United States v. Reynolds

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

Case No. 10-cr-87 (GK)

JASON TODD REYNOLDS,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner is Jason Todd Reynolds, an inmate in a federal prison, who was convicted of

multiple felonies in 2011. Judgment as to Jason Todd Reynolds [Dkt. No. 73]. In 2014, Mr.

Reynolds challenged his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his attorney in his

criminal trial had provided him with unconstitutionally ineffective assistance [Dkt. No. 96]. Mr.

Reynolds’ Motion to Vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was fully briefed, and the Court held an

evidentiary hearing on February 2 and 3, 2015 (“Evidentiary Hearing”). S_ee_ Memorandum Order

Denying Motion to Vacate at 6 [Dkt. No. 140]. Ultimately, on February 19, 2015, the Court denied

Mr. Reynolds’ Motion to Vacate his conviction. id

Mr. Reynolds now asks this Court to vacate the judgment of February 19, 2015, alleging

that various officials within the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) conspired to keep him from

participating in the Evidentiary Hearing, and thereby committed a fraud on this Court and deprived

him of his right to due process. Petition for Relief Under Federal Rule 60(b) and 60(d) (“Petition”)

[Dkt. No. 151]. In addition, Mr. Reynolds brings a number of ancillary claims alleging that: l) an

individual BOP official violated his constitutional rights; 2) various BOP officials have falsified

his prison records, resulting in poorer conditions of confinement and the prospect of more time in

prison; and 3) the Department of Justice has violated the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),

5 U.S.C. § 552. After consideration of the Petition, the Opposition [Dkt. No 155], and the Reply

[Dkt. No. 158], and the entire record herein, Mr. Reynold’s Petition will be denied.

l. BACKGROUND

On January 22, 2014, Mr. Reynolds filed a Motion to Vacate his conviction under 28

U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his attorney for his trial, Edward Sussman, had provided him with

ineffective assistance [Dkt. No. 96]. Mr. Reynolds Was represented by David Bernstein on the

§ 2255 Motion challenging his conviction. On January 5, 2015, the Court scheduled an

Evidentiary Hearing for February 2, 2015. [Dkt. No. 130].

On or around January 14, 2015, the BOP informed Mr. Reynolds that it would not allow

him to travel to the Evidentiary Hearing. BOP officials claimed that there had been a chickenpox

outbreak at the prison where Mr. Reynolds was held and that medical tests confirmed that he lacked

immunity to the chickenpox virus. Therefore, pursuant to BOP protocol, he was not permitted to

travel as he posed a transmission risk. On January 21, 2015, Mr. Bernstein filed an Emergency

Motion to Compel BOP to produce Mr. Reynolds at the Evidentiary Hearing. [Dkt. No. 131]. On

January 28, 2015, the Court held a status conference, by telephone, to discuss the Emergency

l\/Iotion. Subsequently, after informal negotiations between the Government and Mr. Bernstein,

the parties agreed that Mr. Reynolds would appear by video. Exh. E to Opp’n [Dkt. No. 155-5].

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The Court then held the Evidentiary Hearing, as scheduled, on February 2 and 3, 2015, and

Mr. Reynolds participated by video conference Transcript of Motions Hearing Volume 1

(“February 2nd Transcript”) at 5:19-21 (2015) [Dkt. No. 136]. The transcript of the hearing makes

clear that Mr. Reynolds was able to testify fully on the morning of February 2, 2015, despite some

technical issues. § § at 59:19-22 (in which Mr. Bernstein concluded his questioning and Mr.

Reynolds was dismissed); w § at 9:25-10:1, 55:20-56:2 (discussing technical issues,

although confirming that Mr. Reynolds was able to see, hear, and participate). At the conclusion

of his testimony, the video feed Mr. Reynolds used to testify was disconnected, and he did not

participate in the remaining day-and-a-half of the Evidentiary Hearing. I_<L at 60:6-7; Transcript

of Motions Hearing Volume 2 (“February 3rd Transcript”) at 4:7-10 (2015) [Dkt. No. 137] (noting

that Mr. Reynolds was not present for the second day of the Evidentiary Hearing).

In response to the Court’s question of whether his client had agreed that he would only

testify and not appear electronically for the remainder of the hearing, Mr. Bernstein stated: “Well,

actually, Your Honor, we never really entertained the possibility that he would be able to listen to

the entire hearing because we thought we would only have video for two hours. But he did consent

to give his testimony via the video. l did talk to him about that.” February 2nd Transcript at

83:16-21; Ml_sg February 3rd Transcript at 417-10 (noting that “Mr. Reynolds has indicated his

agreement for us to proceed without him being present”). After Mr. Reynolds’ appearance at the

Evidentiary Hearing, his Emergency Motion was terminated as moot because BOP had, in fact,

allowed him to appear at the Evidentiary Hearing. MINUTE ORDER denying as moot Dkt. No.

