STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. LAWRENCE CARTER, JR. (13-10-3174, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3994-14T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LAWRENCE CARTER, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________________________

Submitted April 25, 2017 – Decided August 11, 2017

Before Judges Koblitz and Rothstadt.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,

Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No.

13-10-3174.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney

for appellant (Margaret McLane, Assistant

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the

brief).

Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor,

attorney for respondent (Maura G. Murphy,

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the

brief).

PER CURIAM

A police officer stopped defendant Lawrence Carter, Jr. for

careless driving and failing to maintain a light on his vehicle's

license plate. When he failed to produce his vehicle registration,

another officer searched the vehicle's glove compartment for

defendant's registration card and discovered a handgun. A

subsequent search of the vehicle pursuant to a warrant revealed

additional weapons. Defendant was convicted by a jury of

committing all of the multiple weapons offenses charged in an

indictment.1 The court sentenced him to an aggregate thirteen-

year term, with a nine-year period of parole ineligibility.

Defendant appeals from his judgment of conviction,

challenging the denial of his suppression motion, the rejection

of his claim of discriminatory jury selection, and his sentence.

He specifically argues:

POINT I – BECAUSE THE OFFICER HAD

NO JUSTIFICATION TO CONDUCT A

WARRANTLESS SEARCH FOR THE CAR'S

REGISTRATION AND INSURANCE

1

The jury convicted defendant of two counts of second-degree

unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); two counts

of second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose,

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); two counts of second-degree certain persons

not to possess weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b); one count of third-

degree possession of weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A.

2C:39-4(d); one count of fourth-degree possession of a defaced

firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(d), one count of fourth-degree

possession of weapon (hollow nose or dum-dum bullets), N.J.S.A.

2C:39-3(f); and, one count of fourth-degree unlawful possession

of a weapon (stun gun), 2C:39-5(d).

2 A-3994-14T3

INFORMATION, THE GUNS FOUND IN THE

CAR MUST BE SUPPRESSED.

POINT II – THE COURT FAILED TO

CONDUCT THE THIRD STEP OF THE

GILMORE[2] ANALYSIS, REQUIRING

REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT'S

CONVICTIONS.

POINT III – THE COURT IMPROPERLY

IMPOSED CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES ON

THE GUN POSSESSION AND CERTAIN

PERSONS CONVICTIONS, RENDERING

DEFENDANT'S 13-YEAR WITH A NINE-

YEAR PAROLE DISQUALIFIER MANIFESTLY

EXCESSIVE.

We have considered defendant's arguments in light of our

review of the record and the applicable legal principles. We

affirm.

I.

We begin our review by considering defendant's challenge to

the denial of his suppression motion. The two police officers who

arrested defendant and his co-defendant were the only witnesses

to testify at the suppression hearing. The facts derived from

their testimony are summarized as follows.

On June 1, 2011, Voorhees Police Officer Thomas Macauley

observed defendant's car stop at an intersection with the left

turn signal engaged. When the light at the intersection turned

green, defendant began to turn left, then abruptly turned right.

2

State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508 (1986).

3 A-3994-14T3

Macauley followed defendant and observed that defendant's vehicle

did not have a light on its license plate. After continuing to

follow defendant for a short time, Macauley activated his vehicle's

overhead lights and conducted a traffic stop based upon defendant's

careless driving and the broken light on his license plate.

After defendant pulled over, the officer ran the vehicle's

license plate and discovered the car was registered to defendant

and not reported stolen. When he approached the vehicle, Macauley

observed defendant in the driver's seat, codefendant in the front

passenger seat, and a woman in the back seat.

While defendant remained seated in his car, Macauley asked

him for his license, registration, and insurance. Defendant

initially stated he did not have a license, but eventually produced

a New Jersey driver's license after being asked multiple times.

Although provided with the opportunity to do so, defendant never

produced a registration or other proof of ownership or insurance.

The officer asked defendant to exit the vehicle. When he

inquired what defendant was doing in the area, defendant initially

stated he was coming from Camden and heading towards an out of

town location, but eventually told Macauley "he did not know why

he was in the area." The officer made various observations about

defendant's demeanor that led him to believe defendant may attempt

to flee and that he was a threat to the officer's safety. Macauley

4 A-3994-14T3

conducted a pat down of defendant but did not discover a weapon.

