Opinion

Eddie Brown v. Theressia Lyons

  • 690 F. App'x 872
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Jun 16, 2017
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Clement, Higginson, Per Curiam, Prado
Nature of suit
Prisoner w/ out Counsel
Cited by
1 cases
Authority
More cited than 46.2%

upholding the dismissal of a pro se prisoner’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 , 1985(2)- (3), and 1986 with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii)

How later courts described this case

  • upholding the dismissal of a pro se prisoner’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 , 1985(2)- (3), and 1986 with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Case: 16-60538 Document: 00514036194 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/16/2017

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

No. 16-60538 FILED

June 16, 2017

EDDIE JOSEPH BROWN, Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

THERESSIA LYONS; DAWN STOUGH; ROBERT MCCORMICK; MITCH

OWEN; DIANNE HERMAN-ELLIS; GEORGE HUFFMAN,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 1:16-CV-145

Before CLEMENT, PRADO, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Eddie Joseph Brown, Mississippi prisoner # 87813, moves for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the dismissal of his pro se civil

rights lawsuit filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(2)-(3), and 1986.

Applying 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the district court dismissed Brown’s suit

for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. The district court

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

Case: 16-60538 Document: 00514036194 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/16/2017

No. 16-60538

further denied Brown leave to proceed IFP on appeal, certifying that this

appeal was not taken in good faith under § 1915(a)(3).

By moving to proceed IFP in this court, Brown is challenging the district

court’s certification that his appeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh v.

Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). “When [a] prisoner opts to challenge

the certification decision, the [IFP] motion must be directed solely to the trial

court’s reasons for the certification decision.” Id. In evaluating whether the

appeal is taken in good faith, the relevant inquiry is “whether the appeal

involves legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).”

Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). “[W]here the merits are so intertwined with the

certification decision as to constitute the same issue,” we may deny the IFP

motion and dismiss the appeal sua sponte if it is frivolous. Baugh, 117 F.3d at

202 & n.24; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

In the brief supporting his IFP motion, Brown describes his suit as

asserting that the defendants, which include his defense counsel and the

prosecutors involved in his 2012 Mississippi state jury trial and conviction,

conspired to deprive him of his liberty without due process by falsely entering

an indictment when in fact no grand jury was meeting at the time the

indictment was handed down. Brown acknowledges that the district court

dismissed his case with prejudice because his claims, if successful, would

necessarily imply the invalidity of his still-valid 2012 conviction. Brown fails,

however, to assert any substantive challenge to this reasoning by the district

court, which also serves as the basis for its lack-of-good-faith certification.

Brown has thus failed to brief, and thereby abandoned, any challenge to the

district court’s certification that his appeal is not taken in good faith. See

2

Case: 16-60538 Document: 00514036194 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/16/2017

No. 16-60538

Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202; Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993)

(holding that even pro se arguments must be briefed to be preserved).

Brown’s sole argument in support of his IFP motion is that the district

court was precluded from dismissing his action sua sponte prior to service of

process because he had paid a partial filing fee. However, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

expressly provides that, “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion

thereof, that may have been paid,” a complaint filed by a prisoner shall be

dismissed by the district court “at any time” upon its determination that,

among other things, the action fails to state a claim. Brown’s argument on this

point thus clearly lacks merit and does not constitute a nonfrivolous issue for

appeal. See Howard, 707 F.2d at 220.

In light of the foregoing, the district court did not err in denying Brown’s

IFP motion, since his appeal does not involve legal points arguable on their

merits and is thus not taken in good faith. See id. at 219-20. Accordingly,

Brown’s IFP motion is DENIED and the appeal is DISMISSED AS

FRIVOLOUS. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 & n.24; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. The

dismissal of the complaint by the district court for failure to state a claim and

the dismissal of this appeal as frivolous both count as strikes for purposes of

§ 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996).

Brown is WARNED that, if he accumulates three strikes, he will not be allowed

to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal while he is incarcerated or detained

in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

See § 1915(g).

3

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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