131 Motion to Compel as to JASON TODD REYNOLDS (February 3, 2013) (available on ECF).

In his present Petition, Mr. Reynolds makes a number of distinct claims. First, he alleges

that BOP officials fabricated the results of the chickenpox tests in order to prevent him from

appearing at the Evidentiary Hearing. He also alleges that, during the Evidentiary Hearing, his

BOP case manager, Charles Wilson, disconnected the video feed after Mr. Reynolds had finished

testifying, thereby preventing him from participating in the entirety of the Evidentiary Hearing.

Petition at 16-17, 20-21. He argues that the cumulative effect of these actions was to deny him an

ability to effectively participate in the Evidentiary Hearing, thereby depriving him of his Fifth

Amendment right to due process and perpetrating a fraud on the Court. Li Second, Mr. Reynolds

argues that, by disconnecting the video feed, Mr. Wilson violated various constitutional rights held

by Mr. Reynolds. Li at 17-18, 20-21.

Third, he claims that BOP officials deliberately falsified his prison records and, that if these

records were corrected, he would be incarcerated for less prison time and eligible for improved

conditions of confinement during the remaining time he is incarcerated Petition at 23-36. Fourth

and finally, Mr. Reynolds claims that the Government has not properly responded to a FOIA

request he filed, requesting documents related to his incarceration Petition at 36-38.

II. CLAIMS UNDER FEDERAL RULE 60

A. Preliminary Issues

As a preliminary matter, there is some dispute as to what provisions of Rule 60 Mr.

Reynolds relies on to bring this petition. See Opposition at 6-10. Mr. Reynolds’ Petition is

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entitled “Petition for Relief Under Federal Rule 60(b) and 60(d)”; but each of those subdivisions

contain several different bases on which a court may grant relief.

Having reviewed Mr. Reynolds’ Petition, it is readily apparent that he brings his claims

regarding the conduct of the Evidentiary Hearing under subsections (b)(3), (b)(4), and (d)(3) of

Rule 60. Throughout his filings, Mr. Reynolds repeatedly states that BOP’s alleged attempts to

prevent his participation in the Evidentiary Hearing were based on willful misrepresentations to

the Court that he had chickenpox. This allegation clearly falls within the ambit of Rule 60(b)(3),

which allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment for “fraud (whether previously called

intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party,” as well as Rule

60(d)(3), which preserves the court’s authority to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.”

_S_e__e_ Fed. R. Civ. P. 60.

Additionally, Mr. Reynolds repeatedly asserts that, as a result of these misrepresentations

to the Court, he was unable to participate in the entirety of the Evidentiary Hearing, and that this

violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process. This allegation clearly falls within the ambit

of Rule 60(b)(4), which applies “‘where a judgment is premised . . . on a violation of due process

that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard.”’ United States v. Philip Morris

USA Inc., 840 F.3d 844, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting United Student Aid Funds. lnc. v. Espinosa,

559 U.S. 260, 271(2010)).

B. Analysis

1. Rule 60(b)(3) - Fraud or Misrepresentation

Mr. Reynolds argues that the BOP sought to prevent him from physically appearing at the

Evidentiary Hearing by misrepresenting the results of his medical tests to the Court.

As already noted, Rule 60(b)(3) allows the Court to grant relief due to “fraud (whether

previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). The movant must “show actual prejudice,” which means that he must

demonstrate that the non-movant’s actions “prevented him from presenting his case fully and

fairly.” People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. United States Dept. of Health and Human

SLvic;c_s, 2017 WL 59079, at *11 (D.D.C. Jan. 5, 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rule

60(c)(3)(1) expressly states that a motion brought pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) must be made “no

more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order” being challenged Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(c)(3).

The judgment that Mr. Reynolds challenges, the Memorandum Order ruling on his Motion

to Vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, was entered on February 19, 2015. [Dkt. No. 140]. However,

Mr. Reynolds did not file this Petition until November 2, 2016, well after one year had passed.

Accordingly, he cannot seek relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3).

2. Rule 60(b)(4) - Void Judgment

Mr. Reynolds also argues that by misrepresenting the results of his medical tests and

preventing him from physically appearing at the Evidentiary Hearing, BOP deprived him of his

right to due process, and consequently, that the judgment is void.

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“Rule 60(b)(4) authorizes relief from a final order if ‘the judgment is void.”’ Philip Morris,

840 F.3d at 849. “[T]he Supreme Court explained that Rule 60(b)(4) applies ‘only in the rare

instance where a judgment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a

violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard.”’ Lil_ip

_Mgrr_is, 840 F.3d at 850 (quoting Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 271). Ordinarily, a judgment will be

vacated as void due to a denial of due process where an individual has received no notice of the

suit, does not appear, and therefore is deprived of any opportunity to be heard. See generally 11

Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862

(3d ed.).