He also became concerned about the conduct of defendant's

codefendant and the woman inside the car. They gave inconsistent

explanations as to why they were in the area. He saw codefendant

reaching around the floor of the front seat, not keeping his hands

in plain sight. After the officer removed codefendant, the woman

tried to climb into the front seat and appeared to be very nervous.

Macauley conducted a pat down of codefendant that also did not

yield any weapons.

During Macauley's encounter with defendant and his

passengers, Officer Anthony Del Palazzo arrived on the scene.

Macauley returned to his vehicle to search for outstanding warrants

and discovered that both men had criminal records and that

codefendant had outstanding warrants for his arrest. Macauley

arrested and searched codefendant and discovered latex gloves and

a bandana.

Macauley asked Del Palazzo to search defendant's vehicle for

a registration card or other proof of ownership since none had

been provided. Del Palazzo searched the center console and then

the glove compartment, where he discovered a loaded handgun.

Macauley immediately placed defendant and the woman under arrest.

He issued summonses to defendant for careless driving, N.J.S.A.

39:4-97, and failing to maintain required lamps, N.J.S.A. 39:3-

5 A-3994-14T3

66. The police later obtained a warrant to search the rest of the

vehicle and that search revealed additional weapons and other

contraband.3

After considering the officers' testimony, the exhibits

admitted into evidence, and counsels' arguments, the court denied

defendant's motion, but later reconsidered the reasoning for the

denial after defendant filed a motion for reconsideration. The

court set forth its reasons for reconsideration and again denied

defendant's motion on the record on August 7, 2012, in a

comprehensive oral decision.

Initially, the court summarized the witnesses' testimony and

found the officers' testimony to be credible. The court explained

why it found that Macauley properly stopped defendant for the

motor vehicle violations he observed and its conclusion that the

officer was justified in "ordering defendants out of the vehicle

and subsequently patting them down for weapons."

The court next addressed whether the warrantless search of

the glove compartment violated defendant's Fourth Amendment

3

A subsequent search of the entire vehicle pursuant to a search

warrant resulted in the police also discovering a revolver with a

defaced serial number, loaded with three hollow point bullets, a

stun gun, ammunition stashed within a latex glove, two rolls of

duct tape, multiple pairs of gloves, and two ski masks. Defendant

does not challenge the authorized search on appeal.

6 A-3994-14T3

rights. The court cited State v. Holmgren, 282 N.J. Super. 212

(App. Div. 1995), which it described as holding that "[f]ailure

to produce the vehicle's registration raises a reasonable

suspicion that the vehicle is stolen[; under such circumstances

an] . . . officer may lawfully conduct a limited warrantless search

of areas in the vehicle where such papers may normally be kept by

an owner." The court found, "based upon the fact that the

ownership of the vehicle had not been established by the defendants

. . . . [T]he officer was entitled to look into areas in the

vehicle in which evidence of ownership might be expected to be

found and that would include the glove compartment as well as the

center console." Additionally, relying on State v. Bruzzese, 94

N.J. 210, 236 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S. Ct.

1295, 79 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1984), the court concluded the State

established the plain view exception applied, justifying the

seizure of the weapon.

Our review of the denial of a suppression motion is limited.

See State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44 (2011). We review a motion

judge's factual findings in a suppression hearing with great

deference. State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016). We "must

uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision

so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible

evidence in the record." State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424

7 A-3994-14T3

(2014); see also State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 32-33 (2016). We

defer "to those findings of the trial judge which are substantially

influenced by [the] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and

to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot

enjoy." State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) (quoting State

v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). We owe no deference,

however, to the trial court's legal conclusions or interpretation

of the legal consequences that flow from established facts. Our

review in that regard is de novo. State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503,

516 (2015); State v. Vargas, 213 N.J. 301, 327 (2013).

Applying this standard of review, we conclude that

defendant's arguments relating to the denial of his suppression

motion are without merit. We affirm substantially for the reasons

expressed by the trial court in its comprehensive oral decision.

We add the following comments.

Defendant contends that because Macauley was able to

determine ownership of the vehicle by running the plates, there

was no justification for the officer to search the vehicle's glove

compartment. We disagree.

