Christopher Lea Williams v. John Buraczynski

07/19/2017

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

May 22, 2017 Session

CHRISTOPHER LEA WILLIAMS v. JOHN BURACZYNSKI

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Knox County

No. 2-10-16 William T. Ailor, Judge

No. E2016-01605-COA-R3-CV

This appeal arises from a motor vehicle accident. Christopher Lea Williams

(“Williams”) and John Buraczynski (“Buraczynski”) both worked for Progression

Electric, LLC (“Progression”). In January 2015, Buraczynski was driving his vehicle

with passenger Williams as part of a carpool arrangement when they were involved in an

accident. Williams subsequently claimed he was entitled to and received workers’

compensation benefits. Williams then sued Buraczynski, personally, in the Circuit Court

for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). Buraczynski filed a motion for summary judgment,

arguing that Williams’ exclusive remedy was in workers’ compensation. The Trial Court

granted Buraczynski’s motion. Williams appealed. We affirm the judgment of the Trial

Court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed;

Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CHARLES D.

SUSANO, JR. and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JJ., joined.

Henry S. Queener, III, Nashville, Tennessee, and, Jennifer K. O’Connell, Knoxville,

Tennessee, for the appellant, Christopher Lea Williams.

Thomas M. Horne, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellee, John Buraczynski.

OPINION

Background

This case arises from a motor vehicle accident involving two co-workers. On

January 12, 2015, Buraczynski was driving Williams as part of a carpool arrangement.

Both worked for Progression. The two co-workers were involved in an accident in which

Williams was injured.

Williams sought and obtained workers’ compensation benefits from Progression

or its insurance carrier. Neither Progression nor its insurance carrier denied that Williams

was in the course and scope of his employment with Progression at the time of the

accident. In January 2016, Williams then filed suit against Buraczynski and Progression

alleging that Buraczynski was negligent in operating the vehicle at the time of the

accident. Progression filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim asserting that

Williams’ claim against it was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of Tenn. Code.

Ann. § 50-6-108(a). Williams thereafter nonsuited his claim against Progression and the

case proceeded against Buraczynski. In May 2016, Buraczynski filed a motion to amend

his answer to add the defenses of judicial and equitable estoppel. The motion was

granted. According to Buraczynski, Williams should not be allowed to claim in this

action that he was acting outside the scope of his employment at the time of the accident

when Williams already had applied for and received workers’ compensation benefits.

Buraczynski instead argued that Williams’ exclusive remedy is his workers’

compensation.

In March 2016, Buraczynski filed a motion for summary judgment, which the

Trial Court granted following a June 2016 hearing on the motion. The Trial Court stated

as follows in its oral ruling, which was incorporated into its July 2016 final order:

The Court having reviewed the record and the motion, as well as the

response and the affidavits that have been filed, it is of the opinion that the

following are the undisputed facts:

The Plaintiff and Defendant, John Buraczynski, were riding together

in Mr. Buraczynski’s vehicle on their way to work. During that ride at

some point, the vehicle was involved in a collision and the Plaintiff was

injured.

Later the Plaintiff made representations to his employer that he was

acting in the course and scope of his employment and that the employer

made a determination that the Plaintiff was in the course and scope of his

employment and as a result, Workers’ Comp benefits, Workers’ Comp

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benefits were paid to the Plaintiff by the employer’s Workers’

Compensation carrier.

The Plaintiff has now filed an affidavit in this matter wherein he

makes statements that at the time of the wreck, he was not on Progression

Electric, LLC’s premises at the time of the wreck; that he was not in a

vehicle owned by Progression Electric, LLC; that he was not on the clock

for Progression Electric, LLC; and he was not doing what he was employed

by Progression Electric, LLC to do.

The Court is of the opinion that in making a claim for Workers’

Compensation benefits that the Plaintiff made admissions that are contrary

to his affidavit and that TCA 50-6-108 subsection (a) reads as follows:

The rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to this

chapter, on account of personal injury or death by accident, including a

minor, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, shall exclude all other

rights and remedies of the employee, the employee’s personal

representative, dependents or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on

account of the injury or death.

Based on the Court’s review of the statute, as well as the case law

that has been presented, the Court is of the opinion that based on the Rye

decision, the Plaintiff, I’m sorry, the Defendant has negated an essential

element of the Plaintiff’s complaint and, therefore, the complaint against

Defendant John Buraczynski should be dismissed.

Williams timely filed an appeal to this Court.