Unlike Rule 60(b)(3), “Rule 60(b)(4) motions are not governed by a reasonable time

restriction.” Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic l{;public of Iran, 734 F.3d 1175, 1179 (D.C.

Cir. 2013). “[T]he only question for the court is whether the judgment is void; if it is, relief from

it should be granted.” Ld (internal citations omitted).

Mr. Reynolds was not deprived of his right to due process when he appeared at the

Evidentiary Hearing by video. He had notice of the hearing, made an appearance, and testified.

Although Mr. Reynolds was not present for the testimony of any of the other witnesses, the

transcripts from the Evidentiary Hearing demonstrate that this was a considered decision made in

consultation with his attorney. February 2nd Transcript at 83:16-21; February 3rd Transcript at

4:7-10. Mr. Reynolds’ allegation that Mr. Wilson terminated the video feed and refused to allow

him to participate in the Evidentiary Hearing after his testimony does not change that conclusion.

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Even if true, the transcripts from the Evidentiary Hearing conclusively establish that he and his

attorney decided that he would only appear at the Hearing to give his own testimony and would

not appear or participate once that testimony concluded. February 2nd Transcript at 83:16-21.

As Mr. Reynolds waived, through his attorney, his appearance for the remainder of the

Evidentiary Hearing beyond his own testimony, there was no violation of due process and the

judgment was not void. Consequently, his motion under Rule 60(b)(4) must be denied.

3. Rule 60(d)(3) - Fraud on the Court

Finally, l\/Ir. Reynolds argues that BOP officials’ misrepresented the results of his medical

tests to the Court and such misrepresentation constitutes a fraud on the Court.

Rule 60(d)(3) preserves the authority of the court to “Set aside a judgment for fraud on the

court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3). “Fraud on the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial

machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or

perjury. Fraud upon the court refers only to very unusual cases involving far more than an injury

to a single litigant. Examples include the bribery of a judge or the knowing participation of an

attorney in the presentation of perjured testimony.” Baltia Air Lines, Inc. v. Transaction Mgt.,

L, 98 F.3d 640, 642-43 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

“Relief due to fraud on the court is very rarely warranted and is typically confined to the most

egregious cases . . . in which the integrity of the court and its ability to function impartially is

directly impinged.” More v. Lew, 34 F. Supp. 3d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2014) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Unlike a claim of fraud or misrepresentation brought under Rule 60(b)(3), a claim of

fraud on the court “exists to protect the integrity of the judicial process,” and therefore, “cannot be

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time-barred.” Bowie v. Maddox, 677 F. Supp. 2d 276, 278-79 (D.D.C. 2010) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Mr. Reynolds cannot meet the high bar required to demonstrate a fraud on the court. Even

if the Court Were to accept the allegation that BOP officials misrepresented the results of his

medical tests~_and the evidence Mr. Reynolds submits does not establish that~there is no

indication that any officer of the court, such as an attorney representing the Govemment, Was a

party to the deception.

Moreover, Mr. Reynolds theory of fraud is refuted by the evidence in the record. Mr.

Reynolds argues that BOP officials would not allow him to travel because he purportedly had

chickenpox, but that his test results conclusively show that he did not. Petition at 9. This argument

misconstrues both the results of the tests and the purported reason he was prevented from traveling

to the Evidentiary Hearing. First, while it is true that the test results demonstrate that Mr. Reynolds

did not have chickenpox, they also indicated that he lacked immunity to the virus. Exhibit 2 to

Petition [Dkt. No. 151-1]. It was this lack of immunity-and the resultant risk that Mr. Reynolds

might transmit the chickenpox virus to others if he acquired it from a fellow inmate- which led

the BOP to deny him permission to attend the Evidentiary Hearing. Declaration of Travis

Haczynski [Dkt. No. 155-2]. Thus, Mr. Reynolds is simply wrong in arguing that BOP officials

misrepresented to the Court that he had chickenpox.

As Mr. Reynolds’ allegations do not establish a fraud on the court, his motion under Rule

60(d)(3) shall be denied.

III. OTHER CLAIMS

Mr. Reynolds’ claims that Mr. Wilson violated his constitutional rights and that the

Department of Justice has violated FOIA are not brought pursuant to Rule 60 because they do not

seek relief from a prior judgment of this Court. lnstead, the Court will treat them as though they

were raised in a complaint, filed pursuant to Rule 7, Fed. R, Civ. P. 7(a)(1), and treat the

Government’s Opposition as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or, in the

alternative, as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

A. BIVENS CLAIMS

Mr. Reynolds also attempts to sue his case manager, Mr. Wilson, alleging that Mr. Wilson

violated several of his constitutional rights_-his right to free speech under the First Amendment,

his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment, and his right to confront the witnesses against

him under the Sixth Amendment-by terminating the video connection with the Court during the

Evidentiary Hearing.

