Floyd E. Rayner, III v. Tennessee Department of Correction

07/13/2017

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs June 1, 2017

FLOYD E. RAYNER, III v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTION, ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 16-508-IV Russell T. Perkins, Chancellor

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No. M2017-00223-COA-R3-CV

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Appellant, an inmate in the custody of Appellee Tennessee Department of Correction,

appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for declaratory judgment under the

Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Specifically, Appellant challenges the

Tennessee Department of Correction’s calculation of his criminal sentence, and also

challenges the constitutionality of the criminal statutes, under which he was convicted.

We conclude that the calculation of Appellant’s sentence comports with the judgments of

the criminal court. Appellant’s constitutional arguments challenge his criminal sentence.

As such, he has no recourse under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Affirmed

and remanded.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed and Remanded

KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CHARLES D.

SUSANO, JR. and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JJ., joined.

Floyd Earl Rayner, III, Mountain City, Tennessee, pro se.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter, Andrée Blumstein, Solicitor

General, and Pamela S. Lorch, Senior Counsel, for the appellees, Tennessee Department

of Correction and State Attorney General.

OPINION

I. Background

Floyd Earl Rayner, III (“Appellant”) is an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee

Department of Correction (“TDOC”). As set out in State of Tennessee v. Floyd Earl

Rayner, III, No. M2001-00971-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1336654 (Tenn. Crim. App.

June 19, 2002), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 9, 2002), Mr. Rayner was indicted on five

counts of rape of a child and five counts of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than

thirteen years of age. Id. at *1. In each count, the victim was Appellant’s daughter. Id.

Following trial, the jury convicted Appellant on each count, and the trial court imposed a

21-year sentence in each of the rape-of-a-child convictions and a nine-year sentence in

each of the aggravated-sexual-battery convictions. Id. Two of the rape-of-a-child

sentences and one of the aggravated-sexual-battery sentences were imposed to run

consecutively, and all other sentences were to run concurrently, yielding an effective

sentence of 51 years. Id. The sentencing court granted Appellant pretrial jail credit of

317 days, from April 10, 2000 to the sentence imposition date of February 21, 2001. Mr.

Rayner’s sentence is further explained by Candace Whisman, The TDOC Director of

Sentence Management Services, in her affidavit, which was filed on September 16, 2016.

In relevant part, Ms. Whisman explained:

9. The sentences received in count[s] one through five are for the offense

of Rape of a Child and are to be served at 100% with no sentence reduction

in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-523(b), (c), and (d), and

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(i)(3). The sentences received in counts six

through ten are for the offense of Aggravated Sexual Battery and are to be

served at 100% for a violent offense and can be reduced by up to 15% with

sentence reduction credits earned in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. §

40-35-501(i)(1).

10. Mr. Rayner’s overall sentence calculation of 51 years is based on the

sentences received in counts one, two and six. The sentence effective date

(sentence imposed date of February 21, 2001 minus pretrial jail credit) is

April 10, 2001, and current expiration date is April 10, 2051. He will not

be eligible to begin reducing the nine year sentence in count six until the

first 42 years is served day for day. Calculation of the sentence expiration

for the overall sentence of 51 years is listed below.

Sentence imposed date 1000A589 ct. 1 2-21-2001

Minus 317 pretrial jail credit -317 days

Equal sentence effective date 4-10-2000

Plus 21 years ct. 1 +21 yr

Equals expiration ct. 1 4-10-2021

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Plus 21 years ct. 2 +21 yr

Equals expiration ct. 2 4-10-2042

Plus 9 years ct. 6 + 9 yr

Equals current overall expiration 4-10-2051

The criminal court’s sentencing orders are attached to Ms. Whisman’s affidavit.

On May 16, 2016, Mr. Rayner filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against

TDOC and The State Attorney General (together with TDOC, “Appellees”). By his

complaint, which was brought under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act

(“UAPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225, Mr. Rayner challenged TDOC’s calculation of

his sentence and also challenged the constitutionality of the criminal statutes, under

which he was convicted (Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-523; 40-35-501). On August 8,

2016, Appellees filed an answer, wherein they denied the material allegations of the

complaint and raised, as one of their affirmative defenses, the trial court’s lack of

jurisdiction, under the UAPA, to address Appellant’s dispute concerning his conviction.

By order of December 21, 2016, the trial court dismissed Appellant’s complaint, finding

that Appellees had properly calculated Appellant’s sentence pursuant to the criminal

court’s orders and that Appellant could not challenge the constitutionality of the criminal

statutes by filing a declaratory judgment action under the UAPA. Mr. Rayner appeals.

II. Issues

We restate the issue as: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Mr. Rayner’s

UAPA declaratory judgment action.

III. Standard of Review

There was no trial in this case, and the issues are strictly questions of law.

Therefore, this Court’s review is de novo with no presumption of correctness as to the

trial court’s conclusions. See Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 836

(Tenn. 2008).

We also note that, while we are cognizant of the fact that Mr. Rayner is

representing himself in this appeal, it is well-settled that “pro se litigants are held to the

same procedural and substantive standards to which lawyers must adhere.” Brown v.

Christian Bros. Univ., No. W2012-01336-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 3982137, at *3 (Tenn.

Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 15, 2014). This Court has held that

“[p]arties who choose to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal treatment by

the courts.” Hodges v. Tenn. Att’y Gen., 43 S.W.3d 918, 920 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000);

Paehler v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank, Inc., 971 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1997). Nevertheless, “courts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the

same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected to observe.”

