Jason Ray v. Madison County, Tennessee

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Heard in Jackson April 6, 2017 Session

JASON RAY v. MADISON COUNTY, TENNESSEE

Rule 23 Certified Question of Law

from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Tennessee

No. 15-1015 J. Daniel Breen, Judge

___________________________________

No. M2016-01577-SC-R23-CV – Filed August 16, 2017

___________________________________

We accepted certification of questions of law from the United States District Court for

the Western District of Tennessee, which require us to determine: (1) whether, for split

confinement sentences, Tennessee law authorizes a sentencing court to fix a percentage

of the sentence that a defendant must serve in actual confinement before becoming

eligible to participate in a work program in the local jail or workhouse; and (2) whether

Tennessee law imposes a duty on a sheriff to challenge an inmate’s improper or

potentially improper sentence. We conclude (1) that for split confinement sentences

Tennessee trial judges are authorized to fix a percentage the defendant must serve in

actual confinement before becoming eligible to earn work credits; and (2) that sheriffs in

Tennessee have no duty to challenge an inmate’s sentence as improper or potentially

improper.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 23 Certified Questions of Law

CORNELIA A. CLARK, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JEFFREY S. BIVINS,

C.J., and SHARON G. LEE, HOLLY KIRBY, and ROGER A. PAGE, JJ., joined.

James Bryan Moseley, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, and LeAnne Thorne, Lexington,

Tennessee, for the petitioner, Jason Ray.

Nathan D. Tilly, and James I. Pentecost, Jackson, Tennessee, for the respondent, Madison

County, Tennessee.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée S. Blumstein, Solicitor

General; Charlotte Davis, Assistant Attorney General, for the amicus curiae, Tennessee

Attorney General and Reporter.

Jerry N. Estes, Nashville, Tennessee, for the amicus curiae, Tennessee District Attorneys

General Conference.

Joe Atnip and Patrick G. Frogge, Nashville, Tennessee, for the amicus curiae, Tennessee

Public Defenders Conference.

Richard Lewis Tennent, Nashville, Tennessee, and Sara Compher Rice, Knoxville,

Tennessee, for the amicus curiae, Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Brennan M. Wingerter, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the amicus curiae, Tennessee Sheriffsʼ

Association.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background1

The certified questions of law at issue in this appeal arise from a lawsuit Jason

Ray brought in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee

(“District Court”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. Ray alleged that his civil rights

were violated when his sentence was not reduced by the work credits he earned as a

trusty2 while confined in the Madison County, Tennessee jail (“Jail”) on his split

confinement sentence.3 Mr. Ray’s confinement in the Jail resulted from his plea of

guilty on June 3, 2013, to theft of property over $60,000, a Class B felony. Tenn. Code

Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -105(a)(5) (2014 & Supp. 2016). Class B felonies have an overall

sentencing range of eight to thirty years, id. § 40-35-111(b)(2) (2014),4 with Range I

1

Because this appeal involves a certified question of law from a federal court, we have no record

and derive the factual and procedural background from the District Court’s certification order and from

the District Court’s March 16, 2016 order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, which the District Court incorporated by reference into its certification order. Tenn.

Sup. Ct. R. 23, § 3(B).

2

The “trusty” program is an inmate worker program whereby inmates are able to earn sentence

reduction work credits as well as certain privileges while incarcerated.

3

Mr. Ray named as defendants Madison County and three individuals, Sheriff David Woolfork,

Captain Tom Rudder, and Sergeant Chester Long, Jr., but the District Court dismissed Sheriff Woolfork

and granted summary judgment to Captain Rudder and Sergeant Long on the basis of qualified immunity.

The District Court refused to grant Madison County summary judgment, concluding that a reasonable

finder of fact could determine that the procedures afforded by Madison County, or lack thereof, failed to

provide Mr. Ray due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Therefore, Mr. Ray and Madison County are the only parties before this Court.

4

Mr. Ray’s guilty plea was based on his stealing money over a two-year period from First

Assembly of God Church in Jackson, Tennessee—where he served as secretary, treasurer, and youth

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offenders, like Mr. Ray, subject to a range of eight to twelve years, id. § 40-35-112(a)(2).

Mr. Ray received a ten-year sentence, but the trial court ordered only eleven months and

twenty-nine days served in confinement at the Jail and ordered the remainder of the

sentence served on supervised probation. This type of sentence, known as “split

confinement” or “shock probation,” is considered valuable “in combining both

incarceration and rehabilitation as part of a sentencing program.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-

35-306 (2014), Sentencing Comm’n Cmts.;5 see also Shorts v. Bartholomew, 278 S.W.3d

268, 271 (Tenn. 2009).

Mr. Ray entered the Jail to serve the confinement portion of his sentence on

July 18, 2013, almost two weeks before the trial court issued its official judgment on

July 31, 2013. Such delay between inmates entering the Jail and the Jail receiving

official judgments was not uncommon. As a result, each inmate ordinarily entered the

Jail with a “disposition sheet”—a document described in the record as a written form

meant to ensure that the Jail received accurate information concerning the inmate’s

sentence and what had occurred in the trial court. Although the disposition sheet had a

signature line for the judge, it was not an official court document. Nevertheless, Jail

personnel entered sentencing information from disposition sheets into the Jail’s computer

system before receiving official judgments. After receiving an official judgment, Jail

procedure called for Jail personnel to compare it to the information taken from the

inmate’s disposition sheet. Where the official judgment differed from the disposition

sheet, or questions arose about the inmate’s sentence, Jail procedure called for Jail

personnel to seek clarification from the attorneys or the judge involved in the case.

The disposition sheet with which Mr. Ray entered the Jail on July 18, 2013,

contained no language prohibiting him from immediately serving as a trusty and earning

work credits. Five days after his arrival at the Jail, Mr. Ray signed an Inmate Worker

Policy Contract, which designated him a trusty inmate worker and assigned him to work

in the kitchen. Mr. Ray’s responsibilities included cooking, cleaning, and passing out

meal trays throughout the day. To fulfill these duties, Mr. Ray awoke daily between 2:30

and 3:00 a.m. to serve breakfast at 4:30 a.m. As a trusty, Mr. Ray also received certain

privileges, including issuance of a white jumpsuit instead of the blue one worn by the

Jail’s general population, assignment to a trusty-only residence pod, permission to wear

tennis shoes, extra food, special dining times, and unlimited tea.

director—by using his power as treasurer to write checks to himself in amounts ranging from $500 to

$600.

