Gallatin Housing Authority v. Mahoganee Pelt

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

August 16, 2016 Session

GALLATIN HOUSING AUTHORITY v. MAHOGANEE PELT

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sumner County

No. 83CC12015CV699 Joe Thompson, Judge

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No. M2015-01694-COA-R3-CV – Filed May 16, 2017

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This appeal arises from an indigent tenant’s petition for writs of certiorari and

supersedeas for a de novo review of an unlawful detainer action originally filed in general

sessions court. The tenant sought to remain in possession of the leased premises during

the review without posting a possessory bond. The circuit court initially issued the writs

and, in lieu of a bond, ordered the tenant to pay rent as it became due. The landlord

objected, arguing that a possessory bond was mandatory under the applicable statute.

The circuit court then ordered the tenant to post a bond and, after the tenant failed to

comply, dismissed the previously issued writs. On appeal, the tenant argues that the

circuit court erred in calculating the amount of the bond and in dismissing the writ of

certiorari with the writ of supersedeas. She also contends that the landlord executed the

writ of possession in violation of the initial stay of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure

62.01. We conclude that, although it erred in including court costs as part of the

possessory bond in light of the tenant’s indigence, the trial court properly dismissed the

writs of certiorari and supersedeas after the tenant failed to file a possessory bond. We

also conclude that Rule 62.01 did not stay the dismissal of the writ of supersedeas.

Consequently, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDY J. BENNETT,

J., and J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., joined.

Cherrelle Hooper, Gallatin, Tennessee, and Samuel Keen, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the

appellant, Mahoganee Pelt.

Brandon R. Meredith, Gallatin, Tennessee, for the appellee, Gallatin Housing Authority.

OPINION

I.

In 2015, a dispute arose between Mahoganee Pelt and her landlord, the Gallatin

Housing Authority1 (“GHA”) regarding the calculation of her rent. After Ms. Pelt failed

to make a required rent payment, GHA filed a detainer warrant in the general sessions

court for Sumner County, Tennessee. GHA sought both possession of the premises and a

monetary judgment for unpaid rent and late fees. On June 18, 2015, the general sessions

court ruled that GHA was entitled to possession and also awarded a monetary judgment

for back rent, interest, and damages.

On June 26, 2015, Ms. Pelt petitioned the Circuit Court for Sumner County,

Tennessee, under Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-18-129, to issue writs of certiorari and

supersedeas to the general sessions court to stay execution of the writ of possession and

remove the action to the circuit court for de novo review. After filing a poverty oath and

an affidavit of indigency, Ms. Pelt asked the court to waive any bond requirement for

costs or for any rent that might accumulate during the appeal. In lieu of a bond, Ms. Pelt

asked to pay rent as it became due during the pendency of her appeal.

Initially, the circuit court, by fiat, ordered the court clerk to issue the requested

writs, ordered GHA to recalculate rent based on Ms. Pelt’s current income, and, in lieu of

a bond, required Ms. Pelt to pay the recalculated rent and other charges as they became

due during the litigation. GHA filed a motion to dismiss the writs because Ms. Pelt had

not posted a possessory bond. The court ruled that Ms. Pelt was statutorily required to

post a bond to cover costs, damages, and the value of the rent during litigation. The court

ordered Ms. Pelt to post a bond of $2,199, which was comprised of $1,681 in damages,

$216 in anticipated rent, and $302 in circuit court costs.

On August 5, 2015, Ms. Pelt filed a motion to alter or amend the court’s order.

Ms. Pelt explained that she was unable to obtain the required bond and requested that the

court allow her to meet the bond requirement by paying rent as it became due. The court

denied the motion, dismissed the writs of certiorari and supersedeas with prejudice, and

entered judgment against Ms. Pelt in the amount of $1,996.82.

The day after the court dismissed the writ of supersedeas, GHA obtained a writ of

possession from the general sessions court clerk. A copy of the writ and a Notice of

Eviction was posted on Ms. Pelt’s door on August 17, informing her that she would be

1

Gallatin Housing Authority is a public body that provides affordable housing for low-income

tenants. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-20-102(1), -104 (2011 & Supp. 2016).

