Yvette M Cormier v. Pf Fitness-Midland LLC

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

YVETTE M. CORMIER, UNPUBLISHED

June 1, 2017

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 331286

Midland Circuit Court

PF FITNESS-MIDLAND, LLC, and PLA-FIT LC No. 15-002463-NZ

FRANCHISE, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

PLANET FITNESS HOLDINGS, LLC, PLANET

FITNESS EQUIPMENT, LLC, PLANET

FITNESS NAF, LLC, PFIP, LLC, and TSG

CONSUMER PARTNERS, LLC,

Defendants.

Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and SERVITTO and STEPHENS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court order granting summary disposition in favor of

defendants, PF Fitness-Midland, LLC and PLA-Fit Franchise, LLC (“defendants”)1 pursuant to

MCR 2.116(C)(8) in this civil rights action. We affirm.

Plaintiff entered into a membership agreement to use defendants’ Planet Fitness gym

facility in Midland on January 28, 2015. On February 28, 2015, she entered the women’s locker

room and encountered a transgender individual (a man who identified as a woman). Plaintiff left

the locker room and told the front desk that there was a man in the women’s locker room.

Plaintiff was advised that it was defendants’ policy that people have access to the facility that

corresponds with whatever sex with which an individual self-identifies. Defendant’s corporate

office later advised plaintiff that this was consistent with their policy of not judging whether an

1

The remaining defendants were dismissed from the lawsuit upon the stipulation of the parties.

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individual is a man or a woman. Plaintiff returned to the gym several times in the ensuing days

and warned other women about the policy and to be careful when using the women’s facilities.

On March 4, 2015, defendants terminated plaintiff’s membership.

Plaintiff thereafter filed the instant lawsuit alleging invasion of privacy; sexual

harassment and retaliation in violation of the Elliot Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2301 et

seq.; breach of contract; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and violation of the

Michigan Consumer Protection Act, MCL 445.901 et seq. Defendants each moved for summary

disposition (and joined in each other’s motion), asserting that plaintiff failed to plead any valid

claim. The trial court agreed, granting summary disposition in defendants’ favor. This appeal

followed.

“This Court reviews decisions on motions for summary disposition de novo to determine

if the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Alcona Co v Wolverine

Environmental Prod Inc, 233 Mich App 238, 245; 590 NW2d 586 (1998). MCR 2.116(C)(8)

allows a trial court to grant summary disposition when “[t]he opposing party has failed to state a

claim on which relief can be granted.” MCR 2.116(C)(8). “A motion for summary disposition

brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint on the

allegations of the pleadings alone.” Feyz v Mercy Mem Hosp, 475 Mich 663, 672; 719 NW2d 1

(2006). “All well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true and construed in a light most

favorable to the nonmovant.” Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).

“Conclusory statements, unsupported by factual allegations, are insufficient to state a cause of

action.” Churella v Pioneer State Mut Ins Co, 258 Mich App 260, 272; 671 NW2d 125 (2003).

“[T]he motion tests whether the complaint states a claim as a matter of law, and the motion

should be granted if no factual development could possibly justify recovery.” Feyz, 475 Mich at

672.

This Court also reviews de novo questions of statutory interpretation. See City of Detroit

v Ambassador Bridge Co, 481 Mich 29, 35; 748 NW2d 221 (2008).

On appeal, plaintiff first asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition

in defendants’ favor with respect to her civil rights claims. We disagree.

The Elliott Larsen Civil Rights Act (“CRA”) “is aimed at the prejudices and biases borne

against persons because of their membership in a certain class and seeks to eliminate the effects

of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and biases.” Miller v CA Muer Corp, 420

Mich 355, 363; 362 NW2d 650 (1984) (internal quotations marks and internal citation omitted).

