David E. Breezee v. State of Tennessee

05/09/2017

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

December 6, 2016 Session

DAVID E. BREEZEE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Benton County

No. 10-CR-45 C. Creed McGinley, Judge

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No. W2015-02251-CCA-R3-PC

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The Petitioner, David E. Breezee, appeals the Benton County Circuit Court’s denial of his

petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of rape of a child, rape, and two

counts of incest and resulting effective thirty-four-year sentence. On appeal, he contends

that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, that the post-conviction court

erred by denying his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, and that he is entitled to a

second post-conviction evidentiary hearing due to post-conviction counsel’s deficient

performance. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we

affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E. GLENN

and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JJ., joined.

Lance R. Chism, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, David Eugene Breezee.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Zachary T. Hinkle, Assistant

Attorney General; Matthew F. Stowe, District Attorney General; and Bruce I. Griffey,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

In June 2010, the Benton County Grand Jury indicted the Petitioner for rape of a

child, a Class A felony, in count one; rape, a Class B felony, in count three; and incest, a

Class C felony, in counts two and four. The charges alleged two different victims, B.W.

and D.W., who were the Petitioner’s stepdaughters. The trial court severed the offenses

in counts one and two involving D.W. from the offenses in counts three and four

involving B.W. The Petitioner was tried for counts three and four in April 2011 and

counts one and two in August 2011.

At the first trial, B.W. testified that on February 24, 2010, the Petitioner “came

into her bedroom, pinned her against the wall, and put his hand down her pants and that

he ‘play[ed]’ with her vagina, ‘sticking his fingers inside [her].’” State v. David Eugene

Breezee, No. W2011-01231-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 6728345, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. at

Jackson, Dec. 28, 2012), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. May 14, 2013). D.W. and

D.W.’s boyfriend testified that when D.W. opened the bedroom door, they saw B.W.

pinned against the wall and the Petitioner’s hand down her pants. Id. at *3-4. A jury

convicted the Petitioner of rape and incest of B.W. as charged. After a sentencing

hearing, the trial court merged the incest conviction into the rape conviction and

sentenced the Petitioner to ten years in confinement. See id. at *1.

At the second trial, D.W. testified that one night in 2007, when she was twelve

years old, she awoke with her shorts and undergarment on the floor and the Petitioner’s

tongue in her vagina. See State v. David Eugene Breezee, No. W2011-02186-CCA-R3-

CD, 2012 WL 6717308, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Dec. 26, 2012), perm. to

appeal denied, (Tenn. May 14, 2013). She tried to push him away, but he held her so she

could not move and told her to “shh.” Id. The Petitioner stopped when her mother

walked into the room. Id. On cross-examination, D.W. testified that the Petitioner would

beat her every night while her mother was at work and that the beatings continued for

three to four years. Id. at *4. The mother of the victims testified that she walked in on

the Petitioner’s performing oral sex on D.W. Id. at *3. A second jury convicted the

Petitioner of rape of a child and incest as charged. Id. at *4. After a sentencing hearing,

the trial court merged the incest conviction into the rape of a child conviction and

sentenced him to twenty-five years in confinement. See id. The trial court ordered that

the Petitioner serve the twenty-five-year sentence consecutively to the ten-year sentence

for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years. See id.

The Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences. This court affirmed his

conviction and sentence for rape of a child in count one, reinstated his incest conviction

in count two, and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing as to both counts.

Id. at *1. Two days later, this court affirmed his conviction and sentence for rape in

count three, reinstated his incest conviction in count four, and remanded the case for

resentencing on count four. See David Eugene Breezee, No. W2011-01231-CCA-R3-

CD, 2012 WL 6728345, at *1.

On remand, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to twenty-two years for rape of

a child and five years for each incest conviction. State v. David Eugene Breezee, No.

W2013-00798-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 5745677, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson,

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Oct. 21, 2013), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Mar. 4, 2014). The court ordered that the

Petitioner serve the twenty-two-year sentence consecutively to the previously imposed

ten-year sentence for rape and that he serve the two five-year sentences concurrently with

each other and the other sentences for a total effective sentence of thirty-two years. Id.

This court affirmed the Petitioner’s sentences. Id. at *4.