2

evicted on August 20. Ms. Pelt claims she “was forced to vacate the premises because of

these documents posted to her door indicating she was under an order to leave.”2

II.

Ms. Pelt raises three issues on appeal. First, she contends that the circuit court

erred in determining that Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-18-129 requires indigent

defendants in an unlawful detainer action to post a bond with security sufficient to cover

costs, damages, and the value of rent during the litigation. Second, she argues that the

court erred in dismissing the writ of certiorari with the writ of supersedeas after she failed

to post a possessory bond. Third, she claims that GHA’s execution of the writ of

possession violated the thirty-day stay in Rule 62.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil

Procedure.

To resolve these issues, we must interpret both statutes and procedural rules and

apply them to the undisputed facts. Statutory construction and the interpretation of our

procedural rules are questions of law, which we review de novo, with no presumption of

correctness. Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 889, 895 (Tenn. 2011).

A. UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTIONS

Unlawful detainer3 is a statutory action created to “streamline the cumbersome and

more formal common law action[s], such as ejectment, used to determine rightful

possession of real property.” Newport Hous. Auth. v. Ballard, 839 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tenn.

1992); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-104. At the commencement of an unlawful detainer

action, the plaintiff must post a bond “to pay all costs and damages which shall accrue to

the defendant for the wrongful prosecution of the suit.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-111

(2012).

2

According to the affidavit of the public housing manager, Ms. Pelt moved out “of her own

volition” before the eviction notice was posted on August 17, 2015. When the formal eviction occurred

on August 20, 2015, “there were only a few empty boxes and items of trash remaining at her residence.”

3

Unlawful detainer is defined by statute as:

where the defendant enters by contract, either as tenant or as assignee of a tenant, or as

personal representative of a tenant, or as subtenant, or by collusion with a tenant, and, in

either case, willfully and without force, holds over the possession from the landlord, or

the assignee of the remainder or reversion.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-104 (2012).

3

In cases filed in general sessions court,4 the judge determines which party is

entitled to possession and enters judgment accordingly. Id. § 29-18-119(b) (2012). In

conjunction with the judgment of possession, the judge is also statutorily required to

“ascertain the arrearage of rent, interest, and damages, if any, and render judgment

therefor.” Id. § 29-18-125 (2012); see Nashville Hous. Auth. v. Kinnard, 207 S.W.2d

1019, 1020 (Tenn. 1948) (“[T]he judgment for rent and damages [is] incidental to the

judgment for possession.”). The judgment of possession is only stayed for ten days.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-126 (2012). Thereafter, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to

possession immediately. Id. § 29-18-130(a) (2012).

The unsuccessful defendant in an unlawful detainer action has two options for

seeking de novo review in circuit court. Johnson v. Hopkins, 432 S.W.3d 840, 845 & n.5

(Tenn. 2013). A notice of appeal can be filed within ten days. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-

128 (2012). Or the losing party can, within thirty days, petition the circuit court for writs

of certiorari and supersedeas. Id. § 29-18-129 (2012).

If the defendant chooses to petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas under

Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-18-129, the circuit court must grant the petition and

issue the requested writs if the applicant submits a petition containing a meritorious

defense and a bond with sufficient security to cover all costs, damages, and the value of

the rent of the premises during the litigation. Id. § 29-18-129; Elliott v. Lawless, 53

Tenn. 123, 126 (1871). The writ of certiorari removes the case to the circuit court while

the writ of supersedeas stays enforcement of the possession judgment. Nashville Hous.

Auth. v. Kinnard, 207 S.W.2d at 1020.

The defendant who elects to appeal must file a notice of appeal accompanied by a

cost bond or a poverty oath and a uniform civil affidavit of indigency. Tenn. Code Ann.

§§ 20-12-127 (2009), 27-5-103 (2000), 27-5-108 (Supp. 2016), 29-18-128 (2012); Sup.

