Warner, L. v. Pietrini, B.

J-S38001-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

LEVON T. WARNER, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

B. PIETRINI & SONS, JOHN DOE #1, :

JOHN DOE #2 & “SUPERVISOR :

MACK” :

:

Appellees : No. 618 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered January 7, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No(s): No. 00980 January Term, 2015

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JULY 25, 2017

Appellant, Levon T. Warner, appeals pro se from the order entered in

the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which sustained preliminary

objections filed on behalf of Appellee, B. Pietrini & Sons, John Doe #1, John

Doe #2, and “Supervisor Mack” (collectively Appellee). For the following

reasons, we affirm.

On January 9, 2015, Appellant filed a complaint against Appellee

alleging that Appellant had been injured while working at Appellee’s

construction site, sometime in February 2008, when he experienced chest

pains while working at the job and was taken to the hospital, where doctors

diagnosed him with atrial fibrillation. Appellant also stated a cardiologist had

told Appellant at the time that he had suffered a work-related injury. On

___________________________

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

J-S38001-17

June 26, 2015, Appellant filed an affidavit of service that he had served the

complaint on Appellee by certified mail on February 26, 2015.

On October 16, 2015, Appellee filed preliminary objections to

Appellant’s complaint, contending: 1) improper service; 2) lack of good faith

efforts to serve Appellee; 3) complaint lacked specificity; 4) Workers’

Compensation Act was a complete bar to Appellant’s workplace-injury

claims; and 5) legal insufficiency of Appellant’s claim for punitive damages

and allegations of “reckless” and “wanton” conduct. Appellant filed no

response to Appellee’s preliminary objections. On January 7, 2016, the trial

court sustained Appellee’s preliminary objections and dismissed all of

Appellant’s claims against Appellee. Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of

appeal on January 27, 2016. No concise statement of errors complained of

on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) was ordered or filed.

The following represents Appellant’s issues as stated in his brief:

DID THE TRIAL COURT [ERR] AND VIOLATE APPELLANT’S

RIGHTS UNDER THE 5TH AND 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE

U.S. AS WELL AS THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION,

WHEN [APPELLEES] ADDED UNRELATED CRIMINAL

HISTORY THAT’S NOT RELATED TO APPELLANT’S CIVIL

PROCEEDINGS AND SHOWED BIASNESS AFTER

[APPELLEE’S] ATTORNEY[S] ENTERED THEIR

APPEARANCE?

DID THE TRIAL COURT [ERR] AND VIOLATE APPELLANT’S

RIGHT[S] UNDER THE 5TH AND 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE

U.S. AS WELL AS THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION,

WHEN [APPELLEE] MISREPRESENTED TO THE [TRIAL]

COURT APPELLANT’S WORK RELATED HEART INJURY AND

COMMITTED INTENTIONAL WRONGFUL ACTS, INCLUDING

[FRAUDULENT] CONCEALMENT ACTS BY THEIR

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SILENCE/ADMISSIONS THAT A CIVIL ACTION WAS BEING

FILED AGAINST B. PIETRINI & SONS ET AL., AFTER

[ACCEPTING] THE COMPLAINT, NOT RESPONDING TO IT,

NOT LOGGING A REPORT IN THE OSHA MANDATED

INJURY HISTORY [LOG], FURTHERMORE, [APPELLEE]

TOTALLY IGNORED THE “COURT ORDERS.” THE ONLY

TIME [APPELLEE] PARTICIPATED WAS THE FILING

“[ENTRY] OF APPEARANCE” MONTHS LATER AND

“PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS.” THE COURT DOCKET CAN

PROVE IT[.]

DID THE TRIAL COURT [ERR] AND VIOLATE APPELLANT’S

RIGHTS UNDER THE 5TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS TO THE

U.S. AS WELL AS THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION,

WHEN THE [TRIAL] COURT DISMISSED APPELLANT’S CIVIL

COMPLAINT WITHOUT ALLOWING A PRO SE LITIGANT,

THE OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT, MAKE

PROPER SERVICE, DENIED DISCOVERY AFTER APPELLANT

SHOWED A [GOOD] FAITH EFFORT BY ANSWERING ALL

COURT ORDERS TO THE BEST OF [HIS] ABILITY AND WAS

DUE [DILIGENT] THROUGHOUT THIS [ENTIRE] CIVIL

PROCEEDING?

