observing that "ordinarily the best practice would be for a trial judge to permit the examination of the scope of an expert's opinion – when its admissibility is challenged – at a pretrial N.J.R.E. 104(a) hearing"
How later courts described this case
- observing that "ordinarily the best practice would be for a trial judge to permit the examination of the scope of an expert's opinion – when its admissibility is challenged – at a pretrial N.J.R.E. 104(a) hearing"
- finding no error in the failure to conduct a Rule 104 hearing because the expert was examined at a deposition and that deposition testimony was available to and considered by the trial court at the time of its ruling
- explaining a conflict between the laws of two states exists if "one state provides a cause of action but the other does not"
- "A conflict arises . . . when one state A-1576-17T3 16 provides a cause of action but the other does not . . . ."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0963-12T1
FAIRFAX FINANCIAL HOLDINGS
LIMITED and CRUM & FORSTER
HOLDINGS CORP., APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiffs-Appellants/ April 27, 2017
Cross-Respondents, APPELLATE DIVISION
v.
S.A.C. CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.L.C.,
S.A.C. CAPITAL ADVISORS, L.L.C.,
S.A.C. CAPITAL ASSOCIATES, L.L.C.,
SIGMA CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.L.C.,
STEVEN A. COHEN, ROCKER PARTNERS,
L.P., COPPER RIVER PARTNERS, L.P.,
DAVID ROCKER, THIRD POINT L.L.C.,
DANIEL S. LOEB, JEFFREY PERRY,
INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT PARTNERS, L.L.C.,
WILLIAM GAHAN,1 JAMES S. CHANOS, and
KYNIKOS ASSOCIATES, L.P.,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
EXIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, INC.,
EXIS CAPITAL, L.L.C., EXIS
DIFFERENTIAL PARTNERS, L.P., EXIS
INTEGRATED PARTNERS, L.P., ADAM D.
SENDER, ANDREW HELLER, and MORGAN
KEEGAN & COMPANY, INC.,
Defendants-Respondents/
Cross-Appellants,
1 Defendants Institutional Credit Partners, L.L.C. and William
Gahan entered into a stipulation of dismissal with plaintiffs
prior to oral argument.
and
SPYRO CONTOGOURIS, MAX BERNSTEIN,
MI4 INVESTORS, L.L.C., MI4
RECONNAISSANCE, L.L.C., MI4
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, JOHN D. GWYNN,2
and CHRISTOPHER BRETT LAWLESS,
Defendants.
______________________________________________
Argued October 17, 2016 – Decided April 27, 2017
Before Judges Fisher, Ostrer and Leone.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Docket
No. L-2032-06.
Michael J. Bowe (Kasowitz, Benson, Torres &
Friedman, L.L.P.) of the New York bar,
admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for
appellants/cross-respondents (Nagel Rice,
L.L.P. and Kasowitz, Benson, Torres &
Friedman, L.L.P., attorneys; Bruce H. Nagel,
Jay J. Rice, Marc E. Kasowitz of the New
York bar, admitted pro hac vice, Daniel R.
Benson of the New York bar, admitted pro hac
vice, and Mr. Bowe, of counsel and on the
briefs).
2 Defendant John Gwynn passed away in 2009. He had filed a
counterclaim, which alleged defamation, and the absence of a
disposition of that claim generated inquiries about finality
from this court soon after the appeal was filed. We were advised
that a representative of Gwynn's estate had been substituted in
his place pursuant to Rule 4:34-1, but that the estate had not
appeared in response to the claims asserted against him or to
prosecute his counterclaim. A remand to the trial court resulted
in the filing of a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice of
Gwynn's counterclaim. Gwynn's estate has neither appeared nor
taken any part in this appeal.
2 A-0963-12T1
Benjamin P. McCallen (Willkie Farr &
Gallagher, L.L.P.) of the New York bar,
admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for
respondents S.A.C. Capital Management,
L.L.C., S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.L.C.,
S.A.C. Capital Associates, L.L.C., Sigma
Capital Management, L.L.C. and Steven A.
Cohen (Parker Ibrahim & Berg, L.L.C. and Mr.
McCallen, attorneys; Joseph T. Boccassini,
Martin B. Klotz of the New York bar,
admitted pro hac vice, and Scott S. Rose of
the New York bar, admitted pro hac vice, on
the brief).
Mark S. Werbner (Sayles Werbner, P.C.) of
the Texas bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued
the cause for respondents/cross-appellants
Exis Capital Management, Inc., Exis Capital,
L.L.C., Exis Differential Partners, L.P.,
Exis Integrated Partners, L.P., Adam D.
Sender and Andrew Heller (Walder Hayden &
Brogan, P.A., and Mr. Werbner, attorneys;
Richard A. Sayles of the Texas bar, admitted
pro hac vice, Mr. Werbner, Mark D. Strachan
of the Texas bar, admitted pro hac vice, and
Mark Torian, of the Texas bar, admitted pro
hac vice, of counsel; Rebekah R. Conroy and
Joseph A. Hayden, Jr., on the brief).
Gavin J. Rooney argued the cause for
respondents Copper River Partners, L.P.,
Rocker Partners, L.P. and David Rocker
(Lowenstein Sandler, L.L.P., attorneys; Mr.
Rooney, on the brief).
Tibor L. Nagy, Jr., argued the cause for
respondents Third Point L.L.C., Daniel S.
Loeb and Jeffrey Perry (Tompkins, McGuire,
Wachenfeld & Barry, L.L.P. and Matthew S.
Dontzin (Dontzin Nagy & Fleissig, L.L.P.) of
the New York bar, admitted pro hac vice,
attorneys; Mr. Dontzin, Mr. Nagy, and
William McGuire, on the brief).
Thomas F. Campion argued the cause for
respondent/cross-appellant Morgan Keegan &
3 A-0963-12T1
Company, Inc. (Greenberg, Traurig, L.L.P.,
Drinker Biddle & Reath, L.L.P., and Bruce W.
Collins (Carrington, Coleman, Sloman &
Blumenthal, L.L.P.) of the Texas bar,
admitted pro hac vice, attorneys; Philip R.
Sellinger, Roger B. Kaplan, Aaron Van
Nostrand, Mr. Collins, Diane M. Sumoski of
the Texas bar, admitted pro hac vice, Todd
A. Murray of the Texas bar, admitted pro hac
vice and Bryan A. Erman, of the Texas bar,
admitted pro hac vice, on the briefs).
Stewart D. Aaron (Arnold & Porter, L.L.P.)
of the New York bar, admitted pro hac vice,
argued the cause for respondents Kynikos
Associates, L.P. and James S. Chanos
(Gibbons, P.C., and Mr. Aaron, attorneys;
Mr. Aaron, Susan L. Shin of the New York
bar, admitted pro hac vice, Joel D. Rohlf of
the New York bar, admitted pro hac vice, and
Marco J. Martemucci of the New York bar,
admitted pro hac vice, of counsel; Brian J.
McMahon and Joshua R. Elias, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FISHER, P.J.A.D.
In describing the adjudication of ostensibly difficult
cases, Justice Holmes observed that "when you walk up to the
lion and lay hold the hide comes off and the same old donkey of
a question of law is underneath."3 This case's leonine demeanor
is well-deserved. Discovery generated millions of pages of
documents, the parties conducted more than 150 depositions, the
3 Letter of December 11, 1909 appearing in 1 Holmes-Pollock
Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Sir
Frederick Pollock 1874-1932, at 156 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
1941).
4 A-0963-12T1
joint appendix consists of nearly 200,000 pages, and the
parties' excellent written submissions — succinct though they
are – total nearly 600 pages.4 Nevertheless, as predicted by
Holmes, after grappling with this lion's fearsome hide, we have
found not unfamiliar issues lurking beneath. The sheer size of
this case and the number of issues, however, has frustrated the
normal desire to succinctly describe the implements of decision
and, in the final analysis, overwhelmed our preference for
brevity. Consequently, we take the unusual step of presenting,
for the reader's ease, the following table of contents for this
overlength opinion:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 8
II. PLAINTIFFS' STORY …………………………………………………………………………………… 9
A. The Plot Alleged …………………………………………………………………………… 10
B. The Suit At Hand …………………………………………………………………………… 21
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS …………………………………… 22
IV. THE ISSUES POSED ……………………………………………………………………………………… 25
A. The Viability of the
Racketeering Claims ……………………………………………………………… 26
1. Plaintiffs' Arguments ………………………………………………… 26
4 So numerous were the filings in the trial court that the clerk
was required to assign a second docket number because the
court's database was unable to accommodate more than 999 filings
within a single docket number.
5 A-0963-12T1
2. The Judge's Decision …………………………………………………… 29
3. Our Holding …………………………………………………………………………… 34
(a) Some General Principles …………………………… 35
(b) Ginsberg's Impact …………………………………………… 36
(c) New Jersey's
Racketeering Laws ……………………………………………………… 40
(d) New York's
Racketeering Laws ……………………………………………………… 46
(e) The Choice ……………………………………………………………… 48
(i) Legislative Directive ………………… 50
a. Is There an Express
Directive? ………………………………… 50
b. Is There an Implied
Directive? ………………………………… 52
(ii) Application of the
Second Restatement ……………………………………… 56
a. Section 6 ………………………………………… 56
b. Section 145 …………………………………… 61
c. Specific Tort
Principles ………………………………… 64
(iii) Conclusion …………………………………………… 72
B. The Maintainability of the
Common Law Claims …………………………………………………………………… 73
1. The Statute of Limitations
Applicable to Plaintiffs'
Disparagement Claim ……………………………………………… 73
2. Dismissal of Plaintiffs'
Disparagement and Tortious
6 A-0963-12T1
Interference With Prospective
Economic Advantage Claims Based
on the Absence of
Special Damages …………………………………………………………… 82
(a) Choice of Law ……………………………………………………… 82
(b) Common Law Requirements …………………………… 83
(i) Disparagement ………………………………………… 83
(ii) Tortious Interference
With Prospective
Economic Advantage ………………………… 85
(c) Damages Asserted ……………………………………………… 86
3. Summary ……………………………………………………………………………………… 88
C. The Personal Jurisdiction Rulings ……………………………… 89
1. General Jurisdiction ………………………………………………… 91
(a) Kynikos ……………………………………………………………………… 91
(b) Third Point …………………………………………………………… 92
2. Specific Jurisdiction ………………………………………………… 95
3. Conspiracy-Based Jurisdiction …………………………… 96
4. Summary ……………………………………………………………………………………… 112
D. The Summary Judgments In Favor of
the SAC Defendants and the
Rocker Defendants …………………………………………………………………………… 113
1. The SAC Defendants ………………………………………………………… 113
(a) The Parties' Arguments ……………………………… 113
(b) The Trial Judge's Ruling ………………………… 115
(c) Our Holding …………………………………………………………… 117
2. The Rocker Defendants ………………………………………………… 123
7 A-0963-12T1
(a) The Parties' Arguments ……………………………… 123
(b) The Trial Judge's Ruling ………………………… 125
(c) Our Holding …………………………………………………………… 128
E. Lost Profits and the Elson Reports …………………………… 129
1. General Principles ………………………………………………………… 132
2. The Judge's Disposition of
the In Limine Motion
Regarding Elson's
Expert Testimony ………………………………………………………… 133
3. Our Ruling ……………………………………………………………………………… 136
V. THE CROSS-APPEALS ……………………………………………………………………………………… 141
A. Standing ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 141
B. First Amendment Grounds ………………………………………………………… 145
1. The Parties' Arguments ……………………………………………… 145
2. The Trial Judge's Decision …………………………………… 147
3. Our Holding …………………………………………………………………………… 149
V. CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 155
APPENDIX ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… A-1
I
INTRODUCTION
In this complex litigation, which was summarily dismissed
in many stages over the course of six years, the Canadian and
New Jersey plaintiffs asserted, among other things, that
defendants – most of whom were located in New York – engaged in
8 A-0963-12T1
a racketeering enterprise that caused plaintiffs billions of
dollars in damages. That claim required a careful consideration
of choice-of-law principles because New Jersey recognizes that a
plaintiff may maintain a private civil RICO cause of action and
New York doesn't. We agree the trial court correctly chose and
applied New York law in dismissing the RICO claim. We reject,
however, the trial court's determination that plaintiffs' common
law causes of action were governed by a New York statute of
limitations and hold instead that our own statute of limitations
applies; any past uncertainty about that evaporated with the
illumination provided by our Supreme Court's recent decision in
McCarrell v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 227 N.J. 569 (2017). We
also conclude that New York substantive law applies and limits –
but does not eliminate – plaintiffs' common law causes of
action. Consequently, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand for further proceedings.
II
PLAINTIFFS' STORY
Because our Brill5 standard governed the trial court's
disposition of the many issues presented, as it also guides our
review, Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 59 (2015), we examine
5 Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540
(1995).
9 A-0963-12T1
the disposition of plaintiffs' claims by assuming the truth of
their allegations and by giving plaintiffs the benefit of all
reasonable inferences. Consequently, our description of the
occurrences that triggered this suit are based on plaintiffs'
allegations and should not be construed as our acceptance of
their truth; in short, we only assume their truth. "I cannot
tell how the truth may be; I say the tale as 't was said to me."
Sir Walter Scott, The Lay of the Last Minstrel, canto II, st. 22
(1805).
A. The Plot Alleged
We are told plaintiff Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited
(Fairfax) is a Canadian insurance holding company located in
Toronto, and Crum & Forster Holdings Corp. (C&F) is a New Jersey
corporation headquartered in Morristown. In 1998, Fairfax sought
to rescue C&F from failure by purchasing it for hundreds of
millions of dollars. C&F's turnaround, however, took longer and
proved more difficult than Fairfax originally anticipated. Chief
among its difficulties was what plaintiffs have claimed is a
"racketeering scheme" designed to "kill" them both.
Plaintiffs assert they were the victims of a "bear raid,"
by which short-sellers borrow securities, sell them, and then
drive the price of that stock down through lies and other forms
of market manipulation. See, e.g., Robert G. DeLaMater, Target
10 A-0963-12T1
Defensive Tactics As Manipulative Under Section 14(e), 84 Colum.