Ct. R. 29. Filing a notice of appeal does not stay execution of the judgment of

possession. Bell v. Smith, 202 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tenn. 1947) (“It has long been

recognized as the law in this State that an appeal by defendant from an adverse judgment

. . . does not forestall the writ of possession.”). Once a defendant files a notice of appeal,

the plaintiff cannot execute the writ of possession without first posting a bond for “double

the value of one (1) year’s rent of the premises,” all costs and damages associated with

the wrongful enforcement of the writ, and any judgment rendered on appeal. Tenn. Code

Ann. § 29-18-130(b)(1). But a different procedure applies if the defendant is a tenant

whose continued possession of leased premises is challenged due to nonpayment of rent.

Id. § 29-18-130(b)(2).

4

Unlawful detainer actions may be filed in general sessions, circuit, or chancery court. Tenn.

Code Ann. § 29-18-107, -108 (2012); Robinson v. Easter, 344 S.W.2d 365, 365-66 (Tenn. 1961).

4

In such instances, to retain possession, the appealing tenant must post a bond5 for

one year’s rent and the costs and damages “accruing from the failure of the appeal,

including rent and interest on the judgment.” Id. If the tenant fails to post the required

bond, the landlord may obtain and execute a writ of possession without filing a

possessory bond. Id.

B. THE POSSESSORY BOND REQUIREMENT

Ms. Pelt chose to seek review of the general sessions judgment by filing a petition

for writs of certiorari and supersedeas under Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-18-129. In

accordance with the statute, the circuit court required Ms. Pelt to post a bond in the

amount of $2,199, which included $1,681 in damages, $216 in anticipated rent, and $302

in circuit court costs. On appeal, Ms. Pelt concedes that the statute requires a bond. But

she argues that indigent tenants should be excused from the bond requirement so long as

they pay rent as it becomes due. She also argues that, even if indigent tenants must post a

bond, in this instance the circuit court erred in calculating the amount of the bond.

“Every application of a text to particular circumstances entails interpretation.”

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 53

(2012) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). Our goal in

statutory interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate the legislature’s intent.” Kite v.

Kite, 22 S.W.3d 803, 805 (Tenn. 1997). When a statute’s language is unambiguous, we

derive legislative intent from the statute’s plain language. Carson Creek Vacation

Resorts, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1993). However, when a

statute’s language is subject to several interpretations, we also consider the broader

statutory scheme, the statute’s general purpose, and other sources to ascertain legislative

intent. Wachovia Bank of N.C., N.A. v. Johnson, 26 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2000).

The words used in the statute should be given their natural, ordinary meaning “in

the context in which they appear in the statute and in light of the statute’s general

purpose.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 527 (Tenn. 2010). We must give

meaning to all of the statutory language and avoid a construction that renders any portion

of the statute meaningless. Hammond v. Harvey, 410 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tenn. 2013).

The statute permitting de novo review of unlawful detainer actions by petition for

writs of certiorari and supersedeas specifies the bond requirements based on the party

seeking review. Specifically, Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-18-129 provides as

follows:

5

A cash deposit, an irrevocable letter of credit from a regulated financial institution, or two good

personal sureties will also suffice. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-130(b)(2).

5

The proceedings in such actions may, within thirty (30) days after the

rendition of judgment, be removed to the circuit court by writs of certiorari

and supersedeas, which it shall be the duty of the judge to grant, upon

petition, if merits are sufficiently set forth, and to require from the applicant

a bond, with security sufficient to cover all costs and damages; and, if the

defendant below be the applicant, then the bond and security shall be of

sufficient amount to cover, besides costs and damages, the value of the rent

of the premises during the litigation.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-129. Giving each word in the statute meaning, as we must, an

unsuccessful defendant seeking writs of certiorari and supersedeas must post a bond with

sufficient security to cover costs, damages, and the value of the rent during the litigation.

See Lee Med., Inc., 312 S.W.3d at 527.