DID THE TRIAL COURT [ERR] AND VIOLATE APPELLANT’S

RIGHTS UNDER THE 5TH AND 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE

U.S. AS WELL AS THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION

THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THROUGH

APPELLANT’S MEDICAL RECORDS FROM UNIVERSITY OF

PENNSYLVANIA HOSPITAL PROVING THAT [APPELLEE]

RUSHED APPELLANT TO THE EMERGENCY UNIT AT

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA HOSPITAL WITHOUT

CALLING 911 OR AN AMBULANCE TO THE JOB-SITE FOR

[HIS] HEALTH AND SAFETY, ON FEB. [19], 2008, WHEN

APPELLANT SUFFERED A WORK RELATED HEART ATTACK

INJURY. APPELLANT AND THE [SUPERVISOR]/MACK

[WERE] FROM THE SAME LOCAL 332 UNION THAT

VIOLATED THE BREACH OF CONTRACT BY CONCEALING

APPELLANT’S WORK RELATED HEART INJURY?

DID THE TRIAL COURT [ERR] AND VIOLATE APPELLANT’S

RIGHTS UNDER THE 5TH AND 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE

U.S. AS WELL AS THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION, IN

FINDING THAT THE WEIGHT OF THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE

WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT CLAIMS THAT THERE’S

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NO WAY APPELLANT HAD A HEART ATTACK INJURY PRIOR

TO THE DAY OF THIS WORK RELATED HEART INJURY,

WHEN THE COURTS AND [APPELLEE] HAD A COPY OF

APPELLANT’S ENTIRE MEDICAL RECORDS AND BOXING

LICENSE?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4-5).

As a prefatory matter we note that, although this Court is willing to

construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally

confers no special benefit upon an appellant. First Union Mortg. Corp. v.

Frempong, 744 A.2d 327 (Pa.Super. 1999) (stating pro se status does not

entitle party to any particular advantage due to lack of legal training).

Accordingly, a pro se litigant must comply with the procedural rules set forth

in the Pennsylvania Rules of Court. Jones v. Rudenstein, 585 A.2d 520

(Pa.Super. 1991), appeal denied, 529 Pa. 634, 600 A.2d 954 (1991).

Appellate briefs must conform in all material respects to the briefing

requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Rosselli v. Rosselli, 750 A.2d 355 (Pa.Super. 2000), appeal denied, 564

Pa. 696, 764 A.2d 50 (2000) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 2101). See also Pa.R.A.P.

2114-2119 (addressing specific requirements of each subsection of brief on

appeal).

The applicable rules of appellate procedure mandate that an

appellant’s brief shall consist of the following matters, separately and plainly

entitled and in the following order:

(1) Statement of jurisdiction.

(2) Order or other determination in question.

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(3) Statement of both the scope of review and the

standard of review.

(4) Statement of the questions involved.

(5) Statement of the case.

(6) Summary of argument.

(7) Statement of the reasons to allow an appeal to

challenge the discretionary aspects of a sentence,

if applicable.

(8) Argument for appellant.

(9) A short conclusion stating the precise relief

sought.

(10) The opinions and pleadings specified in

Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule.

(11) In the Superior Court, a copy of the statement of

errors complained of on appeal, filed with the trial

court pursuant to Rule 1925(b), or an averment

that no order requiring a statement of errors

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) was entered.

Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a). Additionally, as to the argument section of an appellate

brief, Rule 2119(a) provides:

Rule 2119. Argument

(a) General rule.—The argument shall be divided

into as many parts as there are questions to be argued;

and shall have at the head of each part—in distinctive type

or in type distinctively displayed—the particular point

treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of

authorities as are deemed pertinent.

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Importantly, where an appellant fails to raise or properly

develop his issues on appeal, or where his brief is wholly inadequate to

present specific issues for review, a court will not consider the merits of the

claims raised on appeal. Butler v. Illes, 747 A.2d 943 (Pa.Super. 2000)

(holding appellant waived claim where appellant failed to set forth adequate

argument concerning claims on appeal; appellant’s argument lacked

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meaningful substance and consisted of mere conclusory statements;

appellant failed to cogently explain or even tenuously assert why trial court

abused its discretion or made error of law). See also Lackner v. Glosser,

892 A.2d 21 (Pa.Super 2006) (explaining appellant’s arguments must

adhere to rules of appellate procedure, and arguments which are not

appropriately developed are waived on appeal; arguments not appropriately

developed include those where party has failed to cite relevant authority in

support of contention); Estate of Haiko v. McGinley, 799 A.2d 155

(Pa.Super. 2002) (stating rules of appellate procedure make clear appellant

must support each question raised by discussion and analysis of pertinent

authority; absent reasoned discussion of law in appellate brief, this Court’s

ability to provide appellate review is hampered, necessitating waiver of issue

on appeal).