The CRA “recognizes that freedom from discrimination because of sex is a civil right.” Hamed

v Wayne Co, 490 Mich 1, 9; 803 NW2d 237 (2011), citing MCL 37.2102(1). “Accordingly, the

act prohibits discrimination because of sex in employment, places of public accommodation, and

public services.” Id. Relevant to this case, the CRA defines discrimination because of sex as

including sexual harassment:

Sexual harassment means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual

favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature

under the following conditions:

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(i) Submission to the conduct or communication is made a term or condition

either explicitly or implicitly to obtain employment, public accommodations or

public services, education, or housing.

(ii) Submission to or rejection of the conduct or communication by an individual

is used as a factor in decisions affecting the individual's employment, public

accommodations or public services, education, or housing.

(iii) The conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of substantially

interfering with an individual's employment, public accommodations or public

services, education, or housing, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive

employment, public accommodations, public services, educational, or housing

environment. [MCL 37.2103]

“The first two subdivisions of MCL 37.2103(i) describe quid pro quo sexual harassment, while

the third subdivision refers to hostile-environment sexual harassment.” Hamed, 490 Mich at 9-

10. “The CRA sexual harassment subsets, MCL 37.2103(i)(i) to (iii) address not only

employment . . . but also discrimination in public services, public accommodations, educational

institutions, and housing.” Diamond v Witherspoon, 265 Mich App 673, 685; 696 NW2d 770

(2005).

A “[p]lace of public accommodation” means a business, or an educational, refreshment,

entertainment, recreation, health, or transportation facility, or institution of any kind,

whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or

accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public.

[MCL 37.2301(a).]

A place of public accommodation also includes certain “private clubs,” including “[a] sports or

athletic club.” MCL 37.2301(a)(iii).

The trial court found that “[t]here is no question [Planet Fitness-Midland] fits” the

definition of a place of public accommodation, and therefore “is subject to the protections of the

statute.” Neither party disputes this finding. The next step, then, is to determine whether

plaintiff was discriminated against (i.e., sexually harassed) in this place of public

accommodation because of her sex.

Before a plaintiff can establish actionable sexual harassment under a hostile work

environment theory or a quid pro quo theory, she must first “allege facts showing that she was

subjected to ‘unwelcome sexual advances,’ ‘requests for sexual favors,’ or ‘conduct or

communication of a sexual nature’.” Corley v Detroit Board of Ed, 470 Mich 274, 279; 681

NW2d 342 (2004). According to plaintiff, because of defendants’ policy, the transgender man

had the opportunity to undress in front of her and to see her undress which, she maintains, is

conduct or communication of a sexual nature. See MCL 37.2301. However, the CRA does not

define sexual harassment as being subjected to an opportunity for a person to engage in verbal or

physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature. Rather the CRA requires that the sexual

conduct or communication substantially interfered with the plaintiff’s utilization of public

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accommodations. MCL 37.2103(i)(i)-(iii). It follows that plaintiff must have actually

experienced the conduct or communication she complains of.

The CRA provides that “[a] person alleging a violation of this act may bring a civil action

for appropriate injunctive relief or damages, or both.” MCL 37.2801(1). In Burchett v Rx

Optical, 232 Mich App 174, 181; 591 NW2d 652 (1998), this Court concluded “that the

Legislature intended to authorize only the person whose civil rights were violated to bring a

cause of action under the CRA.” While plaintiff made conclusory statements that she was

subjected to conduct and communication of a sexual nature, she failed to plead factual

allegations showing that she was actually subjected to verbal or physical conduct or

communication of a sexual nature (i.e., that her rights were violated). She did not, for example,

allege that she was exposed to male genitalia in the women’s locker room. She merely alleged

that she, while clothed, saw a clothed man in the women’s locker room and further only alleged

that defendants’ policy “would” and “could” create a hostile environment for women. Given the

speculative nature of plaintiff’s complaint, without specific allegations showing that plaintiff

was, in fact, subjected to conduct or communication of a sexual nature (rather than potentially

subjected to the same), the trial court correctly granted defendants summary disposition under

2.116(C)(8) on plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims. Corley, 470 Mich at 279.

