Manuel v. City of Joliet

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MANUEL v. CITY OF JOLIET, ILLINOIS, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 14–9496. Argued October 5, 2016—Decided March 21, 2017

During a traffic stop, police officers in Joliet, Illinois, searched petition-

er Elijah Manuel and found a vitamin bottle containing pills. Sus-

pecting the pills to be illegal drugs, the officers conducted a field test,

which came back negative for any controlled substance. Still, they

arrested Manuel and took him to the police station. There, an evi-

dence technician tested the pills and got the same negative result,

but claimed in his report that one of the pills tested “positive for the

probable presence of ecstasy.” App. 92. An arresting officer also re-

ported that, based on his “training and experience,” he “knew the

pills to be ecstasy.” Id., at 91. On the basis of those false statements,

another officer filed a sworn complaint charging Manuel with unlaw-

ful possession of a controlled substance. Relying exclusively on that

complaint, a county court judge found probable cause to detain Ma-

nuel pending trial.

While Manuel was in jail, the Illinois police laboratory tested the

seized pills and reported that they contained no controlled substanc-

es. But Manuel remained in custody, spending a total of 48 days in

pretrial detention. More than two years after his arrest, but less

than two years after his criminal case was dismissed, Manuel filed a

42 U. S. C. §1983 lawsuit against Joliet and several of its police offic-

ers (collectively, the City), alleging that his arrest and detention vio-

lated the Fourth Amendment. The District Court dismissed Manuel’s

suit, holding, first, that the applicable two-year statute of limitations

barred his unlawful arrest claim, and, second, that under binding

Circuit precedent, pretrial detention following the start of legal pro-

cess (here, the judge’s probable-cause determination) could not give

rise to a Fourth Amendment claim. Manuel appealed the dismissal

of his unlawful detention claim; the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

2 MANUEL v. JOLIET

Syllabus

Held:

1. Manuel may challenge his pretrial detention on Fourth Amend-

ment grounds. This conclusion follows from the Court’s settled prec-

edent. In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, the Court decided that a

pretrial detention challenge was governed by the Fourth Amend-

ment, noting that the Fourth Amendment establishes the minimum

constitutional “standards and procedures” not just for arrest but also

for “detention,” id., at 111, and “always has been thought to define”

the appropriate process “for seizures of person[s] . . . in criminal cas-

es, including the detention of suspects pending trial,” id., at 125, n.

27. And in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U. S. 266, a majority of the Court

again looked to the Fourth Amendment to assess pretrial restraints

on liberty. Relying on Gerstein, the plurality reiterated that the

Fourth Amendment is the “relevan[t]” constitutional provision to as-

sess the “deprivations of liberty that go hand in hand with criminal

prosecutions.” Id., at 274; see id., at 290 (Souter, J., concurring in

judgment) (“[R]ules of recovery for such harms have naturally coa-

lesced under the Fourth Amendment”). That the pretrial restraints

in Albright arose pursuant to legal process made no difference, given

that they were allegedly unsupported by probable cause.

As reflected in those cases, pretrial detention can violate the

Fourth Amendment not only when it precedes, but also when it fol-

lows, the start of legal process. The Fourth Amendment prohibits

government officials from detaining a person absent probable cause.

And where legal process has gone forward, but has done nothing to

satisfy the probable-cause requirement, it cannot extinguish a de-

tainee’s Fourth Amendment claim. That was the case here: Because

the judge’s determination of probable cause was based solely on fab-

ricated evidence, it did not expunge Manuel’s Fourth Amendment

claim. For that reason, Manuel stated a Fourth Amendment claim

when he sought relief not merely for his arrest, but also for his pre-

trial detention. Pp. 6–10.

2. On remand, the Seventh Circuit should determine the claim’s

accrual date, unless it finds that the City has previously waived its

timeliness argument. In doing so, the court should look to the com-

mon law of torts for guidance, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 257–

258, while also closely attending to the values and purposes of the

constitutional right at issue. The court may also consider any other

still-live issues relating to the elements of and rules applicable to

Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claim. Pp. 11–15.

590 Fed. Appx. 641, reversed and remanded.

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 3

Syllabus

THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting

opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined.

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 14–9496

_________________

ELIJAH MANUEL, PETITIONER v. CITY OF JOLIET,

ILLINOIS, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[March 21, 2017]

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner Elijah Manuel was held in jail for some seven

weeks after a judge relied on allegedly fabricated evidence

to find probable cause that he had committed a crime.

