Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty.

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT

OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

No. 16–466. Argued April 25, 2017—Decided June 19, 2017

A group of plaintiffs, most of whom are not California residents, sued

Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (BMS) in California state court, al-

leging that the pharmaceutical company’s drug Plavix had damaged

their health. BMS is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in

New York, and it maintains substantial operations in both New York

and New Jersey. Although it engages in business activities in Cali-

fornia and sells Plavix there, BMS did not develop, create a market-

ing strategy for, manufacture, label, package, or work on the regula-

tory approval for Plavix in the State. And the nonresident plaintiffs

did not allege that they obtained Plavix from a California source, that

they were injured by Plavix in California, or that they were treated

for their injuries in California.

The California Superior Court denied BMS’s motion to quash ser-

vice of summons on the nonresidents’ claims for lack of personal ju-

risdiction, concluding that BMS’s extensive activities in the State

gave the California courts general jurisdiction. Following this

Court’s decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___, the State

Court of Appeal found that the California courts lacked general juris-

diction. But the Court of Appeal went on to find that the California

courts had specific jurisdiction over the claims brought by the nonres-

ident plaintiffs. Affirming, the State Supreme Court applied a “slid-

ing scale approach” to specific jurisdiction, concluding that BMS’s

“wide ranging” contacts with the State were enough to support a find-

ing of specific jurisdiction over the claims brought by the nonresident

plaintiffs. That attenuated connection was met, the court held, in

part because the nonresidents’ claims were similar in many ways to

the California residents’ claims and because BMS engaged in other

activities in the State.

2 BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO. v. SUPERIOR

COURT OF CAL., SAN FRANCISCO CTY.

Syllabus

Held: California courts lack specific jurisdiction to entertain the nonres-

idents’ claims. Pp. 4–12.

(a) The personal jurisdiction of state courts is “subject to review for

compatibility with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564

U. S. 915, 918. This Court’s decisions have recognized two types of

personal jurisdiction: general and specific. For general jurisdiction,

the “paradigm forum” is an “individual’s domicile,” or, for corpora-

tions, “an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly re-

garded as at home.” Id., at 924. Specific jurisdiction, however, re-

quires “the suit” to “aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant’s

contacts with the forum.” Daimler, supra, at ___ (internal quotation

marks omitted).

The “primary concern” in assessing personal jurisdiction is “the

burden on the defendant.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-

son, 444 U. S. 286, 292. Assessing this burden obviously requires a

court to consider the practical problems resulting from litigating in

the forum, but it also encompasses the more abstract matter of sub-

mitting to the coercive power of a State that may have little legiti-

mate interest in the claims in question. At times, “the Due Process

Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may . . . di-

vest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.” Id., at 294.

Pp. 4–7.

(b) Settled principles of specific jurisdiction control this case. For a

court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a claim there must be an

“affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, prin-

cipally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum

State.” Goodyear, supra, at 919 (internal quotation marks and

brackets omitted). When no such connection exists, specific jurisdic-

tion is lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant’s unconnected

activities in the State. The California Supreme Court’s “sliding scale

approach”—which resembles a loose and spurious form of general ju-

risdiction—is thus difficult to square with this Court’s precedents.

That court found specific jurisdiction without identifying any ade-

quate link between the State and the nonresidents’ claims. The mere

fact that other plaintiffs were prescribed, obtained, and ingested

Plavix in California does not allow the State to assert specific juris-

diction over the nonresidents’ claims. Nor is it sufficient (or relevant)

that BMS conducted research in California on matters unrelated to

Plavix. What is needed is a connection between the forum and the

specific claims at issue. Cf. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U. S. ___. Pp. 7–9.

(c) The nonresident plaintiffs’ reliance on Keeton v. Hustler Maga-

zine, Inc., 465 U. S. 770, and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472

U. S. 797, is misplaced. Keeton concerned jurisdiction to determine

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 3

Syllabus

the scope of a claim involving in-state injury and injury to residents

of the State, not, as here, jurisdiction to entertain claims involving no

in-state injury and no injury to residents of the forum State. And

Shutts, which concerned the due process rights of plaintiffs, has no

bearing on the question presented here. Pp. 9–11.

(d) BMS’s decision to contract with McKesson, a California compa-

ny, to distribute Plavix nationally does not provide a sufficient basis

for personal jurisdiction. It is not alleged that BMS engaged in rele-

vant acts together with McKesson in California or that BMS is deriv-

atively liable for McKesson’s conduct in California. The bare fact

that BMS contracted with a California distributor is not enough to

establish personal jurisdiction in the State. Pp. 11–12.

(e) The Court’s decision will not result in the parade of horribles

that respondents conjure up. It does not prevent the California and

out-of-state plaintiffs from joining together in a consolidated action in

the States that have general jurisdiction over BMS. Alternatively,

the nonresident plaintiffs could probably sue together in their respec-

tive home States. In addition, since this decision concerns the due

process limits on the exercise of specific jurisdiction by a State, the

question remains open whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the

same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal

court. P. 12.