We conclude that Ms. Pelt’s promise to pay rent as it became due fails to meet the

requirements of the statute.6 The statute specifies a bond with security. Id. A mere

promise to pay is not secured. See Bond, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)

(defining bond as a “written promise to pay money or do some act if certain

circumstances occur or a certain time elapses”); Security, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th

ed. 2014) (defining security as “[c]ollateral given or pledged to guarantee the fulfillment

of an obligation”).

The security requirement is necessary to fulfill the purpose of a possessory bond,

namely to protect the landlord from damages accruing from potentially wrongful

possession of the leased premises during the review of the detainer action. Simmons v.

Taylor, 18 S.W. 867, 867 (Tenn. 1892); Tullahoma Vill. Apartments v. Cyree, No. 85-

206-II, 1986 WL 1664, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 1986). When faced with the

landlord’s superior right to possession, a tenant’s “promise to pay” rent as it becomes due

is insufficient to protect the landlord from financial loss. See Johnson, 432 S.W.3d at

845 (explaining that possessory bonds arose to protect the interests of landlords “in light

of the fact that tenants often remained in possession of the premises during the pendency

of an appeal without paying rent”).

The fact that Ms. Pelt is indigent does not change our analysis. We are cognizant

that our courts have liberally construed the right of indigent parties to litigate their rights

in court without providing security for costs. Campbell v. Lee, 12 Tenn. App. 293, 296-

97 (1930). Still, possessory bonds serve a separate purpose from cost bonds, and our

6

Ms. Pelt’s reliance on this Court’s decision in Elmwood Apartments v. Woodson, No. M2010-

00968-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 1487069, at *1 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2011), as authority for

allowing a tenant to meet the possessory bond requirement by paying rent as it became due is misplaced.

The adequacy of the possessory bond was not at issue in Elmwood Apartments. Id. at *3 (reversing the

lower court’s dismissal of the petition for certiorari and supersedeas because the court failed to allow the

defendant sufficient time to respond to the motion to dismiss).

6

courts have never excused an indigent litigant from providing security for a possessory

bond. See Scott v. Brandon, 143 S.W. 601, 602 (Tenn. 1911) (distinguishing between the

use of a pauper’s oath for a cost bond and a possessory bond in a replevin action); Crye-

Leike Prop. Mgmt. v. Dalton, No. W2015-02437-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 4771769, at *4

(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2016) (holding that indigent tenant had met the requirement to

provide security for costs with pauper’s oath but affirming dismissal of appeal when

tenant retained possession without posting a possession bond). To avoid posting a

possessory bond, indigent litigants always have the option of surrendering possession and

filing a direct appeal. Ballard, 839 S.W.2d at 90.

We next consider the amount of the possessory bond required by the statute.

Ms. Pelt first contends that the court erred by including the amount of the monetary

judgment awarded by the general sessions court in the calculation of the bond amount.

She points to the language of the statute and notes that it does not require a bond for any

judgment but rather a bond for “damages.” Additionally, she argues that the bond

requirement is limited to damages potentially incurred during the pendency of the appeal.

We find Ms. Pelt’s arguments unpersuasive. The natural and ordinary meaning of

“damages” includes a monetary judgment awarded in court as compensation for loss or

injury. See Damages, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining damages as

“[m]oney claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or

injury”); Taylor v. State, No. 02A01-91090BC-00182, 1991 WL 268357, at *2-3 (Tenn.

Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1991) (defining damages as the “pecuniary consequences which the

law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right”) (quoting 22 Am.

Jur. 2d Damages § 1 (1988)). By statute, the pecuniary consequences for unlawful

detainer are “the arrearage of rent, interest, and damages, if any,” assessed by the general

sessions court in conjunction with the possession judgment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-

125.

The plain language of the statute indicates that the bond must “cover, besides costs

and damages, the value of the rent of the premises during the litigation.” Id. § 29-18-129.

Following the rules of grammar and punctuation, “during the litigation” can only modify

“the value of the rent” not “costs and damages.” See Tenn. Manufactured Hous. Ass’n v.

Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 798 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (explaining that

although courts should not base their construction of a statute solely on technical rules of

grammar and punctuation, punctuation may be used in conjunction with other indicators

of meaning). Damages and the value of rent during the litigation are, contrary to Ms.

Pelt’s contention, two separate elements of the bond amount.

Our construction is supported by the history of statute. As the Supreme Court has

explained, since at least 1835, an unsuccessful defendant seeking writs of certiorari and

supersedeas was required to post a bond sufficient to cover costs and damages to the

landlord for wrongful prosecution of the writs and “wrongful detention of the premises.”

7

Simmons, 18 S.W. at 867. The Legislature subsequently amended the statute to include

in the bond requirement the “value of the rent during the litigation” in an effort to

enlarge, not to diminish, the landlord’s protection. Id. Limiting the scope of damages to

those incurred on appeal would run contrary to the statute’s intent as expressed in its

plain language. Thus, we conclude that the court properly interpreted damages to include

the amount of the monetary judgment awarded by the general sessions court.

Ms. Pelt next contends that, because she is indigent, the court erred by including

costs in the calculation of the bond amount. Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-127

authorizes indigent parties to commence a civil action without providing security for

costs and litigation taxes by filing a poverty oath and an affidavit of indigency.

Reasoning that “appeals, appeals in error, and writs of error, and writs of certiorari and

supersedeas in lieu of an appeal,” should be treated as actions, our courts have excused

indigents from providing security for costs in those instances as well. Brandon, 143 S.W.

at 601-02; Hewell v. Cherry, 158 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941); see also

Alexander v. Morris, 71 S.W. 751, 751 (Tenn. 1902) (construing predecessor statute to

include “all proceedings for correction of errors, such as appeal and writ of error, as these

are modes by which the suit is prosecuted”).

We strive to avoid a construction that places one statute in conflict with another.

Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tenn. 1995). “Statutes that relate to the same

subject matter or have a common purpose must be read in pari materia so as to give the

intended effect to both.” In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 552 (Tenn. 2015). Courts

must adopt the most “reasonable construction which avoids statutory conflict and

provides for harmonious operation of the laws.” Carver v. Citizen Utils. Co., 954 S.W.2d

34, 35 (Tenn. 1997).

In light of our liberal policy of allowing indigent parties to proceed in court

without first providing a cost bond, we conclude that the most reasonable construction of

Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-127 and § 29-18-129 is that an indigent defendant in

an unlawful detainer action who has petitioned for writs of certiorari and supersedeas is

required to post a possessory bond, but the bond does not have to include the costs of the

action. In other words, the bond posted by the indigent defendant must be sufficient in

amount to cover damages and the value of the rent of the premises during the litigation.

See Horton v. Vowel, 51 Tenn. 622, 624-25 (1871) (holding in a replevin action that an

indigent plaintiff could proceed on a pauper’s oath after posting sufficient bond to secure

the property at issue); Crye-Leike Prop. Mgmt., 2016 WL 4771769, at *4.

In this case, although it erred in including the amount of costs in determining the

amount of the possessory bond, the circuit court did not err in dismissing the writ of

supersedeas. Ms. Pelt failed to post a possessory bond of any amount.

8

C. WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Next, we address Ms. Pelt’s claim that, even if the court properly dismissed the

writ of supersedeas because she failed to post the necessary bond, the court erred in also

dismissing the writ of certiorari. According to Ms. Pelt, she was still entitled to de novo

review of the general sessions judgment because no bond is required for a writ of

certiorari. We conclude that under the circumstances of this case, Ms. Pelt was not

entitled to proceed with a writ of certiorari after the writ of supersedeas was dismissed.