L. Rev. 228, 244 n.114 (1984). The short-seller then repurchases
the shares at the lower price – or not at all if the prey
becomes bankrupt and its shares are rendered worthless – and
profits from the difference between the higher price at which it
sold the borrowed shares and the lower price it pays for the
shares it returns to the lender. Because short-selling has its
risks – the short-seller must pay interest and post collateral
on the borrowed shares that may prove costly – a "short squeeze"6
quickly causes an increase in the losses suffered.
Plaintiffs claim the short-sellers here were shorted so
heavily that the way to a profit and the avoidance of massive
losses required that they cause Fairfax to fail. Plaintiffs
quote the statements of various defendants that they intended to
"kill this company," "crush this company," "drive a stake
through that pig Fairfax's heart," and "tak[e] this baby down
for the count." Plaintiffs also quote various defendants'
statements that the alleged plan involved "get[ting] them where
they eat, like the credit [analysts] and [stock] holders" and
"stop [their] being able to write biz"; in short, they claim the
short-sellers were intent on inflicting "death by a thousand
6 The profitability of a short position fluctuates with changes
in the values of the borrowed shares. A sudden increase in the
cost of borrowing shares is known as a "short squeeze."
11 A-0963-12T1
knives" by getting Fairfax's subsidiaries "downgraded" and
having C&F go into "runoff," causing a loss of rating and
rendering the company "pretty much worthless."
Plaintiffs claim that, so motivated, defendants engaged in
a RICO enterprise. See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938,
948, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2245, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1265, 1277 (2009)
(defining such an enterprise as "a continuing unit that
functions with a common purpose" that "need not have a
hierarchical structure or a 'chain of command'"). Plaintiffs
allege that all defendants were associated in this RICO
enterprise, and they described in detail the involvement of the
dramatis personae, which we summarize in the following brief
way:
defendant Morgan Keegan & Company,
Inc., a registered broker-dealer that
provides investment services to hedge
funds and others; defendant John Gwynn
was a Morgan Keegan analyst. According
to plaintiffs, Morgan Keegan dissemin-
ated more than sixty materially false
and misleading research reports on
Fairfax and C&F that were authored by
Gwynn, and Morgan Keegan and Gwynn also
uttered numerous disparaging communica-
tions;
defendant S.A.C. Capital Management,
L.L.C., S.A.C. Capital Advisors,
L.L.C., S.A.C. Capital Associates,
L.L.C., and Sigma Capital Management,
L.L.C., are alleged to be hedge funds
controlled by defendant Steven A. Cohen
(collectively "the SAC defendants");
12 A-0963-12T1
according to plaintiffs, the SAC
defendants engaged defendant Spyro
Contogouris on a similar past bear raid
of a different company and, according
to plaintiffs, similarly engaged him to
do the same with plaintiffs. The SAC
defendants were the largest investors
in the Exis defendants7 and non-party
Bridger Capital Management, which both
possessed an economic interest in the
alleged scheme.
Contogouris was, according to plain-
tiffs, an enterprise operative who
posed as an independent research
analyst and disseminated disinforma-
tion, instigated a Securities &
Exchange Commission investigation, and
generated negative news stories about
plaintiffs8 via the so-called "MI4"
reports.9
The Exis defendants were alleged to be
hedge funds that secured a substantial
short position in Fairfax. They and
their chief executive and chief
operating officers, defendants Adam D.
Sender and Andrew Heller, respectively,
were alleged to have maintained the
closest relationship with Contogouris;
they allegedly provided him with office
7 Namely, Exis Capital Management, Inc., Exis Capital, L.L.C.,
Exis Differential Partners, L.P., and Exis Integrated Partners,
L.P.
8 Adding to the drama, plaintiffs allege Contogouris acted
through the use of aliases, such as "Monsieur Skaramanga," a
James Bond villain.
9 The names of these reports refer to defendants MI4 Limited
Partnership, MI4 Reconnaissance L.L.C., and MI4 Investors,
L.L.C. (the MI4 defendants), all entities controlled by
Contogouris.
13 A-0963-12T1
space, assistants and a most sub-
stantial compensation package.
defendants Rocker Partners, L.P., and
Copper River Partners, L.P., are
alleged to be hedge funds based in
Millburn primarily owned and managed by
defendant David Rocker (collectively,
the Rocker defendants); according to
plaintiffs, the Rocker defendants
worked closely with defendant Kynikos
Associates, L.P., Morgan Keegan and
other members of the alleged enterprise
in shorting Fairfax at the scheme's
inception.
defendant Institutional Credit Part-
ners, L.L.C. (ICP) is a financial firm
alleged to have paid and worked closely
with Contogouris, and to have traded in
advance of negative events allegedly
generated by Contogouris. According to
plaintiffs, ICP directly disseminated
false claims about them; ICP employees
are alleged to have worn surgical
gloves to avoid leaving fingerprints on
materials they transmitted, and William
Gahan, an ICP credit analyst, obtained
the bail bond that secured Conto-
gouris's release after he was arrested
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
on an unrelated fraud charge months
after this suit was filed.
defendant Kynikos Associates, L.P. – a
limited partnership organized in 1985
in Delaware with its principal place of
business in New York – is an investment
advisor and management company special-
izing in short-selling; it has managed
over $1 billion for its clients.
Plaintiffs alleged that Kynikos and its
founder and president, James S. Chanos,
participated in the enterprise in that
they worked closely with other defen-
dants, including Contogouris.
14 A-0963-12T1
defendant Christopher Brett Lawless, a
New Jersey resident, worked as a
research analyst for Fitch Ratings in
New York City and for the Center for
Financial Research and Analysis in
Maryland. Lawless allegedly tutored
Contogouris to enable him to pose as a
research analyst and thereafter
continued to collaborate with Morgan
Keegan, Contogouris and those paying
Contogouris.
defendants Third Point, L.L.C., is an
investment management firm created
under the laws of Delaware and
headquartered in New York. During the
times in question, Third Point provided
management services to several invest-
ment funds that traded in Fairfax
securities. Defendant Daniel S. Loeb is
the founder and managing member of
Third Point, and defendant Jeffrey
Perry was a senior analyst.
According to plaintiffs, in 2002, the SAC defendants,
Kynikos, the Rocker defendants, and others, were collaborating
and either aggressively shorting or preparing to short Fairfax.
Plaintiffs claim that C&F had begun to favorably turn its
position around at that time, so defendants' enterprise sought a
"negative catalyst" to drive down C&F's price, and the
enterprise began to "educate[] rating agencies and other
research analysts about their negative views."
On December 18, 2002, the day after deciding to cover their
position, the SAC defendants learned that Gwynn of Morgan Keegan
was about to issue a report that Fairfax and its subsidiaries
15 A-0963-12T1
were under-reserved by billions of dollars and effectively
insolvent. Gwynn tipped off Kynikos and faxed an outline of the
issues. Upon receiving this tip, the SAC defendants began
communicating directly with Gwynn, and Kynikos and Third Point
thereafter traded in advance of the report based on the tipped
information.10
Morgan Keegan published its report on January 17, 2003.
Plaintiffs allege that Morgan Keegan falsely claimed that
Fairfax had overstated its equity by more than $5 billion and
that Morgan Keegan's alleged false claim devastated Fairfax's
stock price, which fell thirteen percent in one day and further
in the days that followed. Two weeks later, Morgan Keegan issued
a second report acknowledging it "possibly" double-counted $2
billion in purported subsidiary liabilities, including at C&F.
As a result, the stock price recovered somewhat but remained
down.
10 Plaintiffs claim that Kynikos re-shorted over $5 million in
shares just before the first report. And, after not shorting for
four months, Third Point sold short $1,500,000 in shares the day
before publication. The SAC defendants did not cover its short
positions by year-end as originally planned but completed their
cover after the report was issued and the stock price dropped
sharply. Plaintiffs assert that many of the trades involving
these and other parties or accounts controlled by the enterprise
members violated insider-trading laws and support their RICO
claim.
16 A-0963-12T1
According to plaintiffs, enterprise members traded heavily
on Morgan Keegan's tips concerning its initial report. In
exchange, Morgan Keegan benefited from these tips by way of
commissions through referred trades, and with the expectation of
greater future benefits. According to plaintiffs, Morgan Keegan
understood their big payoff – what a Morgan analyist referred to
as "our 7-8 digit trade!!" – would come when Fairfax's "stock
goes to zero." Consequently, for the next four years, Morgan
Keegan published more than sixty research reports that portrayed
plaintiffs and their affiliates as "an insolvent, Enron-like
fraud[]"; this disinformation was, according to plaintiffs,
orchestrated, and Morgan Keegan was urged to make sure its
reports were "really negative." Morgan Keegan communicated in
other ways that Fairfax and its executives were "crook[s]" and
"felons" who manipulated financial information to "mak[e] it
look like they have a profit." Plaintiffs claim Morgan Keegan
knew of the falsity of its disseminated statements.
Plaintiffs allege that, despite the inflicted harm, their
turnaround was progressing, causing defendants' enterprise to
either quit its position at a loss or increase the short
position and intensify their efforts. Information amassed in the
joint appendix evokes scenes from Oliver Stone's 1987 film, Wall
Street. One hedge fund manager – defendant Adam Sender, who was
17 A-0963-12T1
affiliated with the Exis defendants – explained to Contogouris
that he "want[ed] [Prem Watsa's11] head in a box," and another
viewed the dissemination of negative reports as the equivalent
of needing to "keep . . . this gun loaded with bullets" and
"eventually this pig will roll over and die." Meanwhile, to add
content to the negative reports, Morgan Keegan allegedly fed
Contogouris with the false claims that: Fairfax was disguising
billions in debt as reinsurance; Fairfax was turning its
investment subsidiaries – with the use of "[s]moke and
[m]irrors" – into "an illegal enterprise"; and that Watsa was
"transferring his personal holdings into asset protection
schemes that he thinks will be safe from regulators."
Over the course of nearly two years, Contogouris –
allegedly at the direction and with the support of Morgan
Keegan, Lawless, the Exis defendants, Third Point and Kynikos –
disseminated false claims to the FBI, federal prosecutors, the
SEC, the media, ratings agencies, research analysts and
investors, that Fairfax was engaged in an Enron-like fraud.12 In
June 2005, the SAC defendants re-shorted Fairfax – a month after
11 Watsa is Fairfax's chairman and chief executive officer.
12 Contogouris anonymously created a website called
Premwatsa.com, which compared Fairfax to the disgraced Enron and
Watsa to Enron's CEO, Kenneth Lay. Much has been written about
the Enron debacle. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, Conspiracy of
Fools: A True Story (2005).
18 A-0963-12T1
Contogouris's approach to the FBI that resulted in the service
of SEC subpoenas on Fairfax in September 2005. Three weeks
earlier, the investors of Exis, of which SAC was the largest,
were tipped off that "subpoenas from the regulators . . . should
be announced in the next three weeks." The Exis defendants and
the SAC defendants increased their short positions in advance of
the subpoenas.
Plaintiffs further allege, and refer to the voluminous
record in support, that Contogouris provided false and negative
information to various media and targeted as part of this
campaign: investors, institutions and research analysts; rating
agencies13; Fairfax executives and staff14; and even to Watsa's
parish pastor.15 Contogouris allegedly made harassing telephone
calls to Watsa's home and office at night to "rattle his cage."
Plaintiffs assert that Contogouris kept Morgan Keegan and
Lawless advised of his activities, and Morgan Keegan reported
these activities to other enterprise members.
13 Contogouris sent his FraudFacts report to Standard & Poor's
and A.M. Best.
14 Plaintiffs allege that Contogouris sent, through the use of
aliases, threatening emails to Watsa's staff in an effort to
find "a way in" via a staff member willing to be a mole.
15 Contogouris allegedly sent information to Watsa's parish
pastor, warning that Watsa, who handled the church's investment
fund, might defraud the church.
19 A-0963-12T1
According to plaintiffs, the enterprise members learned
during the Summer of 2006 that the FBI and federal prosecutors
intended to expand their investigation into Fairfax in light of
Contogouris' disseminations, and they also learned that The New
York Post was about to publish a series of negative stories.
Contogouris used code in communicating this information to
enterprise members, referring to the FBI as the "meteorologist,"
The New York Post reporter as the "Postman," and what he
expected to imminently occur as the "Hurricane," which was due
in August. Sender encouraged others to short the stock and the
SAC defendants, which allegedly were in contact with Sender and
Contogouris "all the time" during this period, increased their
short position in June 2006. To fuel the flames, rumors were
allegedly spread on June 22 and 23, 2006, that Watsa had
transferred his assets into his wife's name and that he fled the
country as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police raided Fairfax's
offices.
The day after these rumors started, the Exis defendants
rewarded Morgan Keegan with substantial trading business.
Fairfax's stock price plummeted for two days before Fairfax
issued a statement debunking the rumors.
20 A-0963-12T1
B. The Suit At Hand
Plaintiffs commenced this lawsuit on July 26, 2006. Their
complaint was filed just before what they allege were to be the
final steps in the enterprise's scheme but not before they
allegedly suffered significant monetary damages. Plaintiffs
claim Fairfax suffered damages to its assets and equity, as well
as those of its subsidiaries, in the billions of dollars.16
Particularly relevant in light of the issues on appeal,
plaintiffs claim C&F incurred a loss of nearly $1 billion,
including: (1) approximately $200,000,000 in capital costs and
interest incurred in and paid from New Jersey in the form of
having to raise capital not otherwise needed; (2) lost profits
estimated at $545,000,000; and (3) increased costs and expenses
in the form of higher directors and officers (D&O) insurance
premiums with far less coverage, and greater legal, accounting,
16 The parties even dispute the purpose of this suit. Morgan
Keegan contends that Fairfax has been a "troubled company for
years," and launched, as part of a "public relations campaign,"
this "sensational" RICO suit, claiming $6 billion in
compensatory damages, which, if trebled as permitted by New
Jersey law, would result in "a headline-grabbing $18 billion,"
caused by "a veritable cabal of short sellers and research
analysts bent on destroying the company" for their own profit.
