statute and requesting the trial court to enjoin

the City from using the Ordinance’s procedures to determine Englum’s section 10 eligibility.

¶ 21 3. The City’s Filings

¶ 22 In March 2014, the City filed answers in both cases. Both answers included identical

arguments raising the City’s “first affirmative defense” of “choice of remedy.” The City’s

choice-of-remedy defense argued, in both cases, that “this matter is not yet ripe” because

Englum had not exhausted the administrative procedures available to him under the Ordinance.

In June 2014, the City filed identical briefs in both cases supporting its “first affirmative

defense.”

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¶ 23 In its briefs, the City argued that it had authority under the Illinois Municipal Code (65

ILCS 5/1-2-1, 10-4-1 (West 2012)) to establish the administrative scheme created by the

Ordinance. Therefore, the City claimed, Englum was required to exhaust the procedures

created by the Ordinance, and his “claim for eligibility to benefits” was not yet ripe for review

by the trial court. (We note that the answer and brief filed in Englum’s injunctive relief action

(case No. 14-CH-6) raised arguments addressing the ripeness of Englum’s claim for

declaratory judgment (“claim for eligibility to benefits”) and not his claim for injunctive

relief.)

¶ 24 4. The December 2014 Hearing

¶ 25 In December 2014, the trial court held a joint hearing in both cases. At the beginning of the

hearing, the court accepted the parties’ request to treat the City’s answers in both cases as

motions to dismiss Englum’s respective complaints. The parties then presented arguments, and

the court took the matter under advisement.

¶ 26 5. The Trial Court’s January 2015 Orders

¶ 27 In January 2015, the trial court entered identical orders in both cases denying the City’s

motions to dismiss. The court determined that the supreme court’s decision in Gaffney v.

Board of Trustees of the Orland Fire Protection District, 2012 IL 110012, 969 N.E.2d 359,

precluded the City from establishing the procedural scheme created by the Ordinance. The

court ordered that Englum’s eligibility for section 10 benefits should be determined by the

court in response to Englum’s complaint for declaratory judgment in case No. 14-CH-5.

(Although the court did not explicitly grant Englum’s motion to enjoin the City’s

administrative procedures, its order had the practical effect of doing so.)

¶ 28 6. The July 2016 Hearing on Englum’s Complaint for

Declaratory Judgment

¶ 29 In July 2016, the trial court conducted a hearing on Englum’s complaint for declaratory

judgment to determine his eligibility for section 10 benefits. After the close of evidence, the

court took the matter under advisement.

¶ 30 7. The Trial Court’s September 2016 Opinion and Order

¶ 31 In September 2016, the trial court entered identical orders with opinions in case Nos.

14-CH-5 and 14-CH-6. As to case No. 14-CH-5, the court concluded that Englum was eligible

for benefits under section 10 of the Safety Benefits Act and ordered the City to award him

those benefits and to compensate him for the costs of the suit.

¶ 32 Regarding case No. 14-CH-6, the court determined, “To the extent any matters remain

pending in 14-CH-6, this Opinion is intended to represent a final ruling in regard thereto.”

¶ 33 This appeal followed.

¶ 34 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 35 The City argues that the trial court erred by (1) denying the City’s motion to dismiss

Englum’s complaint for injunctive relief (case No. 14-CH-6) and, alternatively, (2)

determining that Englum was eligible for benefits under the Safety Benefits Act (case No.

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14-CH-5).

¶ 36 A. Englum’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief

¶ 37 In appeal No. 4-16-0748, the City seeks to appeal from the judgment in case No. 14-CH-6.

The City’s notice of appeal asserts that the City is appealing the trial court’s September 2016

order “denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief.”

The language in the City’s notice of appeal is inaccurate—the court’s September 2016 order

did not deny the City’s motion to dismiss. Instead, the September 2016 order—as it related to

case No. 14-CH-6—purported to “represent a final ruling” as to “any matters remain[ing]

pending.”