The trial court also correctly granted summary disposition to defendants on plaintiff’s

retaliation claim. The CRA provides that “a person shall not . . . [r]etaliate or discriminate

against a person because the person has opposed a violation of this act, or because the person has

made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation,

proceeding, or hearing under this act.” MCL 37.2701(a).

“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the Civil Rights Act, a

plaintiff must show (1) that the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, (2) that

this was known by the defendant, (3) that the defendant took an . . . action adverse

to the plaintiff, and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected

activity and the adverse . . . action.” [Meyers v City of Center Line, 242 Mich

App 560, 568-569; 619 NW2d 182 (2000).]

To engage in a protected activity under MCL 37.2701(a), a plaintiff must clearly convey to an

objective defendant that she is “raising the specter of a claim of unlawful discrimination pursuant

to the CRA.” Barret v Kirtland Community College, 245 Mich App 306, 319; 628 NW2d 63

(2001).

Plaintiff argues that she “was engaged in a protected activity, i.e., using the women’s

locker room and having an expectation to be free from sexual harassment caused by Defendants’

policy.” “Protected activity,” however, plainly refers to the listed actions provided by MCL

37.2701(a): opposing a violation of the CRA, or having made a charge, filed a complaint,

testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the CRA.

MCL 37.2701(a). Even if we were to view plaintiff’s apparent opposition to defendants’ policy

as a protected activity, such opposition to a gender-neutral policy would not have conveyed to an

objective person that she was raising “the specter of a claim of unlawful discrimination pursuant

to the CRA.” Barret, 245 Mich App at 319. Therefore, she did not engage in protected activity.

While the trial court determined that defendants’ policy did not violate the CRA such that

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defendants’ could not have improperly retaliated against plaintiff in violation of the act, we will

not reverse a trial court’s decision if it reached the proper result, albeit for the wrong reason.

Gleason v Michigan Dept of Transp, 256 Mich App 1, 3; 662 NW2d 822 (2003).

Plaintiff next asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in

defendants’ favor on her invasion of privacy claim. We disagree.

“Michigan has long recognized [invasion of privacy] as a common-law tort.” Lewis v

LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175, 183; 670 NW2d 675 (2003). The common-law right of privacy is

said to protect against four types of invasion of privacy.

1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private

affairs.

2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.

3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.

4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or

likeness. [Battaglieri v Mackinac Center for Public Policy, 261 Mich App

296, 300; 680 NW2d 915 (2004), quoting Tobin v Civil Service Comm,

416 Mich 661, 672; 331 NW2d 184 (1982) (emphasis removed).]

Plaintiff based her claim upon the theory of intrusion into her seclusion or solitude.

There are three necessary elements to establish a prima facie case of intrusion

upon seclusion: (1) the existence of a secret and private subject matter; (2) a right

possessed by the plaintiff to keep that subject matter private; and (3) the obtaining

of information about that subject matter through some method objectionable to a

reasonable man. [Doe v Mills, 212 Mich App 73, 88; 536 NW2d 824 (1995)]

“An action for intrusion upon seclusion focuses on the manner in which information is obtained

. . .; it is considered analogous to a trespass.” Id. “Like other torts, there can be no invasion of

privacy under the theory of intrusion upon the seclusion of plaintiffs if plaintiffs consented to

defendant’s intrusion . . .” Lewis, 258 Mich App at 194.

It seems clear that, generally, the exposure of one’s naked body is “a secret and private

subject matter.” The Ninth Circuit has stated, “We cannot conceive of a more basic subject of

privacy than the naked body.” York v Story, 324 F 2d 450, 455 (CA 9, 1963). It also seems clear

that a person has a “reduced expectation of privacy” in a locker room. Vernonia Sch Dist 47J v

Acton, 515 US 646, 657; 115 S Ct 2386; 132 L Ed 2d 564 (1995). At the same time, however,

arguably one would reasonably expect to share a locker room with only members of the same

biological sex. And, there appears to be a greater privacy interest regarding one’s naked body

when dealing with members of the opposite sex. See e.g., York, 324 F 2d at 455 (“The desire to

shield one’s unclothed figured from view of strangers, and particularly strangers of the opposite

sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and personal dignity.”); Canedy v Boardman, 16 F 3d

183, 185 (CA 7, 1994) ([W]hile all forced observations or inspections of the naked body

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implicate a privacy concern, it is generally considered a greater invasion to have one’s naked

body viewed by a member of the opposite sex”).