On July 17, 2014, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief,

alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed

to argue that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offenses were

committed prior to the return of the indictment; failed to interview and call exculpatory

witnesses, including his parents, to testify at trial; failed to object to and request a

limiting instruction regarding testimony about prior bad acts; failed to object to the

State’s knowing use of perjured testimony; and failed to reveal to the jury that B.W. had

received monetary consideration for her testimony against the Petitioner.1 On September

3, 2014, the Petitioner filed a second pro se petition in which he alleged “newly

discovered evidence” in the form of two letters that showed D.W. and her mother had a

motive to fabricate sexual abuse allegations against him. The second petition also raised

additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including that trial counsel failed to

call Ronnie Quillen to testify that he slept on the Petitioner’s couch in February 2007 and

that no sexual misconduct occurred, failed to object to testimony about “sexual abuse

syndrome,” and failed to request jury instructions on all lesser-included offenses.

The post-conviction court appointed counsel, and counsel filed an amended

petition, maintaining that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the State did

not prove the offenses were committed prior to the return of the indictment; failing to

interview and call exculpatory witnesses, including the Petitioner’s parents; failing to

object to and request a limiting instruction on prior bad acts; failing to object to the

State’s knowing use of perjured testimony; and failing to reveal to the jury that B.W. was

promised money from the Victim’s Compensation Fund in exchange for her testimony.

Post-conviction counsel also alleged that evidence unknown to exist at the time of the

trials demonstrated a motive for D.W. and her mother to lie about the abuse.

The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing. At the outset of the

hearing, the court stated that “we’ll be proceeding on [the] ‘Amended Petition’ and [the]

‘Answer’ [to that petition filed by the State] concerning the grounds that have been

alleged.” Post-conviction counsel said nothing to the contrary and called Barbara Parker,

the Petitioner’s mother, as the Petitioner’s first witness. Ms. Parker testified that after the

Petitioner’s trials, she paid off the title loan for D.W.’s father’s truck. Ms. Parker was

1

According to the petition, “Bribes from the Victim Compensation Fund was revealed by a State

official and overheard by [the Petitioner’s father].”

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supposed to be repaid or take ownership of the truck, and the truck stayed parked in her

yard for one year. At that point, she decided she had waited “long enough,” “went

through the belongings” in the truck, and found two letters. The first letter was from the

victims’ mother to D.W.’s father in which she said she loved him and wanted to be with

him. Ms. Parker said that she did not remember seeing a date on the letter but that the

victims’ mother wrote the letter while still living with the Petitioner. Ms. Parker said that

the second letter, which she assumed was from the State, stated that D.W. was paid from

the “‘Victim’s Fund’” before the Petitioner’s trials. The letter was dated.2

Ms. Parker testified that she did not think a proper investigation was conducted

regarding the victims’ allegations. She explained that the Petitioner “had a lot of out of

town jobs” while he worked for Wade Dortch Roofing and that he was not home every

night as D.W. had claimed at trial. He then went to work as an over-the-road truck driver

for Warner Enterprises. She acknowledged, though, that she was at the Petitioner’s home

on the day of one of the alleged crimes and that the Petitioner was there.

On cross-examination by the State, Ms. Parker acknowledged that she did not

know what happened in the home after she left that day. She also acknowledged that an

investigation was conducted but said that it was “very very brief.” Regarding the letter

from the victims’ mother to D.W.’s father, Ms. Parker acknowledged that it did not prove

the Petitioner did not commit the crimes. She said that the “‘Victim’s Fund’” letter also

did not prove his innocence but said that “you shouldn’t get paid until you find out who

the victim is.” Ms. Parker gave the “‘Victim’s Fund’” letter to the Petitioner’s trial

counsel when she found it. She said that she did not remember exactly when she gave it

to counsel but that it was sometime after the Petitioner’s trials. Ms. Parker stated that she

was present at the Petitioner’s trials and that she would have testified for him if called. At

that point, the post-conviction court asked if post-conviction counsel was alleging that

Ms. Parker should have testified at the trials. Post-conviction counsel said no, and the

court stated, “Let’s kind of stick to our ‘Amended Petition[’] and the ‘State’s

Response.’”3 The State did not ask Ms. Parker any further questions.

John R. Breezee, Sr., the Petitioner’s father, testified that he and Ms. Parker went

to the assistant district public defender’s office after the Petitioner’s first or second trial

and that counsel told them “right out that he didn’t care one way or the other, because he

was going to get paid any ways.” Mr. Breezee stated that he repeatedly asked counsel

why counsel did not do more for the Petitioner’s defense and that counsel kept “throwing

out a 412 Rule at me, or something like that.” Mr. Breezee said that the Petitioner’s trial

2

According to the copy of the letter attached to the Petitioner’s September 2014 pro se petition,

the letter was dated August 27, 2010.

3

This issue was raised in the Petitioner’s amended petition.