Instantly, Appellant is pro se on appeal and the defects in his brief are

substantial. Several required components of the brief are missing, including

the order or other determination in question, a cogent standard and scope of

review, an objective statement of the case without argument, a summary of

the argument, an averment that no order requiring a statement of errors

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) was entered, or a

copy of the trial court opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)-(b); Pa.R.A.P.

2117(a)-(b). The most problematic aspect of Appellant’s brief, however, is

his failure to provide developed arguments in support of his issues;

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Appellant’s argument is rambling, repetitive, and often incoherent. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2119. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, we will address only

the arguments we can reasonably discern from this defective brief.

First, Appellant argues Appellee introduced evidence concerning

Appellant’s unrelated criminal history, creating prejudice against Appellant.

Appellant requests a motion in limine to preclude Appellee from introducing

exhibits or information related to Appellant’s current incarceration.

Appellant further contends the statute of limitations did not bar his claim for

workers’ compensation because Appellee committed acts of fraud and

concealment to lull Appellant into a “false sense of security” regarding the

filing of his claim. Appellant argues these acts tolled the running of the

statute of limitations because he was unaware of this deception at the time.

Moreover, Appellant maintains the trial court erred in dismissing Appellant’s

complaint due to lack of proper service. Appellant argues he was denied due

process by not being allowed to amend his complaint. Additionally,

Appellant contends that Appellees violated OSHA requirements by

transporting Appellant to the hospital in a pick-up truck and failing to file an

injury report. Finally, Appellant maintains there was sufficient evidence in

his medical records to prove his injury was work-related, and Appellees

refused to release discovery material in order to avoid liability. For these

reasons, Appellant concludes this Court should vacate the order sustaining

Appellee’s preliminary objections and remand the case to be reopened for

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trial. We disagree.

Appellate review in this case implicates the following general

principles:

In determining whether the trial court properly sustained

preliminary objections, the appellate court must examine

the averments in the complaint, together with the

documents and exhibits attached thereto, in order to

evaluate the sufficiency of the facts averred. The impetus

of our inquiry is to determine the legal sufficiency of the

complaint and whether the pleading would permit recovery

if ultimately proven. This Court will reverse the trial

court’s decision regarding preliminary objections only

where there has been an error of law or abuse of

discretion. When sustaining the trial court’s ruling will

result in the denial of claim or a dismissal of suit,

preliminary objections will be sustained only where the

case is free and clear of doubt.

Clemleddy Const., Inc. v. Yorston, 810 A.2d 693, 696 (Pa.Super. 2002),

appeal denied, 573 Pa. 682, 823 A.2d 143 (2003) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).

With respect to the filing of preliminary objections, the Pennsylvania

Rules of Civil Procedure provide, in pertinent part:

Rule 1028. Preliminary Objections

(a) Preliminary objections may be filed by any party to

any pleading and are limited to the following grounds:

(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of

the action or the person of the defendant, improper

venue or improper form or service of a writ of

summons or a complaint;

* * *

(3) insufficient specificity in a pleading;

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(4) legal insufficiency of a pleading (demurrer)[.]

* * *

Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(1), (3)-(4). “Service of process is a mechanism by which

a court obtains jurisdiction [over] a defendant, and therefore, the rules

concerning service of process must be strictly followed.” Cintas Corp. v.

Lee’s Cleaning Services, Inc., 549 Pa. 84, 91, 700 A.2d 915, 917 (1997)

(citing Sharp v. Valley Forge Medical Center and Heart Hospital, Inc.,

422 Pa. 124, 221 A.2d 185 (1966)).

Thus, improper service is not merely a procedural defect

that can be ignored when a defendant subsequently learns

of the action against…. However, the absence of or a

defect in a return of service does not necessarily divest a

court of jurisdiction of a defendant who was properly

served. The fact of service is the important thing in

determining jurisdiction and...proof of service may be

defective or even lacking, but if the fact of service is

established jurisdiction cannot be questioned.