The matter having come before us by way of summary rulings in
favor of all defendants, we place no reliance on Morgan Keegan's
argument about the motivation of this suit and assume, without
deciding, the bona fides of plaintiffs' claims.
21 A-0963-12T1
and administrative costs to deal with the enterprise's alleged
wrongful actions.
III
A BRIEF HISTORY
OF THE PROCEEDINGS
As mentioned, plaintiffs commenced this action in 2006. A
second amended complaint was filed in 2007 and a third in 2008.
Plaintiffs alleged defendants' manipulations violated New
Jersey's RICO statute and gave rise to several common law
claims, specifically commercial or product disparagement,
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage,
tortious interference with contractual relationships, and civil
conspiracy.
On July 11, 2008, the Rocker defendants moved for summary
judgment, asserting that insufficient evidence existed to
establish that it participated in the alleged conspiracy. The
judge then presiding over the matter17 granted, on September 25,
2008, the Rocker defendants' application, but did so without
prejudice.
17Numerous judges presided over this leviathan of a case during
its long life in the trial court. To avoid confusion, we make no
attempt to distinguish which of the able judges ruled on which
motion. Regardless of the outcome of the many issues raised, we
commend all these judges for their efforts.
22 A-0963-12T1
On May 5, 2011, the SAC defendants sought summary judgment
on grounds substantially similar to those that the Rocker
defendants had successfully advanced, namely, that there was
insufficient evidence to demonstrate the SAC defendants'
participation in the alleged scheme against plaintiffs. On
September 12, 2011, the court granted the SAC defendants' motion
for summary judgment.
Meanwhile, Kynikos moved for summary judgment, claiming our
courts could not assert personal jurisdiction over it. Third
Point and ICP also moved for summary judgment on the same or
similar grounds. Kynikos and Third Point also sought a choice-
of-law determination, arguing New York law both governed
plaintiffs' conspiracy claims and required a dismissal of
plaintiffs' RICO claims. And, in the same period of time, the
Rocker defendants sought a determination that the September 25,
2008 grant of summary judgment "without prejudice" be converted
to a dismissal "with prejudice."
On December 23, 2011, the court granted the Rocker
defendants' application to convert its prior determination to
summary judgment with prejudice and dismissed the third amended
complaint against Kynikos, Third Point and ICP for lack of
personal jurisdiction.
Many more motions followed.
23 A-0963-12T1
On April 13, 2012, Morgan Keegan, Lawless, the Exis
defendants and the MI4 defendants filed a consolidated motion
for summary judgment with respect to all the common law claims
plaintiffs had asserted against them.18 And, on April 20, 2012,
plaintiffs cross-moved for reconsideration of the court's prior
dismissal of the Rocker defendants with prejudice.
On May 11, 2012, the trial court granted partial summary
judgment in favor of Lawless. Finding New York law governed
plaintiffs' racketeering allegations, the trial court dismissed
plaintiffs' RICO claims. And plaintiffs' reconsideration motion
of the with-prejudice dismissal of the claims against the Rocker
defendants was denied.
In June 2012, the trial court heard and summarily dismissed
plaintiffs' claim of tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage but sustained plaintiffs' remaining common
law claims.
Also in June 2012, Morgan Keegan moved for partial summary
judgment, seeking dismissal of plaintiffs' disparagement claim
based on its alleged untimeliness; the motion was denied in
August 2012. Later that month, the judge denied plaintiffs'
request to reconsider its ruling that New York law controlled
18Namely, tortious interference with contractual relationships,
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and
civil conspiracy.
24 A-0963-12T1
plaintiffs' racketeering and conspiracy claims. The judge also
granted Morgan Keegan's application for reconsideration of the
denial of summary judgment on the tortious-interference-with-
contract claim but rejected Morgan Keegan's assertion that a
one-year statute of limitations applied to plaintiffs'
disparagement claim.
On September 5, 2012, plaintiffs stipulated to the
dismissal of Lawless without prejudice. On September 11, 2012,
in accordance with a partial settlement agreement, the judge
signed a consent order, which dismissed without prejudice
plaintiffs' claims against Contogouris and the MI4 defendants.
And, on September 12, 2012, the judge entered final judgment
dismissing the entirety of the remainder of plaintiffs' third
amended complaint, finding "a complete absence of proof" of
proximately-caused damages.
Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. Cross-appeals were
also asserted.
IV
THE ISSUES POSED
In appealing the summary dismissal of its causes of action,
plaintiffs argue the trial court erred: (a) in dismissing their
RICO claims by applying New York rather than New Jersey law; (b)
in dismissing certain of their common law claims by applying New
25 A-0963-12T1
York's statute of limitations rather than New Jersey's; (c) in
dismissing the claims against Kynikos, Third Point and the ICP
defendants19 for lack of personal jurisdiction; (d) in granting
summary judgment in favor of both the SAC defendants and the
Rocker defendants; and (e) in excluding the expert opinion of
Craig Elson on damages that plaintiffs intended to elicit at
trial, thereby shutting the door on any trial at all.
A. The Viability of
The Racketeering Claims
In reviewing the disposition based on the trial court's
application of choice-of-law principles, we describe (1) the
parties' arguments and (2) the judge's decision, and then
express (3) our agreement with the trial court's disposition of
the RICO claim.
1. Plaintiffs' Arguments
Plaintiffs claim the trial court erred by dismissing their
RICO claims through application of New York law. Indeed, they
argue that choice-of-law questions do not even arise when a
matter falls within the intended scope of a New Jersey statute;
that is, they claim our Legislature intended to provide a remedy
19As noted earlier, plaintiffs and the ICP defendants resolved
their differences shortly before oral argument took place in
this court.
26 A-0963-12T1
for every New Jersey domiciliary harmed by a RICO violation,
which the law defines as harm arising from conduct of a
prohibited kind that satisfies the enactment's territorial
predicates, with no distinction between criminal and private
prosecutions. And they argue there was sufficient conduct by
defendants that either occurred within or had a sufficient
effect in New Jersey to satisfy the statute, even apart from the
conspiracy, which by itself – in their view – involved enough
activity within New Jersey to satisfy the Criminal Code's
definition of such an offense.
Plaintiffs argue further that the court had no basis for
"inventing" or "importing" common law principles to impose the
territorial limitations on jurisdiction over traditional torts,
noting that the limitations were not included in either the RICO
statute or in the Criminal Code's general territoriality
statute. On the contrary, they claim the Legislature has
specified that the RICO provisions for civil remedies must be
liberally construed to affect that enactment's remedial purpose
and that all remedies be cumulative to one another and to other
remedies at law.
In addition, plaintiffs argue that the trial judge erred by
failing to recognize there was no policy conflict between New
Jersey and New York law because both states' enactments "provide
27 A-0963-12T1
civil remedies to deter and compensate for" the same proscribed
conduct. And they argue New Jersey's allowance of private civil
remedies does not constitute a different approach toward the
shared goal of deterring racketeering, "only a different
judgment about how best to use each state's judicial system to
do so." Although both states seek to vindicate the same
policies, plaintiffs argue New Jersey's broader remedies made it
the better vehicle for achieving that goal, and thus the correct
law to apply.
Plaintiffs contend further that, even if New Jersey and New
York law generated a true conflict, section 6 of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) (Am. Law Inst., amended
1988),20 provided an independent basis for applying New Jersey
law to the RICO claims. They assert section 6 warranted
application of New Jersey law due to this State's interest in
protecting C&F, which sustained injuries at its New Jersey
headquarters, and because New Jersey had an interest in
protecting other in-state businesses, such as the rating
agencies and business news organizations that the enterprise is
20Our many references to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws shall hereafter in the text be "Second Restatement" and in
citations be "Restatement (Second)," with reference to a
specific section or comment. To avoid confusion, we will provide
greater specificity when referring to the Restatements dealing
with torts and contracts that are cited as well.
28 A-0963-12T1
alleged to have deliberately misled in order to promote their
scheme. Plaintiffs contend they reasonably expected the
protection of New Jersey law to the extent of their business
affecting this State, whereas defendants had no expectation that
their misconduct would be any less violative of New York law
than it would of New Jersey law. In addition, they contend that
failing to apply New Jersey's RICO statute as intended would
inject an unanticipated and unneeded balancing test between New
Jersey law and out-of-state law.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the Second Restatement's
section 145 standards favored application of New Jersey law due
to the predominance of this case's contacts with New Jersey.
They call New Jersey the situs of "the injury" because C&F had
its domicile and principal place of business here, and they note
that several enterprise members were New Jersey residents or
engaged in enterprise activity within the State.
2. The Judge's Decision
In May 2012, the trial judge determined that New York's
local law – that is, the law that applied within New York before
any consideration of choice-of-law principles21 – applied to the
21 The judge's definition of "the local law" accords with the
Second Restatement, which describes "the local law" as the law
that would apply if all parties and relevant events were within
(continued)
29 A-0963-12T1
RICO claims and, accordingly, compelled the entry of summary
judgment in defendants' favor. He first found an actual conflict
existed – because New Jersey recognizes a private civil RICO
action and New York doesn't – and observed that a statutory
mandate for New Jersey jurisdiction over private civil claims
would have precluded a choice-of-law analysis here, but then
found no such mandate existed. The judge explained that RICO's
own territoriality provision was expressly limited to criminal
cases, and that the Legislature did not intend civil RICO claims
to have the same jurisdictional reach or to be exempt from the
"accepted, traditional common law principles of jurisdiction"
for civil claims, which included application of choice-of-law
principles.
The trial judge recognized that the first step in a choice-
of-law analysis was to determine whether any state was presumed
to satisfy the Second Restatement's most fundamental touchstone
of being the state with "the most significant relationship" to
the matter and found that, though choice-of-law principles might
deem C&F's loss of customers to have been an injury sustained in
(continued)
one state, without application of that state's choice-of-law
rules. Restatement (Second), supra, § 145 cmt. h and § 4. In
this context, a reference to "state law" without qualification
means the entire body of a state's law, including its choice-of-
law rules. Ibid.
30 A-0963-12T1
New Jersey, it was "improper" to presume New Jersey jurisdiction
on that basis, because C&F was "a minor player in this matter,"
there was a "complex interrelationship between [the]
plaintiffs," and the RICO allegations here were broader and more
complex than a particular injury to one subsidiary.
According to the trial judge, the "most direct consequence"
of the alleged RICO enterprise was to decrease the market prices
of plaintiffs' securities, a claim for which Fairfax was the
"lead" plaintiff. All the other alleged injuries caused by the
enterprise, namely, the increase in "capital costs," the costs
of responding to the SEC investigation, and the increased legal
and accounting costs, "were a consequence of that deflation."
The "most direct" injury and its derivatives arose from the
alleged enterprise activity that involved the financial markets
and financial news media and, as the judge observed, "[t]he
financial markets, the news media and the parties are clearly
based predominantly in New York." Accordingly, the New Jersey
connections to the RICO claims – namely, the domiciles of C&F,
A.M. Best,22 and Lawless – did not suffice to give New Jersey the
"most significant relationships" to a RICO enterprise as broad
22 A.M. Best is a major rating company headquartered in New
Jersey.
31 A-0963-12T1
and complex as alleged. Consequently, the trial judge found that
New York's local law presumptively applied.
As for the other section 145 factors, the judge found that
the "vast majority" of the alleged misconduct manifestly
occurred in New York and only a fraction was committed by
Lawless, the one defendant located in New Jersey. The judge
determined that all other enterprise members were domiciled or
incorporated elsewhere and conducted their activities elsewhere,
and, also, that the enterprise members did not have a prior
relationship, much less one centered in New Jersey. Furthermore,
Fairfax and its other main United States operating Odyssey
subsidiaries,23 were domiciled or incorporated elsewhere and
operated outside New Jersey. Accordingly, even if the decrease
in the price of C&F securities was deemed a direct injury to
C&F, as opposed to a derivative injury largely arising from its
exposure to Fairfax's troubles, "the place where the injury
occurred," as defined by section 145(2)(a) of the Second
Restatement, was nonetheless in New York's financial markets,
and the enterprise members had "minimal contact with New Jersey"
in causing it.
23 What we refer to as Odyssey consists of: Odyssey Re Holding
Corp., which was incorporated in Delaware and had principal
executive offices in New York; wholly-owned Odyssey Re Group;
and Odyssey America Reinsurance Corp., which had its principal
offices in Connecticut.
32 A-0963-12T1
The trial judge then turned to the general choice-of-law
principles set out in section 6 of the Second Restatement. For
comity's sake, he explained that, although New York and New
Jersey had competing interests about whether private actors
should be able to enforce a RICO statute, the two states'
enactments were nonetheless similar and shared the "fundamental
policies" of preventing racketeering and other organized crime.
The two states' policies were therefore not in fundamental
conflict, so interstate comity required New Jersey to respect
New York's deliberate decision about how to serve that policy
that included a decision to withhold a private RICO cause of
action. The judge found that was also true from the perspective
of "[t]hose involved in the financial markets based in New York"
because they "should be able to depend on New York law" as the
law governing "their conduct."
As for the interests of the parties and the interests
underlying the field of tort law, the judge observed that the
parties knew New York law precluded exposure to private RICO
claims regardless of their conduct. And, because New York had
the "most significant relationship" to the matter, defendants
had "no reasonable expectation" that such exposure could arise
due to the application of another state's local law. The judge
reasoned the result should not change just because the conduct,
33 A-0963-12T1
which was focused on "the New York financial industry," also had
tangential connections outside that state, such as the
communications with A.M. Best, the one major rating agency
located in New Jersey.
The trial judge also observed that the only factor favoring
application of New Jersey law instead of New York law was the
greater involvement in this litigation of New Jersey's courts.
He noted, however, that this factor did not outweigh the need to
serve the choice-of-law "values," which were "certainty,
predictability and uniformity of results" in their application.
Consequently, the judge ruled that the "qualitative balance" of
all the section 145 and section 6 factors of the Second
Restatement compelled application of New York local law, which,
upon application, compelled dismissal of the RICO claims.
3. Our Holding
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that New York law,
which does not permit a private civil racketeering action,
applies in this case and, as held by the trial court, requires
the dismissal of plaintiffs' RICO claim.