The writs of certiorari and supersedeas7 in Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-18-

129 are only available for review of judgments in forcible entry and detainer, forcible

detainer, and unlawful detainer actions and are intended to be used together to enable an

unsuccessful defendant to remain in possession of the leased premises while seeking a de

novo review. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-107 (2012); Kinnard, 207 S.W.2d at 1020

(acknowledging that unsuccessful defendant in unlawful detainer action “could have used

the certiorari and supersedeas together . . . , had she wished to remain in possession of the

property, as provided by [precursor statute to Tenn. Code. Ann. § 29-18-129]”);

CitiFinancial Mortg. Co. v. Beasley, No. W2006-00386-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 77289,

at *4 n.6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2007) (“Certiorari and supersedeas allow the defendant

to retain possession of the property, whereas appeal leaves the defendant vulnerable to

the writ of possession.”). The writ of certiorari in this statute was not intended for use as

a substitute for appeal. Hurt v. Dougherty, 35 Tenn. 418, 425 (1856) (“The certiorari is

not, in forcible entry and detainer cases, a substitute for an appeal.”).

7

In addition to the writs of certiorari and supersedeas available for review of an unlawful detainer

action, Tennessee statutes authorize courts, in appropriate cases, to issue two other writs of certiorari, the

common law writ and the statutory writ. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101, -102 (2000). The main

difference between the common law and the statutory writs is the available scope of review. State v.

Lane, 254 S.W.3d 349, 354 n.4 (Tenn. 2008). Under the common law writ, the reviewing court may only

consider whether a board or tribunal “(1) has exceeded its jurisdiction, or (2) has acted illegally,

arbitrarily, or fraudulently.” McCallen v. City of Memphis, 786 S.W.2d 633, 638 (Tenn. 1990) (quoting

Hoover Motor Exp. Co. v. R.R. and Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 261 S.W.2d 233, 238 (Tenn. 1953)). Review

under the statutory writ of certiorari is de novo. Id.

In a case involving a common law or statutory writ of certiorari, the court may issue a writ of

supersedeas when necessary. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-112 (2000). Dismissal of an ancillary writ of

supersedeas does not affect the reviewing court’s authority to consider the merits of the case. See

Hewgley v. Trice, 340 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tenn. 1960) (discussing the court’s jurisdiction upon issuing

“the common law writ of certiorari, and in aid thereof, the ancillary writ of supersedeas, to review an

interlocutory order or decree of a lower court”). The cases cited by Ms. Pelt as authority for her position

involve an ancillary writ of supersedeas, not the writ of supersedeas in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-129.

See id. at 919; McKee v. Bd. of Elections, 116 S.W.2d 1033, 1037 (Tenn. 1938); City of Nashville v.

Dad’s Auto Accessories, Inc., 285 S.W. 52, 53 (Tenn. 1926).

9

Although the separate statutory writ of certiorari can be used as a substitute for

appeal, this remedy is only available when a party has been denied an appeal through no

fault of their own. See Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Dennis, 675 S.W.2d 489, 490-

91 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-102 (2000). “[U]nless the petitioner

has been deprived of his appeal by inevitable accident, by the wrongful act of the justice

or adverse party, or by his own blameless misfortune, no matter how meritorious his case

may be,” the petition will be dismissed. Jasper Engine & Transmission Exch. v. Mills,

911 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). Dismissal was appropriate here.

Ms. Pelt filed her petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas within the time

allowed for filing a direct appeal. She was not deprived of an appeal and cannot establish

a “good and sufficient reason for not taking an appeal.” See Ammons v. Coker, 139 S.W.

732, 733 (Tenn. 1911) (holding that, even in an unlawful detainer action, the writ of

certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for appeal without making the proper showing);

but see Hewell, 158 S.W.2d at 372-74 (allowing use of statutory writ as a substitute for

appeal when general sessions judge had denied petitioner permission to appeal).

Consequently, the separate statutory writ of certiorari was not available to Ms. Pelt as a

substitute for appeal.

D. WRIT OF POSSESSION

Finally, we address Ms. Pelt’s claim that the execution of the writ of possession

violated the thirty-day stay in Rule 62.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.8

We conclude that the thirty-day stay did not apply to the court’s order dismissing the

writs of certiorari and supersedeas.