5

The Sentencing Commission Comments to the Sentencing Act do not reflect legislation enacted

in 1995 or thereafter because the Sentencing Commission terminated on June 30, 1995. Nevertheless,

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-306 has not been amended since 1989. Therefore, the

Sentencing Commission Comments to section 40-35-306 remain accurate. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

101 (2014), Compiler’s Notes.

-3-

Eight days after Mr. Ray began working as a trusty, the trial court issued its

judgment in Mr. Ray’s case on July 31, 2013. The trial court used a judgment form that

contained the following line: “Minimum service prior to eligibility for work release,

furlough, trusty status and rehabilitation programs: _____ % (Misdemeanor Only).” See

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 17. The trial judge placed “75” in the blank space preceding the

percent symbol.

This 75% notation first came under scrutiny in November 2013, after Mr. Ray was

mistakenly released from custody on October 24, 2013, “as a result of a miscalculation of

his sentence by a corrections officer.” After learning that Mr. Ray had been released

from confinement, the trial judge, on November 14, 2013, called Sergeant Chester

Long, Jr., a correctional officer at the Jail, to inquire about Mr. Ray’s early release.

During this conversation, the trial judge advised Sergeant Long that, pursuant to the trial

court’s judgment, Mr. Ray was not eligible to earn work credits until he had served 75%

of his eleven month, twenty-nine day sentence in actual confinement. The trial judge

directed Sergeant Long to have Mr. Ray picked up and returned to the Jail to serve the

balance of his sentence.

When the trial judge called him, Sergeant Long was not aware Mr. Ray had been

released but promised to investigate the matter. Sergeant Long thereafter talked with his

supervisor, Captain Tom Rudder, the Jail administrator, about the trial judge’s

instructions. Captain Rudder and Sergeant Long subsequently met with the trial judge to

discuss the matter further. In a declaration filed in the District Court, the trial judge

stated that, during this meeting, he “explained to Captain Rudder and Sergeant Long that

pursuant to [the 75%] provision [in the judgment], [Mr. Ray] was not entitled to work

credits until he [had] served 75% of his sentence. Both Sergeant Long and Captain

Rudder stated that they understood [the trial judge’s] orders and pursuant to [his] orders

would not apply work credits to [Mr. Ray’s] sentence.”

After this meeting, Sergeant Long called Mr. Ray and instructed him to return to

the Jail, explaining that he had been mistakenly released from custody too soon. Mr. Ray

returned to the Jail as instructed on November 17, 2013, and he immediately resumed

working as a trusty. One week later, on November 24, 2013, Mr. Ray filed a motion

through counsel asking the trial court to suspend the balance of his sentence or, in the

alternative, to place him on work release. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-306(c) (“At any

time during the period of continuous confinement ordered pursuant to this section, the

defendant may apply to the sentencing court to have the balance of the sentence served

on probation supervision. The application may be made at no less than two-month

intervals.”)

Mr. Ray attended the hearing on the motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the

trial court denied the motion, explaining:

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Now, I want to make sure it’s clear too, he’s not eligible for any type of

work release credits. He’s not eligible for any type of trust[y] credits. The

only credits that he can earn are good behavior credits. That’s the reason

it’s listed at [75%]. So, you know, once he’s served a minimum of nine

months in jail then if he’s behaved himself in jail then the sheriff could give

him good behavior credits and let him out on this 11 months and 29 day

period of shock incarceration. You know, that was the intent of the Court.

That’s the Judgment of the Court[,] and I still feel like that’s the proper

sentence.

The trial court’s July 31, 2013 judgment was not amended after this hearing, and

Mr. Ray did not appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion. In a deposition filed in the

District Court, Mr. Ray acknowledged that the trial court told him he would not be

eligible for work credits until after he had served 75% of the confinement portion of his

sentence. Nevertheless, Mr. Ray continued working as a trusty at the Jail until his release

on April 16, 2014.

In calculating his April 16, 2014 release date, the Jail applied only good behavior

credits authorized by Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-2-111(b) (2014).6 The Jail

did not apply work credits described in other statutes. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 41-2-

146,7 -147,8 and -1509 (2014). In the declaration submitted to the District Court, the trial

6

Section 41-2-111(b) provides:

(b) Each such prisoner who has been sentenced to the county jail or workhouse

for any period of time less than one (1) year on either a misdemeanor or a felony, and

who behaves uprightly, shall have deducted from the sentence imposed by the court time

equal to one quarter (¼) of the sentence. In calculating the amount of good time credit

earned, the one-quarter reduction shall apply to the entire sentence, including pre-trial

and post-trial confinement. Fractions of a day’s credit for good time of one half (½) or

more shall be considered a full day’s credit. If any prisoner violates the rules and

regulations of the jail or workhouse, or otherwise behaves improperly, the sheriff or

superintendent of the institution may revoke all or any portion of the prisoner’s good time

credit; provided, that the prisoner is given a hearing in accordance with due process

before a disciplinary review board and is found to have violated the rules and regulations

of the institution.

7

Section 41-2-146 provides:

(a) When any prisoner has been sentenced to imprisonment in a county

workhouse or jail or is serving time in the county jail or workhouse pursuant to an

agreement with the department of correction, the sheriff or superintendent of the county

shall be authorized to permit the prisoner to participate in work programs.

(b) Work performed by the prisoner under this section shall be credited toward

reduction of the prisoner’s sentence in the following manner: for each one (1) day worked

on such duties by the prisoner the sentence shall be reduced by two (2) days.

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judge stated that applying work credits to the confinement portion of Mr. Ray’s sentence

before he had served 75% of it would have been a violation of his order. By not applying

work credits, the Jail had complied with his ruling.

In contrast, Mr. Ray alleged in his federal civil rights action that, had Madison

County afforded him the work credits he earned as a trusty, he would have been released

from the Jail seven weeks earlier. Mr. Ray argued that, by holding him beyond the date

he should have been released, Madison County deprived him of his rights under the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Mr. Ray

contended that “he had a liberty interest in the work credits that the [trial court’s] order

and instructions could not defeat.”

8

Section 41-2-147 provides in relevant part:

(a) The sheriff or administrative authority having responsibility for the custody of

any person sentenced to a local jail or workhouse pursuant to the provisions of . . .

present . . . § 40-35-306 . . . shall, when a person has become eligible for work related

programs pursuant to [§ 40-35-306], be authorized to permit the person to perform any of

the duties set out in § 41-2-123 [road work by prisoners] or § 41-2-146 [work programs].

(b) Work performed by a prisoner under this section shall be credited toward

reduction of the prisoner’s sentence in the following manner: for each one (1) day worked

on such duties by the prisoner the sentence shall be reduced by two (2) days.