We first consider (a) some general principles, as well as
(b) the impact of the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Ginsberg v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 227 N.J. 7, 18 (2016), on
the issues raised. Then, because an early but pivotal step in
34 A-0963-12T1
resolving a choice-of-law problem requires a determination that
a true conflict exists, we examine (c) New Jersey's racketeering
laws, and their intent and purposes, and we thereafter similarly
analyze (d) New York's racketeering laws. We then conclude this
part of the opinion with a description of (e) the choice of law
required in these circumstances.
(a) Some General Principles
In considering the propriety of the choice-of-law
determinations in question, we observe, first, that the trial
judge's interpretation of the RICO statutes is not entitled to
deference. ADS Assocs. Grp., Inc. v. Oritani Sav. Bank, 219 N.J.
496, 511 (2014). Choice-of-law determinations present legal
questions, which are subjected to de novo review. Bondi v.
Citigroup, Inc., 423 N.J. Super. 377, 418 (App. Div. 2011),
certif. denied, 210 N.J. 478 (2012); Arias v. Figueroa, 395 N.J.
Super. 623, 627 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 193 N.J. 223
(2007). And choice-of-law decisions are made not only issue-by-
issue, Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson, 211 N.J. 362, 374 (2012),
but also, at times, party-by-party, Ginsberg, supra, 227 N.J. at
18.
When New Jersey is the forum state, its choice-of-law rules
control. McCarrell, supra, 227 N.J. at 588; Erny v. Estate of
Merola, 171 N.J. 86, 94 (2002). For tort claims, our Supreme
35 A-0963-12T1
Court has expressly embraced the Second Restatement for choice-
of-law determinations. P.V. ex rel. T.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 197
N.J. 132, 139-43 (2008).
New Jersey courts have also recognized that a parent
corporation may have standing to participate in litigation over
wrongs sustained by its subsidiary if the parent itself has a
sufficient financial interest in the outcome. See, e.g., Bondi,
supra, 423 N.J. Super. at 436-39. See also Section V(A), infra.
Bondi did not declare a categorical rule that the same
jurisdiction's local law always applies to both the parent and
the subsidiary with regard to a particular claim, and, at the
time the trial judge ruled, neither Bondi nor any other reported
New Jersey opinion had suggested a general reason not to adopt
such a rule.
(b) Ginsberg's Impact
Recently, our Supreme Court recognized that, in multi-party
actions, choice-of-law principles may call for the application
of a different state's laws from party-to-party or claim-to-
claim. Ginsberg, supra, 227 N.J. at 18.24 But plaintiffs have
24 To be precise, Ginsberg specifically held that "in the
majority of cases, a defendant-by-defendant analysis furthers
the [Second] Restatement principles and provides the most
equitable method of resolving choice-of-law questions." 227 N.J.
at 18 (emphasis added). But, in explaining this aspect of its
(continued)
36 A-0963-12T1
never sought separate choice-of-law analyses. In fact,
plaintiffs have blurred the distinctions between them and their
subsidiaries, perhaps for strategic reasons,25 thereby
frustrating any attempt at rendering an informed,
individualized, choice-of-law analysis from each plaintiff's
standpoint.
That is, we recognize that in many instances in which
multiple claims are asserted by multiple plaintiffs against
multiple defendants, a court may be asked to make individualized
choice-of-law determinations that "exponentially" increase in
difficulty with every increase in the number of parties and
claims. See Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 627
(3d Cir. 1996). We do not think, however, that where two or more
related corporate plaintiffs file a single action based on the
(continued)
holding, the Court observed that Second Restatement principles
"focus[] on the state's relationship to the parties," and
recognized that, in referring to "parties," the Second
Restatement was not limited and included plaintiffs, defendants,
and "any third party defendants." Ibid. (emphasis added).
Consequently, we do not view Ginsberg's particular holding,
which required in some instances a "defendant-by-defendant
analysis," as applying only in that circumstance. Instead, the
same principles may at times warrant plaintiff-by-plaintiff
analyses as well.
25 For example, if it had pursued its claims separately from
C&F's, Fairfax would have had no plausible argument for applying
New Jersey substantive law to a dispute between a Canadian
corporation based in Toronto and various New York-based
defendants.
37 A-0963-12T1
same operative set of facts, and assert causes of action and
demands for damages allegedly caused to their corporate family –
as if that family constituted a single entity – that a court
must nevertheless disentangle all the possibilities in
identifying the correct state law to be applied to each
plaintiff's claim or claims. Ginsberg does not require that a
court make such determinations when the court is deprived of the
parties' assistance. In short, since plaintiffs do not seek a
separate resolution of each choice-of-law problem from each of
their standpoints, we will not pursue that possibility further.
We would add that to the extent multiple plaintiffs would have a
court treat them differently for choice-of-law purposes, they
must come forward and make that argument26 and, moreover, be
26 We do not interpret our rules as requiring a plaintiff or
plaintiffs to affirmatively plead the application of another
jurisdiction's laws; indeed, we have shown particular liberality
in allowing defendants to assert another jurisdiction's laws in
moving for summary judgment even when not having first asserted
that other jurisdiction's law as an affirmative defense. See
Rowe v. Hoffman-La Roche Inc., 383 N.J. Super. 442, 450-51 (App.
Div. 2006), rev’d on other grounds, 189 N.J. 615 (2007); Erny v.
Russo, 333 N.J. Super. 88, 96 (App. Div. 2000), rev’d on other
grounds, 171 N.J. 86 (2002). But that liberality is stretched
beyond breaking if we were to allow a party to advocate on
appeal, for the first time, an entirely different approach to
already difficult choice-of-law questions. As we said in our
decision in Ginsberg, which the Supreme Court affirmed, "choice-
of-law determination[s] ideally should be made as early in a
case as possible." Ginsberg v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 441 N.J.
Super. 198, 223 (App. Div. 2015); see also Bailey v. Wyeth,
Inc., 422 N.J. Super. 343, 350 (Law Div. 2008), aff’d on other
(continued)
38 A-0963-12T1
willing to be treated separately for all other purposes as
well.27
In the final analysis, Ginsberg not only held that an
individualized assessment is "not feasible in every matter," 227
N.J. at 20, but also that, in each case, a court must ascertain
"the most equitable method of resolving choice-of-law
questions," Id. at 18. A sudden alteration in course – sought
by no one here, even now on appeal – that might arguably be
(continued)
grounds, 433 N.J. Super. 360 (App. Div. 2011), certif. denied,
211 N.J. 274 (2012). And it is well-established in the federal
courts that choice-of-law issues may be waived when not asserted
by the parties, Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306,
316-17 (3d Cir. 2014), a concept that we hold should be applied
here as well. Having said all that, we do not mean to suggest
that plaintiffs have sought a sudden change in course; to the
contrary, even after both our decision and the Supreme Court's
decision in Ginsberg, plaintiffs have continued to pursue their
rights as if they were the same juridical creature and have not
sought an individualized choice-of-law assessment from each
plaintiff's standpoint. Consequently, we hold that in light of
the arguments plaintiffs have posed, and in consideration of
their suggestions as to how we are to exit this choice-of-law
labyrinth, we should not now pursue a wholly different path that
plaintiffs – even in the wake of Ginsberg – have never urged as
the proper or required course.
27 When multiple plaintiffs seek individualized choice-of-law
determinations, we would think concerns about standing, such as
those raised here, would warrant a less liberal approach than
suggested by Bondi, supra, 423 N.J. Super. at 436-39, which we
discussed above and again later in this opinion. In short, a
court should not be expected to choose the law appropriate for
each plaintiff as to each claim, only to have, for example,
plaintiff X lay claim to a right to pursue an award of damages
based on injuries sustained by plaintiff Y.
39 A-0963-12T1
permitted by Ginsberg, does not serve our chief, overarching
goal of seeking an equitable method for resolving the parties'
choice-of-law disputes.
(c) New Jersey's
Racketeering Laws
In enacting anti-racketeering legislation, N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1
to -6.2,28 the Legislature utilized federal statutes as its
model. Accordingly, federal case law provides a useful guide in
understanding our own RICO law. Cagno, supra, 211 N.J. at 508.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the federal and New Jersey
enactments expressly afford a private civil cause of action, see
18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c); N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4(c), whereas New York's
similar law, which we discuss in Section IV(A)(3)(d), infra,
does not. The New Jersey and federal enactments allow "[a]ny
person," who is injured "in his business or property by reason
of a violation" of the statute, to "sue therefore" and recover
treble damages, plus costs of suit including a reasonable
attorney's fee. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c); N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4(c).
All remedies permitted by our RICO law are "cumulative with
each other and other remedies at law," N.J.S.A. 2C:41-6.1, and
28Better known as our RICO law. State v. Cagno, 211 N.J. 488,
508 (2012), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 877, 184 L.
Ed. 2d 687 (2013); State v. Ball, 268 N.J. Super. 72, 98 (App.
Div. 1993), aff'd, 141 N.J. 142 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
1075, 116 S. Ct. 779, 133 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1996).
40 A-0963-12T1
the Legislature has instructed that our RICO law must be
"liberally construed to effect [its] remedial purposes,"
N.J.S.A. 2C:41-6.
The required "racketeering activity," also known as a
predicate act, must itself be a criminal offense. N.J.S.A.
2C:41-1(a)(1), (2); Ball, supra, 141 N.J. at 162; Karo Mktg.
Corp. v. Playdrome Am., 331 N.J. Super. 430, 438 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 165 N.J. 603 (2000). In fact, the predicate act
may not only be one of the crimes the Legislature has identified
but also an "equivalent crime" under the law of "any other
jurisdiction," N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1(a).
A "pattern of racketeering activity" requires two predicate
acts, N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1(d)(1), that have "either the same or
similar purposes, results, participants or victims or methods of
commission or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated incidents," N.J.S.A. 2C:41-
1(d)(2). Participation in a conspiracy to commit prohibited RICO
activity is also prohibited activity. N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2(d). The
designation of conspiracy as racketeering activity under federal
law means that the conspiracy itself may be one of the required
predicate acts. State v. Bisaccia, 319 N.J. Super. 1, 20-21
(App. Div. 1999). In a private civil RICO action, the predicate
act must be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.
41 A-0963-12T1
Interchange State Bank v. Veglia, 286 N.J. Super. 164, 178 (App.
Div. 1995) (citing Holmes v. Sec. Inv'r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S.
258, 265, 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1316-18, 117 L. Ed. 2d 532, 543
(1992)), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 377 (1996).
The prohibited RICO activity relevant here is participation
in an "enterprise" which engages in "a pattern of racketeering
activity." N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2(c). The Legislature did not intend
"to punish mere repeated offenses," so the term "pattern" also
requires "relatedness," which means "some temporal connection or
continuity over time," but nonetheless encompasses "short-term
criminal activity" of the proscribed kind as well as "long-term
criminal activity." Ball, supra, 141 N.J. at 167-69.
"Enterprise" is broadly defined to include all kinds of
entities, as well as "any individual" and any "group of
individuals" who are "associated in fact although not a legal
entity." N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1(c). The enterprise may be "licit" or
"illicit." Ibid.
The enterprise is a statutory element "distinct from the
incidents constituting the pattern of activity." Ball, supra,
141 N.J. at 162. Because it is distinct, the enterprise must
have an "organization" but the organization need not have "a
structure with a particular configuration." Ibid.; accord Cagno,
supra, 211 N.J. at 494. "[A]n informal organization functioning
42 A-0963-12T1
as a continuing unit" is sufficient to facilitate "those kinds
of interactions that become necessary when a group, to
accomplish its goal, divides among its members the tasks that
are necessary to achieve a common purpose." Ball, supra, 141
N.J. at 161-62.
Although evidence establishing the enterprise must "focus"
on "how the participants associated with each other" and on the
extent and nature of the planning, id. at 162-63, it "need not
be distinct or different from the proof that establishes the
pattern of racketeering activity," id. at 162, and a defendant
only needs to possess "some minimal knowledge" of "'the general
nature of the enterprise . . . beyond his individual role.'" Id.
at 176 (quoting United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 577 (3d
Cir. 1991)). In this regard, our Supreme Court has declined to
endorse a definition of enterprise. Id. at 177. An enterprise
may be as little as "the sum of the racketeering acts," with
neither a "definable structure" nor any "purpose . . . greater
than the predicate acts," as we held in Ball, supra, 268 N.J.
Super. at 143-44.
For an enterprise's pattern of racketeering to constitute a
RICO violation, it must "affect trade or commerce," N.J.S.A.
2C:41-2, which is defined as including "all economic activity
involving or relating to any commodity or service," N.J.S.A.
43 A-0963-12T1
2C:41-1(h). That definition of "trade or commerce" does not
specify that the trade or commerce occur within this State,
N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1(h), but the Legislature declared the
enactment's purpose to be the protection of "the legitimate
trade or commerce of this State" and "the general health,
welfare and prosperity of the State and its inhabitants" from
"the infiltration" of the prohibited kinds of activity.
N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1.1(c).
We have held that those declarations, along with the
Legislature's finding of harm to "this State's economy" from
racketeering, N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1.1(b), require that a plaintiff
show the prohibited conduct has affected the trade or commerce
of this State." State v. Casilla, 362 N.J. Super. 554, 563-64
(App. Div.) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1.1(c); emphasis omitted),
certif. denied, 178 N.J. 251 (2003). We have also observed that
the Legislature would have had no reason to address the effects
of racketeering in other states, many of which have their own
RICO statutes, or in interstate commerce, as to which federal
legislation applies. Id. at 564-65.
In a criminal prosecution, in addition to subject matter
and personal jurisdiction, a New Jersey court must have
"territoriality," meaning territorial jurisdiction pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3. State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 36 (2006). That
44 A-0963-12T1
statute recognizes various ways in which an offense may have "a
direct nexus to New Jersey" that would justify its prosecution
as a criminal offense here. State v. Sumulikoski, 221 N.J. 93,
102 (2015).
The plainest examples of territoriality are when the
"result" of the offense "occurs within this State," or when the
"conduct which is an element of the offense" occurs here.