¶ 38 What remained pending in case No. 14-CH-6 was Englum’s complaint for injunctive

relief, which sought to enjoin the City from adjudicating his claim for section 10 benefits under

the administrative procedures established by the Ordinance. The court’s September 2016 order

in case No. 14-CH-6—despite claiming to represent a final ruling as to the pending complaint

for injunctive relief—did not actually specify whether the court was granting or denying that

complaint. Although the court’s order had the practical effect of granting the

injunction—because the court went on to adjudicate Englum’s complaint for declaratory relief

in case No. 14-CH-5 instead of allowing the City to proceed with its administrative

procedures—no final judgment explicitly orders that relief. Without an order specifically

ruling on the complaint for injunctive relief, there is no final judgment in case No. 14-CH-6

from which the City can appeal. We therefore conclude that we lack jurisdiction over appeal

No. 4-16-0748, and we dismiss that appeal.

¶ 39 B. Englum’s Complaint for Declaratory Relief

¶ 40 In appeal No. 4-16-0747, the City appeals the trial court’s decision in case No. 14-CH-5. In

that case, the City filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Englum’s complaint for declaratory

relief was not yet ripe because he had not exhausted the City’s administrative procedures to

resolve his claim. The court denied the City’s motion to dismiss. The denial of a motion to

dismiss is not a final and appealable order. Marzouki v. Najar-Marzouki, 2014 IL App (1st)

132841, ¶ 9, 12 N.E.3d 620. Therefore, this appeal is the City’s first opportunity to seek review

of the trial court’s decision denying plaintiff’s ripeness argument. We therefore address that

argument, which requires us to determine whether the City—a non-home-rule

municipality—had the authority to establish local administrative procedures to determine

eligibility for benefits under section 10 of the Safety Benefits Act.

¶ 41 1. Statutory Language and the Standard of Review

¶ 42 a. Section 10 of the Safety Benefits Act

¶ 43 Section 10 of the Safety Benefits Act provides, in relevant part, the following:

“An employer who employs a full-time law enforcement *** officer, *** who, on or

after the effective date of this Act suffers a catastrophic injury *** shall pay the entire

premium of the employer’s health insurance plan for the injured employee, the injured

employee’s spouse, and for each dependent child of the injured employee until the

child reaches the age of majority ***.

***

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*** [T]he injury *** must have occurred as the result of the officer’s response to

fresh pursuit, *** response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency, an

unlawful act perpetrated by another, or during the investigation of a criminal act.” 820

ILCS 320/10(a), (b) (West 2012).

¶ 44 b. The Standard of Review

¶ 45 The trial court agreed with the parties that the court should construe the City’s answer as a

motion to dismiss but did not clarify what kind of motion to dismiss. We conclude that the

pleading was appropriately construed as a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615(a) of the

Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615(a) (West 2012)). A motion to dismiss under

section 2-615(a) “tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint based on defects apparent on its

face.” Reynolds v. Jimmy John’s Enterprises, LLC, 2013 IL App (4th) 120139, ¶ 25, 988

N.E.2d 984. A section 2-615(a) motion essentially says, “ ‘ “So what? The facts the plaintiff

has pleaded do not state a cause of action against me.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Winters v. Wangler, 386

Ill. App. 3d 788, 792, 898 N.E.2d 776, 779 (2008)). “A section 2-615(a) motion presents the

question of whether the facts alleged in the complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, and taking all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn

from those facts as true, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief may be

granted.” Id. We review a court’s decision on a section 2-615(a) motion to dismiss de novo. Id.

¶ 46 2. Local Government’s Authority To Establish Administrative

Procedures To Decide Section 10 Claims

¶ 47 No Illinois case has addressed the specific issue in this case—namely, whether a

non-home-rule municipality has the authority to establish an administrative scheme for

determining eligibility for benefits under section 10 of the Safety Benefits Act. But two cases

have addressed the related issues of whether a fire protection unit and a home-rule

municipality, respectively, have the authority to establish such procedures. We summarize

those two cases, as follows.