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Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 62-63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Edmundson v. Pratt,

945 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Kaylor v. Bradley, 912 S.W.2d 728, 733 n.4

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

IV. Analysis

A. Pretrial Jail Credits

In his first argument, Mr. Rayner contends that he was denied some of his pretrial

jail credits. Specifically, Appellant claims that he was arrested on December 9, 1999 and

that his pretrial jail credits should equal the number of days from December 9, 1999 to

April 10, 2000. The criminal court judgments, which are attached to Ms. Whisman’s

affidavit, order the pretrial jail credit period to cover April 10, 2000 to the date the court

entered judgment on February 21, 2001. Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-23-

101(c) provides that

[t]he trial court shall, at the time the sentence is imposed and the defendant

is committed to . . . the state penitentiary for imprisonment, render the

judgment of the court so as to allow the defendant credit on the sentence for

any period of time for which the defendant was committed and held in the

city jail . . . or county jail . . . pending arraignment and trial.

This statute directs the criminal court, not the TDOC, to award pretrial jail credits. In

fact, the TDOC “is powerless to change what the trial court awarded or failed to award.”

State v. Smith, No. E2003-01092-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 305805, at *2 (Tenn. Crim.

App. Feb. 18, 2004) (Tipton, J. concurring). Furthermore, the TDOC “may not alter the

judgment of the court, even if that judgment is illegal.” State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d

871, 873 (Tenn. 1978); Tucker v. Morrow, 335 S.W.3d 116, 122 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App.

2009). “The Department [of Correction] is required to calculate sentences in accordance

with the sentencing court’s judgment and with applicable sentencing statutes.” Bonner v.

Tenn. Dept. of Correction¸ 84 S.W.3d 576, 581-82 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Here, the trial

court specifically found that

TDOC properly calculated Mr. Rayner’s pretrial jail credit pursuant

to the criminal court’s judgments, as it is required to do by law. Because

Mr. Rayner’s sentencing court ordered pretrial jail credit from April 10,

2000 to February 21, 2001, the court finds that the TDOC properly

calculated Mr. Rayner’s sentence in accordance with those judgment and

that it cannot by law alter his sentence to include pretrial jail credit from

December 9, 1999 to April 10, 2000.

In counts 1 and 2, Mr. Rayner was sentenced for the offense of Rape

of a Child. This time is to be served at 100% with no sentence reduction

permitted in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-523(b)(c) & (d) and

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(i)(3). These statutes do not permit a child

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rapist to receive sentence credits to reduce a sentence expiration date or to

be paroled on said sentences. Mr. Rayner’s criminal judgments also state

that he is to serve 100% of his sentence for child rape, and those judgments

are in accordance with the aforementioned law. A child rapist must serve

100% of his sentence undiminished by sentence credits and is not eligible

for parole release. See Smith v. Lewis, 202 S.W.3d 124, 127 (Tenn. 2006).

The Court finds that TDOC properly did not apply sentence credits to Mr.

Rayner’s sentence for Rape of a Child.

The criminal court judgments order that the concurrent 9-year

aggravated sexual battery sentences be served consecutive to the 21-year

Rape of a Child sentence in count 2 and that the count 2 sentence be served

consecutive to the 21-year Rape of a Child sentence in count 1. The Court

finds that the TDOC has calculated Mr. Rayner’s sentence in accordance

with the sentencing court’s judgment and with the applicable sentencing

statutes.

We have reviewed the sentencing orders and the applicable sentencing statutes, and we

conclude, as did the trial court, that TDOC properly calculated Mr. Rayner’s sentence.

B. Constitutionality of Criminal Statutes

Mr. Rayner also challenges the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated

Sections 40-35-501 and 39-13-523. Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-35-501 is part

of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989. Tennessee Code Annotated

Section 39-13-523 sets out the punishment for certain sex offenses, including child rape.

Mr. Rayner’s constitutional arguments amount to nothing more than a challenge to his

criminal sentence. It is well settled that “declaratory proceedings under Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 4-5-225 . . . cannot be used to challenge the validity of a criminal conviction or

sentence.” Mitchell v. Campbell, 88 S.W.3d 561, 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). “[A] direct

appeal from a criminal conviction . . . petitions for relief under the Post-Conviction

Procedure Act and petitions for writ of habeas corpus are the exclusive means by which a

prisoner can obtain relief from confinement,” Id. at 567 n. 6, and “[c]ourts of equity are

not constituted to deal with crime and criminal proceedings.” Carter v. Slatery, No.

M2015-00554-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 1268110, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2016)

(internal citation omitted); Tennessee Downs, Inc. v. Gibbons, 15 S.W.3d 843, 847

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (“It is a well-established rule of equity jurisprudence that courts of

equity have no jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of state criminal laws.”).

C. Whether Mr. Rayner’s Pending Discovery Motion is Moot

In its final order, the trial court held that all pending motions were moot. In his

final argument, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to address his motion,

seeking a determination of whether Appellees’ response to Appellant’s requests for

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admissions was sufficient. From our review of the record, Appellant failed to raise this

issue in the trial court through a post-judgment motion.. “Issues raised for the first time

on appeal are waived.” Black v. Blount, 938 S.W.2d 394,403 (Tenn. 1996). Regardless,

having reviewed the substance of Appellant’s pending motion, it appears that Appellant’s

request for admissions raised legal, not factual, issues. Because the trial court ruled on all

pending legal issues, a separate review of Appellant’s motion was unnecessary.

Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s holding that Appellant’s motion is

moot was error.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court. The case is

remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary and are consistent with this

opinion. Costs of the appeal are assessed to the Appellant, Floyd E. Rayner, III. Because

Mr. Rayner is proceeding in forma pauperis in this appeal, execution for costs may issue

if necessary.

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KENNY ARMSTRONG, JUDGE

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