However, even assuming plaintiff had a right to keep the exposure of her naked body

private from members of the opposite sex in the women’s locker room, she has simply not

alleged an intrusion of that privacy. Again, plaintiff alleged that she left the locker room after

encountering “a large, tall man” and then “thoroughly check[ed]” the locker room before using it

on subsequent visits. Her membership to the gym was then terminated. Thus, plaintiff did not

undress and shower in the presence of a biological male at defendant Planet-Fitness-Midland’s

facilities. Further, any intrusion would not have been conducted by defendants or their agents,

but by other club members and guests. Because plaintiff did not allege an intrusion of her

privacy by defendants, the trial court correctly granted defendants summary disposition under

MCR 2.116(C)(8).

Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, this case is not analogous to Harkey v Abate, 131 Mich

App 177; 346 NW2d 74 (1983). In that case, the defendant had installed see-through panels in

the ceiling of the women’s restroom at the roller skating rink that he owned, which permitted

surreptitious observation from above of the entire interior of the restroom. Id. at 179-180. The

plaintiff sued the defendant for an invasion of privacy and this Court framed the issue for its

consideration as “whether the installation of the hidden viewing devices complained of can itself

constitute a sufficient wrongful intrusion into the seclusion or solitude.” Id. at 181. The Court

held that the plaintiff had a right to privacy in the public restroom and that “the installation of the

hidden viewing devices alone constitutes an interference with that privacy which a reasonable

person would find highly offensive.” Id. at 182. It further stated that “though the absence of

proof that the devices were utilized is relevant to the question of damages, it is not fatal to

plaintiff’s case.” Id.

The Harkey Court plainly limited its holding to “hidden viewing devices,” while

recognizing the general rule that an actual intrusion was necessary for an intrusion on seclusion

claim. 131 Mich App at 181. An exception for a hidden viewing device was needed because a

defendant could always assert that he was not using the device at the time the plaintiff was in its

purview. Thus, in Harkey, the plaintiff alleged intrusion of privacy but simply could not prove it

under the circumstances of the case. In contrast, plaintiff alleges only the possibility of intrusion

of privacy. One could argue that an exception similar to the one in Harkey would be appropriate

for a woman unaware of defendants’ policy because the woman may not know the biological sex

of the clothed persons in the locker room. Although, even then, it would still be other club

members and guests, not defendants, intruding upon plaintiff’s privacy and “obtaining of

information about that subject matter . . .” Doe, 212 Mich App at 88. Regardless, plaintiff does

not present that argument, nor does she specifically seek damages for the period before she

learned of the policy, January 28, 2015, through February 28, 2015; the date of the original

incident. After that date, even though plaintiff did not agree with the policy, her use of the

locker room after her knowledge of the policy constituted consent to any intrusion, defeating her

claim of invasion of privacy. Lewis, 258 Mich App at 195.

Next, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in

defendants’ favor on her breach of contract claim. We disagree.

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“A party claiming a breach of contract must establish by a preponderance of the evidence

(1) that there was a contract, (2) that the other party breached the contract and, (3) that the party

asserting breach of contract suffered damages as a result of the breach.” Miller-Davis Co v

Ahrens Const, Inc (On Remand), 296 Mich App 56, 71; 817 NW2d 609 (2012), rev’d in part on

other grounds 495 Mich 161 (2014). “[C]ourts must enforce an agreement as written absent an

unusual circumstance, such as the contract’s violating the law or being contrary to public

policy.” Bill & Dena Brown Trust v Garcia, 312 Mich App 684, 697-698; 880 NW2d 269

(2015).

