Robinson v. United States

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In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. l7-745C

(Filed: July 13, 2017) F l LED

NoT FoR PUBchArroN JUL 1 3 2017

US.COURTOF

) FEDERAL CLA|MS

TAVEREN ROB INS ON, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Pro Se Cornplaint; w Sponte

) Disrnissal for Want of

V. ) Jurisdiction; RCFC 12(h)(3);

) Transfer Not Warranted;

THE UNITED STATES, ) 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2012)

)

Defendant. )

)

ORDER

Before the court is the complaint of p_rg § plaintiff Taveren Robinson and his

application to proceed i_n forma pauperis, both filed on June 5, 2017.l S_ee Pl.’s Compl. 4,

ECF No. l. Because the court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims, the court must

dismiss this case pursuant to Rule lZ(h)(3) of the Rules of the United States Court of

Federal Claims (RCFC). § RCFC lZ(h)(S) (“If the court determines at any time that it

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). The court’s

jurisdictional analysis is set forth below.

I. Bacl<ground

On June 5, 2017, the clerk’s office received a complaint from Taveren Robinson.

Plaintiff’s complaint states it is a “Civil Complaint for Breach of Contract against Robert

Gilmore operating as a F ederal Officer and employee Within the Corp [o]rate State of

Pennsylvania.” Pl.’s Cornpl. 1. The record shows that plaintiff is currently incarcerated

at the State Correctional Institution at Greene (SCI-Greene) in Waynesburg,

Pennsylvania that the Mr. Gilmore is listed as the superintendent at SCl-Greene. w

' Plaintiff’s complaint names the State of Pennsylvania as a third-party defendant in

this matter. However, the court deems Mr. Robinson’s suit to be brought against the

United States, as the United States is the only proper defendant in this court. United

States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941) (citations omitted).

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App’X A to Pl.’s Compl. 2, ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiff states his complaint “aris[es] out of

private injuries and violations of Invo[l]untary Servitude and Unlawful Restraint in

violation of the Thirteenth Arnendment of the United States Constitution’s prohibition

against Involuntary Servitude, Bad Faith/Breach of Contract by breach of contractual

agreement.” Pl.’s Compl. 2. In sum, plaintiffs suit implicates the actions of corrections

officials, gg, Robert Gilmore, of the State of Pennsylvania. l_c; in support of his breach

of contract claim, plaintiffs complaint contains four exhibits, titled: (l) Exhibit A:

Conditional Acceptance Request Proof of Facts; (2) EXhibit B: Notice of F ault and

Opportunity to Cure and Contest Acceptance; (3) Exhibit C: Affidavit of Certificate of

Non»Response and Failure to Contest Acceptance and Agreement; and (4) Exhibit D:

Affidavit of Default and Formal Acceptance Contract. E App’x A to Pl.’s Compl.

Monetary relief is sought in the amount of approximately 3324,500. Pl.’s Compl. 10.

II. Legal Standards

“A court may and should raise the question of its jurisdiction sua sponte at any

time it appears in doubt.” Arctic Corner, lnc. v. United States, 845 F.2d 999, 1000 (Fed.

Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). The practice of the Court of Federal Claims has been for a

judge to review a prc se complaint to ascertain if, beyond peradventure, it cannot support

jurisdiction Thus, the government is not taxed, in a case that unquestionably does not

belong in the Court of Federal Claims, With a Wasteful expenditure of its limited

resources to establish that jurisdiction is lacking In any case alleging a basis for

jurisdiction “‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,”’ Kr_oll

v. Finnerty, 242 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S.

528, 536 (1974)), the court Would be remiss in allowing the action to proceed

In order to determine its jurisdiction over plaintiffs suit, this court must presume

all factual allegations in the complaint to be true and construe all reasonable inferences in

favor of the plaintiff Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), abrogated on other

grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814-15 (1982); Revnolds v. Army & Air

Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1988). However, plaintiff bears the

burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction, Alder Terrace, Inc. v. United States,

161 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed, Cir. 1998) (citing McNutt v. Gen. l\/lotors Acceptance Corp.

of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)), and must do so by a preponderance of the evidence,

Reynolds, 846 F.2d at 748 (citations omitted).