¶ 48 a. Gaffney

¶ 49 In Gaffney, the Board of the Orland Fire Protection District (see Fire Protection District

Act (70 ILCS 705/0.01 to 26 (West 2012))) passed an ordinance establishing an administrative

procedure to determine Orland Park firefighters’ eligibility for benefits under section 10 of the

Safety Benefits Act. Gaffney, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 11, 969 N.E.2d 359. Pursuant to the

ordinance, employees would apply directly to the Board to determine whether the employees

met the eligibility requirements of section 10. Id. Gaffney, a former firefighter, applied to the

Board for section 10 benefits, and the Board denied his application. Gaffney later filed an

action in the trial court for a declaratory judgment that he was entitled to section 10 benefits.

The court dismissed his complaint.

¶ 50 On appeal, the supreme court was tasked with determining whether the Board had

authority to establish and administer its own application procedure for determining section 10

eligibility. The Gaffney court noted that the Safety Benefits Act “does not provide any

guidance on the proper procedure for seeking section 10 benefits.” Id. ¶ 44. Despite the Safety

Benefits Act’s lack of a prescribed procedure, the Gaffney court held that a fire protection

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district lacked the statutory authority to create its own procedure. The Gaffney court explained

that neither the Fire Protection District Act (70 ILCS 705/0.01 to 26 (West 2012)) nor the

Safety Benefits Act itself expressed legislative intent to provide a fire district with authority

“to make administrative decisions on its employees’ eligibility for section 10 benefits.”

Gaffney, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 45, 969 N.E.2d 359. Therefore the court held that a complaint for

declaratory judgment “was the proper means of seeking a determination of section 10 benefits

in this case.” Id. ¶ 46.

¶ 51 b. Pedersen v. Village of Hoffman Estates

¶ 52 In Pedersen v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 2014 IL App (1st) 123402, 8 N.E.3d 1083, the

First District Appellate Court was tasked with determining how the holding of Gaffney should

apply to a home-rule municipality’s authority to enact local administrative procedures for

determining section 10 benefits eligibility.

¶ 53 The Pedersen court first examined the general authority granted to home-rule units under

article VII, section 6(a), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(a)).

Pedersen, 2014 IL App (1st) 123402, ¶¶ 31-33, 8 N.E.3d 1083. Article VII, section 6(a),

provides the following:

“Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and

perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited

to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and

welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(a).

Article VII, section 6(i), provides further:

“Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with the State any power or

function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by law does not

specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State’s exercise to

be exclusive.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(i).

In addition, section 7 of the Statute on Statutes provides, as follows:

“No law enacted after January 12, 1977, denies or limits any power or function of a

home rule unit, pursuant to paragraphs (g), (h), (i), (j), or (k) of Section 6 of Article VII

of the Illinois Constitution, unless there is specific language limiting or denying the

power or function and the language specifically sets forth in what manner and to what

extent it is a limitation on or denial of the power or function of a home rule unit.” 5

ILCS 70/7 (West 2012).

The Pedersen court explained that if the legislature intends to limit the exercise of home-rule

powers, the statute in question “must contain an express statement to that effect.” Pedersen,

2014 IL App (1st) 123402, ¶ 32, 8 N.E.3d 1083. The court added that “[i]n general, the

sovereign powers of home rule units extend to the creation of administrative agencies and

procedures.” Id. ¶ 33.

¶ 54 The Pedersen court then concluded that the Safety Benefits Act did not limit the village’s

home-rule power to create an administrative agency to handle section 10 benefits claims. Id.

¶¶ 34-37. Section 20 of the Safety Benefits Act directly addressed the authority of home-rule

units, as follows:

“An employer, including a home rule unit, that employs a full-time law enforcement,

correctional or correctional probation officer, or firefighter may not provide benefits to

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persons covered under this Act in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of this

Act. This Act is a limitation under subsection (i) of Section 6 of Article VII of the

Illinois Constitution on the concurrent exercise of powers and functions exercised by

the State.” 820 ILCS 320/20 (West 2012).