1 Cal. 5th 783, 377 P. 3d 874, reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,

and KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ.,

joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–466

_________________

BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY, PETITIONER v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, SAN

FRANCISCO COUNTY, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

[June 19, 2017]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

More than 600 plaintiffs, most of whom are not Califor-

nia residents, filed this civil action in a California state

court against Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (BMS),

asserting a variety of state-law claims based on injuries

allegedly caused by a BMS drug called Plavix. The Cali-

fornia Supreme Court held that the California courts have

specific jurisdiction to entertain the nonresidents’ claims.

We now reverse.

I

A

BMS, a large pharmaceutical company, is incorporated

in Delaware and headquartered in New York, and it main-

tains substantial operations in both New York and New

Jersey. 1 Cal. 5th 783, 790, 377 P. 3d 874, 879 (2016).

Over 50 percent of BMS’s work force in the United States

is employed in those two States. Ibid.

BMS also engages in business activities in other juris-

dictions, including California. Five of the company’s

research and laboratory facilities, which employ a total of

2 BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO. v. SUPERIOR

COURT OF CAL., SAN FRANCISCO CTY.

Opinion of the Court

around 160 employees, are located there. Ibid. BMS also

employs about 250 sales representatives in California and

maintains a small state-government advocacy office in

Sacramento. Ibid.

One of the pharmaceuticals that BMS manufactures and

sells is Plavix, a prescription drug that thins the blood and

inhibits blood clotting. BMS did not develop Plavix in

California, did not create a marketing strategy for Plavix

in California, and did not manufacture, label, package, or

work on the regulatory approval of the product in Califor-

nia. Ibid. BMS instead engaged in all of these activities

in either New York or New Jersey. Ibid. But BMS does

sell Plavix in California. Between 2006 and 2012, it sold

almost 187 million Plavix pills in the State and took in

more than $900 million from those sales. 1 Cal. 5th, at

790–791, 377 P. 3d, at 879. This amounts to a little over

one percent of the company’s nationwide sales revenue.

Id., at 790, 377 P. 3d, at 879.

B

A group of plaintiffs—consisting of 86 California resi-

dents and 592 residents from 33 other States—filed eight

separate complaints in California Superior Court, alleging

that Plavix had damaged their health. Id., at 789, 377

P. 3d, at 878. All the complaints asserted 13 claims under

California law, including products liability, negligent

misrepresentation, and misleading advertising claims.

Ibid. The nonresident plaintiffs did not allege that they

obtained Plavix through California physicians or from any

other California source; nor did they claim that they were

injured by Plavix or were treated for their injuries in

California.

Asserting lack of personal jurisdiction, BMS moved to

quash service of summons on the nonresidents’ claims, but

the California Superior Court denied this motion, finding

that the California courts had general jurisdiction over

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 3

Opinion of the Court

BMS “[b]ecause [it] engages in extensive activities in

California.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 150. BMS unsuccess-

fully petitioned the State Court of Appeal for a writ of man-

date, but after our decision on general jurisdiction in

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___ (2014), the Califor-

nia Supreme Court instructed the Court of Appeal “to

vacate its order denying mandate and to issue an order to

show cause why relief sought in the petition should not be

granted.” App. 9–10.

The Court of Appeal then changed its decision on the

question of general jurisdiction. 228 Cal. App. 4th 605,

175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412 (2014). Under Daimler, it held,

general jurisdiction was clearly lacking, but it went on to

find that the California courts had specific jurisdiction

over the nonresidents’ claims against BMS. 228 Cal.

App. 4th 605, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 425–439.

The California Supreme Court affirmed. The court

unanimously agreed with the Court of Appeal on the issue

of general jurisdiction, but the court was divided on the

question of specific jurisdiction. The majority applied a

“sliding scale approach to specific jurisdiction.” 1 Cal. 5th,

at 806, 377 P. 3d, at 889. Under this approach, “the more

wide ranging the defendant’s forum contacts, the more

readily is shown a connection between the forum contacts

and the claim.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Applying this test, the majority concluded that “BMS’s

extensive contacts with California” permitted the exercise

of specific jurisdiction “based on a less direct connection

between BMS’s forum activities and plaintiffs’ claims than

might otherwise be required.” Ibid. This attenuated

requirement was met, the majority found, because the

claims of the nonresidents were similar in several ways to

the claims of the California residents (as to which specific

jurisdiction was uncontested). Id., at 803–806, 377 P. 3d,

at 887–889. The court noted that “[b]oth the resident and

nonresident plaintiffs’ claims are based on the same alleg-

4 BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO. v. SUPERIOR

COURT OF CAL., SAN FRANCISCO CTY.

Opinion of the Court

edly defective product and the assertedly misleading

marketing and promotion of that product.” Id., at 804, 377

P. 3d, at 888. And while acknowledging that “there is no

claim that Plavix itself was designed and developed in

[BMS’s California research facilities],” the court thought it

significant that other research was done in the State.

Ibid.

Three justices dissented. “The claims of . . . nonresi-

dents injured by their use of Plavix they purchased and

used in other states,” they wrote, “in no sense arise from

BMS’s marketing and sales of Plavix in California,” and

they found that the “mere similarity” of the residents’ and

nonresidents’ claims was not enough. Id., at 819, 377

P. 3d, at 898 (opinion of Werdegar, J.). The dissent ac-

cused the majority of “expand[ing] specific jurisdiction to

the point that, for a large category of defendants, it be-

comes indistinguishable from general jurisdiction.” Id., at

816, 377 P. 3d, at 896.