Plaintiff signed a membership agreement (contract) with defendants, wherein she

“agree[d] to comply with Planet Fitness’ membership policies and club rules that may be

communicated to me from time to time either in writing, through club signage or verbally.” The

contract further provided that “Planet Fitness may, in its sole discretion modify the policies and

any club rule without notice at any time” and “Planet Fitness reserves the right to refund the pro-

rated cost of unused services and terminate [any] membership immediately for violation of any

membership policy or club rule.” Plaintiff does not dispute that defendants had the ability to

change their policies, but maintains that the “no judgment” policy allowing people to use the

locker room according to the sex they self-identify with violates the CRA. This argument is

without merit given that plaintiff failed to adequately plead a violation of the CRA.

Moreover, plaintiff was advised of the club policy on or about February 28, 2015, and, on

March 4, 2015, was told by defendants that she must either submit to the policy or have her

membership terminated. Plaintiff admitted that she refused to comply with a club policy that she

had notice of, which constituted “violation of any membership policy or club rule.” Therefore,

under the clear language of the contract, defendants had right to terminate her membership.

Accepting plaintiff’s allegations as true, she failed to plead that defendant breached the contract

and the trial court correctly granted defendants summary disposition on this claim.

Plaintiff asserts next that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in

defendants’ favor on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, usurping the jury’s

role of determining what conduct qualified as extreme and outrageous. We disagree.

“Michigan courts have recognized that the common-law tort of intentional infliction of

emotional distress vindicates a person’s right to be free from serious, intentional and

unprivileged invasions of mental and emotional tranquility.” Cotton v Banks, 310 Mich App

104, 129; 872 NW2d 1 (2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “To establish a

claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove the following

elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4)

severe emotional distress.” Hayley v Allstate Ins Co, 262 Mich App 571, 577; 686 NW2d 273

(2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“Liability attaches only when a plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct is

so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of

decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”

Lewis, 258 Mich App at 196 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Liability does not

extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.”

Doe, 212 Mich App at 91. “It is for the trial court to initially determine whether the defendant’s

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conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery.”

Hayley, 262 Mich App at 577. “But where reasonable individuals may differ, it is for the jury to

determine if the conduct was so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery.” Id. To establish

intent or recklessness, “[a] plaintiff can show that a defendant specifically intended to cause a

plaintiff emotional distress or that a defendant’s conduct was so reckless that any reasonable

person would know emotional distress would result.” Lewis, 258 Mich App at 197 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiff’s allegations that defendants’ policy is extreme and outrageous because “it

would allow men to be present while women are changing, showering, or using the restroom”

and “would allow a man to disrobe and be naked with the women who are also using said

facilities” are insufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Transgender rights and policies are polarizing issues and each individual may have a feeling on

the issue and on what locker room such individuals should be using. Regardless of whether an

average member of the community may find the policy outrageous, the fact is that plaintiff did

not suffer severe emotional distress as a matter of law. One encounter with a biological male in

a women’s locker room, both persons clothed, does not constitute “distress . . . so severe that no

reasonable man could be expected to endure it.” Haverbush v Powelson, 217 Mich App 228,

235; 551 NW2d 206 (1996). Indeed, plaintiff continued to visit the gym and would thoroughly

check the women’s locker room for biological males apparently ready to experience such an

encounter again.

In addition, while plaintiff cites to defendants’ attempts to coerce her into submitting to

the policy and then terminating her membership, as previously established, defendants had the

right under the membership agreement to terminate plaintiff’s membership for refusing to

comply with the policy. And, “[a] person is not liable for intentional infliction of emotional

distress where he has done no more than insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way.”

Sankar v Detroit Bd of Educ, 160 Mich App 470, 483; 409 NW2d 213 (1987). “This is so even

if the actor is aware that such insistence upon his legal rights is certain to cause emotional

distress.” Id.