(c) Any prisoner receiving sentence credits under this section shall not be eligible

for the sentence reduction authorized by § 41-2-111 [good time credit].

9

Section 41-2-150 provides in relevant part:

(a) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, except as provided in

subsection (b), any person sentenced to the county workhouse or jail, either for a felony

or misdemeanor conviction, in counties with programs whereby prisoners work either for

pay or sentence reduction, or both, shall be required to participate in work programs

during the period of the person’s incarceration. Any prisoner who refuses to participate

in those programs when work is available shall have any sentence reduction credits

received pursuant to the provisions of § 41-2-123 [road work by prisoners] or § 41-2-146

[work programs] reduced by two (2) days of credit for each one (1) day of refusal to

work. Any prisoner who refuses to participate in the work programs who has not

received any sentence reduction credits pursuant to § 41-2-123 or § 41-2-146 may be

denied good time credit in accordance with the provisions of § 41-2-111(b) and may also

be denied any other privileges given to inmates in good standing for refusal to work.

(b) The only exceptions to the requirements of subsection (a) shall be for those

persons who, in the opinion of the sheriff or the superintendent of the jail, would present

a security risk or a danger to the public if allowed to leave the confines of the jail or

workhouse and those persons who, in the opinion of a licensed physician or licensed

medical professional, should not perform the labor for medical reasons.

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Madison County moved for summary judgment in the District Court, arguing that

Tennessee statutes and decisions authorize a sentencing judge to establish the percentage

of actual confinement that a split confinement inmate must serve prior to becoming

eligible to accrue work credits. The District Court denied Madison County’s motion for

summary judgment.10 Nevertheless, the District Court certified the following questions

to this Court:

1. Does a Tennessee sentencing court or the county sheriff possess the

ultimate authority to determine the eligibility of a felon sentenced to serve a

split confinement sentence in a local jail or workhouse to participate in a

trusty work program and, therefore, be entitled to work credits under

Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 41-2-146 or 41-2-147?

2. In the event a Tennessee sentencing court issues an improper or

potentially improper sentence, does a sheriff have a duty under Rule 36.1 or

the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure or under any other Tennessee

law to challenge the sentence, or is [it] the duty of the criminal defendant,

the defense attorney and the district attorney general to challenge an illegal

sentence?

We accepted certification of these two questions but also directed the parties to

file supplemental briefs addressing some additional underlying questions:

1. When a sentencing court imposes a sentence of split confinement

pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-306, whereby a defendant is ordered

to serve a period of continuous confinement of up to one year in the local

jail or workhouse followed by a period of probation, which additional

statutory sentencing provisions, if any, dictate how the period of continuous

confinement is to be served?

A. Does Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-302(d), Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

314(b)(1), or any other statutory provision authorize a sentencing

court (imposing a sentence of split confinement pursuant to Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-35-306) to fix a percentage of the continuous

confinement portion that a defendant must serve prior to being

eligible for consideration in a work release/trusty program in the local

jail or workhouse?

B. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-211(3) provides that if a defendant is

convicted of an offense designated as a felony but the court imposes a

sentence of less than one year in the jail or local workhouse, the

defendant is considered a felon but he is sentenced as in the case of a

10

As already noted, the District Court granted the individual defendants summary judgment, and

they are not before this Court.

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misdemeanor. Despite the reference in the Sentencing Commission

Comments that this section continues the practice of allowing certain

Class E felons to serve a sentence of less than one year in the local jail

or workhouse, did the General Assembly intend for this statutory

section to apply to a defendant who, as here, was convicted of a Class

B felony and received a ten-year sentence to be served in split

confinement with 11 months, 29 days confinement in the local jail or

workhouse and the balance probated?

2. If the sentencing court imposes a sentence of split confinement and is

authorized to fix a percentage of service that a defendant must serve prior to

becoming eligible for work credits, does such authority conflict with Tenn.

Code. Ann. §§ 41-2-146, 41-2-147, 41-2-150, or any other provision related

to earning or crediting work credits?

Ray v. Madison Cnty., M2016-01577-SC-R23-CV (Tenn. Dec. 21, 2016) (order

accepting certification and requesting supplemental briefing of underlying issues). We

also invited the Tennessee Bar Association, the Tennessee Association of Criminal

Defense Lawyers, the Tennessee Attorney General, the Tennessee District Public

Defenders Conference, and the Tennessee District Attorneys General Conference to

submit amici curiae briefs. Id. All have done so, and we are grateful for the additional

perspectives they have provided.

II. Standards of Review

Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 23 provides that this Court “may, in its discretion,

answer questions of law certified to it by . . . a District Court of the United States in

Tennessee” if the questions of state law are “determinative of the cause” and “there is no

controlling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.” Tenn. Sup.

Ct. R. 23, § 1. Rule 23 “promotes judicial efficiency and comity and protects this State’s

sovereignty.” Yardley v. Hosp. Housekeeping Sys., LLC, 470 S.W.3d 800, 803 (Tenn.

2015). This Court has exercised its authority in this case to adjust the certified questions

“to provide the guidance actually sought.” Shorts, 278 S.W.3d at 280 n.13 (citing 17A

Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure, Jurisdiction 3d. § 4248 n.67

(Westlaw 2009)). De novo review applies to all the questions of law presented herein.

Shorts, 278 S.W.3d at 274.

Furthermore, the answers to these questions of law depend upon the interpretation

of statutes; therefore, we apply the familiar rules of statutory construction. Id. A court’s

overarching purpose in construing statutes is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent,

without expanding a statute beyond its intended scope. Baker v. State, 417 S.W.3d 428,

433 (Tenn. 2013). Words used in a statute “must be given their natural and ordinary

meaning in the context in which they appear and in light of the statute’s general purpose.”

Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tenn. 2012). We endeavor to construe

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statutes in a reasonable manner “which avoids statutory conflict and provides for

harmonious operation of the laws.” Baker, 417 S.W.3d at 433 (internal quotations

omitted). Where statutory language is ambiguous or a statutory conflict exists, we may

consider and discern legislative intent from matters other than the statutory language,

“such as the broader statutory scheme, the history and purpose of the legislation, public

policy, historical facts preceding or contemporaneous with the enactment of the statute,

earlier versions of the statute, the caption of the act, and the legislative history of the

statute.” Womack v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 448 S.W.3d 362, 366 (Tenn. 2014) (citing

Pickard v. Tennessee Water Quality Control Bd., 424 S.W.3d 511, 518 (Tenn. 2013)).