The primary question in this case is whether Manuel may

bring a claim based on the Fourth Amendment to contest

the legality of his pretrial confinement. Our answer fol-

lows from settled precedent. The Fourth Amendment, this

Court has recognized, establishes “the standards and

procedures” governing pretrial detention. See, e.g., Ger-

stein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 111 (1975). And those consti-

tutional protections apply even after the start of “legal

process” in a criminal case—here, that is, after the judge’s

determination of probable cause. See Albright v. Oliver,

510 U. S. 266, 274 (1994) (plurality opinion); id., at 290

(Souter, J., concurring in judgment). Accordingly, we hold

today that Manuel may challenge his pretrial detention on

the ground that it violated the Fourth Amendment (while

we leave all other issues, including one about that claim’s

timeliness, to the court below).

2 MANUEL v. JOLIET

Opinion of the Court

I

Shortly after midnight on March 18, 2011, Manuel was

riding through Joliet, Illinois, in the passenger seat of a

Dodge Charger, with his brother at the wheel. A pair of

Joliet police officers pulled the car over when the driver

failed to signal a turn. See App. 90. According to the

complaint in this case, one of the officers dragged Manuel

from the car, called him a racial slur, and kicked and

punched him as he lay on the ground. See id., at 31–32,

63.1 The policeman then searched Manuel and found a

vitamin bottle containing pills. See id., at 64. Suspecting

that the pills were actually illegal drugs, the officers con-

ducted a field test of the bottle’s contents. The test came

back negative for any controlled substance, leaving the

officers with no evidence that Manuel had committed a

crime. See id., at 69. Still, the officers arrested Manuel

and took him to the Joliet police station. See id., at 70.

There, an evidence technician tested the pills once

again, and got the same (negative) result. See ibid. But

the technician lied in his report, claiming that one of the

pills was “found to be . . . positive for the probable pres-

ence of ecstasy.” Id., at 92. Similarly, one of the arresting

officers wrote in his report that “[f ]rom [ his] training and

experience, [ he] knew the pills to be ecstasy.” Id., at 91.

On the basis of those statements, another officer swore out

a criminal complaint against Manuel, charging him with

unlawful possession of a controlled substance. See id., at

52–53.

Manuel was brought before a county court judge later

that day for a determination of whether there was proba-

ble cause for the charge, as necessary for further deten-

——————

1 Because

we here review an order dismissing Manuel’s suit, we ac-

cept as true all the factual allegations in his complaint. See, e.g.,

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination

Unit, 507 U. S. 163, 164 (1993).

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 3

Opinion of the Court

tion. See Gerstein, 420 U. S., at 114 (requiring a judicial

finding of probable cause following a warrantless arrest to

impose any significant pretrial restraint on liberty); Ill.

Comp. Stat., ch. 725, §5/109–1 (West 2010) (implementing

that constitutional rule). The judge relied exclusively on

the criminal complaint—which in turn relied exclusively

on the police department’s fabrications—to support a

finding of probable cause. Based on that determination,

he sent Manuel to the county jail to await trial. In the

somewhat obscure legal lingo of this case, Manuel’s subse-

quent detention was thus pursuant to “legal process”—

because it followed from, and was authorized by, the

judge’s probable-cause determination.2

While Manuel sat in jail, the Illinois police laboratory

reexamined the seized pills, and on April 1, it issued a

report concluding (just as the prior two tests had) that

they contained no controlled substances. See App. 51.

But for unknown reasons, the prosecution—and, critically

for this case, Manuel’s detention—continued for more than

another month. Only on May 4 did an Assistant State’s

Attorney seek dismissal of the drug charge. See id., at 48,

101. The County Court immediately granted the request,

and Manuel was released the next day. In all, he had

spent 48 days in pretrial detention.

On April 22, 2013, Manuel brought this lawsuit under

42 U. S. C. §1983 against the City of Joliet and several of

its police officers (collectively, the City). Section 1983

creates a “species of tort liability,” Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U. S. 409, 417 (1976), for “the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-

——————

2 Although not addressed in Manuel’s complaint, the police depart-

ment’s alleged fabrications did not stop at this initial hearing on

probable cause. About two weeks later, on March 30, a grand jury

indicted Manuel based on similar false evidence: testimony from one of

the arresting officers that “[t]he pills field tested positive” for ecstasy.

App. 96 (grand jury minutes).