"[A] police officer may make 'ordinary inquiries incident to

[a traffic] stop . . . such as 'checking the driver's license,'

verifying whether the driver has any outstanding warrants, 'and

inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance.'"

8 A-3994-14T3

State v. Dunbar, ____ N.J. ____,____ (2017) (slip op. at 22-23)

(quoting Rodriguez v. United States, ____ U.S. ____,____, 135 S.

Ct. 1609, 1615, 191 L. Ed. 2d 492, 499 (2015)). The inquiry allows

an officer to confirm, among other things, a driver's compliance

with N.J.S.A. 39:3-29, which requires the operator of a vehicle

to have these documents in his possession and to produce them when

requested by a police officer performing his duties. See State

v. Perlstein, 206 N.J. Super. 246, 253 (App. Div. 1985).

During the traffic stop, "after the driver has been provided

the opportunity to produce his credentials and is either unable

or unwilling to do so," State v. Hamlett, 449 N.J. Super. 159, 173

(App. Div.) (quoting State v. Keaton, 222 N.J. 438, 450 (2015)),

certif. granted, ____ N.J. ____ (2017), a limited warrantless

search of a glove compartment for vehicle ownership documents may

be conducted by a police officer. Id. at 175 (quoting Gonzales,

supra, 227 N.J. at 101). Our Supreme Court has repeatedly

recognized with approval this type of limited search for documents.

See State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 28 (2009), overruled on

other grounds, State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 423-25, 427, 450 (2015)

(addressing the requirements for application of the "automobile

exception" to the warrant requirement as discussed in Pena-

Flores). Under this "driving documents" exception, "[i]f the

vehicle's operator is unable to produce proof of registration, the

9 A-3994-14T3

officer may search the car for evidence of ownership." Keaton,

supra, 222 N.J. at 448 (citing State v. Boykins, 50 N.J. 73, 77

(1967)); accord Pena-Flores, supra, 198 N.J. at 31; State v.

Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 12 (1980); State v. Gammons, 113 N.J. Super.

434, 437 (App. Div.), aff'd o.b., 59 N.J. 451 (1971), as long as

the driver first has an opportunity to produce them voluntarily.

See Hamlett, supra, 449 N.J. Super. at 170-74.

Contrary to defendant's argument, and consistent with a

driver's obligations under N.J.S.A. 39:3-29, the Supreme Court has

approved the application of this exception to the warrant

requirement even though police officers had the ability to use an

on-board mobile data terminal (MDT) to check on a vehicle's

registration and ownership.4 See e.g. Keaton, supra, 222 N.J. at

448-49. The availability of that information to a police officer

does not alter the driver's obligation "to be in the possession

of [the required documents] at all times[, which are] to be

exhibited upon request to a police officer so that he may

4

A MDT "consists of a screen and keypad that are linked to the

computerized databases of the New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles

(DMV)" and allows an officer to obtain information about a

vehicle's registered owner from his police car. State v. Donis,

157 N.J. 44, 46 (1998). Before the use of MDT's, a police officer

obtained the same information over a radio from a police

dispatcher. Id. at 48. Under those circumstances the Court also

approved the application of the exception. See Pena-Flores, supra,

198 N.J. at 15-16.

10 A-3994-14T3

determine, among other things, the 'correctness of the

registration certificate, as it relates to the registration number

and number plates of the motor vehicle for which it was issued.'"

Gammons, supra, 113 N.J. Super. at 437 (quoting N.J.S.A. 39:3-29).

Here, defendant was offered the opportunity to voluntarily

present his registration and other ownership documents while still

in his vehicle and refused to do so, just as he initially refused

to present his license. The fact that the police officer had used

a MDT or called in the plates and received a verbal confirmation

of ownership did not relieve defendant from his obligation to turn

over those documents. When he refused to do so, or if he was

unable to do so, the officer was permitted to conduct the limited

search of the glove compartment. Hamlett, supra, 449 N.J. Super.

at 174. Once he discovered the handgun, it was "properly seized

under the plain view exception to the search warrant requirement

. . . [, which] allows seizures without a warrant so long as an

officer is 'lawfully . . . in the area where he observed and seized

the incriminating item or contraband, and it [is] immediately

apparent that the seized item is evidence of a crime." Ibid.