We presume that the General Assembly has knowledge of its prior enactments and knows

the state of the law and the existence of other statutes relating to the same subject at the

time it enacts new statutes. Shorts, 278 S.W.3d at 277; Neff v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 704

S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tenn. 1986). While this Court has often applied these principles, doing so

in the context of the many statutes raised in this appeal has been particularly difficult

because of the issues noted below.

III. Analysis

A. Authority of Trial Courts Imposing Split Confinement Sentences

Eight years ago a federal court certified a question of law under Rule 23, which

required this Court to confront “inconsistent and overlapping” statutes concerning the

applicability of and responsibility for calculating sentence credits for certain split

confinement sentences. Shorts, 278 S.W.3d at 274-75, 282. A federal lawsuit has once

again “revealed what we believe to be a lack of statutory clarity” and “gaps” in

Tennessee statutes regarding split confinement sentencing procedures.11 Id. With no

11

In a declaration offered in support of the individual defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

which the District Court quoted in its order granting in part and denying in part summary judgment,

Captain Rudder described the uncertainty in Tennessee law as follows:

Tennessee law is not clear on how a jail should apply said credits. Thus, city and county

jails across Tennessee calculate and apply jail credits differently because state law is not

clear on how said credits should be calculated or applied.

Specifically, there are questions not answered under Tennessee law concerning

whether an inmate’s time in jail should be calculated on a day to day, week to week, or

month to month basis. Also there ha[ve] been discussions as to how many days are to be

considered in a sentence of 11 months and 29 days[,] and there are different methods

used by different facilities as to said timeframe. For example, some jails will not provide

an inmate “work credits” until he has worked more than 25% of his entire sentence

because before he does so, they only apply the “good time credits,” which amount to 25%

of his sentence. Thus, in such a situation, [a]n inmate serving 11 months, 29 days, would

not receive any work credits until after he worked around 91 days. Other jails, like the

Madison County Jail, calculate an inmate’s credits on a monthly basis, so that once an

inmate has worked enough in a month to cover more than 25% of his time in that month,

he receives “work time credits” instead of “good time credits” for that month. Further,

some jails calculate the credits on the back end of the entire sentence, including the

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substantial legislative changes having been made in the interim, we remain frustrated by

the lack of express and clear statutory guidance on how split confinement sentences are to

be imposed and how a split confinement defendant’s eligibility for work and other

rehabilitative programs is to be determined. Nevertheless, we are cognizant of our duty

to wade into this quagmire a second time and resolve the dilemmas this case presents.

We begin this unwelcome task by reviewing the principles about which there is no

disagreement.

Under the Tennessee Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, as amended in 2005,

Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-101 through 505 (“Sentencing Act”), trial

judges have broad discretion when fashioning sentences. State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682,

706-07 (Tenn. 2012). “The [Sentencing] Act requires a case-by-case approach to

sentencing, and authorizes, indeed encourages, trial judges to be innovative in devising

appropriate sentences.” State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tenn. 1996). For felony

offenses, the Sentencing Act provides trial courts with the following options: (1)

continuous confinement either in a local jail or workhouse or in a Tennessee Department

of Correction facility; (2) periodic confinement in a local jail or workhouse; (3) split

confinement; (4) fines; (5) restitution; (6) probation; (7) work release; (8) community

corrections; or (9) a combination of these options. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-104(c)

(2014).

The Sentencing Act encourages trial courts to utilize alternative sentences. Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-35-102(3)(C) (2014) (“Punishment shall be imposed to prevent crime

and promote respect for the law by . . . [e]ncouraging effective rehabilitation of those

defendants, where reasonably feasible, by promoting the use of alternative sentencing

and correctional programs that elicit voluntary cooperation of defendants . . . .”

(emphasis added)). To this end, the Sentencing Act allows trial courts to order probation

or split confinement sentences for most sentences of ten (10) years or less. Tenn. Code

Ann. §§ 40-35-303(a), 40-35-306 (2014 & Supp. 2016). Where a trial court orders

probation,

the court shall sentence the defendant to a specific sentence but shall

suspend the execution of all or part of the sentence and place the defendant

on supervised or unsupervised probation either immediately or after a

period of confinement for a period of time no less than the minimum

sentence allowed under the classification and up to and including the

statutory maximum time for the class of the conviction offense.

probationary period. Thus, an inmate sentenced to “shock probation” would receive

work credits on his entire sentence, not just the portion of the sentence spent in jail,

meaning he would likely spend no less time in jail.

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Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(c)(1). When ordering probation, trial courts have broad

authority both to establish terms for the supervision of probation and also to impose

conditions with which offenders must comply, id. § -303(d)(1)-(12), including any

“conditions reasonably related to the purpose of the offender’s sentence and not unduly

restrictive of the offender’s liberty or incompatible with the offender’s freedom of

conscience, or otherwise prohibited by this chapter,” id. § -303(d)(9).

As already noted, a split confinement sentence is “shock probation” and a valuable

alternative sentencing option that combines “incarceration and rehabilitation as part of a

sentencing program.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-306, Sentencing Comm’n Cmts; see also

Shorts, 278 S.W.3d at 280 (stating that “[s]plit confinement sentences are, by definition,

different from sentences of continuous confinement–technically, they are probated

sentences” (emphasis added)). When imposing a split confinement sentence, trial courts

order defendants, like Mr. Ray, to serve “a portion of the sentence in continuous

confinement for up to one (1) year in the local jail or workhouse,” and the confinement is

followed by “probation for a period of time up to and including the statutory maximum

time for the class of the conviction offense.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-306(a). If a

defendant serving a split confinement sentence violates “the terms of probation” or “the

rules of the institution where the defendant is confined,” the trial court has authority “to

revoke the sentence of split confinement and impose a sentence” which “shall not exceed

the remainder of the full sentence.” Id. § -306(b). On the other hand, “[a]t any time

during the period of continuous confinement ordered . . . the defendant may apply to the

sentencing court to have the balance of the sentence served on probation supervision,” so

long as the application is “made at no less than two-month intervals.” Id. § -306(c).

Thus, under section 40-35-306, the trial court retains authority to increase or decrease the

confinement portion of the sentence as appropriate for the circumstances.

However, no language in section 40-35-306 expressly answers the first question

presented in this appeal—whether a trial court has authority to require a split confinement

defendant to serve a certain percentage of the sentence in actual confinement before

becoming eligible to participate in work programs and accrue work credits. By contrast,

as Mr. Ray points out, a prior version of the statute authorizing split confinement

sentences expressly required trial courts to set such a percentage. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-

35-306 (a)-(b)(1) (1984).12

12

Subsections (a) and (b)(1) of the 1984 version of section 40-35-306, now repealed, provided as

follows:

(a) A defendant receiving probation may be required to serve a portion of the

sentence in continuous confinement for up to one (1) year in the jail or workhouse, with

the remainder of such sentence on probation supervision.