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was the prosecutor’s first trial and that “[i]n my opinion, he was showboating for his

parents.” Mr. Breezee then described an incident that occurred during jury deliberations:

I was standing out there on the bridge out there when the air

conditioning was down where the jury couldn’t go to the

regular room. They crossed the [bridge] out there to [go] to a

room over there, and the D.A. said, “Well, we need a guilty

verdict here or nobody is going home tonight.”

Mr. Breezee told trial counsel about the prosecutor’s statement.

On cross-examination, the State asked if Mr. Breezee knew what the prosecutor

was referring to, and Mr. Breezee answered, “The only thing I can make out of that was

that he was wanting a guilty verdict.” The State asked if the prosecutor could have been

talking to some people from his office, and Mr. Breezee said, “No, because a couple of

the jurors said, ‘Oh, we’ve got to do something, because we need to go home tonight.’”

Mr. Breezee said that the jurors were talking among themselves as they were walking

across the bridge and that four or five other people also heard the prosecutor’s statement.

Ronnie Quillen testified that he had been friends with the Petitioner for about

twenty-five years and that he lived with the Petitioner and the victims’ mother “on

several different occasions” for six or eight years. He said he was not present when any

of the alleged acts took place and was in Florida at the time of the Petitioner’s trials. Mr.

Quillen stated that the victims’ mother was “always cheating” on the Petitioner, that she

even told Mr. Quillen that she loved Mr. Quillen, and that the Petitioner “ain’t never

touched them kids.” Post-conviction counsel asked if Mr. Quillen was living with the

Petitioner on February 12, 2007, and he answered, “Let me think. If it was it was just

right after that that I went to Florida.” He said he never saw the Petitioner do anything to

the victims.

The State did not present any proof. In a written order, the post-conviction court

denied the petition for post-conviction relief. The court first noted that the Petitioner was

represented at both trials by the district public defender and the assistant district public

defender. The court then stated that it was skeptical of the testimony by the Petitioner’s

parents “due to the relationship and possible bias on behalf of the [P]etitioner.” As to

Ms. Parker’s testimony about the two letters, the post-conviction court found that the

letters were not available at either trial but stated that nothing indicated the letters would

have had any impact on the trials. The court also stated that it did not think a victim’s

receiving payments as partial restitution for being a victim would have had any effect on

showing bias in the victim’s testimony. The court noted that it heard both of the victims

testify at the trials and that “their testimony was incredibly persuasive and incriminating.”

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As to Mr. Breezee’s testimony, the court found “absolutely no evidence of jury

misconduct” and that, in any event, the proof at the trials was “overwhelming.” As to

Mr. Quillen’s testimony, the court noted that Mr. Quillen was not present at the trials,

that he was not present when the alleged acts occurred, and that he “just gave generalized

testimony that he believed the [P]etitioner could not be guilty.” The court found that

defense counsel “ably represented” the Petitioner at trial and “did everything they could

legitimately do on behalf of their client.”

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of

counsel because trial counsel failed to challenge the validity of the verdict in the April

2011 trial based on Mr. Breezee’s testimony that the jury was exposed to improper

outside influence, failed to call Barbara Parker to testify at his August 2011 trial, and

failed to call Ronnie Quillen to testify at both trials. The Petitioner also contends that the

post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for a writ of error coram nobis and

that he is entitled to a second post-conviction evidentiary hearing based on post-

conviction counsel’s deficient performance at the first hearing.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To be successful in a claim for post-conviction relief, a petitioner must prove the

factual allegations contained in the post-conviction petition by clear and convincing

evidence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110(f). “‘Clear and convincing evidence means

evidence in which there is no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the

conclusions drawn from the evidence.’” State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1999) (quoting Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn.

1992)). Issues regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be accorded

their testimony, and the factual questions raised by the evidence adduced at trial are to be

resolved by the post-conviction court as the trier of fact. See Henley v. State, 960

S.W.2d 572, 579 (Tenn. 1997). Therefore, the post-conviction court’s findings of fact are

entitled to substantial deference on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against

those findings. See Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001).

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact.

See State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). We will review the post-conviction

court’s findings of fact de novo with a presumption that those findings are correct. See

Fields, 40 S.W.3d at 458. However, we will review the post-conviction court’s

conclusions of law purely de novo. Id.

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When a petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective

assistance of counsel, “the petitioner bears the burden of proving both that counsel’s

performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” Goad v.

State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984)). To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must show that counsel’s

performance was below “the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal

cases.” Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). To establish prejudice, the

petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Generally,

[b]ecause a petitioner must establish both prongs of the test, a

failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides a

sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance

claim. Indeed, a court need not address the components in

any particular order or even address both if the [petitioner]

makes an insufficient showing of one component.

Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

Turning to the instant case, the Petitioner notes that trial counsel did not testify at

the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. He argues that he made an initial showing of the

jury’s exposure to improper outside influence during the April 2011 trial through his

father’s testimony at the hearing and, therefore, that the burden shifted to the State to

explain the conduct or demonstrate it was harmless. He asserts that because the State

failed to present trial counsel at the hearing, “he successfully established that the

Prosecutor made an improper comment to the jury” and that his case was prejudiced by

the improper comment. The State responds that the post-conviction court found Mr.

Breezee’s testimony about the prosecutor’s comment to the jury not credible and that it

was the Petitioner’s responsibility to have defense counsel testify at the evidentiary

hearing.

We are perplexed that the State failed to call trial counsel to testify. “We have

observed on many occasions that original counsel, when available, should always testify

in a post-conviction proceeding when there is an allegation that he was ineffective.”

State v. Hopson, 589 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979). Moreover, “the state

should present the attacked counsel to show what occurred.” State v. Craven, 656

S.W.2d 872, 873 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982); Garrett v. State, 530 S.W.2d 98, 99 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1975).

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Nevertheless, even without trial counsel’s testimony at the post-conviction

evidentiary hearing to contradict the Petitioner’s claim of outside influence, the Petitioner

has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to relief. In the

order denying the petition, the post-conviction court found “absolutely no evidence of

jury misconduct.” Moreover, the court found that the evidence against the Petitioner was

overwhelming. Thus, the Petitioner did not establish deficient performance or prejudice.

During oral arguments, post-conviction counsel asserted that the post-conviction court

improperly found the Petitioner’s father not credible based solely on the witness’s

familial relationship. We disagree. While the court stated that it was considering Mr.

Breezee’s testimony “with skepticism” due to his relationship with the Petitioner, the

court did not make a blanket determination regarding his credibility. The court then

found Mr. Breezee’s testimony about the prosecutor’s comment to the jury not credible.

We note that although the Petitioner claims the prosecutor made the statement during the

April 2011 trial, Mr. Breezee did not say when he heard the statement. We conclude that

the Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

The Petitioner also claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to have Ms.

Parker testify at his August 2011 trial that he was out of town often, which would have

contradicted D.W.’s testimony that he was at home every night. The Petitioner

acknowledges that the post-conviction court specifically asked post-conviction counsel

during the evidentiary hearing if he was alleging that Ms. Parker should have testified

and that counsel said no. Nevertheless, he requests that we consider the issue. The post-

conviction court did not address the issue in its order denying relief, and we conclude that

the issue has been waived. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) (providing that “[n]othing in this

rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or

who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the

harmful effect of an error). In any event, while Ms. Parker testified at the hearing that the

Petitioner was gone often, she testified that he was home on the day of at least one of the

incidents. Moreover, the post-conviction court concluded that the trial evidence was

overwhelming. Therefore, the Petitioner is not entitled to relief. See Tenn. R. App. P.

36(b); State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (providing that

in order to an error to be considered plain error, “consideration of the issue is necessary

to do substantial justice”).

Regarding Mr. Quillen, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel should have

called Mr. Quillen to testify at both trials about the victims’ mother’s infidelity, which

would have allowed counsel to argue that she was not credible and that she had a motive

to lie against the Petitioner. However, the Petitioner did not raise this specific issue in his

amended petition for post-conviction relief. He also did not raise it at the evidentiary

hearing, and the post-conviction court did not address it in the order denying the petition.

See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). Moreover, as noted by the State, the victims’ mother

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admitted at the Petitioner’s first trial that she “‘mess[ed] around’” with a registered sex

offender in 2007 while the Petitioner was working away from home. See David Eugene

Breezee, No. W2011-02186-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 6717308, at *3. Thus, trial counsel

and one jury were aware of her infidelity. That jury convicted the Petitioner anyway, and

we conclude that he is not entitled to relief. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b).

B. Error Coram Nobis

Next, the Petitioner claims that the post-conviction court erred by denying his

petition for a writ of error coram nobis, seeking relief for the two letters found by his

mother. He acknowledges that he did not file a separate document titled “petition for writ

of error coram nobis” in this case but argues that the post-conviction court should have

addressed the letters as a petition for writ of error coram nobis because they constituted

“newly discovered evidence.” We disagree with the Petitioner.

As noted by the Petitioner, this court addressed this very issue in Cyntoia Denise

Brown v. State, No. M2013-00825-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 5780718, at *1 (Tenn. Crim.