For these claims, he relies on _BLM. In §i_\_/B, the Supreme Court recognized that an

implied cause of action may exist against federal officials who violate an individual’s

constitutional rights. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).

Mr. Reynolds’ Bivens claims fail because Mr. Wilson’s alleged termination of the video

feed could not have violated his constitutional rights.l As discussed above, Mr. Reynolds’ own

l Because it is evident that Mr. Reynolds has not even sufficiently alleged a violation of his

constitutional rights, it is not necessary to address whether he could bring a claim under Bivens

had such a violation occurred. w Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 122-26 (2012) (noting that

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attorney agreed to the procedure for the Evidentiary Hearing, in which Mr. Reynolds would testify

but would not continue to listen or participate after his testimony concluded Accordingly, even if

Mr. Reynolds were correct that Mr. Wilson terminated the video feed and refused to restart it, he

fails to state a claim that his constitutional rights were violated Therefore, his Bivens claims shall

be dismissed

B. ACCURATE PRISON RECORDS CLAIMS

Mr. Reynolds also alleges that BOP officials have intentionally fabricated his prison

records. Moreover, he claims that, as a result of the false information contained in those records,

he is unable to participate in drug treatment programs that would reduce the amount of time that

he is incarcerated and is ineligible for certain privileges that would improve the conditions of his

confinement The Government argues that Mr. Reynolds may not raise this claim in this Court

because he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Opp’n at 19.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that “No action shall be brought with respect

to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other F ederal law, by a prisoner confined to

any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available

are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Government has promulgated regulations that establish

specific procedures for prisoners who wish to challenge the conditions of their confinement §§

28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.19 (collectively known as the “Administrative Remedy Program

a Bivens cause of action does not exist for every violation of a constitutional right committed by a

federal official).

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Regulations”). These regulations govern challenges to numerous aspects of the conditions of a

prisoners confinement, including: the computation of credit for time served for a state sentence

against her federal sentence, United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992); the calculation of her

restitution payments, United States v. Clark, 953 F. Supp. 2d 80 (D.D.C. 2013); and her ability to

live in a manner consistent with her religious faith. Smith v. Director, 412 Fed. Appx. 427 (3d

Cir. 201 1). The requirement that an inmate exhaust her administrative remedies before bringing a

claim in federal district court is mandatory and “applies to all prisoners seeking redress for prison

circumstances or occurrences.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 520 (2002); §ee_eg C_la_r_k, 953 F.

Supp. 2d at 82; Morton v. Bolyard, 810 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2011).

The Administrative Remedy Program Regulations govern Mr. Reynolds’ claims regarding

his prison records and the Government has submitted a sworn declaration from Patrick Kissell, an

Administrative Remedy Specialist with the BOP, declaring that Mr. Reynolds has not complied

with the requirements of the Administrative Remedy Program Regulations. Exhibit J to Opp’n

[Dkt. No. 15 5-10]. Mr. Reynolds has failed to respond in any way to demonstrate that he has not

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

l\/Ir. Reynolds fails to allege that he has taken any steps to exhaust his administrative

remedies, let alone identify anything that contradicts Mr. Kissell’s declaration. Instead, he merely

points to the fact that he filed a FOIA request with DOJ and that they responded to that request.

However, the fact that he has filed requests for documents under FOIA does not demonstrate that

he has exhausted his administrative remedies to have his prison records corrected

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Because Mr. Reynolds failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking to have

this Court order the BOP to correct his prison records, this claim shall be dismissed, or in the

alternative, summary judgment shall be granted to the Government2

C. FOIA CLAIMS

Mr. Reynolds also claims that the Department of Justice has not properly responded to a

FOIA request that he filed on March 15, 2015. It is apparent from the exhibits Mr. Reynolds

attached to his Petition that this issue is presently before another member of this Court. Compare

Complaint in Jason T. Reynolds v. Department of Justice, l6-cv-01428-JEB [Dkt. No. 1], Mh

Exhibit 18 [Dkt. No. 151-1]. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this claim and it

shall be dismissed without prejudice

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Reynolds Petition is denied in its entirety.

§ tate /@/Q

April 19, 2017 Gladys Kesslg

United States District Judge

Copies to: attorneys on record via ECF

2 Though not argued by the Government, Mr. Reynolds’ failure to exhaust his administrative

remedies likely also bars him from bringing his Bivens claims. “[E]xhaustion in cases covered by

§ 1997e(a) is now mandatory . . . . Thus federal prisoners suing under [Bivens] must first exhaust

inmate grievance procedures.” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (internal citations omitted).

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