(b)(1) The court shall specify what percentage of the sentence imposed must be

served in actual confinement before the defendant may become eligible for release

classification status which may include all programs except parole. Such percentages

shall be expressed in one (1) of the following numeric percentages: Zero percent (0%),

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Moreover, none of the other statutes on which Madison County relies expressly

confer such authority on trial courts. Admittedly, one of these statutes, Tennessee Code

Annotated section 40-35-314(b)(1) (2014), states that, “[w]hen imposing the sentence to

the local jail or workhouse, the defendant is eligible for release classification status as

provided in this chapter; however, the court may specify an earlier percentage of

eligibility for all programs except parole.”13 Nevertheless, subsection (a) of section 40-

35-314 expressly limits its application to felony offenders serving split confinement

sentences “of eight (8) years or less.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-314(a) (emphasis

added). This statute clearly does not apply to Mr. Ray’s split confinement sentence of ten

years. 14

ten percent (10%), twenty percent (20%), thirty percent (30%), forty percent (40%), fifty

percent (50%), sixty percent (60%), seventy percent (70%), eighty percent (80%), ninety

percent (90%), or one hundred percent (100%).

13

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-314 provides in relevant part:

(a) If confinement is directed, the court shall designate the place of confinement

as a local jail or workhouse if required pursuant to § 40-35-104(b) or, if the sentence is

eight (8) years or less and combined with periodic or split confinement not to exceed one

(1) year, the court shall designate the place of confinement as a local jail or

workhouse. . . .

(b)(1) When imposing the sentence to the local jail or workhouse, the defendant

is eligible for release classification status as provided in this chapter; however, the court

may specify an earlier percentage of eligibility for all programs except parole. This

percentage shall be expressed in one (1) of the following numeric percentages: zero

percent (0%), ten percent (10%), twenty percent (20%), thirty percent (30%), forty

percent (40%) or fifty percent (50%); provided, that the percentage shall be no higher

than the release eligibility percentage under § 40-35-501.

(2) In the event the judgment does not specify a percentage as provided in

subdivision (b)(1), the defendant shall be eligible for the programs, except parole, six (6)

months prior to release eligibility date under § 40-35-501.

(c) The court shall retain full jurisdiction over the defendant during the term of

the sentence and may reduce or modify the sentence or may place the defendant on

probation supervision where otherwise eligible. Following the first application,

applications to reduce or to alter the manner of the service of the sentence may be made

at no less than two (2) month intervals.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-314(a)-(c) (2014) (emphases added).

14

When the Sentencing Act was initially enacted, probation and split confinement sentences

were available only for sentences of eight years or less. In 2005, the General Assembly amended the

Sentencing Act to make probation and split confinement sentences available for sentences of ten years or

less. See 2005 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 353, § 7. However, section 40-35-314(a) was not amended in 2005

and remains applicable only to split confinement sentences of eight years or less. We are not at liberty to

extend the statute to apply to split confinement sentences greater than eight years but urge the General

Assembly to enact a statute that addresses this gap in some manner. We are constrained to point out,

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As Madison County points out, another statute specifically authorizes, indeed

obligates, trial courts to specify in the judgment the percentage of a misdemeanor

sentence that a misdemeanor offender must serve in actual confinement before becoming

“eligible for consideration for work release, furlough, trusty status and related

rehabilitative programs.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-302(d) (2014). This statute states:

In imposing a misdemeanor sentence, the court shall fix a

percentage of the sentence that the defendant shall serve. After service of

such a percentage of the sentence, the defendant shall be eligible for

consideration for work release, furlough, trusty status and related

rehabilitative programs. The percentage shall be expressed as zero percent

(0%), ten percent (10%), twenty percent (20%), thirty percent (30%), forty

percent (40%), fifty percent (50%), sixty percent (60%), seventy percent

(70%) but not in excess of seventy-five percent (75%). If no percentage is

expressed in the judgment, the percentage shall be considered zero percent

(0%). When the defendant has served the required percentage, the

administrative authority governing the rehabilitative program shall have

the authority, in its discretion, to place the defendant in the programs as

provided by law. In determining the percentage of the sentence to be

served in actual confinement, the court shall consider the purposes of this

chapter, the principles of sentencing and the enhancement and mitigating

factors set forth in this chapter and shall not impose such percentages

arbitrarily.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-302(d) (emphases added). The language of this statute is quite

similar to the language that appeared in prior versions of the statute authorizing split

however, that even if section 40-35-314(b) applied here, it provides no authorization for the trial court’s

decision to require Mr. Ray to serve 75% of the confinement portion of his sentence before becoming

eligible for work programs. Rather, section 40-35-314(b) states that an inmate “is eligible for release

classification status as provided in this chapter; however, the court may specify an earlier percentage of

eligibility for all programs except parole.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-314(b)(1) (emphasis added). A

trial court exercising its option to designate “an earlier percentage of eligibility” must express the

percentage as “zero percent (0%), ten percent (10%), twenty percent (20%), thirty percent (30%), forty

percent (40%) or fifty percent (50%); provided, that the percentage shall be no higher than the release

eligibility percentage under § 40-35-501.” Id. (emphasis added). For Range I sentences, like Mr. Ray

received, “this chapter,” i.e., the Sentencing Act, sets the release eligibility percentage at “thirty percent

(30%) of the actual sentence imposed less sentence credits earned and retained by the defendant.” Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-35-501(c) (2014). Thus, even if section 40-35-314(b) applied, it provides no authority

for a trial court to set a percentage higher than 30% on a Range I sentence, although it authorizes trial

judges to set a lesser percentage. Furthermore, in Shorts, this Court explained that prisoners serving split

confinement sentences are not assigned release eligibility dates as contemplated in sections 40-35-501

and 40-35-314. Shorts, 278 S.W.3d at 280-81. Thus, by its own terms, and for the reasons stated in

Shorts, section 40-35-314(b) does not apply.

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confinement sentences. See supra at note 11. But section 40-35-302(d) is plainly and

expressly limited to misdemeanor sentencing. It does not apply to Mr. Ray, who pleaded

guilty to a Class B felony and received a felony split confinement sentence.

Nevertheless, Madison County argues that, even though section 40-35-302(d) does

not apply by its own terms to Mr. Ray’s sentence, another statute, Tennessee Code

Annotated section 40-35-211(3), applies section 40-35-302(d) to felony offenders who

are ordered to serve less than one year in a local jail as part of a felony split confinement

sentence. We do not agree.