Cintas Corp., supra at 91, 700 A.2d at 918 (internal citations omitted). In

other words, successful service of process is the focus of an “improper

service” inquiry. Id.

Regarding service of process in actions commenced in the First Judicial

District, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 400.1(a) provides:

Rule 400.1 Provisions for all Courts of the First

Judicial District

(a) In an action commenced in the First Judicial District,

original process may be served

(1) within the county by the sheriff or a competent

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adult, or

(2) in any other county by deputized service as

provided by Rule 400(d) or by a competent adult

forwarding the process to the sheriff of the county

where service may be made.

Pa.R.C.P. 400.1(a)(1)-(2). Rule 400(d) states:

Rule 400. Person to Make Service

* * *

(d) If service is to be made by the sheriff in a county

other than the county in which the action was commenced,

the sheriff of the county where service may be made shall

be deputized for that purpose by the sheriff of the county

where the action was commenced.

Pa.R.C.P. 400(d). Finally, Rule 424, governing service of process on

corporations, provides:

Rule 424. Corporations and Similar Entities

Service of original process upon a corporation or similar

entity shall be made by handing a copy to any of the

following persons provided the person served is not a

plaintiff in the action:

(1) an executive officer, partner or trustee of the

corporation or similar entity, or

(2) the manager, clerk or other person for the time

being in charge of any regular place of business or activity

of the corporation or similar entity, or

(3) an agent authorized by the corporation or similar

entity in writing to receive service of process for it.

Pa.R.C.P. 424. As a general rule, proper service of process on a corporation

in Pennsylvania cannot be satisfied by certified mail. See Vogt v. Liberty

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Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 900 A.2d 912 (Pa.Super. 2006) (holding court lacked

personal jurisdiction over corporation because service of original process was

erroneously effected by regular and certified mail).

Under Rule 1028(a)(3), the pertinent question is “whether the

complaint is sufficiently clear to enable the defendant to prepare his

defense,” or “whether the plaintiff’s complaint informs the defendant with

accuracy and completeness of the specific basis on which recovery is sought

so that [the defendant] may know without question upon what grounds to

make his defense.” Rambo v. Greene, 906 A.2d 1232, 1236 (Pa.Super.

2006).

“Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state; a complaint must not only give

the defendant notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests, but the complaint must also formulate the issues by

summarizing those facts essential to support the claim.” Lerner v. Lerner,

954 A.2d 1229, 1235 (Pa.Super. 2008). The pleadings standards set forth in

Pa.R.C.P. 1019 specifically

require the pleader to disclose the material facts sufficient

to enable the adverse party to prepare his case. A

complaint therefore must do more than give the defendant

fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests. It should formulate the issues by fully

summarizing the material facts. Material facts are ultimate

facts, i.e. those facts essential to support the claim.

Evidence from which such facts may be inferred not only

need not but should not be alleged.... Allegations will

withstand challenge under [Rule] 1019(a) if (1) they

contain averments of all of the facts the plaintiff will

eventually have to prove in order to recover, and (2) they

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are sufficiently specific so as to enable defendant to

prepare his defense.

Id. at 1235-36 (quoting Baker v. Rangos, 324 A.2d 498, 505-06

(Pa.Super. 1974)).

Under Rule 1028(a)(4), the relevant question is whether the contested

pleading is legally sufficient. Weiley v. Albert Einstein Medical Center,

51 A.3d 202, 208 (Pa.Super. 2012). A challenge in the nature of a

demurrer, gives rise to the following scope and standard of review:

Our review of a trial court’s sustaining of preliminary

objections in the nature of a demurrer is plenary. Such

preliminary objections should be sustained only if,

assuming the averments of the complaint to be true, the

plaintiff has failed to assert a legally cognizable cause of

action. We will reverse a trial court’s decision to sustain

preliminary objections only if the trial court has committed

an error of law or an abuse of discretion.

All material facts set forth in the complaint as well as all

inferences reasonably [deducible] therefrom are admitted

as true for [the purpose of this review]. The question

presented by the demurrer is whether, on the facts

averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is

possible. Where a doubt exists as to whether a demurrer

should be sustained, this doubt should be resolved in favor

of overruling it.