4 MANUEL v. JOLIET

Opinion of the Court

tion,” §1983. Manuel’s complaint alleged that the City

violated his Fourth Amendment rights in two ways—first

by arresting him at the roadside without any reason, and

next by “detaining him in police custody” for almost

seven weeks based entirely on made-up evidence. See

App. 79–80.3

The District Court dismissed Manuel’s suit. See 2014

WL 551626 (ND Ill., Feb. 12, 2014). The court first held

that the applicable two-year statute of limitations barred

Manuel’s claim for unlawful arrest, because more than two

years had elapsed between the date of his arrest (March

18, 2011) and the filing of his complaint (April 22, 2013).

But the court relied on another basis in rejecting Manuel’s

challenge to his subsequent detention (which stretched

from March 18 to May 5, 2011). Binding Circuit prece-

dent, the District Court explained, made clear that pretrial

detention following the start of legal process could not give

rise to a Fourth Amendment claim. See id., at *1 (citing,

e.g., Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F. 3d 747, 750 (CA7 2001)).

According to that line of decisions, a §1983 plaintiff chal-

lenging such detention must allege a breach of the Due

Process Clause—and must show, to recover on that theory,

that state law fails to provide an adequate remedy. See

2014 WL 551626, at *1–*2. Because Manuel’s complaint

rested solely on the Fourth Amendment—and because, in

any event, Illinois’s remedies were robust enough to pre-

clude the due process avenue—the District Court found

that Manuel had no way to proceed. See ibid.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed

——————

3 Manuel’s allegation of unlawful detention concerns only the period

after the onset of legal process—here meaning, again, after the County

Court found probable cause that he had committed a crime. See supra,

at 3. The police also held Manuel in custody for several hours between

his warrantless arrest and his first appearance in court. But through-

out this litigation, Manuel has treated that short period as part and

parcel of the initial unlawful arrest. See, e.g., Reply Brief 1.

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 5

Opinion of the Court

the dismissal of Manuel’s claim for unlawful detention

(the only part of the District Court’s decision Manuel

appealed). See 590 Fed. Appx. 641 (2015). Invoking its

prior caselaw, the Court of Appeals reiterated that such

claims could not be brought under the Fourth Amend-

ment. Once a person is detained pursuant to legal pro-

cess, the court stated, “the Fourth Amendment falls out of

the picture and the detainee’s claim that the detention is

improper becomes [one of] due process.” Id., at 643–644

(quoting Llovet v. Chicago, 761 F. 3d 759, 763 (CA7 2014)).

And again: “When, after the arrest[,] a person is not let go

when he should be, the Fourth Amendment gives way to

the due process clause as a basis for challenging his deten-

tion.” 590 Fed. Appx., at 643 (quoting Llovet, 761 F. 3d, at

764). So the Seventh Circuit held that Manuel’s com-

plaint, in alleging only a Fourth Amendment violation,

rested on the wrong part of the Constitution: A person

detained following the onset of legal process could at most

(although, the court agreed, not in Illinois) challenge his

pretrial confinement via the Due Process Clause. See 590

Fed. Appx., at 643–644.

The Seventh Circuit recognized that its position makes

it an outlier among the Courts of Appeals, with ten others

taking the opposite view. See id., at 643; Hernandez-

Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F. 3d 91, 99 (CA1 2013) (“[T]here is

now broad consensus among the circuits that the Fourth

Amendment right to be free from seizure but upon proba-

ble cause extends through the pretrial period”).4 Still, the

——————

4 See also Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F. 3d 110, 114–118

(CA2 1995); McKenna v. Philadelphia, 582 F. 3d 447, 461 (CA3 2009);

Lambert v. Williams, 223 F. 3d 257, 260–262 (CA4 2000); Castellano v.

Fragozo, 352 F. 3d 939, 953–954, 959–960 (CA5 2003) (en banc); Sykes

v. Anderson, 625 F. 3d 294, 308–309 (CA6 2010); Galbraith v. County of

Santa Clara, 307 F. 3d 1119, 1126–1127 (CA9 2002); Wilkins v. De-

Reyes, 528 F. 3d 790, 797–799 (CA10 2008); Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F. 3d

581, 584–586 (CA11 1996); Pitt v. District of Columbia, 491 F. 3d 494,

6 MANUEL v. JOLIET

Opinion of the Court

court decided, Manuel had failed to offer a sufficient rea-

son for overturning settled Circuit precedent; his argu-

ment, albeit “strong,” was “better left for the Supreme

Court.” 590 Fed. Appx., at 643.

On cue, we granted certiorari. 577 U. S. ___ (2016).