Section 40-35-211 provides:

In fixing a sentence for a felony or misdemeanor, the court shall impose a

specific sentence length for each offense:

(1) Specific sentences for a felony shall be for a term of years or

months or life, if the defendant is sentenced to the department of

correction; or a specific term of years, months or days if the defendant

is sentenced for a felony to any local jail or workhouse. Specific

sentences for a misdemeanor are for a specific number of months or

days or hours or any combination thereof. There are no indeterminate

sentences. Sentences for all felonies and misdemeanors are

determinate in nature, and the defendant is responsible for the entire

sentence undiminished by sentence credits of any sort, except for

credits authorized by § 40-23-101 relative to pretrial jail credit, or §§

33-5-406 and 33-7-102 relative to mental examinations and treatment,

and prisoner sentence reduction credits authorized by § 41-21-236.

(2) If the minimum punishment for any offense is imprisonment in the

penitentiary for one (1) year, but in the opinion of the court the

offense merits a lesser punishment, the defendant may be sentenced to

the local jail or workhouse for any period less than one (1) year,

except as otherwise provided.

(3) If a defendant is convicted of an offense designated as a felony but

the court imposes a sentence of less than one (1) year in the local jail

or workhouse, the defendant shall be considered a felon but shall be

sentenced as in the case of a misdemeanor, and, therefore, shall be

entitled to sentence credits under § 41-2-111. Upon the defendant

becoming eligible for work release, furlough, trusty status or related

rehabilitative programs as specified in § 40-35-302(d), the defendant

may be placed in the programs by the sheriff or administrative

authority having jurisdiction over the local jail or workhouse.

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Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-211 (2014). Accepting Madison County’s argument would

require us to read subsections (2) and (3) of section 40-35-211 in isolation from each

other. But, as the Sentencing Commission Comments to section 40-35-211 explain, these

subsections must be read as a unit:

[t]his section requires that a determinate sentence be imposed in all felony

and misdemeanor cases. Subdivision (1) permits a reduction of the

sentence for certain types of pretrial jail credits and prisoner sentence

reduction credits as provided in other sections.

Subdivision (2) continues the practice of prior law which permits the trial

judge to reduce sentences to less than one year where the minimum

statutory penalty is one year. Under the sentencing grid, this would be

possible for a Class E, Range I, offender. The sentence is still considered a

felony, but the court may impose a sentence of less than one year to be

served in the local jail or workhouse. In such instances, subdivision (3)

allows some aspects of misdemeanor sentencing to apply.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-211, Sentencing Comm’n Cmts. (emphasis added). Reading

the statute as a whole, and particularly reading subsections (2) and (3) together in light of

the Sentencing Commission Comments, we conclude that subsection (3) applies only to

the circumstances described in subsection (2)—where a defendant is convicted of a

felony with a minimum one-year sentence and the trial court imposes a sentence of less

than one year. Under current law, only Class E felonies meet the description provided in

subsection (2). Mr. Ray pleaded guilty to a Class B felony, not a Class E felony. The

minimum sentence for the offense to which Mr. Ray pleaded guilty was eight years, not

one year. Section 40-35-211(3) therefore does not apply to Mr. Ray’s case.

Thus, we conclude that none of the confusing and inconsistent statutes expressly

confers authority on a trial court to include, in a judgment imposing a split confinement

felony sentence, a percentage of actual confinement that must be served before a split

confinement felony defendant becomes eligible to accrue work credits. By the same

token, however, no statute expressly precludes trial courts from doing so. As already

noted, this Court is obligated to adopt a reasonable construction of the law that provides

for the harmonious operation of the laws and avoids absurd results. In the context of the

statutes at issue in this appeal, we acknowledge that this obligation is certainly difficult to

fulfill. Nevertheless, considering all the statutes, relevant authorities, and the arguments

of the parties, as well as those of the amici curiae, we are convinced that the Sentencing

Act implicitly authorizes trial courts to establish the percentage of a felony split

confinement sentence that a defendant must serve in actual confinement before becoming

eligible to earn work sentencing credits.

We reach this conclusion for several reasons. First, the statute authorizing split

confinement sentences includes no limitations on a trial court’s authority to impose such

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a condition when extending to a felony offender the substantial benefits of a split

confinement sentence. Second, section 40-35-306 expressly reposes in the trial court the

authority to revoke or suspend a split confinement felony sentence as circumstances may

necessitate. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-306(b)-(c). Third, as we explained in Shorts,

split confinement sentences are technically probated sentences. 278 S.W.3d at 280. When

ordering probation, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303(d)(9) authorizes trial

courts to impose “conditions reasonably related to the purpose of the offender’s

sentence.” This statute is broad enough to provide trial courts with authority to ensure

that a person sentenced to split confinement—shock probation—serves an appropriate

portion of the sentence in actual confinement, and setting a percentage that must be

served before the inmate may accrue two-for-one work sentencing credits is essential to

this purpose. Fourth, another statutory provision, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-

35-314(g)(1), states that “[a]ny defendant convicted of a felony and sentenced to serve

such sentence in a local jail or workhouse pursuant to . . . § 40-35-306 . . . shall be

ordered, as a part of the sentence, to participate in any work program operated by the jail

or workhouse in which the defendant is incarcerated.” By affording trial courts authority

to order a defendant, as part of a split confinement sentence under section 40-35-306, to

participate in a local jail’s work program, this statute also implicitly affords trial courts

authority to prescribe the conditions that an inmate must satisfy before participating in a

work program. Fifth, any holding that trial courts lack authority to fix a percentage of a

felony split confinement sentence that must be served in actual confinement before work

credits may be accrued has the potential to discourage trial courts from utilizing split

confinement sentences. Discouraging the use of alternative sentences would be

inconsistent with the Sentencing Act, which encourages trial courts to utilize alternative

sentences. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(6). Sixth, any holding that trial courts lack

such authority would also be inconsistent, in spirit if not in letter, with a decision of this

Court, rendered before split confinement sentences were expressly authorized by statute,

which held that trial courts possess authority to order a period of confinement as a

condition of probation. See State v. Gaines, 622 S.W.2d 819, 820-21 (Tenn. 1981)