We granted certiorari to decide whether the California

courts’ exercise of jurisdiction in this case violates the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 580 U. S.

___ (2017).1

II

A

It has long been established that the Fourteenth

Amendment limits the personal jurisdiction of state

courts. See, e.g., Daimler, supra, at ___–___ (slip op., at 6–

13); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S.

286, 291 (1980); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326

U. S. 310, 316–317 (1945); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714,

——————

1 California

law provides that its courts may exercise jurisdiction “on

any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution . . . of the United

States,” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §410.10 (West 2004); see Daimler AG

v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 6).

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 5

Opinion of the Court

733 (1878). Because “[a] state court’s assertion of jurisdic-

tion exposes defendants to the State’s coercive power,” it is

“subject to review for compatibility with the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause,” Goodyear Dunlop

Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U. S. 915, 918

(2011), which “limits the power of a state court to render a

valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant,”

World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, at 291. The primary focus

of our personal jurisdiction inquiry is the defendant’s

relationship to the forum State. See Walden v. Fiore, 571

U. S. ___, ___–___ (2014) (slip op., at 5–8); Phillips Petro-

leum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S. 797, 806–807 (1985).

Since our seminal decision in International Shoe, our

decisions have recognized two types of personal jurisdic-

tion: “general” (sometimes called “all-purpose”) jurisdic-

tion and “specific” (sometimes called “case-linked”) juris-

diction. Goodyear, 564 U. S., at 919. “For an individual,

the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction

is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an

equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly

regarded as at home.” Id., at 924. A court with general

jurisdiction may hear any claim against that defendant,

even if all the incidents underlying the claim occurred in a

different State. Id., at 919. But “only a limited set of

affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable

to” general jurisdiction in that State. Daimler, 571 U. S.,

at ___ (slip op., at 18).

Specific jurisdiction is very different. In order for a

state court to exercise specific jurisdiction, “the suit” must

“aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant’s contacts with

the forum.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (internal quotation

marks omitted; emphasis added); see Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 472–473 (1985); Helicopteros

Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U. S. 408, 414

(1984). In other words, there must be “an affiliation be-

tween the forum and the underlying controversy, princi-

6 BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO. v. SUPERIOR

COURT OF CAL., SAN FRANCISCO CTY.

Opinion of the Court

pally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the

forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regula-

tion.” Goodyear, 564 U. S., at 919 (internal quotation

marks and brackets omitted). For this reason, “specific

jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriv-

ing from, or connected with, the very controversy that

establishes jurisdiction.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks

omitted).

B

In determining whether personal jurisdiction is present,

a court must consider a variety of interests. These include

“the interests of the forum State and of the plaintiff in

proceeding with the cause in the plaintiff ’s forum of

choice.” Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., City and County

of San Francisco, 436 U. S. 84, 92 (1978); see Daimler,

supra, at ___–___, n. 20 (slip op., at 21–22, n. 20); Asahi

Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty.,

480 U. S. 102, 113 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444

U. S., at 292. But the “primary concern” is “the burden on

the defendant.” Id., at 292. Assessing this burden obvi-

ously requires a court to consider the practical problems

resulting from litigating in the forum, but it also encom-

passes the more abstract matter of submitting to the

coercive power of a State that may have little legitimate

interest in the claims in question. As we have put it,

restrictions on personal jurisdiction “are more than a

guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litiga-

tion. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on

the power of the respective States.” Hanson v. Denckla,

357 U. S. 235, 251 (1958). “[T]he States retain many

essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in particu-

lar, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts. The

sovereignty of each State . . . implie[s] a limitation on the

sovereignty of all its sister States.” World-Wide

Volkswagen, 444 U. S., at 293. And at times, this federal-

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 7

Opinion of the Court

ism interest may be decisive. As we explained in World-

Wide Volkswagen, “[e]ven if the defendant would suffer

minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate

before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum

State has a strong interest in applying its law to the con-

troversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient

location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as

an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act

to divest the State of its power to render a valid judg-

ment.” Id., at 294.

III

A

Our settled principles regarding specific jurisdiction

control this case. In order for a court to exercise specific

jurisdiction over a claim, there must be an “affiliation

between the forum and the underlying controversy, prin-

cipally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in

the forum State.” Goodyear, 564 U. S., at 919 (internal

quotation marks and brackets in original omitted). When

there is no such connection, specific jurisdiction is lacking

regardless of the extent of a defendant’s unconnected

activities in the State. See id., at 931, n. 6 (“[E]ven regu-

larly occurring sales of a product in a State do not justify

the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to those

sales”).

For this reason, the California Supreme Court’s “sliding

scale approach” is difficult to square with our precedents.

Under the California approach, the strength of the requi-

site connection between the forum and the specific claims

at issue is relaxed if the defendant has extensive forum

contacts that are unrelated to those claims. Our cases

provide no support for this approach, which resembles a

loose and spurious form of general jurisdiction. For spe-

cific jurisdiction, a defendant’s general connections with the

forum are not enough. As we have said, “[a] corporation’s

8 BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO. v. SUPERIOR

COURT OF CAL., SAN FRANCISCO CTY.