Section 20 expressly limited the authority of home-rule units to act inconsistently with the

provisions of the Safety Benefits Act. But the Safety Benefits Act contained no language

providing how Safety Benefits Act claims should be adjudicated procedurally. Therefore, the

Pedersen court held that “section 20 contains no language declaring the manner of deciding

claims under [the Safety Benefits Act] is an exclusive state power or function.” Pederson,

2014 IL App (1st) 123402, ¶ 37, 8 N.E.3d 1083.

¶ 55 In short, while the Safety Benefits Act contained substantive requirements for section 10

eligibility, the Safety Benefits Act contained no procedural requirements for determining

whether a former employee met the substantive criteria. As a result, the Pedersen court

concluded that “a home rule unit may employ an administrative procedure for assessing claims

without acting in a manner inconsistent with the requirements” of the Safety Benefits Act. Id.

¶ 56 3. This Case

¶ 57 This case requires us to decide an issue left unanswered after Gaffney and

Pedersen—namely, whether a non-home-rule municipal unit has authority to establish

administrative procedures to determine eligibility for section 10 benefits. We are aware of no

published Illinois case that has addressed that specific legal issue.

¶ 58 a. Authority of Non-Home-Rule Municipalities

¶ 59 Non-home-rule units are governed by “Dillon’s Rule,” which provides that

“non-home-rule units possess only those powers that are specifically conveyed by the

Constitution or by statute.” (Emphasis added.) Village of Sugar Grove v. Rich, 347 Ill. App. 3d

689, 694, 808 N.E.2d 525, 530 (2004). Article VII, section 7, of the Illinois Constitution

conveys six enumerated powers to non-home-rule units:

“(1) [T]he power to make local improvements by special assessments; (2-4) the power,

through referendum, to adopt, alter or repeal their forms of government and to provide

for ‘their officers, manner of selection and terms of office’; and (5-6) the power to incur

debt and to levy or impose additional taxes, subject to certain exceptions and

limitations.” Hawthorne v. Village of Olympia Fields, 204 Ill. 2d 243, 255, 790 N.E.2d

832, 840 (2003) (quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 7).

In addition to those six enumerated powers, the legislature may grant additional powers “either

expressly or impliedly, by statute.” Id.

¶ 60 “While non-home-rule municipalities have the authority to enact ordinances, such

ordinances may in no event conflict with state law or prohibit what a state statute expressly

permits.” Village of Wauconda v. Hutton, 291 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1060, 684 N.E.2d 1364, 1366

(1997). “A local ordinance may impose more rigorous or definite regulations in addition to

those enacted by the state legislature so long as they do not conflict with the statute.” Id.

¶ 61 One particularly broad grant of power provided by the legislature is contained in section

1-2-1 of the Illinois Municipal Code, which provides the following, applicable to both

home-rule and non-home-rule municipalities:

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“The corporate authorities of each municipality may pass all ordinances and make all

rules and regulations proper or necessary, to carry into effect the powers granted to

municipalities ***.” 65 ILCS 5/1-2-1 (West 2012).

¶ 62 One way non-home-rule municipalities exceed their power is by enacting ordinances that

infringe on an already existing state statutory scheme. For example, in Hawthorne, the state

legislature had enacted the Child Care Act of 1969 (225 ILCS 10/1 to 20 (West 2000)), which

regulated child-care facilities and, in particular, day-care businesses operated out of residential

homes. The non-home-rule Village of Olympia Fields then passed a zoning ordinance that

regulated “home occupation” businesses, resulting in a near-ban on home day cares in the

village. Hawthorne, 204 Ill. 2d at 246-47, 790 N.E.2d at 835-36. The village argued that it had

authority to pass its ordinance under section 11-13-1 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/1-2-1

(West 2000)), which provided municipalities with the authority to enact zoning ordinances to

regulate structures and their uses.

¶ 63 The supreme court held that the village’s ordinance went too far. The court acknowledged

that the Municipal Code granted the village the authority to enact zoning ordinances, but

“ ‘[w]here there is a conflict between a statute and an ordinance, the ordinance must give

way.’ ” Hawthorne, 204 Ill. 2d at 259, 790 N.E.2d at 842 (quoting Village of Mundelein v.