Regarding a demurrer, this Court has held:

A demurrer is an assertion that a complaint does not

set forth a cause of action or a claim on which relief

can be granted. A demurrer by a defendant admits

all relevant facts sufficiently pleaded in the complaint

and all inferences fairly deducible therefrom, but not

conclusions of law or unjustified inferences. In ruling

on a demurrer, the court may consider only such

matters as arise out of the complaint itself; it cannot

supply a fact missing in the complaint.

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Where the complaint fails to set forth a valid cause of

action, a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer

is properly sustained.

Lerner, supra at 1234-35 (internal citations omitted).

Regarding affirmative defenses, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil

Procedure Rule 1030 provides:

Rule 1030. New Matter

(a) Except as provided by subdivision (b), all affirmative

defenses including but not limited to the defenses

of…immunity from suit…shall be pleaded in a responsive

pleading under the heading “New Matter”….

Pa.R.C.P. 1030(a). For example, statutory immunity from suit is not

properly raised in preliminary objections to a complaint; it is an affirmative

defense that should be raised in new matter in a responsive pleading.

Heifetz v. Philadelphia State Hospital, 482 Pa. 386, 393 A.2d 1160

(1978); Taras v. Wausau Ins. Companies, 602 A.2d 882 (Pa.Super.

1992), appeal denied, 532 Pa. 657, 615 A.2d 1313 (1992) (stating statutory

immunity under Workers’ Compensation Act is affirmative defense that is

properly raised in new matter rather than by preliminary objections to

complaint). Nevertheless:

Where a party erroneously asserts substantive defenses in

preliminary objections rather than to raise these defenses

by answer or in new matter, the failure of the opposing

party to file preliminary objections to the defective

preliminary objections, raising the erroneous defenses,

waives the procedural defect and allows the trial court to

rule on the preliminary objections.

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Preiser v. Rosenzweig, 614 A.2d 303, 305 (Pa.Super. 1992), aff’d, 538

Pa. 139, 646 A.2d 1166 (1994). See also Fewell v. Besner, 664 A.2d

577, 582 (Pa.Super. 1995) (stating: “Where a party improperly raises

‘immunity from suit’ in preliminary objections and the opposing party does

not object to this defect, then the question of immunity from suit may be

decided by the court”).

Instantly, the trial court reasoned as follows:

The pro se [Appellant], who is currently incarcerated, filed

an appeal from an order entered by this Court that

sustained [Appellee’s] preliminary objections to the

Complaint filed on January 9, 2015. That Complaint was

almost completely illegible, and it contained several pages

upon which the written text was [smudged] to such an

extent that it was impossible to read the printed words on

those pages. The Complaint contained no separate

paragraphs or counts, and it did not espouse a clear theory

of liability against [Appellee]. To the extent that it was

possible to comprehend the Complaint, [Appellant] averred

that he was injured while working for [Appellee] on a

construction project. He averred that he suffered chest

pains while [racking] concrete on February 19, 2008 and

was taken to the hospital where he was diagnosed with

atrial fibrillation. [Appellant] averred that a cardiologist

named Dr. Dixon told him that he had suffered a work

related injury.

On June 26, 2015, [Appellant] filed an Affidavit of Service

stating:

I, Levon T. Warner, pro se do hereby state that I

served the defendant[s] B. Pietrini & Sons

Construction, my civil complaint upon certified mail

on Feb 26, 2015. According to the certified

receipt[s, t]he complaint was received and signed for

by Patricia Dunior on March 17, 2015. No. {7014

1200 0000 5099 2390}. Please see attached

exhibits as a matter of proof/record.

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Discussion

This [c]ourt [sustained] the uncontested preliminary

objections filed by [Appellee] because [Appellant] failed to

effectuate proper service of process against [Appellee].

This [c]ourt also [sustained] preliminary objections

because the claims brought by [Appellant] were barred by

the exclusivity provisions in the Workers’ Compensation

Act.

The address [c]ited by [Appellant] in the Affidavit of

Service filed on June 26, 2015 is located in Pennsylvania;

therefore, he failed to obtain personal jurisdiction over

[Appellee] when he mailed the Complaint to this

Pennsylvania address of 111 E. Church Road, King of

Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406. Since [Appellant] failed to

respond to the preliminary objections, the only evidence of

record that this [c]ourt could review when deciding this

matter was the Affidavit of Service.