N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(a)(1). Conduct committed outside the State has a
nexus to New Jersey if New Jersey law would view such acts as
"constitut[ing] an attempt to commit a crime within the State,"
N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(a)(2), meaning an attempt to cause a result
within the State that would be an offense if caused by in-state
conduct. See State v. Bragg, 295 N.J. Super. 459, 464-65 (App.
Div. 1996). Outside conduct is also sufficient if New Jersey law
would deem it "a conspiracy to commit an offense within the
State," as long as there is also an "overt act in furtherance
of" the conspiracy that is committed here. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-
3(a)(3). Conversely, our courts have jurisdiction over conduct
occurring within the State that causes a result in another
state, or is part of an attempt or conspiracy to do so, as long
as that conduct would be an offense under both New Jersey law
and the other state's law. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(a)(4).
45 A-0963-12T1
(d) New York's
Racketeering Laws
Turning to New York's Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA),
1986 N.Y. Laws, c. 516, § 2; N.Y. Penal Law §§ 460.00 to 460.80
(Consol. 2014), we first observe that a violation is called the
crime of "enterprise corruption," N.Y. Penal Law § 460.20.
Unlike New Jersey's law, OCCA is not modeled on federal
statutes. It "is far more restrictive than" federal RICO,
because New York "calculatedly narrowed the definition of the
requisite pattern of criminal activity" to avoid conflating an
ordinary "criminal offense or criminal transaction" with the
ongoing "pattern" that characterizes organized crime. Simpson
Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., 515 N.Y.S.2d 794, 799 (App. Div.
1987), aff’d, 530 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1988); N.Y. Penal Law
§ 460.10.
OCCA allows designated county and state officials to
prosecute charges of enterprise corruption. N.Y. Penal Law
§ 460.50. Although the New York Legislature's findings declare
OCCA's purposes to include "making both criminal and civil
remedies available," N.Y. Penal Law § 460.00, the only penalties
it provides, beyond incarceration, are criminal forfeiture and
fines allocated primarily to victim restitution. N.Y. Penal Law
§ 460.30. Those penalties may only be imposed on persons
convicted of enterprise corruption. Ibid.
46 A-0963-12T1
Unlike our Legislature's approach, the New York Legislature
rejected a policy of either liberal or strict construction in
order to preserve a role for "discretion." N.Y. Penal Law
§ 460.00. Even when "the letter of the law" defining an OCCA
violation is satisfied, "the question whether to prosecute"
under OCCA "is essentially one of fairness." Ibid. Such
"fairness" was preserved by leaving the decision to label
alleged criminal conduct as "enterprise corruption" to "those
institutions of government which have traditionally exercised
that function: the grand jury, the public prosecutor, and an
independent judiciary." Ibid. OCCA accordingly does not provide
for a private civil cause of action, see, e.g., Simpson, supra,
515 N.Y.S.2d at 807 (Spatt, J., dissenting), as the parties
concede.
OCCA liability requires the personal commission of "a
pattern of criminal activity" comprising two felonies: a
conspiracy to engage in a "criminal enterprise" and a knowing
participation in the activity or finances of the criminal
enterprise, or of any other enterprise. N.Y. Penal Law § 460.20.
OCCA also specifies that the pattern of criminal activity may
not serve as the "criminal enterprise." N.Y. Penal Law
§ 460.10(1). Instead, the criminal enterprise must consist of "a
group of persons sharing a common purpose of engaging in
47 A-0963-12T1
criminal conduct, associated in an ascertainable structure
distinct from a pattern of criminal activity, and with a
continuity of existence, structure and criminal purpose beyond
the scope of individual criminal incidents." Ibid. In Ball,
supra, 141 N.J. at 159, our Supreme Court observed that OCCA was
unique among the federal and other state RICO enactments because
it explicitly required an ascertainable structure, separate from
the underlying crimes that constituted the pattern of
racketeering activity.
Unlike New Jersey law, OCCA does not specify that a
violation must affect trade or commerce, or indeed, that any
particular effect must have occurred or be deemed to have
occurred within New York's borders.
Consequently, in light of the vastly different approaches
engaged by New Jersey and New York to combat racketeering, there
is no doubt that a true conflict exists for choice-of-law
purposes.
(e) The Choice
In examining the trial court's choice, we start with our
Supreme Court's observation that, "[a]lthough we have
traditionally denominated our conflicts approach as a flexible
'governmental interest' analysis, we have continuously resorted
to the [Second Restatement] in resolving conflict disputes
48 A-0963-12T1
arising out of tort." P.V., supra, 197 N.J. at 135-36. The
Second Restatement's approach focuses on the state with "the
'most significant relationship'" to the parties and issues. Id.
at 136.
"Probably the most important function of choice-of-law
rules" is to foster comity by promoting "harmonious relations"
and facilitating "commercial intercourse" between and among
states. Restatement (Second), supra, § 6 cmt. d. The first step
is to establish that "an actual conflict exists" between the
laws of the involved states. P.V., supra, 197 N.J. at 143. A
conflict arises, like here, when one state provides a cause of
action but the other does not, especially when that provision or
denial reflects an intent to regulate conduct rather than
allocate losses. Id. at 143-44, 148-51 (observing that a
conflict existed between New Jersey law, which maintained
statutory immunity from tort liability for charitable
corporations, and Pennsylvania law, which "definitively
abrogated its charitable immunity laws").
A conflict, however, does not always lead to a choice-of-
law analysis. The analysis is preempted when our Legislature has
determined that New Jersey public policy requires the
application of our substantive law whenever our courts have
jurisdiction over the kind of claim at issue, regardless of the
49 A-0963-12T1
interest of another state. See id. at 140 (citing Restatement
(Second), supra, § 6(1)).
(i) Legislative Directive
Because a choice-of-law analysis may be precluded or
preempted by law, our first task, in light of the arguments
posed, requires that we ascertain whether there is a legislative
direction regarding the application of substantive law. For the
reasons that follow, we conclude that our Legislature has not
made such a declaration for cases like this, either (a)
expressly, or (b) by implication.
a. Is There an
Express Directive?
Plaintiffs are mistaken in arguing that our Legislature has
expressly required the application of our RICO laws to out-of-
state conduct. In this respect, plaintiffs rely on provisions in
our Criminal Code that express its territorial parameters. The
Code recognizes its application to conduct occurring "outside
the State" so long as it "constitute[s] an attempt to commit a
crime within the State," N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(a)(2), or to "conduct
occurring outside the State" so long as it "is sufficient under
the law of this State to constitute a conspiracy to commit an
offense within the State and an overt act in furtherance of such
conspiracy occurs within the State," N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(a)(3).
50 A-0963-12T1
Because the criminal racketeering laws are also included
within the Criminal Code, plaintiffs argue that the territorial
reach applicable to a criminal prosecution under those
racketeering laws also applies to a private RICO action brought
under those same laws and principles. We disagree. The
territorial parameters delineated in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(a), by
their very terms, apply to criminal prosecutions, not private
civil causes of action that may be based on provisions of the
Criminal Code. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(a) unmistakably states that its
six territorial rules apply to "a person [who] may be convicted
under the law of this State of an offense . . . for which he is
legally accountable" (emphasis added).
Consequently, despite plaintiffs' forceful argument, this
provision does not contain the "preemptive legislative
expression," State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estate of
Simmons, 84 N.J. 28, 39 (1980), necessary to support the
imposition of our substantive law to conduct occurring outside
the State. Because such an extensive reach would likely
constitute "an impermissible intrusion into the affairs of other
states," O'Connor v. Busch Gardens, 255 N.J. Super. 545, 549-50
(App. Div. 1992), we reject the contention that N.J.S.A. 2C:1-
3(a) constitutes a legislative directive as to the reach of New
Jersey substantive law in a private RICO cause of action.
51 A-0963-12T1
b. Is There an
Implied Directive?
We also reject any contention that such a legislative
directive may be found by implication here.
The preeminent expression of New Jersey public policy is
the Legislature's enactments. State Farm, supra, 84 N.J. at 39.
If a statute declares that a substantive rule applies in a
situation that would otherwise pose a choice-of-law question,
"New Jersey courts would follow that directive even when the law
of other jurisdictions dictated a contrary result." Ibid. That
understanding conforms with the Second Restatement's instruction
that, "subject to constitutional restrictions," a court "will
follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law."
Restatement (Second), supra, § 6(1). Examples include the
Uniform Commercial Code provisions that direct courts to choose
the law "of a particular state" or of the state that the parties
specified. Id. at § 6 cmt. a.
But, because statutes are usually not so "explicit," a
court may determine whether the issue presented "falls within
the intended range of application of a particular statute." Id.
at § 6 cmt. b & cmt. c. The Legislature's intended "range of
application" should be enforced "when these intentions can be
ascertained and can constitutionally be given effect," even if
52 A-0963-12T1
another state's substantive law "would be applicable under usual
choice-of-law principles." Id. at § 6 cmt. b. Thus, if the
forum's legislature "intended that the statute should be applied
to the out-of-state facts involved, the court should so apply
it[.]" Ibid. "On the other hand, if the legislature intended
that the statute should be applied only to acts taking place
within the state, the statute should not be given a wider range
of application." Ibid.
The absence of such a declaration in an enactment implies
the Legislature intended application only to conduct or results
that occur within the State, and that it did not have an
interest in facilitating or preventing developments occurring
elsewhere. Van Slyke v. Worthington, 265 N.J. Super. 603, 613-14
(Law Div. 1992). The Second Restatement similarly recognizes
that laws are commonly "formulated solely with the intrastate
situation in mind," with no suggestion they are "intended to
have extraterritorial application." Restatement (Second), supra,
§ 6 cmt. e. That would explain the absence in P.V., supra, 197
N.J. at 148-49, of a suggestion that the Charitable Immunity Act
could be understood as containing such a declaration,
notwithstanding the "importance" of that enactment's remedial
53 A-0963-12T1
policy and the Legislature's mandate to construe the enactment
liberally.29
The higher standards for criminal liability in New York's
OCCA, when compared to those in New Jersey's RICO statutes,
meant that a defendant would be exposed to liability under New
Jersey's local law for conduct that would not be illegal under
New York's law. The New York Legislature made its enactment
narrower than federal RICO, instead of broader as did our
Legislature. See Ball, supra, 268 N.J. Super. at 107. New York
29Plaintiffs emphasize two decisions from other jurisdictions in
support of their position. We do not find they suggest a
contrary view than that which we have reached. In Marshall v.
Fenstermacher, 388 F. Supp. 2d 536, 547 (E.D. Pa. 2005), the
court was required to apply "the conflicts regime of the forum
state," Pennsylvania. The plaintiff had asserted common law
torts under both Pennsylvania and New Jersey law but asserted
RICO claims only under New Jersey and federal law, id. at 546,
presumably because Pennsylvania's statute, like New York's, did
not afford a private civil cause of action. See 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 911. The court simply stated that it would consider the
New Jersey RICO claims under the New Jersey statute, with no
mention of choice-of-law doctrine and without citation to New
Jersey's RICO or general territoriality statutes. Marshall,
supra, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 562 n.29. In the other case urged by
plaintiffs, Houston v. Whittier, 216 P.3d 1272, 1278-80 (Idaho
2009), it was explained that Idaho courts were not automatically
compelled to let a plaintiff assert Oregon causes of action
simply because they were statutory. Instead, the court had to
find the absence of a conflict with "the public policy of the
forum," and allowed the maintenance of the causes of action only
after finding that Oregon statutes were "virtually identical" to
Idaho's. Id. at 1279-80. Thus, plaintiffs are mistaken in
suggesting that Houston presents an instance in which the
existence of a statutory cause of action precluded a court from
conducting a choice-of-law analysis.
54 A-0963-12T1
also precluded private litigants from pursuing cases that
prosecutors with limited resources might decline, as opposed to
New Jersey's decision to encourage private litigants with the
prospect of treble damages and counsel fee awards. Cf. Lindsey
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d 636, 646 (W.D. Tenn. 1999)
(observing that Congress included a private cause of action in
federal RICO "[t]o facilitate the enforcement of its
provisions"); Metro Int'l, Inc. v. Alco Standard Corp., 657 F.
Supp. 627, 634 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (recognizing that, "[t]o
facilitate and strengthen enforcement," Congress created RICO
with a private right of action for treble damages).
As in P.V., supra, 197 N.J. at 148-49, the difference in
approaches reflected a difference in policy and not a reflection
of mere variations in the procedural rules to be followed in
establishing a liability that both states recognized in
principle for the alleged conduct, as was the case in both State
Farm, supra, 84 N.J. at 42-43, and Cornett, supra, 211 N.J. at
377-78. We, thus, recognize that it is immaterial whether the
New York Legislature's motivation was to protect individuals or
the preeminence of its financial marketplace by limiting the
vehicles that private litigants could use to inhibit incidental
activity. It only matters that New York and New Jersey reached
"conflicting resolutions of a particular policy issue." See
55 A-0963-12T1
Boyes v. Greenwich Boat Works, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 543, 548
(D.N.J. 1998). In other words, New York did not intend, by
enacting OCCA, to regulate all the conduct New Jersey intended
to reach in enacting its RICO laws; consequently, we reject
plaintiffs' characterization of the New Jersey private right of
action as simply a stronger remedy to advance an out-of-state
policy that is otherwise the same as the in-state policy.
(ii) Application of
The Second Restatement
Having found no legislative directive that would govern the
choice-of-law problem, we turn to the Second Restatement and
examine its: (a) section 6 factors; (b) section 145 principles;
and (c) specific tort principles.
a. Section 6
In the absence of an explicit statutory directive or a
directive that can "be ascertained by a process of
interpretation and construction," Restatement (Second), supra,
§ 6 cmt. b, there is a nonexclusive list of seven factors to be
considered in choosing the applicable law:
(a) the needs of the interstate and inter-
national systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other
interested states and the relative interests
56 A-0963-12T1
of those states in the determination of the
particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expecta-
tions,
(e) the basic policies underlying the
particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniform-
ity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and applica-
tion of the law to be applied.
[Id. at § 6(2).]
The factor that deserves the greatest emphasis in a
particular case is that which furthers the most relevant policy
interest, such as "protecting the justified expectations of the
parties" or "favoring uniformity of result." Id. at § 6 cmt. c.