Finally, plaintiff submits that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to

defendants’ on her claim brought under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). We

disagree.

The MCPA “prohibits the use of unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts, or

practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.” Zine v Chrysler Corp, 236 Mich App 261, 270-

271; 600 NW2d 384 (1999), citing MCL 445.903(1). “Trade or commerce” is defined as

the conduct of a business providing goods, property, or service primarily for

personal, family, or household purposes and includes the advertising, solicitation,

offering for sale or rent, sale, lease, or distribution of a service or property,

tangible or intangible, real, personal, or mixed, or any other article, or a business

opportunity. [MCL 445.902(1)(g).]

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A person who suffers loss as a result of a violation of the MCPA “may bring an action to recover

actual damages or $250.00, whichever is greater, together with reasonable attorneys’ fees.”

MCL 445.911(2).

“The MCPA is in many ways derivative of the common-law tort of fraud.” Brownlow v

McCall Enterprises, Inc, 315 Mich App 103, 123; 888 NW2d 295 (2016). However, the MCPA

eliminates an essential element of the common-law tort of fraud, i.e., proof of the intent of the

merchant in most of the subsections. Id. “When the Legislature intended to require a plaintiff to

prove the defendant's intent, it specifically so provided in the statute.” Id. at 125. And, while a

common law fraud claim based on misrepresentation requires that the plaintiff show reasonable

reliance on misrepresentation, only two of the MCPA's thirty-three “unfair, unconscionable, or

deceptive methods, acts or practices” expressly require some form of reasonable reliance by the

consumer. See MCL. § 445.903(1)(s) (“which fact could not be reasonably known by the

consumer”) and (bb) (“a person reasonably believes”).

Plaintiff alleged that defendants represented that there were separate locker rooms,

shower and restroom facilities for men and women and in having an unwritten policy allowing

men who self-identify as women to use the women’s facilities defendants violated MCL

445.903(1)(g), (n),2 (s), (t), (y), (bb), and (cc) of the MCPA. That statute provides, in relevant

part:

(1) Unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts, or practices in the

conduct of trade or commerce are unlawful and are defined as follows:

***

(g) Advertising or representing goods or services with intent not to dispose of

those goods or services as advertised or represented.

***

(n) Causing a probability of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the legal

rights, obligations, or remedies of a party to a transaction.

***

(s) Failing to reveal a material fact, the omission of which tends to mislead or

deceive the consumer, and which fact could not reasonably be known by the

consumer.

2

Plaintiff cited MCL 445.911(1)(n), but that statutory subsection does not exist. See MCL

445.911. Considering the allegation accompanying that citation, it is clear that plaintiff was

referring to MCL 445.903(1)(n).

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(t) Entering into a consumer transaction in which the consumer waives or purports

to waive a right, benefit, or immunity provided by law, unless the waiver is

clearly stated and the consumer has specifically consented to it.

***

(y) Gross discrepancies between the oral representations of the seller and the

written agreement covering the same transaction or failure of the other party to

the transaction to provide the promised benefits.

***

(bb) Making a representation of fact or statement of fact material to the

transaction such that a person reasonably believes the represented or suggested

state of affairs to be other than it actually is.

(cc) Failing to reveal facts that are material to the transaction in light of

representations of fact made in a positive manner.

In her appeal brief, plaintiff does not cite to any particular subsection of the MCPA buts

simply states that a policy allowing men full access to the women’s facilities is a material fact

that should have been disclosed and that she correctly pled how defendants violated each

subsection of the MCPA by either misrepresenting the facts or omitting them entirely. Plaintiff

cites to no authority or statute, or even her complaint, in support of her position. It is not

sufficient for a party “simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this

Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his

arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” Wilson v

Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998), quoting Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182,

203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959). We consider this claim abandoned on appeal and do not consider it.

We also do not consider her claim of error regarding exemplary damages, given our conclusion

that all of her claims were properly dismissed.

Affirmed.

/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens

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