Opinion of the Court

‘continuous activity of some sorts within a state . . . is not

enough to support the demand that the corporation be

amenable to suits unrelated to that activity.’ ” Id., at 927

(quoting International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 318).

The present case illustrates the danger of the California

approach. The State Supreme Court found that specific

jurisdiction was present without identifying any adequate

link between the State and the nonresidents’ claims. As

noted, the nonresidents were not prescribed Plavix in

California, did not purchase Plavix in California, did not

ingest Plavix in California, and were not injured by Plavix

in California. The mere fact that other plaintiffs were

prescribed, obtained, and ingested Plavix in California—

and allegedly sustained the same injuries as did the non-

residents—does not allow the State to assert specific

jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims. As we have

explained, “a defendant’s relationship with a . . . third

party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdic-

tion.” Walden, 571 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8). This re-

mains true even when third parties (here, the plaintiffs

who reside in California) can bring claims similar to those

brought by the nonresidents. Nor is it sufficient—or even

relevant—that BMS conducted research in California on

matters unrelated to Plavix. What is needed—and what is

missing here—is a connection between the forum and the

specific claims at issue.

Our decision in Walden, supra, illustrates this require-

ment. In that case, Nevada plaintiffs sued an out-of-state

defendant for conducting an allegedly unlawful search of

the plaintiffs while they were in Georgia preparing to

board a plane bound for Nevada. We held that the Nevada

courts lacked specific jurisdiction even though the plain-

tiffs were Nevada residents and “suffered foreseeable

harm in Nevada.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 11). Because the

“relevant conduct occurred entirely in Georgi[a] . . . the

mere fact that [this] conduct affected plaintiffs with con-

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 9

Opinion of the Court

nections to the forum State d[id] not suffice to authorize

jurisdiction.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14) (emphasis added).

In today’s case, the connection between the nonresi-

dents’ claims and the forum is even weaker. The relevant

plaintiffs are not California residents and do not claim to

have suffered harm in that State. In addition, as in Wal-

den, all the conduct giving rise to the nonresidents’ claims

occurred elsewhere. It follows that the California courts

cannot claim specific jurisdiction. See World-Wide

Volkswagen, supra, at 295 (finding no personal jurisdiction

in Oklahoma because the defendant “carr[ied] on no activ-

ity whatsoever in Oklahoma” and dismissing “the fortui-

tous circumstance that a single Audi automobile, sold [by

defendants] in New York to New York residents, happened

to suffer an accident while passing through Oklahoma” as

an “isolated occurrence”).

B

The nonresidents maintain that two of our cases sup-

port the decision below, but they misinterpret those

precedents.

In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. 770

(1984), a New York resident sued Hustler in New Hamp-

shire, claiming that she had been libeled in five issues of

the magazine, which was distributed throughout the

country, including in New Hampshire, where it sold

10,000 to 15,000 copies per month. Concluding that spe-

cific jurisdiction was present, we relied principally on the

connection between the circulation of the magazine in New

Hampshire and damage allegedly caused within the State.

We noted that “[f]alse statements of fact harm both the

subject of the falsehood and the readers of the statement.”

Id., at 776 (emphasis deleted). This factor amply distin-

guishes Keeton from the present case, for here the nonres-

idents’ claims involve no harm in California and no harm

to California residents.

10 BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO. v. SUPERIOR

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Opinion of the Court

The nonresident plaintiffs in this case point to our hold-

ing in Keeton that there was jurisdiction in New Hamp-

shire to entertain the plaintiff ’s request for damages

suffered outside the State, id., at 774, but that holding

concerned jurisdiction to determine the scope of a claim

involving in-state injury and injury to residents of the

State, not, as in this case, jurisdiction to entertain claims

involving no in-state injury and no injury to residents of

the forum State. Keeton held that there was jurisdiction

in New Hampshire to consider the full measure of the

plaintiff ’s claim, but whether she could actually recover

out-of-state damages was a merits question governed by

New Hampshire libel law. Id., at 778, n. 9.

The Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,

472 U. S. 797 (1985), which involved a class action filed in

Kansas, is even less relevant. The Kansas court exercised

personal jurisdiction over the claims of nonresident class

members, and the defendant, Phillips Petroleum, argued

that this violated the due process rights of these class

members because they lacked minimum contacts with the

State.2 According to the defendant, the out-of-state class

members should not have been kept in the case unless

they affirmatively opted in, instead of merely failing to opt

out after receiving notice. Id., at 812.

Holding that there had been no due process violation,

the Court explained that the authority of a State to enter-

tain the claims of nonresident class members is entirely

different from its authority to exercise jurisdiction over an

out-of-state defendant. Id., at 808–812. Since Shutts

concerned the due process rights of plaintiffs, it has no

——————

2 The Court held that the defendant had standing to argue that the

Kansas court had improperly exercised personal jurisdiction over the

claims of the out-of-state class members because that holding materially

affected the defendant’s own interests, specifically, the res judicata

effect of an adverse judgment. 472 U. S., at 803–806.

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 11

Opinion of the Court

bearing on the question presented here.