"Generally speaking, it would be unfair and improper to hold a
person liable under a local law of one state when he had
justifiably molded his conduct to conform to the requirements of
another state," as opposed to acting "without giving thought to
the legal consequences of [his] conduct or to the law that may
be applied." Id. at § 6 cmt. g. When "the purposes sought to be
achieved by a local statute or common law rule would be
furthered by its application to out-of-state facts, however,
this is a weighty reason why such application should be made."
Id. at § 6 cmt. e.
57 A-0963-12T1
The proper choice often "represents an accommodation of
conflicting values" that requires the forum court to name the
"general principle" that deserves the most weight and then
analyze the circumstances of the case in that regard. Id. at § 6
cmt. c. Without a statutory mandate to apply its own local law,
a court "must decide for itself whether the purposes sought to
[be] achieved by a local statute or rule should be furthered at
the expense of" other relevant factors. Id. at § 6 cmt. e. Those
include "the relevant policies of all other interested states"
and their "relative interest" in regulating the underlying
conduct that gave rise to the litigation, or in providing a
remedy for a particular plaintiff against a particular
defendant. Id. at § 6 cmt. f. "[W]here the policies of the
interested states are largely the same but where there are
nevertheless minor differences between their relevant local law
rules," there is "good reason for the court to apply the local
law of that state which will best achieve the basic policy, or
policies, underlying the particular field of law involved." Id.
at § 6 cmt. h.
In applying section 6 of the Second Restatement in P.V.,
supra, 197 N.J. at 152-53, the Court noted that interstate
comity additionally counsels that the forum state should defer
to the other state's local law if: (1) applying the forum
58 A-0963-12T1
state's local law would "substantially impair" the other state's
ability "to regulate the conduct of those who chose to operate
within its borders," and (2) applying the other state's local
law would not inhibit the forum's ability to regulate conduct
that occurs within its own borders. For example, the plaintiff
in P.V. was a New Jersey resident pursuing a tort claim against
a Pennsylvania charity for conduct that occurred in
Pennsylvania. Id. at 135. The Court found both of the conditions
that it noted for affording comity: (1) applying New Jersey's
broad charitable immunity to the activity in Pennsylvania would
"substantially impair[]" Pennsylvania's "ability to regulate the
conduct of those who chose to operate within its borders," and
(2) applying Pennsylvania law would not prevent New Jersey from
applying its law of charitable immunity to activities within New
Jersey. Id. at 153.
The parallel of this case to P.V. rests on the fact that
the alleged RICO activity predominantly occurred in New York
rather than New Jersey, and was primarily aimed at harming
plaintiffs indirectly by damaging their reputation by
influencing the mostly New York-based financial markets and
financial news media. In those circumstances, the application of
New York law would not set a precedent that inhibits New Jersey
from providing a civil cause of action for in-state activities
59 A-0963-12T1
that qualify as racketeering under New Jersey's statute; New
Jersey could still protect its domiciliaries and New Jersey
commerce from harm that is felt mostly within its borders.
In contrast, applying New Jersey's civil cause of action
would nullify New York's policy of protecting analogous activity
from being prosecuted as "racketeering" by private litigants,
who lack the institutional constraints of prosecutors and grand
juries. These distinctions in the two neighboring state's laws
created differing expectations about what conduct each would
allow or prohibit.
This case is, thus, distinguishable from those in which
courts declined to dismiss claims recognized under New Jersey
local law, even though out-of-state plaintiffs might have been
unable to pursue such causes of action under their own state's
local law. In those matters, the plaintiffs were allowed to
pursue their claims on the ground that their home states had no
reason to deny them the fortuity of a remedy for what both
states recognized as "the same evil," even if they did not
recognize it to the same degree. See Boyes, supra, 27 F. Supp.
2d at 547-48 (recognizing that Pennsylvania had no interest in
denying its residents the greater damages available under New
Jersey consumer fraud statutes for claims against a New Jersey
seller); Smith v. Alza Corp., 400 N.J. Super. 529, 542-51 (App.
60 A-0963-12T1
Div. 2008) (recognizing that Alabama had no interest in denying
its residents the procedural and substantive advantages afforded
under New Jersey's product liability and consumer fraud
statutes, but not Alabama's, for claims against a New Jersey
manufacturer); Almog v. Isr. Travel Advisory Serv., Inc., 298
N.J. Super. 145, 159 (App. Div. 1997) (recognizing Israel had no
interest in denying its citizens the substantive advantages of
New Jersey defamation law in New Jersey residents' claims for
defamation published in New Jersey), appeal dismissed, 152 N.J.
361, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 817, 119 S. Ct. 55, 142 L. Ed. 2d 42
(1998).
That, however, is not what's before us. As we have
observed, New Jersey and New York local law do not just differ
in the degree to which they deal with an otherwise common policy
of allowing a private civil RICO cause of action. They share no
such interest, as demonstrated by the fact that New Jersey law
permits, and New York law categorically disallows, such private
claims. Thus, we conclude that the section 6 factors favor
choosing New York as the state providing the applicable law.
b. Section 145
In addition, when a cause of action sounds in tort, the
general choice-of-law rule is to ascertain the state with "the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties
61 A-0963-12T1
under the principles stated in [section] 6." Restatement
(Second), supra, § 145(1). That determination is to be made for
each "issue in tort," ibid., meaning each element needed to
establish the tort or a defense to it. Id. at § 145 cmt. d. In
making that determination, certain contacts are "to be taken
into account," including:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the
injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality,
place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if
any, between the parties is centered.
[Id. at § 145(2).]
Accord P.V., supra, 197 N.J. at 141. Plaintiffs and defendants
have not asserted or alleged a prior relationship that preceded
the alleged events in this dispute.
The contacts analysis is "not merely quantitative." Id. at
147. Its purpose is to assess the contacts in terms of the
guiding touchstones of the Second Restatement's section 6,
which, "[r]educed to their essence," are: "(1) the interests of
interstate comity; (2) the interests of the parties; (3) the
interests underlying the field of tort law; (4) the interests of
judicial administration; and (5) the competing interests of the
62 A-0963-12T1
states." Ibid. (citations omitted). The "relative importance"
of the matter's contacts with a state may vary according to "the
nature of the tort involved." Restatement (Second), supra, § 145
cmt. f. Furthermore, for each tort issue, the contacts "are to
be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect
to the particular issue." Id. at § 145 & cmt. d.
If the primary purpose of the local "tort rule" is to deter
or punish misconduct, then the most important contact will be
the conduct's location. Id. at § 145 cmt. c. "[T]he same is true
when the conduct was required or privileged by the local law of
the state where it took place," id. at § 145 cmt. e, so "[a]
rule [of tort] which exempts the actor from liability for
harmful conduct is entitled to the same consideration in the
choice-of-law process as is a rule which imposes liability," id.
at § 145 cmt. c. In that way, the tort policies behind New
Jersey's local law and New York's local law on private civil
causes of action for racketeering are entitled to equal
consideration, even if the purpose of New York's "tort rule" was
to prevent private civil liability for certain conduct that
would create such liability in New Jersey. In short, were we to
apply section 145's general rule for torts, we would choose New
York as providing the applicable law because it has the most
significant relationship under section 6.
63 A-0963-12T1
c. Specific Tort Principles
In addition to section 145's general factors for torts, the
Second Restatement also provides more specific choice-of-law
rules for particular torts. P.V., supra, 197 N.J. at 141. There
are rules for personal injuries, injuries to tangible things,
injuries resulting from a plaintiff's reliance on fraud or
misrepresentations, and injuries resulting from defamation or
injurious falsehood. Restatement (Second), supra, §§ 146-51.
Only injurious falsehood is germane to plaintiffs' RICO claim.
For Second Restatement purposes, an "injurious falsehood"
is any false statement that causes pecuniary loss. Id. at § 151
cmt. a; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 623A (1976)
(declaring that an injurious falsehood creates liability for one
who publishes it with knowledge or reckless disregard of its
falsity and with intent "to result in harm to interests of the
other having a pecuniary value"). An injurious falsehood "need
not cast any reflection upon the plaintiff's personal reputation
in order to be actionable." Restatement (Second), supra, § 151
cmt. a. It is enough that the false statement "disparage[s] the
plaintiff's title to his property, or its quality or the
character or conduct of the plaintiff's business." Ibid. This
description encompasses defendants' alleged RICO scheme.
64 A-0963-12T1
The Second Restatement does not have another tort rule that
might cover plaintiffs' RICO claims. Plaintiffs' alleged RICO
injuries are not a form of defamation, nor do they constitute a
form of "personal injury" for choice-of-law purposes, because
"personal injury" is limited to "physical harm or mental
disturbance," which means that "injuries to a person's
reputation . . . are not 'personal injuries' in the sense here
used." Id. at § 146 cmt. b. Plaintiffs' RICO injuries are not
"Injuries to Tangible Things" as used in section 147 of the
Second Restatement. Plaintiffs' alleged injuries do not arise
from "Fraud and Misrepresentation" for choice-of-law purposes
because plaintiffs do not allege that they "suffered pecuniary
harm on account of [their own] reliance on the defendant[s']
false representations." Id. at § 148(1). Rather, plaintiffs
allege reliance by others. Plaintiffs do not assert a defamation
claim, but the rules for "Defamation" and "Multistate
Defamation" in sections 149 and 150 of the Second Restatement
are incorporated into section 151, which covers "Injurious
Falsehood." Thus, the only rules for specific torts relevant to
plaintiffs' RICO claim are sections 149 through 151 of the
Second Restatement.
65 A-0963-12T1
For defamation,30 "the local law of the state where the
publication occurs determines the rights and liabilities of the
parties, except as stated in [section] 150, unless, with respect
to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant
relationship under the principles stated in [section] 6 to the
occurrence and the parties." Id. at § 149. That same rule
governs the choice of law analysis for injurious falsehood. Id.
at § 151 & cmt. b. Here, the state where the publications
primarily occurred was the state with the most significant
relationship – New York.
Next, we must consider whether section 150 calls for a
different result. For multistate defamation, an "aggregate
communication" is "any one edition of a book or newspaper, or
any one broadcast over radio or television, exhibition of a
motion picture," or a similar act of publication, id. at
§ 150(1), meaning "a single aggregate communication to a large
number of persons at one time." Id. at § 150 cmt. c. Multiple
publications of a defamatory statement to numerous individuals
30To be clear, plaintiffs did not assert a defamation claim nor
complained in this appeal that their allegations should have
been interpreted as if they had sought damages based on a claim
of defamation. Nevertheless, their disparagement claims may –
for these purposes – be viewed similarly due to their
theoretical kinship. Cf. Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Pub.
Co., 104 N.J. 125, 133 (1986) (recognizing that the torts of
product disparagement and defamation "sometimes overlap").
66 A-0963-12T1
are not necessarily "aggregate communications" subject to
section 150, as they can be separate acts that require an
individual choice-of-law analysis that may lead to differing
results. Id. at § 149 cmt. a. Although plaintiffs have alleged
multiple publications of certain defamatory statements, which
might not qualify as section 150 multistate defamations, they
primarily allege aggregate communications published in a manner
intended to influence all persons and entities who follow or
participate in the financial marketplace and financial news
media.
The "single publication rule" applies to section 150
aggregate communications, so the matter may be determined as if
plaintiff has only one cause of action, regardless of the number
of jurisdictions in which the aggregate communication was
published. Id. at § 150 cmt. c; Restatement (Second) of Torts,
supra, § 577A cmts. e & f.
In addition, we must consider that, in this context, a
corporation is a legal person and therefore without domicile in
the choice-of-law sense. Restatement (Second), supra, § 150
cmt. f; see also id. at § 11 cmt. 1. Thus, when a corporation
claims multistate defamation, the state with the most
significant relationship to the matter "will usually be the
state where the corporation . . . had its principal place of
67 A-0963-12T1
business" as long as that state was one in which the multistate
defamation was published. Id. at § 150(3). This is because it is
assumed that a corporation sustains its greatest injury from
defamation there. Id. at § 150 cmt. f. Another state, however,
may have the "most significant relationship with respect to the
particular issue if it is the state where the defamatory
communication caused plaintiff the greatest injury to its
reputation." Ibid. That can occur if "the matter claimed to be
defamatory related to an activity of the plaintiff that is
principally located in this state," id. at § 150 cmt. f(b), or
"the plaintiff suffered greater special damages in this state
than in the state of its principal place of business," id. at §
150 cmt. f(c), or "the place of principal circulation of the
matter claimed to be defamatory was in this state," id. at § 150
cmt. f(d).
As alleged by plaintiffs, defendants' RICO scheme targeted
plaintiffs' use of the New York financial markets for securities
offerings and for third-party trading of their securities, which
was an "activity" of plaintiffs that was "principally located
in" New York. Ibid. As a result, New York was the state where
defendants' false communications caused plaintiffs "the greatest
injury to [their] reputation" because the main injury from the
alleged RICO scheme was the decrease in offering and market
68 A-0963-12T1
share prices due to the reputational harm that plaintiffs
suffered in the markets where plaintiffs conducted such
"activity." That is bolstered because, although defendants'
publications were multistate, "the place of principal
circulation of the matter claimed to be defamatory was in" New
York. Ibid. Thus, New York is the state with the most
significant relationship under section 150 as well as sections 6
and 145.
That conclusion remains undisturbed when considering
"special damages." If the injury was the loss of particular
customers or of market share in particular locations, those
would also be important contacts in determining which state's
law to apply. See Pony Comput., Inc. v. Equus Comput. Sys. of
Miss., Inc., 162 F.3d 991, 996 (8th Cir. 1998); Jelec USA, Inc.
v. Safety Controls, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 945, 952-53 (S.D. Tex.
2007). As we discuss elsewhere, plaintiffs' cognizable special
damages are the alleged loss of 180 customers throughout the
country. There was no evidence that any loss of customers or
market share occurred to a greater degree in New Jersey than in
New York or elsewhere.
