Christopher Lock v. Cindia Torres

Case: 16-41405 Document: 00514038508 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/19/2017

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

Fif h Circuit

No. 16-41405 FILED

Summary Calendar June 19, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

CHRISTOPHER LOCK; KEVIN MEYER,

Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

CINDIA TORRES; DARREN FRANCES; CHARLES MCQUEEN; HARRIS

COUNTY, TEXAS,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:14-CV-2766

Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

LESLIE H. SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judge:*

Christopher Lock and Kevin Meyer sued Cindia Torres, Darren Frances,

Charles McQueen, and Harris County, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which the district court

granted. We AFFIRM.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 29, 2012, Kevin Meyer, a Harris County Sheriff’s Deputy,

hosted his wedding reception at a lodge in Houston, Texas. We will call him

Deputy Meyer to distinguish him from his father. Several hundred guests

attended the reception. Cindia Torres and Darren Frances, both Harris

County Constable’s Office Precinct 1 Deputies, provided security for the event.

Torres wore her uniform; Frances worked in plain clothes but displayed his

gun, handcuffs, badge, and police identification.

The reception featured an open bar that served, among other things,

draft and canned beer. Some guests also brought wine and hard liquor.

Around 8:30 p.m., the bartender decided to stop serving alcohol because he

“noticed a significant number of guests who were dressed slopp[ily], slurring

their words and stumbling.” The bartender then informed Torres, Frances,

and the groom’s mother about his decision.

Robert Meyer (“Mr. Meyer”), Deputy Meyer’s father, became visibly

agitated when he learned of the bartender’s decision to cease the alcohol

service. As a result, he “began loudly complaining” and informed the bartender

that his son was a police officer who could handle any problems himself.

Frances then intervened to inform Mr. Meyer that “the bartenders were simply

doing what they had a right to do.” There is no dispute that Mr. Meyer

responded with some degree of physical force, though only some witnesses said

he “struck or pushed” Frances. Frances gave a strong warning not to touch

him again. There is some evidence that Mr. Meyer later stumbled backward

and touched Frances a second time. Other possibilities of how a later

“touching” occurred is that Mr. Meyer “pushed” Frances, or that he simply

placed his hand on Frances’s shoulder to better hear what he was saying.

Cindia Torres, who we remind was the uniformed constable, observed

the disagreement and began to escort Mr. Meyer from the ballroom. Deputy

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Meyer, the groom, came to his father’s aid, along with thirty to forty other

people. Torres claims Deputy Meyer grabbed her “shoulder or shirt collar.”

Torres asked the deputy to release her, and, when he refused, the plain-clothed

constable Frances put Deputy Meyer “in a bear-hug and told him to identify

himself.” Other witnesses recall the scene differently. Some claim that Deputy

Meyer never touched Torres or interfered with his father’s arrest. The

appellees claim that both Meyers were intoxicated at the time of the incident.

After the initial altercation, Torres and Frances directed both Meyers to

the lounge area for questioning. During the conversation, a large crowd formed

in the hallway, prompting the bartender to place a table in front of the doorway

to prevent additional congregants from crowding the area. Torres and Frances

then asked the partygoers “to move away and to leave” the premises

immediately or they would be arrested.

Accounts differ as to what happened after this warning. Torres states

that several guests, including Christopher Lock, claimed to be police officers

and refused to leave the scene. Torres maintains that Lock ignored her threat

to arrest him for criminal trespass and continued to disturb the scene by

yelling to Deputy Meyer and using profanity toward her. Torres claims she

physically escorted Lock to the exit but was unable to make him leave. Lock,

on the other hand, claims that Torres used profanity toward him after he tried

to identify himself as a police officer. By his account, he never responded to

her comments. He claims instead to have “left and went off the property” to

stand on the street outside. Other witnesses corroborated Lock’s version of

events.

At some point, Torres called her supervisors and requested

reinforcement. Along with other deputies, Harris County Constable Sergeant

Charles McQueen arrived and talked with Lock. Their conversation is the

point of some debate. Lock claims that McQueen gave him permission to

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reenter the lodge; McQueen denies ever giving such permission. For her part,

Torres states that she did not hear McQueen give Lock permission but that he

later told her he had done so.

Torres arrested Deputy Meyer “for interfering with public duties when

he grabbed and pulled her” as she attempted to detain his father. She arrested

Lock for criminal trespass after he “remained on the premises after receiving

notice to depart . . . .” When McQueen arrived on the scene, he asked Torres

not to file charges in order to avoid “bad blood” between the sheriff’s office and

the constable’s office. By then, Torres had already called an assistant district

attorney (“ADA”), who agreed to bring charges. Torres did not inform the ADA

that Deputy Meyer and Lock were law enforcement officers, but the ADA

claims that information “wouldn’t have changed [her] decision” to accept the

charges. Although McQueen would have released Deputy Meyer and Lock as

a professional courtesy, he maintains that Torres “had total probable cause for

her actions at the scene.”

Both of the Meyers and Lock were taken to jail and formally charged. A

Harris County Criminal Court judge, Pam Derbyshire, found probable cause

and set bail. All charges were later dismissed.

Only Deputy Meyer and Lock brought this Section 1983 suit; Mr. Meyer

did not sue. They claimed “Torres arrested them without probable cause.”

They further alleged that McQueen was deliberately indifferent to their rights

by failing to properly train and supervise his subordinates. Finally, they

claimed Harris County has enacted unconstitutional practices and customs

that caused the alleged Section 1983 violations. The district court granted

summary judgment to all defendants. Deputy Meyer and Lock timely appealed.