Respondents nevertheless contend that Shutts supports

their position because, in their words, it would be “absurd

to believe that [this Court] would have reached the exact

opposite result if the petitioner [Phillips] had only invoked

its own due-process rights, rather than those of the non-

resident plaintiffs.” Brief for Respondents 28–29, n. 6

(emphasis deleted). But the fact remains that Phillips did

not assert that Kansas improperly exercised personal

jurisdiction over it, and the Court did not address that

issue.3 Indeed, the Court stated specifically that its “dis-

cussion of personal jurisdiction [did not] address class

actions where the jurisdiction is asserted against a de-

fendant class.” Shutts, supra, at 812, n. 3.

C

In a last ditch contention, respondents contend that

BMS’s “decision to contract with a California company

[McKesson] to distribute [Plavix] nationally” provides a

sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction. Tr. of Oral Arg.

32. But as we have explained, “[t]he requirements of

International Shoe . . . must be met as to each defendant

over whom a state court exercises jurisdiction.” Rush v.

Savchuk, 444 U. S. 320, 332 (1980); see Walden, 571 U. S.,

at ___ (slip op, at 8) (“[A] defendant’s relationship with a

. . . third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for

jurisdiction”). In this case, it is not alleged that BMS

engaged in relevant acts together with McKesson in Cali-

fornia. Nor is it alleged that BMS is derivatively liable for

McKesson’s conduct in California. And the nonresidents

“have adduced no evidence to show how or by whom the

——————

3 Petitioner speculates that Phillips did not invoke its own due pro-

cess rights because it was believed at the time that the Kansas court

had general jurisdiction. See Reply Brief 7, n. 1.

12 BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO. v. SUPERIOR

COURT OF CAL., SAN FRANCISCO CTY.

Opinion of the Court

Plavix they took was distributed to the pharmacies that

dispensed it to them.” 1 Cal. 5th, at 815, 377 P. 3d, at 895

(Werdegar, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted). See Tr. of

Oral Arg. 33 (“It is impossible to trace a particular pill to a

particular person . . . . It’s not possible for us to track

particularly to McKesson”). The bare fact that BMS con-

tracted with a California distributor is not enough to

establish personal jurisdiction in the State.

IV

Our straightforward application in this case of settled

principles of personal jurisdiction will not result in the

parade of horribles that respondents conjure up. See Brief

for Respondents 38–47. Our decision does not prevent the

California and out-of-state plaintiffs from joining together

in a consolidated action in the States that have general

jurisdiction over BMS. BMS concedes that such suits

could be brought in either New York or Delaware. See

Brief for Petitioner 13. Alternatively, the plaintiffs who

are residents of a particular State—for example, the 92

plaintiffs from Texas and the 71 from Ohio—could proba-

bly sue together in their home States. In addition, since

our decision concerns the due process limits on the exer-

cise of specific jurisdiction by a State, we leave open the

question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same

restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a

federal court. See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff

& Co., 484 U. S. 97, 102, n. 5 (1987).

* * *

The judgment of the California Supreme Court is re-

versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings

not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 1

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–466

_________________

BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY, PETITIONER v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, SAN

FRANCISCO COUNTY, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

[June 19, 2017]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, dissenting.

Three years ago, the Court imposed substantial curbs on

the exercise of general jurisdiction in its decision in Daim-

ler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___ (2014). Today, the Court

takes its first step toward a similar contraction of specific

jurisdiction by holding that a corporation that engages in

a nationwide course of conduct cannot be held accountable

in a state court by a group of injured people unless all of

those people were injured in the forum State.

I fear the consequences of the Court’s decision today will

be substantial. The majority’s rule will make it difficult to

aggregate the claims of plaintiffs across the country whose

claims may be worth little alone. It will make it impossi-

ble to bring a nationwide mass action in state court

against defendants who are “at home” in different States.

And it will result in piecemeal litigation and the bifurca-

tion of claims. None of this is necessary. A core concern in

this Court’s personal jurisdiction cases is fairness. And

there is nothing unfair about subjecting a massive corpo-

ration to suit in a State for a nationwide course of conduct

that injures both forum residents and nonresidents alike.

I

Bristol-Myers Squibb is a Fortune 500 pharmaceutical

2 BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO. v. SUPERIOR

COURT OF CAL., SAN FRANCISCO CTY.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

company incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in

New York. It employs approximately 25,000 people

worldwide and earns annual revenues of over $15 billion.

In the late 1990’s, Bristol-Myers began to market and sell

a prescription blood thinner called Plavix. Plavix was

advertised as an effective tool for reducing the risk of

blood clotting for those vulnerable to heart attacks and to

strokes. The ads worked: At the height of its popularity,

Plavix was a blockbuster, earning Bristol-Myers billions of

dollars in annual revenues.

Bristol-Myers’ advertising and distribution efforts were

national in scope. It conducted a single nationwide adver-

tising campaign for Plavix, using television, magazine,

and Internet ads to broadcast its message. A consumer in

California heard the same advertisement as a consumer in

Maine about the benefits of Plavix. Bristol-Myers’ distri-

bution of Plavix also proceeded through nationwide chan-

nels: Consistent with its usual practice, it relied on a small

number of wholesalers to distribute Plavix throughout the

country. One of those distributors, McKesson Corporation,

was named as a defendant below; during the relevant time

period, McKesson was responsible for almost a quarter of

Bristol-Myers’ revenue worldwide.