Hartnett, 117 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 1015, 454 N.E.2d 29 (1983)). The Hawthorne court explained

that “a non-home-rule unit *** cannot adopt ordinances under a general grant of power that

infringe upon the spirit of state law or are repugnant to the general policy of the state.” Id. at

258-59, 790 N.E.2d at 842. The village exceeded its power by enacting a “complete bar” to

state-licensed day-care homes, rendering the state’s comprehensive statutory scheme in that

area “a nullity.” Id. at 261, 790 N.E.2d at 843.

¶ 64 In a similar vein was the supreme court’s decision in Pesticide Public Policy Foundation v.

Village of Wauconda, 117 Ill. 2d 107, 510 N.E.2d 853 (1987). That case involved the Illinois

Pesticide Act of 1979 (Pesticide Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 5, ¶¶ 801 to 828) and the

Structural Pest Control Act (Pest Control Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 111½, ¶¶ 2201 to

2225), which established statewide licensing standards for pesticide use and awarded

regulatory power to state-government agencies. The non-home-rule Village of Wauconda later

enacted its own ordinance regulating the use of pesticides in the village more strictly than the

State acts. Pesticide Public Policy Foundation, 117 Ill. 2d at 109-10, 510 N.E.2d at 860.

¶ 65 The supreme court held that, although the Village of Wauconda had authority under the

Municipal Code to enact its ordinance, that authority was preempted by the Pesticide Act and

the Pest Control Act. Specifically, the village had explicit power to enact its ordinance under

section 11-20-5 of the Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 24, ¶ 11-20-5), which granted

municipalities the authority to make any regulations necessary to promote the public health.

Pesticide Public Policy Foundation, 117 Ill. 2d at 114, 510 N.E.2d at 862. But that authority

was preempted by the state legislature’s establishing “a broad and detailed scheme designed to

regulate the field of pesticide use in all respects.” Id. at 116, 510 N.E.2d at 862. “Where the

legislature enacts a comprehensive scheme of regulation, the legislature implies by the scheme

that there is no room for additional regulation by local government units.” Id. at 115, 510

N.E.2d at 862. By expansively legislating in that area, the legislature “intended that the State

occupy exclusively the field of pesticide regulation.” Id. at 116, 510 N.E.2d at 863.

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¶ 66 b. The City’s Authority To Enact the Ordinance in This Case

¶ 67 The City argues that section 10-4-1 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/10-4-1 (West 2012))

granted it the authority to enact the Ordinance. Section 10-4-1 of the Municipal Code provides,

as follows:

“The corporate authorities of any municipality may provide by ordinance in regard to

the relation between all municipal officers and employees in respect to each other, the

municipality, and the people.” Id.

¶ 68 We agree with the City and hold that section 10-4-1 granted the City the authority to enact

the Ordinance in this case. The determination of section 10 eligibility involves the “relation”

between municipal “employees,” the “municipality,” and “the people” who pay taxes that fund

section 10 benefits. The language of section 10-4-1, in addition to section 1-2-1, which grants

municipalities the authority to “pass all ordinances and make all rules and regulations proper or

necessary, to carry into effect the powers granted to municipalities,” granted the City authority

to establish administrative procedures to determine its employees’ eligibility for health

insurance benefits (65 ILCS 5/1-2-1 (West 2012)).

¶ 69 In so concluding, we are aware that any doubt concerning the grant of power to a

non-home-rule entity is resolved against the non-home-rule entity. Rajterowski v. City of

Sycamore, 405 Ill. App. 3d 1086, 1119, 940 N.E.2d 682, 709 (2010). Nonetheless, for the

reasons stated, we conclude that section 10-4-1 and 1-2-1 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS

5/10-4-1, 1-2-1 (West 2012)) provide the City with the necessary authority.

¶ 70 4. Was the City’s Authority Preempted by the Safety Benefits Act?

¶ 71 Having determined that the City had the general authority to enact the Ordinance, we now

determine whether the Safety Benefits Act evinces the legislature’s intent to preempt that

authority. We conclude that the Safety Benefits Act does not preempt the City’s authority.