The Tucl<er Act delineates this court’s jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012).

That statute “confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Federal Claims over the specified

categories of actions brought against the United States.” Fisher v. United States, 402

F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations omitted). These include money

damage claims against the federal government founded upon the Constitution, an act of

Congress, a reguiation promulgated by an executive department, any express or implied

contract With the United States, or any claim for liquidated or unliquidated damages in

cases not sounding in tort. LCL (citing 28 U.S.C. § l491(a)(1)).

2

The Tucker Act concurrentiy “Waives the Government’s sovereign immunity for

those actions.” 151_. The statute does not, however, create a substantive cause of action or

right to recover money damages in the Court of Federal Claims. I_d_. “[T]o come Within

the jurisdictional reach and the Waiver of the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify a

separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages.” pludg

ln other Words, the source underlying the cause of action must be money-

mandating, in that it “‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal

Government . . . .”’ United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976) (quoting Eastport

S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967) and citing Mosca V.

United States, 417 F.2d 1382, 1386 (Ct. Cl. 1969)). 1f the provision relied upon is found

to be money-mandating, the plaintiff need not rely upon a Waiver of sovereign immunity

beyond the Tucker Act. Huston v. United States, 956 F.2d 259, 261 (Fed. Cir. 1992)

(citing United States v. Mitcheli, 463 U.S. 206, 218 (1983)). lf, on the other hand, no

money-mandating source supports the cause of action and jurisdiction is found to be

lacl<ing, this court must dismiss the claim, RCFC 12(h)(3 ), unless the interest of justice is

served by transferring the case, 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2012).

IH. Analysis

A. Statutes Alleged to Provide Jurisdiction in This Court

Plaintiff`s complaint states that jurisdiction over his claims is provided by 28

U.S.C. §§ 3001, 3002 (2012). Pl.’s Compl. 1, ECF No. 1. Both ofthese statutes concern

federai debt collection procedures, not the jurisdiction of this specialized court.

Additionally, plaintiff asserts jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. §§ 2104-2105 (2012), Which

provide definitions of federal officers and employees Li None of these statutes is a

money-mandating provision Which could support plaintiffs request for money damages

in this court.

B. Plaintiff`s Thirteenth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff` s complaint includes a claim under the Thirteenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution. Pl.’s Compl. 5, ECF No. 1. This court, however, does not

have subject matter jurisdiction over claims raised under that constitutional provision.

See Nwogu v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 637, 650 (2010) (holding that the Thirteenth

Amendment does not require the payment of money for its violation and thus provides no

basis for this court’s jurisdiction), rev’d in part on other grounds, 497 F. App’x 952 (Fed.

Cir. 2012); Johnson v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 769, 774 (2007) (“This court . . . cannot

entertain claims brought under the Thirteenth Amendment because it does not mandate

the payment of money damages for its violation.”).

C. Claims Against Parties Other Than the United States

lt is well established that the Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction

over civil wrongs, or torts, committed by agents of the United States. Brams v. United

States, 105 F.3d 62l, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Eastport S.S. Corp., 178 Ct. Cl. at 614. “The

Tucl<er Act grants the Court of Federal Ciaims jurisdiction over suits against the United

States, not against individual federal officials.” Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621,

624 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Indeed, allegations of “wrongful conduct by governmental officials

in their official capacity are tort claims over which the United States Court of Federal

Claims does not have jurisdiction.” Sindram v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 788, 792

(2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § l346(b)). For that reason, l\/lr. Robinson’s claim against a

superintendent of a state correctional faciiity, Mr. Robert Gilmore, is outside of this

court’s subject matter jurisdiction

D. Breach of Contract Claim

Plaintiff’s complaint attaches four exhibits as supporting evidence that the United

States has entered into a binding contract with him: (1) Conditional Acceptance Request

Proof of Facts; (2) Notice of Fault and Opportunity to Cure and Contest Acceptance; (3)

Affidavit of Certificate of Non-Response and Failure to Contest Acceptance and

Agreement; and, (4) Affidavit of Default and Formal Acceptance Contract. The exhibits

are not signed by any officer or employee of the United States. Three of the exhibits are

signed only by Mr. Robinson. A fourth exhibit is signed by a “third party,” Neal C.