The 2005 publication of an article in the New England

Journal of Medicine questioning the efficacy and safety of

Plavix put Bristol-Myers on the defensive, as consumers

around the country began to claim that they were injured

by the drug. The plaintiffs in these consolidated cases are

86 people who allege they were injured by Plavix in Cali-

fornia and several hundred others who say they were

injured by the drug in other States.1 They filed their suits

——————

1 Like the parties and the majority, I refer to these people as “resi-

dents” and “nonresidents” of California as a convenient shorthand. See

ante, at 2; Brief for Petitioner 4–5, n. 1; Brief for Respondents 2, n. 1.

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 3

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

in California Superior Court, raising product-liability

claims against Bristol-Myers and McKesson. Their claims

are “materially identical,” as Bristol-Myers concedes. See

Brief for Petitioner 4, n. 1. Bristol-Myers acknowledged it

was subject to suit in California state court by the resi-

dents of that State. But it moved to dismiss the claims

brought by the nonresident plaintiffs—respondents here—

for lack of jurisdiction. The question here, accordingly, is

not whether Bristol-Myers is subject to suit in California

on claims that arise out of the design, development, manu-

facture, marketing, and distribution of Plavix—it is. The

question is whether Bristol-Myers is subject to suit in

California only on the residents’ claims, or whether a state

court may also hear the nonresidents’ “identical” claims.

II

A

As the majority explains, since our pathmarking opinion

in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310

(1945), the touchstone of the personal-jurisdiction analysis

has been the question whether a defendant has “certain

minimum contacts with [the State] such that the mainte-

nance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.’ ” Id., at 316 (quoting Milli-

ken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 463 (1940)). For decades this

Court has considered that question through two different

jurisdictional frames: “general” and “specific” jurisdiction.

See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall,

466 U. S. 408, 414, nn. 8–9 (1984). Under our current case

law, a state court may exercise general, or all-purpose,

jurisdiction over a defendant corporation only if its “affili-

ations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as

——————

For jurisdictional purposes, the important question is generally (as it is

here) where a plaintiff was injured, not where he or she resides.

4 BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO. v. SUPERIOR

COURT OF CAL., SAN FRANCISCO CTY.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564

U. S. 915, 919 (2011).2

If general jurisdiction is not appropriate, however, a

state court can exercise only specific, or case-linked, juris-

diction over a dispute. Id., at 923–924. Our cases have

set out three conditions for the exercise of specific jurisdic-

tion over a nonresident defendant. 4A C. Wright, A. Mil-

ler, & A. Steinman, Federal Practice and Procedure §1069,

pp. 22–78 (4th ed. 2015) (Wright); see also id., at 22–27,

n. 10 (collecting authority). First, the defendant must

have “ ‘purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of con-

ducting activities within the forum State’ ” or have pur-

posefully directed its conduct into the forum State. J.

McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U. S. 873, 877

(2011) (plurality opinion) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357

U. S. 235, 253 (1958)). Second, the plaintiff ’s claim must

“arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s forum conduct.

Helicopteros, 466 U. S., at 414. Finally, the exercise of

jurisdiction must be reasonable under the circumstances.

Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano

Cty., 480 U. S. 102, 113–114 (1987); Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 477–478 (1985). The factors

relevant to such an analysis include “the burden on the

defendant, the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the

dispute, the plaintiff ’s interest in obtaining convenient

——————

2 Respondents do not contend that the California courts would be able

to exercise general jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers—a concession that

follows directly from this Court’s opinion in Daimler AG v. Bauman,

571 U. S. ___ (2014). As I have explained, I believe the restrictions the

Court imposed on general jurisdiction in Daimler were ill advised. See

BNSF R. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (SOTOMAYOR, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part); Daimler, 571 U. S., at ___

(SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment). But I accept respondents’

concession, for the purpose of this case, that Bristol-Myers is not

subject to general jurisdiction in California.

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 5

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

and effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest

in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,

and the shared interest of the several States in furthering

fundamental substantive social policies.” Id., at 477 (in-

ternal quotation marks omitted).

B

Viewed through this framework, the California courts

appropriately exercised specific jurisdiction over respond-

ents’ claims.

First, there is no dispute that Bristol-Myers “purposefully

avail[ed] itself,” Nicastro, 564 U. S., at 877, of California

and its substantial pharmaceutical market. Bristol-Myers

employs over 400 people in California and maintains half

a dozen facilities in the State engaged in research, devel-

opment, and policymaking. Ante, at 1–2. It contracts with

a California-based distributor, McKesson, whose sales

account for a significant portion of its revenue. Supra, at

2. And it markets and sells its drugs, including Plavix, in

California, resulting in total Plavix sales in that State of

nearly $1 billion during the period relevant to this suit.