Defendant's motion to suppress was correctly denied.

II.

We turn next to defendant's contention regarding the trial

court's response to his claim that the prosecutor impermissibly

11 A-3994-14T3

exercised his preemptory challenges based on race. During jury

selection defendant challenged the prosecutor's use of peremptory

challenges against four African American jurors. The court

conducted an inquiry and determined that defendant established a

prima facie claim, as "there ha[d] been a disproportionate number

of challenges" to African Americans. The prosecutor then explained

the reasons for his challenges as to each of the identified

potential jurors. He cited to one juror's disclosure "that she

had a police friend, captain, who had a bad experience with other

colleagues" and to another who was a minister, who the prosecutor

believed would have "difficult[y] . . . judg[ing] someone else on

guilt." The prosecutor explained that he challenged another

potential juror who he understood enjoyed "playing [video] games

that involved guns."5 Finally, the prosecutor explained he

challenged the last of the subject jurors, who was an African

American architect, but the reasons for the use of that challenge

were unclear from the record and marked inaudible on the

transcript.6 Defendant took issue with the prosecutor's

explanations.

5

Defendant and the trial court pointed out the juror did not

mention video games involving guns, simply video games.

6

Although the record does not disclose an express statement of

the prosecutor's reasons for challenging the architect, the record

12 A-3994-14T3

The trial court found "a prima facie case . . . was made[;]"

however, it was "satisfied that the State has presented neutral

reasons for exercising the disputed challenges." Accordingly, it

concluded "there [wa]s no issue for [the court] to address."

Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court made its

determination "[w]ithout analyzing [his] arguments or the

prosecutor's race-neutral reasons" and that "[t]he court's failure

to conduct the required third step of the Gilmore analysis . . .

requires reversal of defendant's convictions." We disagree.

The burden is on a defendant to prove purposeful

discrimination based on the totality of the relevant facts.

Gilmore, supra, 103 N.J. at 534; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,

93-94, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1721, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 85-86 (1986). "The

opponent of the strike bears the burden of persuasion regarding

racial motivation, and a trial court finding regarding the

credibility of an attorney's explanation of the ground for a

peremptory challenge is entitled to great deference." State v.

Thompson, 224 N.J. 324, 344 (2016) (quoting Davis v. Ayala, ____

U.S. ____,____, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2199, 192 L. Ed. 2d 323, 335

(2015)) (adopting federal standard of appellate review). We will

discloses the veniremember was undecided as to the issue of gun

control and expressed a view that the justice system may be biased

against certain ethnic groups.

13 A-3994-14T3

not disturb "a trial court's ruling on the issue of discriminatory

intent . . . unless it is clearly erroneous." Ibid. (quoting

Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1207-08,

170 L. Ed. 2d 175, 181 (2008)). "A trial court's findings should

be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken 'that the

interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'" Id.

at 345 (quoting Elders, supra, 192 N.J. at 243). "An appellate

court should not disturb the trial court's findings merely because

'it might have reached a different conclusion were it the trial

tribunal' or because 'the trial court decided all evidence or

inference conflicts in favor of one side' in a close case." Ibid.

(quoting Elders, supra, 192 N.J. at 243).

"This standard, we note, necessarily applies to the trial

court's assessment of the prosecutor's candor and sincerity in the

presentation of reasons for exercising peremptory challenges."

Ibid. We "extend substantial deference to a trial court's

determination . . . [because] only the trial judge is in a position

to make 'first-hand observations' of the demeanor of both the

attorney who exercises the peremptory challenge and the juror who

is excused." State v. Osorio, 402 N.J. Super. 93, 105 (App. Div.

2008) (quoting Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at 477, 128 S. Ct. at 1208,

170 L. Ed. 2d at 181), aff'd. 199 N.J. 486 (2009).

14 A-3994-14T3

A prosecutor may not deprive a defendant of the right to

trial by an impartial jury by excluding jurors based on race. See

Thompson, supra, 224 N.J. at 340. When a prosecutor's selection

of jurors is discriminatory, not only is a particular defendant

harmed, but "the very integrity of the courts is jeopardized."

Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 237-38, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2323-

24, 162 L. Ed. 2d 196, 212 (2005).

