Opinion

Teresa Sands v. Donald E. Thomas

  • 162 A.3d 226
  • 2017 ME 98
  • 2017 Me. LEXIS 100
  • 2017 WL 2180639
Court
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
Filed
May 18, 2017
Status
Published
On the bench
Saufley, Alexander, Mead, Gorman, Jabar, Hjelm, Humphrey
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 3.7%

The opinion

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions

Decision: 2017 ME 98

Docket: Pen-16-317

Submitted

On Briefs: April 27, 2017

Decided: May 18, 2017

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

TERESA SANDS

v.

DONALD E. THOMAS

PER CURIAM

[¶1] Teresa Sands appeals from a post-judgment order entered in the

Superior Court (Penobscot County, Mallonee, J.), pursuant to 14 M.R.S.

§ 6014(2)(B) (2016), awarding her attorney fees of $8,000—an amount

significantly less than the nearly $60,000 she requested—after a jury found

Donald E. Thomas liable for illegal eviction and wrongful use of civil

proceedings.

[¶2] We review an award of attorney fees pursuant to section

6014(2)(B) “for abuse of discretion and accord the trial court substantial

deference,” Mancini v. Scott, 2000 ME 19, ¶¶ 4, 10, 744 A.2d 1057 (quotation

marks omitted), recognizing that the “court is in the best position to observe

the unique nature and tenor of the litigation as it relates to a request for

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attorney fees,” Kezer v. Cent. Me. Med. Ctr., 2012 ME 54, ¶ 28, 40 A.3d 955

(quotation marks omitted).

[¶3] In awarding fees of $8,000, the court explained that Sands’s claim

for illegal eviction was “uncomplicated” and based on “straightforward and

almost completely undisputed” facts; and that “the litigatory effort in the case

was increased by several orders of magnitude” because of “[t]he addition of

claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and the

request for an award of punitive damages,” which “greatly expanded the

volume and complexity of the body of relevant facts[,] . . . increased the

likelihood of trial[,] and lengthened the trial itself.” Because Sands did not

include a transcript of the trial proceedings as part of the record on appeal, we

assume that the record supports those findings. See Rothstein v. Maloney,

2002 ME 179, ¶ 11, 816 A.2d 812.

[¶4] Additionally, Sands argues that the court did not adequately

explain the award of $8,000, as opposed to some other amount. Although

Sands filed a motion for additional findings of fact, she did not propose

findings about the specific number of hours that an attorney would

reasonably work on the case and on the illegal eviction claim in particular. See

M.R. Civ. P. 52(b) & Advisory Committee’s Note to 2015 amend. (“[I]t is the

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litigant’s responsibility to include with the [Rule 52(b)] motion suggested

findings that are both specific and supported by the record.”); Eremita v.

Marchiori, 2016 ME 160, ¶ 3, 150 A.3d 336. We therefore infer that the court

properly made the factual findings needed to support its ultimate

determination that an $8,000 fee award was “reasonable.” See 14 M.R.S.

§ 6014(2)(B); Sullivan v. Tardiff, 2015 ME 121, ¶ 15, 124 A.3d 652.

[¶5] Of the five substantive claims, accompanied by a request for

punitive damages, that Sands raised in her complaint, she prevailed on only

two, and of those, as the court correctly observed, only the claim for illegal

eviction could support an award of attorney fees. Although Sands argues that

her non-fee claims arose from the illegal eviction and that she was therefore

entitled to an award that reflected her attorneys’ cumulative effort on the

case, we have never held that a court is required to issue a cumulative award

for both fee and non-fee claims when those claims are factually linked. See

Advanced Constr. Corp. v. Pilecki, 2006 ME 84, ¶ 31, 901 A.2d 189. Further,

regardless of whether the claims were factually related, we assume that the

record supports the court’s express finding that there was a distinction in

complexity between the fee and non-fee claims. See Rothstein, 2002 ME 179,

¶ 11, 816 A.2d 812.

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[¶6] We therefore conclude that the court did not apply an improper

legal standard in evaluating Sands’s request for attorney fees, see Advanced

Constr. Corp., 2006 ME 84, ¶ 31, 901 A.2d 189, and that the court’s ultimate fee

award of $8,000 does not reflect any abuse of discretion, see Kezer, 2012 ME

54, ¶ 28, 40 A.3d 955; Mancini, 2000 ME 19, ¶ 10, 744 A.2d 1057.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Julie D. Farr, Esq., Gilbert & Greif, P.A., Bangor, for appellant Teresa Sands

Donald Brown, Esq., Don Brown Law, Brewer, for appellee Donald Thomas

Penobscot County Superior Court docket number CV-2014-104

FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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