Second, respondents’ claims “relate to” Bristol-Myers’ in-

state conduct. A claim “relates to” a defendant’s forum

conduct if it has a “connect[ion] with” that conduct. Inter-

national Shoe, 326 U. S., at 319. So respondents could

not, for instance, hale Bristol-Myers into court in Califor-

nia for negligently maintaining the sidewalk outside its

New York headquarters—a claim that has no connection

to acts Bristol-Myers took in California. But respondents’

claims against Bristol-Myers look nothing like such a

claim. Respondents’ claims against Bristol-Myers concern

conduct materially identical to acts the company took in

California: its marketing and distribution of Plavix, which

it undertook on a nationwide basis in all 50 States. That

respondents were allegedly injured by this nationwide

course of conduct in Indiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, and

6 BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO. v. SUPERIOR

COURT OF CAL., SAN FRANCISCO CTY.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

not California, does not mean that their claims do not

“relate to” the advertising and distribution efforts that

Bristol-Myers undertook in that State. All of the plain-

tiffs—residents and nonresidents alike—allege that they

were injured by the same essential acts. Our cases require

no connection more direct than that.

Finally, and importantly, there is no serious doubt that

the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims is

reasonable. Because Bristol-Myers already faces claims

that are identical to the nonresidents’ claims in this suit,

it will not be harmed by having to defend against respond-

ents’ claims: Indeed, the alternative approach—litigating

those claims in separate suits in as many as 34 different

States—would prove far more burdensome. By contrast,

the plaintiffs’ “interest in obtaining convenient and effec-

tive relief,” Burger King, 471 U. S., at 477 (internal quota-

tion marks omitted), is obviously furthered by participat-

ing in a consolidated proceeding in one State under shared

counsel, which allows them to minimize costs, share dis-

covery, and maximize recoveries on claims that may be too

small to bring on their own. Cf. American Express Co. v.

Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U. S. ___, ___ (2013)

(KAGAN., J., dissenting) (slip op., at 7) (“No rational actor

would bring a claim worth tens of thousands of dollars if

doing so meant incurring costs in the hundreds of thou-

sands”). California, too, has an interest in providing a

forum for mass actions like this one: Permitting the non-

residents to bring suit in California alongside the resi-

dents facilitates the efficient adjudication of the residents’

claims and allows it to regulate more effectively the con-

duct of both nonresident corporations like Bristol-Myers

and resident ones like McKesson.

Nothing in the Due Process Clause prohibits a Califor-

nia court from hearing respondents’ claims—at least not

in a case where they are joined to identical claims brought

by California residents.

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 7

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

III

Bristol-Myers does not dispute that it has purposefully

availed itself of California’s markets, nor—remarkably—

did it argue below that it would be “unreasonable” for a

California court to hear respondents’ claims. See 1 Cal.

5th 783, 799, n. 2, 377 P. 3d 874, 885, n. 2 (2016). Instead,

Bristol-Myers contends that respondents’ claims do not

“arise out of or relate to” its California conduct. The ma-

jority agrees, explaining that no “adequate link” exists

“between the State and the nonresidents’ claims,” ante, at

8—a result that it says follows from “settled principles [of ]

specific jurisdiction,” ante, at 7. But our precedents do not

require this result, and common sense says that it cannot

be correct.

A

The majority casts its decision today as compelled by

precedent. Ibid. But our cases point in the other direction.

The majority argues at length that the exercise of spe-

cific jurisdiction in this case would conflict with our decision

in Walden v. Fiore, 571 U. S. ___ (2014). That is plainly

not true. Walden concerned the requirement that a de-

fendant “purposefully avail” himself of a forum State or

“purposefully direc[t]” his conduct toward that State,

Nicastro, 564 U. S., at 877, not the separate requirement

that a plaintiff ’s claim “arise out of or relate to” a defend-

ant’s forum contacts. The lower court understood the case

that way. See Fiore v. Walden, 688 F. 3d 558, 576–582

(CA9 2012). The parties understood the case that way.

See Brief for Petitioner 17–31, Brief for Respondent 20–44,

Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12–18, in Wal-

den v. Fiore, O. T. 2013, No. 12–574. And courts and

commentators have understood the case that way. See,

e.g., 4 Wright §1067.1, at 388–389. Walden teaches only

that a defendant must have purposefully availed itself of

the forum, and that a plaintiff cannot rely solely on a

8 BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO. v. SUPERIOR

COURT OF CAL., SAN FRANCISCO CTY.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

defendant’s contacts with a forum resident to establish the

necessary relationship. See 571 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8)

(“[T]he plaintiff cannot be the only link between the de-

fendant and the forum”). But that holding has nothing to

do with the dispute between the parties: Bristol-Myers has

purposefully availed itself of California—to the tune of

millions of dollars in annual revenue. Only if its language

is taken out of context, ante, at 8–9, can Walden be made

to seem relevant to the case at hand.

By contrast, our decision in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,

Inc., 465 U. S. 770 (1984), suggests that there should be no

such barrier to the exercise of jurisdiction here. In Keeton,

a New York resident brought suit against an Ohio corpo-

ration, a magazine, in New Hampshire for libel. She

alleged that the magazine’s nationwide course of con-

duct—its publication of defamatory statements—had

injured her in every State, including New Hampshire.