(holding that, under a statute stating that trial courts could set “such conditions of

probation as the trial judge shall deem fit and proper,” trial courts, “in granting probation

may require as a condition thereof that the defendant be incarcerated for such reasonable

and lawful period or periods of time as the trial judge deems fit and proper.”). Finally,

holding that trial courts lack such authority when imposing felony split confinement

sentences, when the Sentencing Act obligates trial courts to set such a percentage for

misdemeanor offenders who commit less serious offenses, would be inconsistent with the

purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102(1)-

(2), -103(1)-(4). Accordingly, we conclude that the Sentencing Act implicitly authorizes

trial courts to include, in a judgment imposing a felony split confinement sentence, the

percentage of the sentence that must be served in actual confinement before the defendant

may participate in work programs and earn work credits. Establishing the percentage of

actual confinement that a felony split confinement defendant must serve before accruing

work credits is encompassed within the wide discretion trial courts possess under the

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Sentencing Act when imposing alternative sentences. See State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d

273, 278-79 (Tenn. 2012) (discussing the discretion trial courts possess).15

A trial court exercising this authority may fix the actual confinement percentage at

100%, if doing so is consistent with the principles of the Sentencing Act. See, e.g., State

v. Waller, No. M2007-02688-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 230493 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb 2,

2009) (imposing a split confinement sentence of twelve months to be served in

confinement at 100%); State v. Wells, No. M2002-02290-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL

22204491 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2003) (imposing a one-year split confinement

sentence at 100%); State v. Franklin, No. 01C01-9510-CR-00348, 1997 WL 83772

(Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 1997) (upholding a split confinement sentence of one year to

be served at 100%), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 17, 1997). However, even if a trial

court orders 100% service of a split confinement sentence—which would effectively

preclude a defendant from earning work credits—the 100% requirement does not

preclude inmates from earning good time credits under Tennessee Code Annotated

section 41-2-111(b). See State v. Hudson, No. E2001-00377-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL

264625, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 19, 2002) (explaining that section 41-2-111(b)

entitles defendants sentenced to county jails for less than one year to good conduct credits

and citing earlier cases applying this same proposition), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 1,

2002).

We also conclude that recognizing a trial court’s implicit authority to fix a

percentage of actual confinement that a felony split confinement defendant must serve

before participating in work programs does not conflict with other statutory provisions

related to work credits. Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-2-146(a) generally

provides that “the sheriff or superintendent of the county shall be authorized to permit the

prisoner to participate in work programs.” Another statute states that the sheriff may

allow inmates to work “within the county on roads, parks, public property, public

easements or alongside public waterways up to a maximum of fifty feet (50’) from the

shoreline.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-2-123(b)(1) (2014). Sections 41-2-123 and 41-2-146

describe the type of work inmates may perform, whereas another statute, Tennessee Code

Annotated section 41-2-147, establishes that inmates cannot participate in these work

programs and accrue work credits until they have become eligible to do so. Specifically,

section 41-2-147(a) states:

The sheriff or administrative authority having responsibility for the

custody of any person sentenced to a local jail or workhouse pursuant to the

provisions of . . . present § 40-35-302, § 40-35-306, § 40-35-307, or § 40-

15

The judgment form provided in Rule 17 of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court does not

include a separate blank for the trial court to specify the percentage of a felony split confinement sentence

that must be served before the defendant becomes eligible for work programs. Nevertheless, the form

does include a box titled “Special Conditions,” and trial courts should note in this space the percentage of

a felony split confinement sentence the inmate must serve before becoming eligible to participate in work

programs and accrue work credits.

- 17 -

35-314 shall, when a person has become eligible for work related programs

pursuant to those sections, be authorized to permit the person to perform

any of the duties set out in § 41-2-123 or 41-2-146.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-2-147(a) (emphases added). This statute clearly conditions the

power of a sheriff or administrative authority to permit the prisoner to participate in work

programs upon the prisoner having become eligible to do so, and an inmate’s eligibility is

determined by the percentage fixed in the judgment of the trial court.

Our reading of section 41-2-147 is consistent with a 2006 decision of the Court of

Criminal Appeals, which construed section 41-2-147 in the context of a judgment

ordering 100% service of a DUI sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals held:

We construe the phrase “has become eligible for work-related programs

pursuant to [40-35-302(d)]” to mean that the inmate may be authorized to

participate in such programs only after he or she has served the fixed

percentage of the sentence as set by the court. Thus, the trial court controls

the eligibility to participate in these programs to the extent that the court

fixes the percentage of confinement required before participation in the

“two for one” work programs is permitted.

State v. Lewis, No. M2004-02450-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 1816317, at *7 (Tenn. Crim.

App. June 28, 2006) (emphasis added), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2006)

(footnote omitted); see also Op. Tenn. Att’y. Gen., No. 91-96 (Dec. 4, 1991) (opining that

for inmates serving split confinement sentences “[e]ligibility for participation in such

work programs is determined either by a percentage set by the court at the time of

sentencing, or, if no such percentage has been set, by the release eligibility date under

T[ennessee Code Annotated section] 40-35-501. T[ennessee Code Annotated section]

40-35-314(b)(1) and (2) (1990).”) The General Assembly has not removed the eligibility

language from section 41-2-147 since the decision in Lewis, and we conclude that the

Lewis holding applies to felony split confinement sentences, as well as DUI sentences.

The language of section 41-2-147(a) concerning eligibility controls over any arguably

conflicting statutory language elsewhere, because “[w]here a conflict is presented

between two statutes, a more specific statutory provision takes precedence over a more

general provision.” Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 20 (Tenn. 2013).

Moreover, this understanding of section 41-2-147 is consistent with our own

discussion in Shorts of how sheriffs are to calculate release dates for split confinement

defendants. There, we considered whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-8-

201(a)(3), which sets out the duties of county sheriffs and requires sheriffs to calculate

the release date and order the release of a person serving a split confinement sentence in a

county jail. Shorts, 278 S.W.3d at 270. We observed that the statute imposed

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a duty upon a Tennessee sheriff to enforce the terms of a judgment ordering

a sentence of split confinement. This duty includes noting the term of

confinement provided for in the judgment order, crediting the prisoner for

time served as indicated on the judgment order, calculating any credits that

may be earned, and timely releasing the prisoner at the conclusion of the

period of confinement ordered.

Shorts, 278 S.W.3d at 282. The analysis in Shorts makes clear that the trial court’s

judgment is the lodestar by which sheriffs must be guided when calculating a felony split

confinement defendant’s release date and entitlement to sentence credits.