We also are presented with no ground upon which to conclude
that defamation or disparagement of a parent company generally
amounts to defamation or disparagement of a subsidiary, or vice
69 A-0963-12T1
versa. The issue of entity separation for corporate parents and
subsidiaries raises additional questions concerning the locus of
the injury. For example, in a case that concerned the looting of
a corporation rather than its defamation, we favored application
of Delaware's equitable principles to pierce the corporate veil,
and gave the parent standing to protect financial interests
against the adverse party, because the parent's interests were
not as distinct from its subsidiary's contractual rights as the
doctrine of "entity separateness" generally presumes. Bondi,
supra, 423 N.J. Super. at 437-39. Although such recognition
implies that the subsidiary's injury is also an injury to the
parent, we intended no implication that the locus of the injury
necessarily moved from where the subsidiary as a separate entity
would have felt it to where the parent as a separate entity
would feel it.
Plaintiffs have alleged and argued that C&F's finances were
inextricably intertwined with Fairfax's. And they have argued
that the market viewed Fairfax and its subsidiaries as so
inseparable that some defendants bought shares of the
subsidiaries and affiliates as proxies for Fairfax shares, which
had become too costly to borrow due to demand from those
shorting Fairfax. Plaintiffs have further argued that
defendants' defamation of C&F served the main goal of destroying
70 A-0963-12T1
the entirety of Fairfax itself, and defendants rarely bothered
to distinguish among its subsidiaries. According to plaintiffs,
the RICO enterprise operated by spreading false information in
the financial markets and the financial news media, and by
encouraging federal law enforcement and securities officials
outside New Jersey to investigate Fairfax's use of reinsurance.
The goal was to damage Fairfax's reputation in order to reduce
the market share price, and the proceeds of securities
offerings, of all Fairfax entities.
In responding, defendants mostly view Fairfax as an
integrated company whose general financial instability reached
every branch of the Fairfax family tree.31 And defendants'
criticisms of C&F served more as criticism of the Fairfax
edifice than criticisms of C&F individually. Indeed, some
defendants expressly articulated an intent for their criticisms
of a subsidiary, or their short positions in a subsidiary, to
harm plaintiff Fairfax Financial Holdings. In addition, we
observe that the parent corporation of the financially-
intertwined Fairfax entities was located in Toronto, and all
share-trading occurred on the New York Stock Exchange or the
Toronto Stock Exchange.
31 We have appended to this opinion a graph setting forth the
relationship of the various Fairfax entities.
71 A-0963-12T1
In summary, the weight of the conduct in this alleged
enterprise of multistate disparagement was in New York, not New
Jersey. The financial markets and financial news media were
predominantly located in New York, making New York central to
defendants' publications. New York is "the state where the
[harmful] communication[s] caused the greatest injury to
[plaintiffs'] reputation." Restatement (Second), supra, § 150
cmt. f. For all these reasons, New York has "a more significant
relationship to the occurrences and the parties." Ibid.
(iii) Conclusion
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial judge
correctly gave C&F's direct alleged losses little weight in
balancing the state contacts and interests for the RICO claims.
We, thus, affirm the determination that New York law applied and
that, in applying New York law, plaintiffs' racketeering claim
could not stand.
72 A-0963-12T1
B
THE MAINTAINABILITY OF
THE COMMON LAW CLAIMS
Plaintiffs contend the trial judge erroneously dismissed
two of their common law claims.32 They first argue the trial
judge mistakenly applied New York's statute of limitations
rather than New Jersey's more generous time-bar to their
disparagement claim,33 and, second, they argue the judge
erroneously excluded evidence of damages on their claims of
disparagement and tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage.
(1) Statute of Limitations
Applicable to Plaintiffs'
Disparagement Claim
Plaintiffs argue the trial judge erred in ascertaining the
appropriate statute of limitations to be applied to their
disparagement claim. They argued in the trial court that New
32 Plaintiffs do not address in their appeal the trial court's
disposition of their tortious interference with contractual
relations claim.
33Morgan Keegan has not only responded to plaintiffs' arguments
about the applicable time-bar, but has also cross-appealed and
argues, among other things, that the trial judge erred in
applying New York's three-year statute of limitations instead of
New York's one-year limitation period.
73 A-0963-12T1
Jersey's six-year statute of limitations34 applied, Morgan Keegan
argued for application of New York's one-year statute of
limitations,35 and the trial judge found controlling the three-
year New York statute of limitations.36
After this appeal was argued the Supreme Court decided
McCarrell v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., supra, 227 N.J. at 574-75,37
which illuminates our way by holding that section 142 of the
Second Restatement "is now the operative choice-of-law rule for
resolving statute-of-limitations conflicts because it . . .
channel[s] judicial discretion and lead[s] to more predictable
and uniform results that are consistent with the just
expectations of the parties." The Court described its holding as
"a natural progression in [its] conversion from the
governmental-interest test to the Second Restatement [which
34N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 (declaring that "[e]very action at law for .
. . any tortious injury to real or personal property . . . shall
be commenced within 6 years next after the cause of any such
action shall have accrued").
35N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(3) (declaring that "an action to recover
damages for," among other things, "libel, slander, [and] false
words causing special damages" "shall be commenced within one
year").
36N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4) (declaring that "an action to recover
damages for an injury to property" "must be commenced within
three years").
37We invited and recently received and considered the parties'
supplemental briefs on McCarrell's impact on the issues in this
case.
74 A-0963-12T1
began] in P.V.[, supra,] 197 N.J. 132," and which adopted the
methodology described earlier in this opinion for resolving
conflicts concerning substantive tort law. McCarrell, supra, 227
N.J. at 574-75. McCarrell's approach has certainly simplified
the disposition of most conflicts concerning a choice between
two or more states' statutes of limitations.
The process starts with an understanding that when an
action is commenced here, "New Jersey's choice-of-law rules
[apply] in deciding whether this State's or another state's
statute of limitations governs the matter." Id. at 583. In
defining New Jersey choice-of-law rules, the McCarrell Court
instructed that the first matter of interest is whether there is
a "true conflict." Id. at 584. "When application of the forum
state's or another state's statute of limitations results in the
same outcome, no conflict exists, and the law of the forum state
governs." Ibid. (citing Rowe v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 189
N.J. 615, 621 (2007)). A true conflict occurs "when a complaint
is timely filed within one state's statute of limitations but is
filed outside another state's." Ibid. (citing Schmelze v. ALZA
Corp., 561 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1048 (D. Minn. 2008)).
We can perceive a circumstance – perhaps applicable here –
where a complaint is filed within time regardless of which
competing state's statute of limitations is applied, but the
75 A-0963-12T1
scope of the claim is limited or enhanced depending on the
statute of limitations applied. For example, a plaintiff may sue
on a series of defamatory statements occurring over the course
of two years. If one state has a one-year statute of limitations
and the other has a two-year statute of limitations, the
plaintiff's suit – if filed within one year of the last
defamatory statement – would be timely filed pursuant to either
state's statute of limitations. But, if the one-year statute of
limitations is found applicable, the allegations or resulting
damages would be limited by that choice of law because
allegations of defamatory statements made more than a year
before the suit's commencement would not be cognizable. That
particular problem was not likely contemplated in McCarrell
because the facts didn't warrant its consideration; that product
liability action was either timely if our statute of limitations
applied or entirely barred if Alabama's applied.
In any event, other than referring to a "true conflict" as
one which makes a difference as to the timeliness of the suit,
the Court also emphasized that the test is whether the choice of
"statute of limitations is outcome determinative." Id. at 584
(emphasis added). In the example we have provided, the outcome
would be impacted if a suit would be timely under either statute
of limitations because, if the shorter limitations period was
76 A-0963-12T1
applied, only the defamatory statements asserted within one year
of the filing would be actionable. In ascertaining the existence
of a true conflict, we assume the McCarrell Court intended the
broader view suggested by its "outcome determinative" language.
Indeed, later in the opinion, the Court again emphasized that
whether the conflict is "outcome determinative" is the question,
and, in that regard, the Court quoted with approval a federal
judge who stated, in a different way, that there is no conflict
if "'there is no divergence between the potentially applicable
laws.'" Id. at 591 n.9 (quoting Spence-Parker v. Del. River &
Bay Auth., 656 F. Supp. 2d 488, 497 (D.N.J. 2009)). Because some
or most of defendants' allegedly disparaging statements from
2002 to 2006 would cease to be actionable if a shorter New York
statute – either New York's one-year or its three-year statute
of limitations – were to be applied to this 2006 complaint
rather than New Jersey's six-year statute of limitations,
N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1, we conclude that the choice-of-law decision
here is "outcome determinative" and requires a resolution.
There being a true conflict, McCarrell instructs, 227 N.J.
at 592-93, that we must apply the Second Restatement's section
142, which states that, "barring exceptional circumstances
[that] make such a result unreasonable":
(1) The forum will apply its own statute of
limitations barring the claim.
77 A-0963-12T1
(2) The forum will apply its own statute of
limitations permitting the claim unless:
(a) maintenance of the claim would
serve no substantial interest of
the forum; and
(b) the claim would be barred
under the statute of limitations
of a state having a more
significant relationship to the
parties and the occurrence.
Because application of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 permits the maintenance
of the claim, subsection (1) of section 142 has no application.
We, thus, gaze toward section 142's subsection (2). And, as the
Court held, under section 142(2)(a), "the statute of limitations
of the forum state generally applies whenever that state has a
substantial interest in the maintenance of the claim."
McCarrell, supra, 227 N.J. at 593. If that is so, then "the
inquiry ends." Ibid. It is "[o]nly when the forum state has 'no
substantial interest' in the maintenance of the claim [that] a
court [would] consider [s]ection 142(2)(b) – whether 'the claim
would be barred under the statute of limitations of a state
having a more significant relationship to the parties and the
occurrence.'" Ibid.
In this case, section 142 is easily applied, as anticipated
by McCarrell's description of the test. Ibid. (observing that
section 142: "benefits from an ease of application; places both
78 A-0963-12T1
this State's and out-of-state's citizens on an equal playing
field, thus promoting principles of comity; advances
predictability and uniformity in decision-making; and allows for
greater certainty in the expectations of the parties"). Section
142 "makes clear that when New Jersey has a substantial interest
in the litigation and is the forum state, it will generally
apply its statute of limitations." Ibid. Stated another way,
under section 142, the forum state "presumptively applies its
own statute of limitations unless . . . [it] has no significant
interest in the maintenance of the claim and the other state,
whose statute has expired, has 'a more significant relationship
to the parties and the occurrence,' . . . or . . . given 'the
exceptional circumstances of the case,' following the Second
Restatement rule would lead to an unreasonable result."
McCarrell, supra, 227 N.J. at 597.
There is no doubt that New Jersey has a substantial
interest in this litigation. One of the plaintiffs – C&F – has
its principal place of business in New Jersey and claims
injuries to its business caused by the alleged disparagement of
it and its products. Because New Jersey has a significant
interest, it is irrelevant under section 142 that New York has a
"more significant relationship to the parties and the
occurrence." Ibid. Absent "exceptional circumstances," not
79 A-0963-12T1
remotely suggested here, that this would "lead to an
unreasonable result," the test described in McCarrell requires
application of our own statute of limitations. Ibid.
Consequently, the timeliness of plaintiffs' disparagement
cause of action – the only claim as to which plaintiffs argue
the judge erred in applying a shorter, New York statute of
limitations – is governed by our six-year statute of
limitations. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.38 See Patel v. Soriano, 369 N.J.
Super. 192, 247 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 141
(2004). Although New Jersey has a one-year statute of
limitations for libel and slander of a person, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3,
plaintiffs claim commercial disparagement of their business and
products, sometimes referred to as trade libel. Patel, supra,
369 N.J. Super. at 246-47. In New Jersey, "a claim for trade
libel is subject to the general six-year statute of limitations
applicable to malicious interference claims." Id. at 247.
Moreover, that statute of limitations applies to disparagement
whether "the aspersion reflects only on the quality of
plaintiff's products, or on the character of plaintiff's
38For these same reasons, we reject the argument Morgan Keegan
asserted in its cross-appeal that the trial judge erred in
applying New York's three-year statute of limitations, instead
of New York's one-year statute of limitations.
80 A-0963-12T1
business as such." Ibid.39 Therefore, "the more restricted
statute of limitations for slander does not apply" here. Id. at
249.
The six-year statute of limitations applies to plaintiffs'
disparagement claims, as well as their other common law causes
of action. The trial judge erred in applying a shorter statute
of limitations.
39 As the trial judge recognized, a statement that attacks an
insurance company as a fraud or a Ponzi scheme, or an assertion
that it is insolvent or bankrupt, among other similar things,
may constitute an attack on its products. Here, statements
disparaging the financial condition of plaintiffs may have a
direct link to its products; plaintiffs are in the business,
through the sale of insurance policies, of making promises to
clients to pay them money in the future in the event of certain
occurrences. Statements that question plaintiffs' ability to
make those payments strike at both the heart of their reputation
and the products they sell – a view that can be seen in the
assertions of Fairfax's chairman and chief executive officer:
When you're in the insurance business and
you are selling a promise to pay a claim in
a year or two or three or four, when you
have all of this noise . . . when there
[are] statements made that the company is
bankrupt, of course, you have clients who
would not do business with you. Why would a
client do business with a property casualty
insurance company that's going bankrupt?
81 A-0963-12T1
2. Dismissal of Plaintiffs'
Disparagement and Tortious Interference
With Prospective Economic Advantage Claims
Based on the Absence of Special Damages
Plaintiffs also argue the trial court erred in excluding
evidence of damages allegedly incurred because of both
disparagement and tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage. This involves not only a determination of
which state's substantive law applies in assessing the
maintainability of those common law actions but also the content
of that substantive law.
(a) Choice of Law
We need not discuss at length our determination that New
York provides the substantive law applicable to plaintiffs'
common law causes of action. Although the choice-of-law
principles discussed in Section IV(B)(1), supra, required
application of this State's statute of limitations, other
choice-of-law principles – already discussed in Section IV(A),
supra, which led to our affirmance of the dismissal of the
racketeering claim – compel the adoption of New York's common
law in assessing the sufficiency of plaintiffs' claims of
82 A-0963-12T1
disparagement and tortious interference with prospective
economic advantages.40
(b) Common Law
Requirements
The parties' chief bone of contention concerns the types of
damages plaintiffs were required to assert and prove to sustain
their claims of disparagement and tortious inference with
prospective economic advantage. We discuss these separately.