Discussion

We restate and consolidate the issues raised on appeal into the following

dispositive issue: whether the Trial Court erred in granting Buraczynski’s motion for

summary judgment.1

As our Supreme Court has instructed regarding appellate review of a trial court’s

ruling on a motion for summary judgment:

1

After entry of the Trial Court’s order granting Buraczynski’s motion for summary judgment, Williams

filed a fourth amended complaint naming a third party “John Doe” driver defendant. The record appears

to be silent as to whether leave to amend ever was granted by the Trial Court. Buraczynski contends that

this appeal therefore is not of a final order. We disagree. As no order was entered with respect to the

fourth amended complaint, and the order granting Buraczynski summary judgment adjudicated all issues

in the case, we may proceed to decide this appeal.

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Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for

summary judgment de novo, without a presumption of correctness. Bain v.

Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997); see also Abshure v. Methodist

Healthcare–Memphis Hosp., 325 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Tenn. 2010). In doing

so, we make a fresh determination of whether the requirements of Rule 56

of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied. Estate of

Brown, 402 S.W.3d 193, 198 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Hughes v. New Life Dev.

Corp., 387 S.W.3d 453, 471 (Tenn. 2012)).

***

[I]n Tennessee, as in the federal system, when the moving party does not

bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden of

production either (1) by affirmatively negating an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s claim or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving

party’s evidence at the summary judgment stage is insufficient to establish

the nonmoving party’s claim or defense. We reiterate that a moving party

seeking summary judgment by attacking the nonmoving party’s evidence

must do more than make a conclusory assertion that summary judgment is

appropriate on this basis. Rather, Tennessee Rule 56.03 requires the

moving party to support its motion with “a separate concise statement of

material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine

issue for trial.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. “Each fact is to be set forth in a

separate, numbered paragraph and supported by a specific citation to the

record.” Id. When such a motion is made, any party opposing summary

judgment must file a response to each fact set forth by the movant in the

manner provided in Tennessee Rule 56.03. “[W]hen a motion for summary

judgment is made [and] . . . supported as provided in [Tennessee Rule 56],”

to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party “may not rest upon the

mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading,” but must respond, and by

affidavits or one of the other means provided in Tennessee Rule 56, “set

forth specific facts” at the summary judgment stage “showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06. The nonmoving party

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as

to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.

Ct. 1348. The nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific

facts in the record which could lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of

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the nonmoving party. If a summary judgment motion is filed before

adequate time for discovery has been provided, the nonmoving party may

seek a continuance to engage in additional discovery as provided in

Tennessee Rule 56.07. However, after adequate time for discovery has

been provided, summary judgment should be granted if the nonmoving

party’s evidence at the summary judgment stage is insufficient to establish

the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Tenn. R. Civ. P.

56.04, 56.06. The focus is on the evidence the nonmoving party comes

forward with at the summary judgment stage, not on hypothetical evidence

that theoretically could be adduced, despite the passage of discovery

deadlines, at a future trial.

Rye v. Women’s Care Cntr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250, 264-65 (Tenn.

2015).

Williams argues on appeal that the Trial Court erred in interpreting his decision to

seek and obtain workers’ compensation as evidence that he was acting in the scope of his

employment at the time of the accident.2 Buraczynski disagrees and cites to Tennessee

law which he maintains establishes workers’ compensation as the exclusive remedy

under the undisputed facts of this case. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-108(a) (2014) provides

the following in regards to exclusive remedy in workers’ compensation:

(a) The rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to this chapter,

on account of personal injury or death by accident, including a minor

whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, shall exclude all other rights and

remedies of the employee, the employee’s personal representative,

dependents or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of the

injury or death.

With respect to recovery of damages from a third-party tortfeasor, Tenn. Code

Ann. § 50-6-112 (c)(1) (2014), provides for a subrogation lien in favor of the employer as

follows:

(c)(1) In the event of a recovery against the third person by the worker, or

by those to whom the worker’s right of action survives, by judgment,

settlement or otherwise, and the employer’s maximum liability for workers’

compensation under this chapter has been fully or partially paid and

2

Citing Tenn. R. App. P. 27, Buraczynski argues that Williams’ failure to cite properly to the record in

his brief on appeal is grounds for waiver of appellate review. A party that fails to comply with Rule 27 in

an appellate brief risks waiving appellate review. Bean v. Bean, 40 S.W.3d 52, 55-56 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2000). However, we decline to find waiver in the present case and will decide this appeal on its merits.

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discharged, the employer shall have a subrogation lien against the recovery,

and the employer may intervene in any action to protect and enforce the

lien.