App. Nov. 6, 2014), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. May 15, 2015). In that case, the

petitioner’s pro se petition for post-conviction relief contained a brief section titled

“‘NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE’” regarding her claim that fetal alcohol

syndrome played a part in her actions on the night of the crime. Cyntoia Denise Brown,

No. M2013-00825-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 5780718, at *20. In her amended petition,

she argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of

the disease. Id. As in the instant case, Brown’s post-conviction counsel never mentioned

“error coram nobis” prior to or at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the State did

not respond to the issue as an error coram nobis claim, and the post-conviction court did

not address the issue as an error coram nobis claim or state the coram nobis standard of

review. Id. Thus, this court concluded that the issue for coram nobis relief was not

raised in the court below, and we refused to treat the petition for post-conviction relief as

one requesting relief under the writ of error coram nobis. Id. (citing Asata Lowe v. State,

No. E2006-02028-CCA-MR3-PC, 2008 WL 631169, at *23 (Tenn. Crim. App. at

Knoxville, Mar. 10, 2008), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 2008)). We see no reason to

rule any differently here. Moreover, while the Petitioner attached copies of the letters to

his September 2014 pro se petition, he did not introduce the original letters into evidence

at the post-conviction hearing. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). Thus, he is not entitled to

relief.

D. Second Post-Conviction Evidentiary Hearing

Finally, the Petitioner contends that at the very least, he is entitled to a second

post-conviction evidentiary hearing due to the deficient performance of his first post-

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conviction counsel.4 Specifically, he contends that a second hearing is warranted because

post-conviction counsel failed to follow Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28 section

6(C)(3), which requires that counsel file a certificate of counsel within thirty days of

being appointed; failed to address the numerous claims raised in the pro se petitions and

the amended petition at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing; failed to call trial counsel

to testify at the hearing; and made no argument at the close of proof.

Initially, we note that “there is no constitutional entitlement to the effective

assistance of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding.” Frazier v. State, 303 S.W.3d 674,

680 (Tenn. 2010). Nevertheless, Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28 section 6(C)

provides as follows:

(2) Appointed or retained counsel shall be required to

review the pro se petition, file an amended petition asserting

other claims which petitioner arguably has or a written notice

that no amended petition will be filed, interview relevant

witnesses, including petitioner and prior counsel, and

diligently investigate and present all reasonable claims.

(3) Appointed or retained counsel shall file the

certificate of counsel set forth in the appendix within thirty

(30) days of either being retained or appointed to represent

petitioner, except for good cause shown.

However, our supreme court has stated that while Tennessee Supreme Court Rule

28 section 6(C)(2) and section 6(C)(3) “set forth a minimum standard of service to which

post-conviction counsel is held,” they “do not provide any basis for relief from a

conviction or sentence.” Id. at 681. Additionally, this court has repeatedly held that

post-conviction counsel’s Rule 28 violations do not warrant a second post-conviction

hearing. See, e.g., Thaddeus Johnson v. State, No. W2014-00053-CCA-R3-PC, 2014

WL 7401989, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Dec. 29, 2014), perm. to app. denied,

(Tenn. May 18, 2015); Anthony Boyland v. State, No. W2013-01226-CCA-MR3-PC,

2014 WL 3818612, at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Aug. 4, 2014), perm. to appeal

denied, (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2014); Jonathan Everett v. State, No. W2013-02033-CCA-R3-

PC, 2014 WL 3744498, at *67 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, July 28, 2014), perm. to

appeal denied, (Tenn. Nov. 19, 2014). In any event, post-conviction counsel filed an

amended petition raising many of the issues in the pro se petitions and then filed a motion

to declare the case “complex and/or extended.” In that motion, counsel stated that he had

4

Post-conviction counsel in the present appeal did not file the amended petition for post-

conviction relief or represent the Petitioner at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing.

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spent “a significant and lengthy” amount of time researching and reviewing the

Petitioner’s case file and that meetings and conferences with the Petitioner and his family

had been “extensive and lengthy.” The State agreed, and the post-conviction court

granted the motion. A post-conviction evidentiary hearing was held, and counsel called

the Petitioner’s parents and Mr. Quillen to testify. Although counsel did not address

many of the Petitioner’s claims at the hearing, “[a]ll that due process requires in the post-

conviction setting is that the defendant have ‘the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful

time and in a meaningful manner.” Stokes v. State, 146 S.W.3d 56, 61 (Tenn. 2004)

(quoting House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705, 711 (Tenn. 1995)). Accordingly, we conclude

that the Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

III. Conclusion

Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the

judgment of the post-conviction court.

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NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE

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