(i) Disparagement
We initially observe that, in New York, defamation claims,
which are akin to disparagement claims, require "special
damages," meaning an economic loss resulting from the harm to
the plaintiff's reputation. Liberman v. Gelstein, 605 N.E.2d
344, 347 (N.Y. 1992); Matherson v. Marchello, 473 N.Y.S.2d 998,
1000 (App. Div. 1984). This requires the identification of
customers who would have dealt with the plaintiff but for the
reputational harm. Squire Records, Inc. v. Vanguard Recording
Soc'y, Inc., 226 N.E.2d 542, 543 (N.Y. 1967); Drug Research
Corp. v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 166 N.E.2d 319, 322 (N.Y. 1960);
DiSanto v. Forsyth, 684 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629 (App. Div. 1999);
40We will not conduct an individualized choice-of-law assessment
regarding plaintiffs' common-law claims for reasons expressed
earlier. See Section IV(A)(3)(b), supra.
83 A-0963-12T1
Waste Distillation Tech., Inc. v. Blasland & Bouck Eng'rs, P.C.,
523 N.Y.S.2d 875, 877 (App. Div. 1988).
This principle seems to have emanated from New York state
courts' disagreements with one federal case in New York that had
allowed a substitute measure of damages for a plaintiff that
sold its product only by mail order. Charles Atlas, Ltd. v.
Time-Life Books, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 150, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
The district judge in Charles Atlas held that it was "virtually
impossible to identify those who did not order the plaintiff's
product because of the" product disparagement, and allowed the
plaintiff "to prove lost sales by other means" as long as
"'other factors [are] satisfactorily excluded by sufficient
evidence[.]'" Ibid. (quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the
Law of Torts § 128, at 923-24 (4th ed. 1971)).41 In rejecting
41 Dean Prosser observed:
[T]he whole modern tendency is away from any
such arbitrary rule. Starting with a few
cases involving goods offered for sale at an
auction, and extending to others in which
there has been obvious impossibility of any
identification of the lost customers, a more
liberal rule has been applied, requiring the
plaintiff to be particular only where it is
reasonable to expect him to do so. It is
probably still the law everywhere that he
must either offer the names of those who
have failed to purchase or explain why it is
impossible for him to do so; but where he
cannot, the matter is dealt with by analogy
(continued)
84 A-0963-12T1
Charles Atlas, New York's Appellate Division held that a
disparagement claim is dependent on "evidence of particular
persons who ceased to be or refused to become customers." De
Marco-Stone Funeral Home Inc. v. WEBG Broadcasting Inc., 610
N.Y.S.2d 666, 668 (App. Div. 1994); see also Prince v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 941 N.Y.S.2d 488, 488 (App. Div.
2012).
(ii) Tortious Interference With
Prospective Economic Advantage
To sustain a claim for tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage pursuant to New York substantive
law: there must be a prospective business relationship between
the plaintiff and a third party; the defendant must know of that
relationship and intentionally interfere with it; the
defendant's means of interference must amount to a crime, an
independent tort, or conduct that arose solely out of malice;
and the result must be some injury to the relationship with the
third party. Posner v. Lewis, 965 N.E.2d 949, 952 n.2 (N.Y.
(continued)
to the proof of lost profits resulting from
breach of contract. If the possibility that
other factors have caused the loss of the
general business is satisfactorily excluded
by sufficient evidence, this seems entirely
justified by the necessities of the
situation.
85 A-0963-12T1
2012); Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, 818 N.E.2d 1100, 1102-03 (N.Y.
2004); Amaranth LLC v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 888 N.Y.S.2d
489, 494-96 (App. Div. 2009). The requirement to specifically
identify the business lost is the same as noted above with
regard to disparagement claims.
The business prospect must be identifiable, and the
plaintiff must show that it would have obtained that prospect's
business but for the interference. Learning Annex Holdings, LLC
v. Gittelman, 850 N.Y.S.2d 422, 423 (App. Div. 2008). The
defendant must know of the specific third party and the
prospective business relationship. See GS Plasticos Limitada v.
Bureau Veritas Consumer Prods. Servs., Inc., 931 N.Y.S.2d 567,
568 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 957 N.E.2d 1159 (N.Y. 2011).
(c) Damages Asserted
To maintain its common law claims, C&F's marketing
department developed a list of 180 specifically-identified
customers or potential customers whose business it claims C&F
would have maintained or secured but for defendants' wrongful
acts. C&F employees developed a model of the lost revenue and
profits for each such customer. For the period between 2003 and
2009, they estimated the lost revenue at $102 million and lost
profits at $19 million; the total volume of business "quoted but
not written" by C&F during that period was approximated at $14
86 A-0963-12T1
billion, of which the revenue lost on those 180 accounts
represented less than one percent.
Jorge Echemendia, a corporate representative of United
States Fire Insurance Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of C&F,
testified at a deposition that he and another C&F employee
developed the list from C&F's records, which included the
customer call report system that was used to archive notes on
existing and potential accounts, and from communications with
brokers and other producers. C&F recognized in 2004 that
customers were paying greater attention to an insurer's ratings
and financial capacity, and it accordingly added those concerns
to the list of reasons that could be cited in a call report as a
cause for losing a particular customer. Approximately 170 of
the 180 accounts in the list were identified due to the
selection of such a reason in the call report, while the rest
were identified from emails that attributed the loss of an
account to those reasons.
The trial court found no proof the 180 customers relied on
defendants' statements. But plaintiffs proffered that
defendants' scheme was designed to disparage and interfere by
lowering C&F's ratings and to cast doubt on the financial
soundness of C&F and its parent. Plaintiffs' proofs that these
180 customers relied on the resulting reduced ratings and
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financial reputation indicated these customers relied on
defendants' statements indirectly, as defendants allegedly
intended. For example, plaintiffs cited a March 2005 email,
which followed a March 2005 rating agency report. Echemendia
also asserted that "a few" of "the articles distributed by the
defendants" were named in a call report or in an email.
The question before us is not whether these assertions of
lost business are persuasive or even whether they must be
presented through expert opinion. The question as we understand
it, in light of the trial court's disposition and in light of
New York law, requires a determination of whether plaintiffs
asserted a loss of business sufficient to withstand summary
disposition. We find plaintiffs' allegations regarding the 180
lost customers were sufficiently specific to meet the
requirements of New York law.42
3. Summary
For these reasons, our review of the trial judge's
disposition of the two common law causes of action referred to
in plaintiffs' appeal – disparagement and the tortious
42 Because plaintiffs' disparagement and tortious interference
with prospective economic advantage claims survive, their claim
of a civil conspiracy may also be further maintained. Corris v.
White, 289 N.Y.S.2d 371, 374 (App. Div. 1968); see also Banco
Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 177-78 (2005).
88 A-0963-12T1
interference with prospective economic advantage – leads us to
conclude that: New Jersey's six-year statute of limitations
applies to those claims; New York law imposes a requirement that
plaintiffs allege special damages; and summary judgment was
erroneously granted because the claim of 180 lost business
prospects was sufficient to meet the requirements of New York
law.
C
THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION RULINGS
Plaintiffs argue that the trial judge erred in dismissing
the Kynikos and Third Point defendants for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Plaintiffs assert that those defendants ought to
be held subject to suit in New Jersey because they participated
in the overarching conspiracy to harm them. In response, these
defendants argue that our courts do not recognize conspiracy-
based jurisdiction and, alternatively, that plaintiffs have not
presented any competent evidence to show they were part of a
conspiracy. As required by Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540, we
assume plaintiffs' allegations regarding these defendants are
true for purposes of determining whether the trial court
properly granted summary judgment on personal jurisdiction
grounds.
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Before examining the relationship of these defendants to
New Jersey, we first observe that the due process clause permits
the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in two
ways – general and specific jurisdiction. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v.
Admiral Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 106, 119 (1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1183, 115 S. Ct. 1175, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1128 (1995). A
nonresident's continuous and systematic contacts that
approximate an actual presence give rise to general
jurisdiction. Ibid. Specific or "case-linked" jurisdiction
"depends on an 'affiliatio[n] between the forum and the
underlying controversy,' principally, activity or an occurrence
that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to
the State's regulation." Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A.
v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851, 180 L. Ed.
2d 796, 803 (2011) (quoting Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T.
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1136 (1966)).
We, thus, turn to the relationship between these two groups
of defendants – the Kynikos and Third Point defendants – and
this State, and examine whether there is jurisdiction in this
State over these defendants through a consideration of the
concepts of (1) general, (2) specific, and (3) conspiracy-based
jurisdiction.
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1. General Jurisdiction
(a) Kynikos
Kynikos – formed in 1985 as a limited partnership organized
in Delaware with its principal place of business in New York –
is an investment advisor and management company that specializes
in short-selling and has managed over $1 billion for its
clients. During the relevant period, Kynikos purchased services
and products from New Jersey vendors; it did not, however, have
any property, an office, a mailing address, a phone number, or a
bank account in this State. Kynikos was not registered to
conduct business in New Jersey, and any employees who were
residents of New Jersey reported to Kynikos's offices in New
York or London.
Kynikos did not advertise its services in New Jersey. It
operated a password-protected website, which only its existing
or prospective clients could access. Kynikos had seven New
Jersey clients between 2002 and 2007; those relationships were
client-initiated and comprised less than one-half of one percent
of Kynikos's total investment assets. Kynikos filed partnership
tax returns in New Jersey only because some of its related
entities shared partial ownership of airplanes that were
occasionally hangared at Teterboro Airport in Bergen County.
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Defendant James S. Chanos, Kynikos's founder and president,
was a New York resident; he did not have a New Jersey mailing
address, phone number or bank account. Chanos did not own
property in New Jersey, and he was not obligated to file a
personal income tax return in New Jersey. Like Kynikos, Chanos
only filed partnership returns in connection with the airplanes
in Bergen County.
In September 2000, defendant Jeffrey Perry, formerly of
SAC, joined Kynikos as a co-manager. After an alleged "falling
out" with Chanos, Perry left Kynikos in 2005 and joined Third
Point as a senior analyst. He was a New York resident and had
no New Jersey mailing address, phone number or bank account.
Perry did not own property in, and did not regularly travel to,
New Jersey. Although he paid New Jersey taxes in 2005 for
earnings from an unrelated investment, he otherwise has not been
obligated to file a personal income tax return in New Jersey.
Kynikos traded in Fairfax stock between March 2002 and June
2007, and in Odyssey stock between January 2006 and March 2007.
Kynikos never held stock in, nor traded any interest in, C&F.
(b) Third Point
Third Point – a Delaware limited liability company with its
principal office in New York and a satellite office in
California – was an employee-owned hedge fund that serviced
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pooled investments and institutional investors and had an
investment relationship with the Exis defendants.
During the relevant period, Third Point provided management
services to a number of funds that traded the securities of
Fairfax and related entities. Those funds paid Third Point
management fees; the funds themselves, however, are not parties
to this suit and, in any event, had no New Jersey presence. The
brokers who executed those trades were not located in New Jersey
and no Third Point member resided in New Jersey.
Between 2002 and 2006, New Jersey residents comprised only
four percent of the investors in Third Point's funds, and less
than two percent of the cash Third Point managed belonged to New
Jersey investors. Third Point paid New Jersey taxes on behalf of
its investors, but the Third Point funds reimbursed those
outlays; Third Point itself did not pay New Jersey taxes.
Third Point purchased services and products from New Jersey
vendors, but those payments were minimal, representing less than
one percent of Third Point's operating budgets between 2002 and
2007. Third Point was not registered to conduct business in New
Jersey, did not own or lease property here, and did not have any
New Jersey-based offices, mailing addresses, phone numbers or
bank accounts. Third Point did not send general solicitations to
New Jersey residents unless such information was requested.
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Defendant Daniel S. Loeb was the managing member and
founder of Third Point and, as noted previously, Perry was a
senior analyst. Both Loeb and Perry had their primary residences
in New York and did not travel to New Jersey on a regular basis.
Neither owned nor leased property in New Jersey or maintained a
New Jersey mailing address or phone number.
Loeb had personal accounts with various New Jersey savings
banks, but he was not required to pay New Jersey income taxes.
Plaintiffs alleged that Loeb directed Perry to help Contogouris
develop and disseminate false information about Fairfax's
health.
Third Point traded extensively in the following entities
and at the following times: (1) Fairfax, between June 2002 and
February 2007; (2) Odyssey, between November 2005 and December
2006; (3) Northbridge Financial Corporation, a Fairfax
subsidiary located in Canada, between June 2002 and November
2006; and (4) C&F, between July 2006 and April 2007. Third
Point's trading of C&F-related interests amounted to only three
percent of its overall Fairfax-related transactions. Those
interests, however, consisted of bonds that were not issued by
C&F; they were instead originally issued by non-party Crum &
Forster Funding Corp., a Delaware corporation. C&F assumed those
94 A-0963-12T1
bonds on June 30, 2003, through a transaction conducted in New
York purportedly in accordance with New York law.
Considering the contacts of the Kynikos and Third Point
defendants, we conclude they are insufficient to give our courts
general jurisdiction over them because the contacts do not
constitute "continuous and systematic activities in the forum."
Waste Mgmt., supra, 138 N.J. at 119.
2. Specific Jurisdiction
There being no basis upon which to assert general
jurisdiction over these defendants, we consider whether they had
specific contacts with persons or entities in New Jersey that
relate to the alleged enterprise or conspiracy. Although we do
not have the benefit of the trial judge's view of plaintiffs'
specific allegations of communications by these defendants
toward entities or persons in New Jersey, we have closely
examined the record in light of the parties' arguments. We find
any such communications to be so inconsequential as to justify
rejection of the argument that the court was authorized to
exercise specific jurisdiction over these defendants.
95 A-0963-12T1
As for Kynikos, plaintiffs allude to a handful of
communications it had with A.M. Best,43 CNBC,44 and "a New Jersey-
based" Dow Jones reporter, Carol Redmond.45 And, as for
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.