This Court addressed whether a worker could bring a common law negligence

action against a co-worker where the exclusive remedy provision of Tenn. Code Ann. §

50-6-108(a) applied. In Waddell v. Ogledzinkski, No. E2001-03131-COA-R3-CV, 2002

WL 31895580, at *8-9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2002), no appl. perm. appeal filed, we

stated as pertinent:

Mr. Waddell appears to argue that granting Mr. Ogledzinkski [his co-

worker] immunity is contrary to the purpose of the statute as determined by

the Court in Millican.

Mr. Waddell also cites the more recent case of Plough v. Premier

Pneumatics, Inc., supra. In Plough an injured employee filed tort actions

against some, but not all, of several allegedly negligent third parties within

the one year limitation period and his employer sought to bring actions

against the remaining third parties within six months of the expiration of

that one year. This Court disagreed with the appellees’ argument that an

employer may only sue third parties when the injured employee has failed

to sue any third party within one year of the injury and determined that the

employer’s lawsuits were permitted under the statute. Mr. Waddell

references the Court’s determination that in enacting the statute the

Legislature intended “to place the pecuniary loss on the author of the

misfortune, thus allowing both employer and employee to benefit.” Mr.

Waddell asserts that allowance of his negligence action against Mr.

Ogledzinkski will place the pecuniary loss in this case upon the author of

the misfortune in accord with legislative intent.

We disagree that the Courts’ analyses of legislative intent set forth in

Millican and Plough require that we allow Mr. Waddell’s present tort suit

against Mr. Ogledzinkski. Neither of these cases sanction a common law

negligence action by one employee against another for injuries arising out

of and in the course of their common employment. While recognizing the

legislative intent that an injured employee receive full recovery of damages

and that the pecuniary loss incurred by such employee be placed on the

author of his misfortune, we must at the same time recognize the competing

rights and expectations acquired by a co-employee subject to the workers’

compensation law. As recognized by the courts of this state, one of these

rights and expectations is that such co-employee not be subject to a tort suit

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by another employee for actions taken in furtherance of the employer’s

business.

For the foregoing reasons we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court

and remand for collection of costs below.

This Court discussed exclusive remedy and third parties in relation to workers’

compensation further in the case of Ridenour v. Carman, No. M2012-00801-COA-R3-

CV, 2013 WL 1097805, at *5-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2013), rule 11 appl. perm.

appeal denied Aug. 14, 2013, as follows:

Workers’ compensation is a “unique concept in the law,” which

operates to “provide quick and efficient compensation to injured workers in

exchange for immunizing employers from tort liability and limiting their

damages.” Curtis v. G.E. Capital Modular Space, 155 S.W.3d 877, 882

(Tenn. 2005) (internal citations omitted). Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-

6-108(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Law states “[t]he rights and

remedies to an employee subject to this chapter, on account of personal

injury or death by accident, ... shall exclude all other rights and remedies of

the employee, the employee’s personal representative, dependents or next

of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of the injury or death.”

However, Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-108(a) “do[es] not shield

everyone in the work environment under all circumstances” from liability.

Taylor v. Linville, 656 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tenn. 1983).

Workers’ compensation is the injured employee’s exclusive remedy,

unless a third party, other than the employer, causes the injury. Davis v.

Alexsis, Inc. 2 S.W.3d 228, 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing McAlister v.

Methodist Hosp., 550 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tenn. 1977)). Tennessee Code

Annotated § 50-6-112(a) expressly allows the injured worker to recover

against a third party under certain circumstances:

When the injury or death for which compensation is payable

under this chapter was caused under circumstances creating a

legal liability against some person other than the employer to

pay damages, the injured worker, ... shall have the right to

take compensation under this chapter, and the injured worker,

... may pursue the injured worker’s remedy by proper action

in a court of competent jurisdiction against the other person.

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The action authorized by Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-112(a)

is in tort. Davis, 2 S.W.3d at 229 (citing Plough, Inc. v. Premier

Pneumatics, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 495 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)). The policy for

allowing suit against a responsible third party is that “since the third party

could not have been liable for workers’ compensation, he should be

prepared to make the injured person whole under normal tort principles.”

Posey v. Union Carbide Corp., 705 F.2d 833, 834 (6th Cir.1983).

Plaintiff alleges that Chad Carman was reckless, grossly negligent,

or negligent on November 12, 2007, when he came upon the scene of

Plaintiff’s accident and failed to render aid or call for medical assistance,

and instead simply loaded Plaintiff into another truck and drove him home,

without taking any steps to advise anyone of Plaintiff’s condition.

Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-112(a) expressly allows an injured

worker to pursue a tort remedy when the injury was caused “under

circumstances creating a legal liability against some person other than the

employer....” See also Davis, 2 S.W.3d at 229. By his own deposition

testimony, Chad Carman was not an employee of the Auction Company at

the time of the incident, he was merely helping his father, thus, Plaintiff’s

claims against Chad Carman are claims against a third party, not the

employer. As a consequence, the Workers’ Compensation Law does not

bar Plaintiff’s claim against Chad Carman. Davis, 2 S.W.3d at 229; see also

McAlister, 550 S.W.2d at 242.

For the foregoing reasons, we find that Chad Carman failed to

establish that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, we

reverse the grant of summary judgment to Chad Carman.

Williams argues on appeal that, in order for the exclusive remedy protection to

apply to Buraczynski, “the undisputed facts of this case must establish Williams was

employed by Progression when the accident occurred and that the accident arose out

of and in the course of his employment.” (Bold in original) Williams contends the

evidence presented failed to establish those necessary conditions. Buraczynski argues, on

the contrary, that Williams’ actions in both seeking and obtaining workers’ compensation

benefits serve to cancel his current representations. Buraczysnki states that, whether

under a theory of judicial or equitable estoppel, Williams is barred from bringing a

negligence claim against his co-worker.3 In response to Buraczynski’s Rule 56.03

3

Buraczynski submitted, as part of his motion for summary judgment, the affidavit of Barbara Mitchell,

Progression’s payroll manager. Ms. Mitchell stated in part: “Pursuant to the Local Union’s protocol, both

the Plaintiff and the Defendant were paid for travel to and from the work site at which they were working

on January 12, 2015.”

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statement of material of facts, Williams admitted that “[a]t the time of this accident, the

Defendant [Buraczynski] was an employee of Progression Electric, LLC, (hereinafter

“Progression”), and was in the course and scope of his employment with Progression and

was on the job, working for Progression.”

Our Supreme Court has discussed and distinguished judicial and equitable

estoppel as follows:

Although this Court agrees that a party may be estopped from

contradicting a sworn statement previously made or from gaining an unfair

advantage by taking inconsistent positions in a legal proceeding, we do not

agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the doctrine of judicial

estoppel should be applied in both instances. Instead, we take this

opportunity to clarify that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is applicable

only when a party has attempted to contradict by oath a sworn statement

previously made. See Allen v. Neal, 217 Tenn. 181, 396 S.W.2d 344, 346

(1965) (noting that “[j]udicial estoppels arise from sworn statements made

in the course of judicial proceedings, generally in a former litigation, and

are based on public policy upholding the sanctity of an oath and not on

prejudice to adverse party by reason thereof, as in the case of equitable

estoppel”). In those instances where no oath is involved but the party is

attempting to gain an unfair advantage by maintaining inconsistent legal

positions, the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied.

***

The essential elements of an equitable estoppel as related to

the party estopped are said to be[:] (1) Conduct which

amounts to a false representation or concealment of material

facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey the

impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent

with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert;

(2) Intention, or at least expectation that such conduct shall be

acted upon by the other party; [and] (3) Knowledge, actual or

constructive[,] of the real facts.

Werne, 954 S.W.2d at 745.

Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. v. Epperson, 284 S.W.3d 303, 315-16 (Tenn.

2009) (emphasis in original).

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Williams unabashedly argues that he is entitled to have the best of both worlds in

that for purposes of his workers’ compensation claim, he was in the scope and course of

his employment with Progression yet at the exact same time for purposes of his tort claim

against his co-worker Buraczynski, he was not in the scope and course of his employment

with Progression. Williams may not have it both ways. Having chosen to receive his

workers’ compensation benefits under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation statutes,

Williams is subject to the restrictions placed on him under those same statutes. While it

very well may be that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience,”4

we are not required to turn a blind eye and accept the illogical argument that Williams

was both in the scope and course of his employment and not in the scope and course of

his employment at the exact same time.

Whether barred by a species of estoppel, or under the exclusive remedy provision

of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-108(a), Williams is limited exclusively to his recovery in

workers’ compensation. Williams may not bring this common law negligence claim

against his co-worker Buraczynski for the same incident. Buraczynski has negated an

essential element of Williams’ claim and has shown that Williams’ evidence “is

insufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Rye,

477 S.W.3d at 265. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court granting summary

judgment in favor of Buraczynski.

Conclusion

The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed, and this cause is remanded to the

Trial Court for collection of the costs below. The costs on appeal are assessed against the

Appellant, Christopher Lea Williams, and his surety, if any.

____________________________________

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE

4

Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr. (1881), The Common Law: Little, Brown and Company.

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