Parnell, Jr. The documents appear to be an attempt by Mr. Robinson to create a contract

and a debt owed by l\/lr. Gilmore, the prison superintendent, to Mr. Robinson.

Plaintiff’s complaint refers to these exhibits as proof that a contract exists between

Mr. Robinson and the United States. fn pertinent part, his complaint states as follows

[As to] all matters herefore agree[d] upon by Robert Gilmore pursuant to the

full agreement of particulars contained in the Conditionai Acceptance and

related exhibits attached hereto[,] . . . Robert Gilmore[] has by his silence

and acquiescence agreed to the Facts.

By Mr. Gilmore’s silence and acquiescence for the particular claims in the

Conditional Acceptance and upon his dishonor and admission to the injuries,

he [Robert Gilmore] herein binds the United States and the State of

Pennsylvania for financial compensation to compe[n]sate the Plaintiff for

injuries.

Pl.’s Compl. 3-4, ECF No. 1.

The allegations of a contract in the complaint are frivolous As this court has

explained,

A party does not place a matter within our [court’sj jurisdiction by simply

calling something a contract which does not meet the legal definition of one.

The Federal Circuit has established “that insubstantial allegations as to the

existence of a money~mandating contract will warrant dismissal for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.”

Harris v. United States, No. 13~69C, 2013 WL 4017276, at *2 (Fed. Cl. July 31, 2013)

(citation omitted). ln order to establish that a valid contract exists with the United States,

whether express or iinplied-in-fact, a plaintiff must show: (1) mutuality of intent; (2)

consideration; (3) lack of ambiguity in the offer and acceptance; (4) actual authority to

bind the [federal] government in contract on the part of the government officer whose

conduct is relied upon. Karn-Almaz v. United States, 682 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir.

2012) (citing Hanlin v. United States, 316 F.3d 1325, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Not one of

these contract formation elements is present here.

Plaintiff argues that Mr. Gilmore’s failure to acknowledge and respond to the

documents sent to him constitutes acceptance by silence. Even if this theory of acceptance

were valid, there is no non-frivolous allegation in the complaint that Mr. Gilmore, a state

official, has the authority to bind the United States iii contract. Even assuming all of the

facts in the complaint to be true, plaintiffs complaint does not plead the existence of a

contract with the United States.

E. Transfer to Another Court ls Not in the lnterest of Justice

As discussed §i_iprg, this court has no jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims. When

this court finds that it does not have jurisdiction over a case before it, the court may deem

it appropriate to transfer the case to another federal court. The transfer of cases from this

court to another federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2012), which states in

relevant pait that

[w]henever a civil action is filed in [this] court . . . and [this] court finds that

there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice,

transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in which the action or

appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed, and the

action or appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in or noticed for the court

to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was actually filed in or

noticed for the court from which it is transferred

Ld “Transfer is appropriate when three elements are metz (1) The transferring court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the case could have been filed in the court receiving

the transfer; and (3) the transfer is in the interests ofjustice.” Brown v, United States, 74

Fed. Cl. 546, 550 (2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1631). The first condition ofthe transfer

statute has been met, because this court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims

l. Procedural History

ln determining if transfer is appropriate, we must review the previous litigation

cited by plaintiff in his complaint which plaintiff specifically acknowledges that “in some

aspects are similar issues” currently before the court. Pl.’s Compl. 2, ECF No. l. i\/lore

specifically, he cites to “Case No. A.D. 3 of 2014, A.D. 718, 2016 and 2:16-cv-0l764.”

id Because plaintiffs complaint before this court does not include any further

information on these cited cases the court has turned to the Public Access to Court

Electronic Records (PACER) which revealed that plaintiff has been a plaintiff in six

cases, five in the United States District Court of the Western District of Pennsylvania

(Pittsburgh) and the sixth case being the one before this court now. Robinson v. Folino

et al. tRobinson l), Dl<t. No. 1:2007-cv-00095 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (habeas corpus claim);

Robinson v. Smith (Robinson ll), Dkt. No. l:2013-cv-00198 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (prisoner

civil rights (prisoner condition) claim); Robinson v. Vilushis, et al. (Robinson lll), Dk.