We apply the well-known rules of statutory construction to the interpretation of

procedural rules. Lind, 356 S.W.3d at 895. Our goal is to “effectuate the drafters’ intent

without broadening or restricting the intended scope of the rule.” Fair v. Cochran, 418

S.W.3d 542, 544 (Tenn. 2013). We seek to discern intent from the language used in the

rule. When that language is unambiguous, we simply enforce the rule as written. Id. If

the language of the rule is capable of more than one meaning, we “must seek a reasonable

construction in light of the purposes, objectives, and spirit of the [rule] based on good

sound reasoning.” Scott v. Ashland Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 49 S.W.3d 281, 286 (Tenn.

2001) (quoting State v. Turner, 913 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1995)).

The Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure did not apply in this case until after it was

removed to the circuit court for de novo review. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 1(2); Brown v. Roland,

8

Although Ms. Pelt filed a motion for stay of judgment of possession, pursuant to Rules 62.02

and 62.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, requesting that the circuit court grant an additional

stay of proceedings to enforce its order dismissing the writs during appeal, she has not raised the circuit

court’s denial of her motion for stay as an issue on appeal.

10

357 S.W.3d 614, 618 (Tenn. 2012). Absent a writ of supersedeas, a possession judgment

rendered in general sessions court is only stayed for ten days. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-

126; Bell, 202 S.W.2d at 656 (“It has long been recognized as the law in this State that an

appeal by defendant from an adverse judgment [in an unlawful detainer action] does not

forestall the writ of possession. The writs of certiorari and supersedeas under [Tenn.

Code Ann. § 29-18-129] are the only means of reaching that result.”).

The writ of possession was stayed by the writ of supersedeas issued on June 26,

2015. But, on August 13, 2015, the circuit court dismissed the writ after Ms. Pelt failed

to post the required possessory bond. Once the writ of supersedeas was dismissed, GHA,

as the prevailing party in general sessions court, was entitled to the issuance and

execution of the writ of possession. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-130(a).

Ms. Pelt argues, however, that Rule 62.01 stayed execution or enforcement of the

court’s dismissal order for thirty days after its entry date, and therefore, the writ of

supersedeas remained in place. Rule 62.019 expressly excludes injunction actions from

the thirty-day stay. When the relief granted by the circuit court is “essentially injunctive

in nature,” this Court has held that enforcement of the judgment is not stayed absent an

express order from the circuit court. Open Lake Sporting Club v. Lauderdale Haywood

Angling Club, 511 S.W.3d 494, 505 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015), appeal denied, (Jan. 14,

2016). The determination of whether, and on what terms, to stay an injunction or the

denial of an injunction is left to the discretion of the judge. Id.

Ms. Pelt petitioned the circuit court for a writ of certiorari to remove the unlawful

detainer action from general sessions court for de novo review and for a writ of

supersedeas to stay the writ of possession. A writ is a court order “commanding the

addressee to do or refrain from doing some specified act.” Writ, Black’s Law Dictionary

(10th ed. 2014). As such, a writ is injunctive in nature, and to the extent the circuit

court’s order dismissed the writs, the order was the equivalent of a denial of injunctive

relief. See Injunction, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining injunction as a

“court order commanding or preventing an action”). Therefore, Rule 62.01 did not apply

9

Rule 62.01 provides, in relevant part:

Except as otherwise provided in this Rule, no execution shall issue upon a judgment, nor

shall proceedings be taken for its enforcement until the expiration of 30 days after its

entry. In injunction and receivership actions, . . . an interlocutory or final judgment shall

not be stayed after entry unless otherwise ordered by the court and upon such terms as to

bond or otherwise as it deems proper to secure the other party.

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 62.01.

11

to the dismissal of the writs, and GHA was entitled to seek and enforce the writ of

possession.10

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s order dismissing the writs

of certiorari and supersedeas with prejudice.

_________________________________

W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JUDGE

10

The portion of the circuit court’s order granting a monetary judgment, however, was subject to

the thirty-day stay provided in Rule 62.01. See Forgey-Lewis v. Lewis, No. E2009-00851-COA-R3-CV,

2011 WL 332710, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2011) (holding it was error to allow garnishment before

expiration of thirty-day stay).

12