Mr. Ray nevertheless argues that Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-2-150

requires sheriffs to place all inmates in work programs upon their incarceration and thus

entitles all inmates to receive work sentencing credits immediately. We cannot agree

with this argument. Section 41-2-150 states that, “[n]otwithstanding any other law to the

contrary,” an inmate housed in a “county workhouse or jail, either for a felony or

misdemeanor conviction . . . shall be required to participate in work programs during the

period of the person’s incarceration.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-2-150(a). Prisoners who

refuse to participate in work programs when work is available “shall have any sentence

reduction credits received pursuant to the provisions of § 41-2-123 or § 41-2-146 reduced

by two (2) days of credit for each one (1) day of refusal to work.” Id. Any prisoner who

refuses to work, but who has not already received any sentence reduction credits pursuant

to sections 41-2-123, or 41-2-146, “may be denied good time credit in accordance with

the provisions of § 41-2-111(b) and may also be denied any other privileges given to

inmates in good standing for refusal to work.” Id. Subsection (b) allows the sheriff to

except from this work requirement persons who would present a security risk or a danger

to the public if allowed to leave the jail or workhouse and persons who, “in the opinion of

a licensed physician or licensed medical professional, should not perform the labor for

medical reasons.” Id. at § 41-2-150(b).

We read section 41-2-150 as establishing the obligation of inmates to work, when

work is available and offered to them, but we conclude that nothing in this statute

contradicts the requirement of section 41-2-147 that inmates must first become eligible to

participate in work programs. A felony split confinement inmate does not become

eligible to participate in a work program and accrue work sentencing credits until the

inmate has served the percentage of actual confinement required by the trial court’s

judgment. Although section 41-2-150 grants sheriffs authority to determine when an

inmate may be excused from work programs and not incur penalties for refusing to work,

it does not confer upon sheriffs, or any other entity, the authority to determine an

inmate’s eligibility to participate in a work program and earn work credits. We therefore

conclude that section 41-2-150 does not conflict with Tennessee Code Annotated section

41-2-147(a).

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Furthermore, section 41-2-150 must be read in light of section 40-35-314(g),

which, as already noted, requires trial courts to order inmates serving felony split

confinement sentences pursuant to section 40-35-306 in the local jail to participate in

work programs as part of the sentence. Again, by affording trial courts authority to order

split confinement inmates to participate in work programs, this statute implicitly affords

trial courts authority to prescribe the conditions of that participation. Read together, the

relevant statutes recognize that the trial court’s judgment remains paramount in

determining when a felony split confinement inmate may participate in a work program

and earn work credits.

Accordingly, in response to the first question certified by the District Court, we

hold that sentencing judges in Tennessee have implicit authority to include in a judgment

the percentage of a felony split confinement sentence that a defendant must serve in

actual confinement before becoming eligible to participate in work programs. The trial

court’s implicit authority to establish this percentage does not conflict with the statutes

governing work credits, because, as explained above, these statutes contemplate, albeit

through a glass darkly, that an inmate must be eligible to participate in the program

before a sheriff may allow the inmate to participate in such programs and earn work

credits.

B. Whether a sheriff has a duty under Tennessee law to challenge an improper

or potentially improper sentence?

Both parties and most of the amici agree that the answer to this question is “No.”

Nevertheless, in the interest of being responsive to the District Court, we will address it

as well. The Tennessee Constitution provides that the qualifications and duties of the

Sheriff “shall be prescribed by the General Assembly.” Tenn. Const. art. VII, § 1. This

Court has acknowledged that more than 100 statutes in the Tennessee Code address the

duties of sheriffs in this State. Renteria-Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville &

Davidson Cnty., 382 S.W.3d 318, 321-22 (Tenn. 2012). Neither party to this appeal has

suggested that any of these statutes expressly imposes on sheriffs a duty to challenge an

improper or potentially improper sentence. Moreover, we have held that, rather than

challenging a trial court’s judgment as improper, sheriffs have a statutory “duty to see

that the orders of the courts, including judgment orders, are enforced.” Shorts, 278

S.W.3d at 281 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-201(a)(1) & (3)). As we explained in

Shorts, Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-8-201(a)(1):

Impose[s] a duty upon a Tennessee sheriff to enforce the terms of a

judgment ordering a sentence of split confinement. This duty includes

noting the term of confinement provided for in the judgment order,

crediting the prisoner for time served as indicated on the judgment order,

calculating any credits that may be earned, and timely releasing the prisoner

at the conclusion of the period of confinement ordered.

- 20 -

Id. at 281-82 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-201(a)(1) & (3)). Another statute places a

duty on each sheriff to execute a judgment of imprisonment as soon as possible. Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-23-103 (2012). Another statute prohibits a sheriff from appearing in any

court as attorney or counsel for any party in any civil suit or criminal proceeding. Tenn.

Code Ann. § 8-8-205(a) (2016). Under another statute, a sheriff may be held in contempt

of court and be subject to civil liability for failing to obey any process. Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 8-8-207 (2016). From these statutes, and our discussion in Shorts, it is clear that

Tennessee sheriffs are bound by judgments and orders and have no obligation or

authority to challenge a sentence imposed by a court. Certainly, sheriffs may seek

clarification of judgments and orders when necessary to fulfill their duty to see that court

orders are enforced, but they have no duty to challenge an improper or potentially

improper sentence.

Just as Tennessee statutes and decisions impose no duty on a sheriff to challenge

an improper or potentially improper sentence, Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure

36.1 also imposes no duty on Tennessee sheriffs to do so. The language of Tennessee

Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 very clearly provides a mechanism for only “the

defendant or the state” to seek correction of an illegal sentence. Tenn. R. Crim. P.

36.1(a)(1). Rule 36.1 neither obligates nor permits a Tennessee sheriff to do so.

Accordingly, we answer the second certified question in the negative: Tennessee sheriffs

have no duty to challenge an improper or potentially improper sentence.

IV. Conclusion

Notwithstanding the lack of any express statutory answers to the questions posed,

we conclude: (1) that the Sentencing Act implicitly authorizes Tennessee trial judges to

include in the judgment of a felony split confinement sentence the percentage of actual

confinement the defendant must serve before becoming eligible to participate in a work

program and earn work credits; and (2) that sheriffs in Tennessee have no duty to

challenge a sentence as improper or potentially improper. Nevertheless, we entreat the

General Assembly to address the gaps and inconsistencies in the statutes governing

felony split confinement sentences, which have been identified in this opinion and in the

earlier decision in Shorts, by either enacting a statute expressly adopting our analysis or

addressing these matters in another fashion. Asking either trial judges or sheriffs to wade

through the statutory quagmire that now exists is unreasonable and unworkable.

The Clerk is directed to transmit a copy of this opinion to the United States

District Court for the Western District of Tennessee in accordance with Tennessee

Supreme Court Rule 23, section 8. Costs in this Court are taxed equally to Jason Ray and

Madison County, for which execution may issue if necessary.

__________________________________

CORNELIA A. CLARK, JUSTICE

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