A claim of bias in jury selection is evaluated using a three-

step process:

Step one requires that, as a threshold matter,

the party contesting the exercise of a

peremptory challenge must make a prima facie

showing that the peremptory challenge was

exercised on the basis of race or ethnicity.

That burden is slight, as the challenger need

only tender sufficient proofs to raise an

inference of discrimination. If that burden

is met, step two is triggered, and the burden

then shifts to the party exercising the

peremptory challenge to prove a race- or

ethnicity-neutral basis supporting the

peremptory challenge. In gauging whether the

party exercising the peremptory challenge has

acted constitutionally, the trial court must

ascertain whether that party has presented a

reasoned, neutral basis for the challenge or

if the explanations tendered are pretext.

Once that analysis is completed, the third

step is triggered, requiring that the trial

court weigh the proofs adduced in step one

against those presented in step two and

determine whether, by a preponderance of the

evidence, the party contesting the exercise

of a peremptory challenge has proven that the

contested peremptory challenge was exercised

15 A-3994-14T3

on unconstitutionally impermissible grounds

of presumed group bias.

[Osorio, supra, 199 N.J. at 492-93.]

See also Thompson, supra, 224 N.J. at 341-44.

The trial court here conducted the required analysis. It

found defendant established a prima facie case, noting that four

of the State's peremptory challenges were used to exclude African

American jurors (step one), the prosecutor provided a reasoned,

neutral basis for excluding the African American jurors (step

two), basing his challenges on the veniremembers' responses to

questions that raised legitimate concerns for the prosecutor, see

Osorio, supra, 199 N.J. at 505 (stating that peremptory strikes

may be justified if reasonably relevant to case being tried), and

the judge considered the arguments of both sides and found no

constitutional violation (step three). While the trial court

failed to explicitly label its consideration of the parties'

arguments as "step three" of its analysis, its application of that

step can be inferred from its comments. See State v. Locurto, 157

N.J. 463, 472 (1999).

We discern no reason to disagree with the trial court's

determination in this case.7 "[T]he prosecutor's race-neutral

7

On appeal, relying upon State v. Fuller, 182 N.J. 174, 201-02

(2004) (stating no juror may be disqualified from jury service

16 A-3994-14T3

reasons for striking the jurors were found by the court to be

credible and were supported by the record." Thompson, supra, 224

N.J. at 350.

III.

Finally, we address defendant's argument concerning his

sentence. According to defendant, the court erred by imposing

consecutive sentences for his weapons possession offenses and his

certain person offenses. He contends that the court failed to set

forth a complete analysis of the Yarbough factors and made factual

errors in its findings. We find no merit to these contentions.

On April 25, 2014, the court sentenced defendant, placing its

reasons on the record in a thorough and comprehensive oral

decision. Addressing its reasons for imposing consecutive

sentences, the court stated:

First of all, as noted by Yarbough,[8] there

can be no free crimes in a system for which

the punishment shall fit the crime . . . and

based exclusively on his or her religious beliefs or the lack

thereof), defendant raises an argument for the first time that the

minister was improperly challenged based only on his religious

beliefs. We find no merit to this argument as its premise is

belied by the record of the juror's responses to questions about

his occupation – he stated he was an "ordained minister," "work[ed]

in the church," was "a police chaplain," and that his church had

"marched in Philadelphia" – as compared to any specific religious

beliefs.

8

State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.

1014, 106 S. Ct. 1193, 89 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1986).

17 A-3994-14T3

their objectives were not prominently --

predominantly independent of each other, with

the exception of the charge of certain persons

not to possess weapons.

With respect to whether the crimes were

committed at different times or separate

places, the [c]ourt note[s] that the prior

conviction for which this charge, certain

persons, was based, occurred at separate times

and places from the current crimes. Also,

with respect to the fact of his gun related

offenses. Although those offenses did not

involve separate acts of violence or threats

of violence, or multiple victims, a sentencing

court may impose consecutive sentences even

though a majority of the Yarbough factors

support [a] concurrent sentence.

And I just wanted to put those on the record

for my reasons for making [c]ount [n]ine

consecutive to all counts except [c]ount

[t]en. And [c]ount [t]en will be served

concurrent to [c]ount [n]ine in that, for the

reasons that I've stated as well as the fact

that it is based on similar or same crimes

which qualify the defendant for certain

persons.