With some limited exceptions, not applicable in this

matter, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure require

deputized service of process by sheriff to obtain

jurisdiction over defendants located within the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. …

* * *

In addition to the fatal flaws in [Appellant’s] method for

service of process, the claims brought by [Appellant] in

this matter were barred by the Pennsylvania Workers’

Compensation Act. [Appellant’s] Complaint clearly alleged

that he was working for [Appellee] at the time of the

alleged incident in February of 2008. In his Complaint,

[Appellant] himself described the alleged injury as a “work

related injury.”

It is well established under Pennsylvania law that the

Workers’ Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy

to a claimant against his or her employer. 77 P.S. [§

481]; See also Alston v. St. Paul Insurance

Companies, 531 Pa. 261, 612 A.2d 421 (1992); Kuney

v. PMA Insurance Compan[y], 525 Pa. [171], 578 A.2d

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1285 (1990); Santiago v. Pennsylvania National

Mutual Casualty Insurance Co., 613 A.2d [1235], 1242

([Pa.Super.] 1992). The Act provides that the “liability of

an employer under this act shall be exclusive and in place

of any and all other liability to such employees…in any

action at law or otherwise on account of any injury.” 77

[P.S.] § [481]. “[T]he exclusivity clause of the

Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 481,

reflects historical quid pro quo between an employer and

employee whereby the employee is relieved of the burden

of establishing fault for a work-related injury, and is

compensated expeditiously. The employer in turn is

relieved of the possibility of a larger damages verdict in a

common law action. The comprehensive system of

substantive, procedural and remedial laws comprising the

workers’ compensation system is the exclusive forum for

redress of injuries in any way related to the workplace.”

Snyder v. Pocono Medical Center, 547 Pa. 415, 419-20,

[690 A.2d 1152, 1155] (1977). Likewise, the Plaintiff

cannot hold a co-employee liable at common law for any

injury during employment, except for intentional wrong

acts. 77 [P.S.] § [72].

The workers’ compensation system was created to address

workplace injuries much like the one [Appellant] suffered

in February 2008. [Appellant] in his Complaint states that

he “was working on a job site” when he suffered his

alleged injury and was “rushed” to the hospital. He states

that he was diagnosed with atrial fibrillation and was told

by cardiologist, Dr. Dixon, that this was a work related

injury. Therefore, [Appellant’s] correct path for relief

would be through the channels of the workers’

compensation system because the Workers’ Compensation

Act provides the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries

such as the one alleged by [Appellant].

Conclusion

This [c]ourt did not have personal jurisdiction over

[Appellee] because [Appellant] failed to comply with the

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure that govern service

of process. [Appellant’s] claims are equally barred by the

exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act.

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(Trial Court Opinion, filed October 4, 2016, at 1-4) (internal footnote

omitted). We accept the court’s analysis. The court makes clear it reviewed

Appellant’s complaint and did not sustain Appellee’s preliminary objections

simply because Appellant failed to respond. See, e.g., Dixon v.

Northwestern Mutual, 146 A.3d 780 (Pa.Super. 2016) (reiterating general

principle that party’s failure to respond to preliminary objections does not

sustain preliminary objections by default); Schuylkill Navy v. Langbord,

728 A.2d 964 (Pa.Super. 1999) (stating court cannot sustain preliminary

objections based solely on party’s failure to file proper response).

Moreover, the trial court appropriately addressed the Workers’

Compensation Act in its analysis, although statutory immunity is an

affirmative defense more properly raised in new matter and not through

preliminary objections. See Heifetz, supra; Taras, supra. Appellee raised

“immunity from suit” in preliminary objections, but Appellant did not object;

so the court was free to rule on the issue. See Fewell, supra; Preiser,

supra.

As a final word, review of Appellant’s complaint confirms the complaint

did not meet the general pleading requirements, as it was both factually and

legally insufficient. An entire page of the three and a half page document is

completely illegible. The remaining pages contain an incomplete summary

of the material facts and issues as well as many incoherent allegations

insufficient to withstand the preliminary objections. The state of Appellant’s

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complaint makes it virtually impossible to achieve an accurate understanding

of his claims. See Lerner, supra; Rambo, supra. Additionally, even if the

limited information that can be drawn from Appellant’s brief were true,

Appellant failed to set forth a legally cognizable claim for which relief can be

granted. See Lerner, supra; 77 P.S. § 481. Accordingly, we affirm.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/25/2017

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