This Court unanimously rejected the defendant’s argu-

ment that it should not be subject to “nationwide dam-

ages” when only a small portion of those damages arose in

the forum State, id., at 781; exposure to such liability, the

Court explained, was the consequence of having “continu-

ously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire

market,” ibid. The majority today dismisses Keeton on the

ground that the defendant there faced one plaintiff ’s claim

arising out of its nationwide course of conduct, whereas

Bristol-Myers faces many more plaintiffs’ claims. See

ante, at 10. But this is a distinction without a difference:

In either case, a defendant will face liability in a single

State for a single course of conduct that has impact in

many States. Keeton informs us that there is no unfair-

ness in such a result.

The majority’s animating concern, in the end, appears to

be federalism: “[T]erritorial limitations on the power of the

respective States,” we are informed, may—and today do—

trump even concerns about fairness to the parties. Ante,

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 9

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

at 6. Indeed, the majority appears to concede that this is

not, at bottom, a case about fairness but instead a case

about power: one in which “ ‘the defendant would suffer

minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate

before the tribunals of another State; . . . the forum State

has a strong interest in applying its law to the contro-

versy; [and] the forum State is the most convenient location

for litigation’ ” but personal jurisdiction still will not lie.

Ante, at 7 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-

son, 444 U. S. 286, 294 (1980)). But I see little reason to

apply such a principle in a case brought against a large

corporate defendant arising out of its nationwide conduct.

What interest could any single State have in adjudicating

respondents’ claims that the other States do not share? I

would measure jurisdiction first and foremost by the

yardstick set out in International Shoe—“fair play and

substantial justice,” 326 U. S., at 316 (internal quotation

marks omitted). The majority’s opinion casts that settled

principle aside.

B

I fear the consequences of the majority’s decision today

will be substantial. Even absent a rigid requirement that

a defendant’s in-state conduct must actually cause a plain-

tiff ’s claim,3 the upshot of today’s opinion is that plaintiffs

——————

3 Bristol-Myers urges such a rule upon us, Brief for Petitioner 14–37,

but its adoption would have consequences far beyond those that follow

from today’s factbound opinion. Among other things, it might call into

question whether even a plaintiff injured in a State by an item identical

to those sold by a defendant in that State could avail himself of that

State’s courts to redress his injuries—a result specifically contemplated

by World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 297 (1980).

See Brief for Civil Procedure Professors as Amici Curiae 14–18; see also

J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U. S. 873, 906–907 (2011)

(GINSBURG, J., dissenting). That question, and others like it, appears to

await another case.

10 BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO. v. SUPERIOR

COURT OF CAL., SAN FRANCISCO CTY.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

cannot join their claims together and sue a defendant in a

State in which only some of them have been injured. That

rule is likely to have consequences far beyond this case.

First, and most prominently, the Court’s opinion in this

case will make it profoundly difficult for plaintiffs who are

injured in different States by a defendant’s nationwide

course of conduct to sue that defendant in a single, consol-

idated action. The holding of today’s opinion is that such

an action cannot be brought in a State in which only some

plaintiffs were injured. Not to worry, says the majority:

The plaintiffs here could have sued Bristol-Myers in New

York or Delaware; could “probably” have subdivided their

separate claims into 34 lawsuits in the States in which

they were injured; and might have been able to bring a

single suit in federal court (an “open . . . question”). Ante,

at 12. Even setting aside the majority’s caveats, what is

the purpose of such limitations? What interests are

served by preventing the consolidation of claims and

limiting the forums in which they can be consolidated?

The effect of the Court’s opinion today is to eliminate

nationwide mass actions in any State other than those in

which a defendant is “ ‘essentially at home.’ ”4 See Daim-

ler, 571 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8). Such a rule hands one

more tool to corporate defendants determined to prevent

the aggregation of individual claims, and forces injured

plaintiffs to bear the burden of bringing suit in what will

often be far flung jurisdictions.

Second, the Court’s opinion today may make it impossi-

——————

4 The Court today does not confront the question whether its opinion

here would also apply to a class action in which a plaintiff injured in

the forum State seeks to represent a nationwide class of plaintiffs, not

all of whom were injured there. Cf. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U. S. 1,

9–10 (2002) (“Nonnamed class members . . . may be parties for some

purposes and not for others”); see also Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction

and Class Actions, 62 Ind. L. J. 597, 616–617 (1987).

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 11

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

ble to bring certain mass actions at all. After this case, it

is difficult to imagine where it might be possible to bring a

nationwide mass action against two or more defendants

headquartered and incorporated in different States. There

will be no State where both defendants are “at home,” and

so no State in which the suit can proceed. What about

a nationwide mass action brought against a defendant

not headquartered or incorporated in the United States?

Such a defendant is not “at home” in any State. Cf. id., at

___–___ (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op.,

at 18–19). Especially in a world in which defendants are

subject to general jurisdiction in only a handful of States,

see ibid., the effect of today’s opinion will be to curtail—

and in some cases eliminate—plaintiffs’ ability to hold

corporations fully accountable for their nationwide conduct.

The majority chides respondents for conjuring a “parade

of horribles,” ante, at 12, but says nothing about how suits

like those described here will survive its opinion in this

case. The answer is simple: They will not.

* * *

It “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice,’ ” International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 316,

to permit plaintiffs to aggregate claims arising out of a

single nationwide course of conduct in a single suit in a

single State where some, but not all, were injured. But

that is exactly what the Court holds today is barred by the

Due Process Clause.

This is not a rule the Constitution has required before. I

respectfully dissent.