Our review of sentencing determinations is limited and

governed by the "clear abuse of discretion" standard. State v.

Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363-65 (1984); see also State v. Bolvito, 217

N.J. 221, 228 (2014). In our review, we will "not substitute

[our] judgment for the judgment of the sentencing court[,]" State

v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 606 (2013), nor will we disturb a

sentence that is not manifestly excessive or unduly punitive, does

not constitute an abuse of discretion, and does not shock the

18 A-3994-14T3

judicial conscience. State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215-16,

220 (1989). We are "bound to affirm a sentence, even if [we]

would have arrived at a different result, as long as the trial

court properly identifies and balances aggravating and mitigating

factors that are supported by competent credible evidence in the

record." Id. at 215. We may only disturb a sentence if: "(1) the

sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating and

mitigating factors . . . were not based upon competent and credible

evidence in the record; or (3) 'the application of the guidelines

to the facts of [the] case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable

so as to shock the judicial conscience.'" State v. Fuentes, 217

N.J. 57, 70 (2014) (quoting Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 364-65).

Applying these standards, we discern no abuse of the court's

discretion in sentencing defendant to consecutive sentences,

essentially for the reasons expressed by the trial court. We add

only the following comments.

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a) provides that "multiple sentences shall

run concurrently or consecutively as the court determines at the

time of sentence." Although there are no statutorily set rules

for imposing consecutive sentences, the Court in Yarbough set

forth a number of guidelines concerning same.9 A sentencing court

9

The factors that must be considered are as follows:

19 A-3994-14T3

(1) there can be no free crimes in a system

for which the punishment shall fit the crime;

(2) the reasons for imposing either a

consecutive or concurrent sentence should be

separately stated in the sentencing decision;

(3) some reasons to be considered by the

sentencing court should include facts relating

to the crimes, including whether or not:

(a) the crimes and their objectives

were predominantly independent of

each other;

(b) the crimes involved separate

acts of violence or threats of

violence;

(c) the crimes were committed at

different times or separate places,

rather than being committed so

closely in time and place as to

indicate a single period of aberrant

behavior;

(d) any of the crimes involved

multiple victims;

(e) the convictions for which the

sentences are to be imposed are

numerous;

(4) there should be no double counting of

aggravating factors;

(5) successive terms for the same offense

should not ordinarily be equal to the

punishment for the first offense; [and]

(6) there should be an overall outer limit on

the cumulation of consecutive sentences for

20 A-3994-14T3

(continued)

applies these factors qualitatively, not quantitatively. State

v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 427 (2001). Thus, a court may impose

consecutive sentences "even though a majority of the Yarbough

factors support concurrent sentences." Id. at 427-28; see e.g.,

State v. Molina, 168 N.J. 436, 442 (2001) (finding consecutive

sentences were warranted despite the presence of only one Yarbough

factor). Concurrent sentences are not mandated even where the

crimes are connected by a "unity of specific purpose, . . . were

somewhat interdependent of one another, and were committed within

a short period of time of one another." State v. Swint, 328 N.J.

Super. 236, 264 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 492 (2000).

Once it considers the Yarbough factors, the court is obligated

to expressly state the reasons for imposing consecutive sentences

or risk remand for resentencing. State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112,

122 (1987). "[T]he reasons for imposing either a consecutive or

concurrent sentence should be separately stated in the sentencing

decision." State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109, 129 (2011) (quoting

Yarbough, supra, 100 N.J. at 643.)

multiple offenses not to exceed the sum of the

longest terms (including an extended term, if

eligible) that could be imposed for the two

most serious offenses.

[Yarbough, supra, 100 N.J. at 643-44 (footnote

omitted).]

21 A-3994-14T3

Here, the judge cogently applied the Yarbough criteria in

assessing the appropriateness of imposing consecutive sentences.

The certain persons not to have weapons offense was clearly a

distinct offense from the other weapons charges, and it had

distinct elements. Imposing a concurrent sentence on defendant

for this offense would have given him a "free crime" and would

have frustrated the legislature's intent to deter persons with

criminal histories from possessing weapons. Moreover, the

aggregate sentence does not shock the judicial conscience. See

Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 365.

Affirmed.

22 A-3994-14T3