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DISCUSSION

Our review of summary judgment is de novo, in which we apply the same

legal standard to the evidence as the district court did. Gowesky v. Singing

River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 507 (5th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is

appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party bears the

initial burden of identifying the basis for its motion and the portions of the

record that support it. Nola Spice Designs, L.L.C. v. Haydel Enters., Inc., 783

F.3d 527, 536 (5th Cir. 2015). Once that burden is satisfied, the nonmovant

must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits . . . designate specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Our review of the evidence must be in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, with all reasonable inferences from the

evidence made in that party’s favor. Nola Spice, 783 F.3d at 536.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who deprives

another of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution

and laws” of the United States. To make a sufficient claim, plaintiffs “must (1)

allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a

person acting under color of state law.” Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233

F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs “must identify defendants who were

either personally involved in the constitutional violation or whose acts are

causally connected to the constitutional violation alleged.” Anderson v.

Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999). We address the

claims against the individual and municipal defendants separately.

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I. Individual Defendants Torres, Frances, and McQueen

Both plaintiffs allege that Torres arrested them without probable cause

and that Frances failed to protect them from unlawful arrest. Lock further

alleges that McQueen failed to protect him from unlawful arrest and failed to

supervise Torres when she arrested him. The district court held that the

individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects “government officials performing

discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Once a defendant raises the defense of qualified

immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing the defense does not apply.

Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). To do so, the plaintiff

must show: “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and

(2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.”

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 536 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). We have discretion to determine

which step to address first. Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir.

2013).

We first address the claims against Torres. “The right to be free from

arrest without probable cause is a clearly established constitutional right.”

Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1994). To overcome the

qualified-immunity defense, the plaintiffs must show Torres did not have

probable cause to arrest them. Probable cause exists when a police officer “had

knowledge that would warrant a prudent person’s belief that the person

arrested had already committed or was committing a crime.” Id. An officer is

entitled to qualified immunity even if she “reasonably but mistakenly

conclude[d] that probable cause [was] present.” Id. at 1017.

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Relevant here is the independent-intermediary doctrine. See Cuadra v.

Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 813 (5th Cir. 2010). “Under that

doctrine, if facts supporting an arrest are placed before an independent

intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediary’s decision

breaks the chain of causation for the Fourth Amendment violation.” Jennings

v. Patton, 644 F.3d 297, 300–01 (5th Cir. 2011). The rule applies even if the

intermediary acted after the arrest. Buehler v. City of Austin/Austin Police

Dep’t, 824 F.3d 548, 554 (5th Cir. 2016). It does not apply, though, if “it can be

shown that the deliberations of [the] intermediary were in some way tainted

by the actions of the defendant.” Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1428 (5th Cir.

1988).

The district court held that the independent-intermediary doctrine

applied to bar the claims against Torres. After the arrests, these two plaintiffs

were brought before Judge Pam Derbyshire. She found there to be probable

cause for their detention. Though the facts surrounding the arrests are

disputed, all that matters is that there is no competent summary-judgment

evidence to suggest the police in any way tainted Judge Derbyshire’s

determination. See Buehler, 824 F.3d at 556. Whether probable cause existed

is thus moot.

On appeal, the plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Buehler, alleging that

Torres intentionally misdirected Judge Derbyshire by lying in her presentation

of facts. These claims are simply allegations, which, “without more, are

insufficient to overcome summary judgment.” Cuadra, 626 F.3d at 813.

Instead, “the plaintiff[s] must affirmatively show that the defendants tainted

the intermediary’s decision.” See Buehler, 824 F.3d at 555 (alterations

omitted). No such evidence is in the record. Torres is thus entitled to qualified

immunity. See id.

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The independent-intermediary doctrine also bars the claims against

Frances and McQueen. On appeal, Deputy Meyer and Lock confine their

argument to whether McQueen needed to be present for supervisory liability

to attach. He did, as “liability will not attach where an officer is not present at

the scene of the constitutional violation.” Whitley, 726 F.3d at 646. Also

important is whether there was acquiescence by a defendant officer in the

violation. Id. at 647. Here, McQueen was not present at the time of the events

giving rise to the arrests. He did not encourage or approve of Torres’s conduct

prior to his arrival, nor did he communicate such support in some way.

Moreover, the district court correctly concluded that the judicial determination

of probable cause “broke the causal chain between Torres’s actions and any

resulting constitutional harm.” Likewise, that determination broke any causal

chain between the arrests and the alleged failure to intervene or supervise.

The district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Frances and

McQueen also.

II. Municipal Defendant Harris County

The plaintiffs argue that Harris County is liable because it has four

“unconstitutional practices and customs” that combined to cause the alleged

constitutional violations. These are inadequate supervision of law-

enforcement personnel; failure to train and discipline officers engaged in

wrongdoing; retaining officers who should be fired; and improperly

maintaining law-enforcement records.

Before a municipality can be liable under Section 1983, it must be shown

that it had policies that were the “moving force” that led to constitutional

violations. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–89 (1989). The fact that

an official policy may have led to police misconduct is not the test. “There must

at least be an affirmative link between the training inadequacies alleged, and

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the particular constitutional violation at issue.” City of Oklahoma City v.

Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 n.8 (1985). Municipal liability will not attach if the

complaining party “has suffered no constitutional injury” at the hands of a

municipal employee. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).

Because the independent-intermediary doctrine operates as a bar to all

claims against Torres, Frances, and McQueen, there is no constitutional

violation arising from the actions of the individual defendants. Without a

constitutional violation, Harris County is not liable under Section 1983. See

Shields v. Twiss, 389 F.3d 142, 151 (5th Cir. 2004).

AFFIRMED.

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