¶ 72 Unlike the statutory context in Hawthorne, which involved a comprehensive state statutory

scheme, the Safety Benefits Act is not comprehensive. As the supreme court noted in Gaffney,

the Safety Benefits Act “does not provide any guidance on the proper procedure for seeking

section 10 benefits.” Therefore, in contrast to Hawthorne, the City was not preempted from

establishing local procedures to address the statutory gap.

¶ 73 This case is also distinguishable from Pesticide Public Policy Foundation. There, the

supreme court overruled the village’s pesticide-regulation ordinance because “[t]o allow a

local non-home-rule unit of government to override the determinations of the legislature would

frustrate the purposes of the [state pesticide statutes].” Pesticide Public Policy Foundation,

117 Ill. 2d at 119, 510 N.E.2d at 864. In this case, the Ordinance did not override the

determinations of the legislature. Instead, the Ordinance complemented the determinations of

the legislature by enacting a procedural process to fulfill the substantive requirements of the

Safety Benefits Act. The Ordinance did not “frustrate the purposes” of the Safety Benefits Act.

If anything, the Ordinance facilitated the purposes of the Safety Benefits Act. Therefore, the

City was not preempted from establishing the administrative procedures provided by the

Ordinance.

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¶ 74 5. Englum’s Additional Arguments

¶ 75 Englum first argues that allowing the City to enact its own procedures to administer section

10 benefits would violate the equal-protection clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.

1970, art. I, § 2) because not every municipality in Illinois has enacted similar procedures;

therefore, section 10 benefits would be administered unequally to different citizens in different

parts of the State. We reject this argument.

¶ 76 Englum’s equal-protection argument overlooks the nature of municipal authority. The

Illinois Constitution of 1970 broadened the authority of local governments to legislate at the

local level. If an equal-protection violation occurred each time a municipality passed a unique

ordinance, municipal lawmaking authority would be illusory. We note that Englum has cited

no authority in support of his equal-protection argument.

¶ 77 Englum also argues that allowing the City to enact its administrative scheme would be

unfair because it would allow the City to usurp the trial court’s fact-finding role. Under the

procedural arrangement established by the Ordinance, the City hearing officer would act as

fact finder, and the trial court would act as a court of review owing deference to the hearing

officer’s findings of fact. Englum argues that the Ordinance is merely the City’s underhanded

attempt to have a City official perform the fact-finding instead of the court.

¶ 78 Englum presented no evidence regarding the City’s ulterior motives, nor does he cite any

authority for the proposition that we should evaluate the City’s intent when determining its

municipal authority. We confine our analysis to the plain language of the Illinois Constitution,

the relevant statutes, and the Ordinance. Under those applicable authorities, we determine that

the City had the authority to establish the administrative procedures contained in the

Ordinance. Englum’s eligibility for section 10 benefits should have been determined by those

procedures instead of a complaint for declaratory relief. See Beahringer v. Page, 204 Ill. 2d

363, 375, 789 N.E.2d 1216, 1224 (2003) (“The exhaustion doctrine applies where a claim is

cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency.”).

¶ 79 C. The Trial Court’s Decision on the Merits

¶ 80 Because we have determined that Englum’s claim for section 10 benefits should have been

adjudicated pursuant to the City’s administrative procedures, we do not reach the merits of the

trial court’s decision awarding Englum section 10 benefits.

¶ 81 In conclusion, in appeal No. 4-16-0747, we reverse the trial court’s decision denying the

City’s motion to dismiss Englum’s complaint for declaratory relief in case No. 14-CH-5.

¶ 82 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 83 For the foregoing reasons, in appeal No. 4-16-0747, we reverse the trial court’s judgment

denying the City’s motion to dismiss Englum’s complaint for declaratory relief. We conclude

that we lack jurisdiction to hear appeal No. 4-16-0748, and we dismiss that appeal.

¶ 84 No. 4-16-0747, Reversed.

¶ 85 No. 4-16-0748, Dismissed.

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