No. 1:2013~cv~00199 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (prisoner civil rights (prisoner condition) claim);

Robinson v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Robinson IV); Dk. No. l:2013-cv-00268

(W.D. Pa. 2013) (habeas corpus claim); Robinson v. Wetzel (Robinson V), Dk. No.

l:2016~cv~01764 (W.D, Pa. 2016) (prisoner civil rights (prisoner condition) claim).

A cursory review of the dockets in the five district court cases did not make any

reference to Case No. A.D. 3 of 2014 cited in plaintiffs complaint before this court.

However, the docket in Robinson V revealed that on November 23, 2016, the Court of

Common Pleas of Greerie County, Case No. A.D. 718, 2016 was removed from that state

court and placed in the United States District Court for the Western District of

Pennsylvania. Robinson V, Dk. No. 1:2016-cv-01764, ECF No. l (Notice of Removal).

We shall now consider if the claims before the district court in that case are similar to

claim’s currently before this court.

Plaintiffs complaint in Robinson V consists of three counts: (1) a breach of

constitutional amendment claim (2) an intentional tort claim for unlawful restraint; and

(3) an intentional tort claim for false imprisonment alleging that plaintiff has been

illegally held in prison in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution because the Department of Corrections is not in possession of certain

sentencing documents and/or such documents were never generated l_d. at ECF Nos. 1,

2. Currently before the District Court is defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim, and plaintiffs motion to remand counts two and three of his complaint back to

state court. l_d at ECF Nos. 2, 7. Additionally, in Robinson V, defendant filed a notice to

the court on l\/lay 2, 2017. I_dl at ECF No. l6. Therein, defendant notified the court,

stating the following:

'l`his is one of four cases filed simultaneously by inmates at SCl-Greene

alleging they are being unconstitutionally held in prison, The four cases are

identical in all respects other than the inmate-Plaintiff and the particular

sentence he received

l_d. lt is apparent that the operative facts in the district court case are the same as the facts

in this matter, with the addition of plaintiffs exhibits

2. Transfer of this Case

The court now considers whether “it is in the interest ofjustice” to transfer

plaintiffs complaint to another court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. _”1:§§

Peanut Farmers v. United States, 409 F.3d 1370, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating that

the Court of Federal Clainis should consider whether transfer is appropriate once the

court has determined that it lacks jurisdiction). Section 1631 states in pertinent part:

Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section 610 of this

title . . . and that court finds that there is a want ofjurisdiction, the court shall,

if it is in the interest ofjustice, transfer such action . . . to any other such court

in which the action . . , could have been brought at the time it was filed or

noticed . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1631; se_e 28 U.S.C. § 610 (2012) (defining courts as “courts of appeals and

district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the

Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin lslands, the

United States Court of Federal Claims, and the Court of international Trade”).

The court does not believe, however, that it is in the interest of justice to transfer

Mr. Robinson’s claims. Plaintiff requests relief from this court for being unlawfully held

at the State Correctional institution at Greene in Waynesburg, Pennsylvania. Mr.

Robinson is already seeking this same relief from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Pennsylva.nia in this regard E Robinson V, W.D. Pa. Dk. No.

1:2016-cv~01764. lt is not in the interest of justice to transfer his claims to a court which

already has pending before it a similar suit. Any of the claims l\/lr. Robinson presents to

this court can be presented to the district court in the suit he has brought there. For this

reason, transfer is not warranted

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that transfer of plaintiffs remaining claims

would not be appropriate

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs

claims, and it is not in the interest of justice to transfer plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiff s

application to proceed ip forma pauperis is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed

to DISMISS plaintiffs complaint for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice E RCFC

12(h)(3). The Clerk of Court will enter judgment for defendant Additionally, the clerk’s

office is directed to return any future filings not in compliance with this court’s rules to

plaintiff, unfiled, without further order.

lT lS SO ORDERED.

4 “l’Yi r~/i (i gal/4 j i/)€_/f/l("i/Vl

PATRICIA E. CAl\/[PBE_ LL- SMILH;

Judge