II

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreason-

able . . . seizures.” Manuel’s complaint seeks just that

protection. Government officials, it recounts, detained—

which is to say, “seiz[ed]”—Manuel for 48 days following

his arrest. See App. 79–80; Brendlin v. California, 551

U. S. 249, 254 (2007) (“A person is seized” whenever offi-

cials “restrain[ ] his freedom of movement” such that he is

“not free to leave”). And that detention was “unreason-

able,” the complaint continues, because it was based solely

on false evidence, rather than supported by probable

cause. See App. 79–80; Bailey v. United States, 568 U. S.

186, 192 (2013) (“[T]he general rule [is] that Fourth

Amendment seizures are ‘reasonable’ only if based on

probable cause to believe that the individual has commit-

ted a crime”). By their respective terms, then, Manuel’s

claim fits the Fourth Amendment, and the Fourth

Amendment fits Manuel’s claim, as hand in glove.

This Court decided some four decades ago that a claim

challenging pretrial detention fell within the scope of the

Fourth Amendment. In Gerstein, two persons arrested

without a warrant brought a §1983 suit complaining that

they had been held in custody for “a substantial period

solely on the decision of a prosecutor.” 420 U. S., at 106.

The Court looked to the Fourth Amendment to analyze—

and uphold—their claim that such a pretrial restraint on

liberty is unlawful unless a judge (or grand jury) first

——————

510–511 (CADC 2007).

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 7

Opinion of the Court

makes a reliable finding of probable cause. See id., at 114,

117, n. 19. The Fourth Amendment, we began, establishes

the minimum constitutional “standards and procedures”

not just for arrest but also for ensuing “detention.” Id., at

111. In choosing that Amendment “as the rationale for

decision,” the Court responded to a concurring Justice’s

view that the Due Process Clause offered the better

framework: The Fourth Amendment, the majority coun-

tered, was “tailored explicitly for the criminal justice

system, and it[ ] always has been thought to define” the

appropriate process “for seizures of person[s] . . . in crimi-

nal cases, including the detention of suspects pending

trial.” Id., at 125, n. 27. That Amendment, standing

alone, guaranteed “a fair and reliable determination of

probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial

restraint.” Id., at 125. Accordingly, those detained prior to

trial without such a finding could appeal to “the Fourth

Amendment’s protection against unfounded invasions of

liberty.” Id., at 112; see id., at 114.5

And so too, a later decision indicates, those objecting to

a pretrial deprivation of liberty may invoke the Fourth

Amendment when (as here) that deprivation occurs after

——————

5 The Court repeated the same idea in a follow-on decision to Ger-

stein. In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44, 47 (1991), we

considered how quickly a jurisdiction must provide the probable-cause

determination that Gerstein demanded “as a prerequisite to an extended

pretrial detention.” In holding that the decision should occur within 48

hours of an arrest, the majority understood its “task [as] articulat[ing]

more clearly the boundaries of what is permissible under the Fourth

Amendment.” 500 U. S., at 56. In arguing for still greater speed, the

principal dissent invoked the original meaning of “the Fourth Amend-

ment’s prohibition of ‘unreasonable seizures,’ insofar as it applies to

seizure of the person.” Id., at 60 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The difference

between the two opinions was significant, but the commonality still

more so: All Justices agreed that the Fourth Amendment provides the

appropriate lens through which to view a claim involving pretrial

detention.

8 MANUEL v. JOLIET

Opinion of the Court

legal process commences. The §1983 plaintiff in Albright

complained of various pretrial restraints imposed after a

court found probable cause to issue an arrest warrant, and

then bind him over for trial, based on a policeman’s un-

founded charges. See 510 U. S., at 268–269 (plurality

opinion). For uncertain reasons, Albright ignored the

Fourth Amendment in drafting his complaint; instead, he

alleged that the defendant officer had infringed his sub-

stantive due process rights. This Court rejected that

claim, with five Justices in two opinions remitting Albright

to the Fourth Amendment. See id., at 271 (plurality opin-

ion) (“We hold that it is the Fourth Amendment . . . under

which [ his] claim must be judged”); id., at 290 (Souter, J.,

concurring in judgment) (“[I]njuries like those [he] alleges

are cognizable in §1983 claims founded upon . . . the

Fourth Amendment”). “The Framers,” the plurality wrote,

“considered the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty

and drafted the Fourth Amendment to address it.” Id., at

274. That the deprivations at issue were pursuant to legal

process made no difference, given that they were (allegedly)

unsupported by probable cause; indeed, neither of the two

opinions so much as mentioned that procedural circum-

stance. Relying on Gerstein, the plurality stated that the

Fourth Amendment remained the “relevan[t]” constitu-

tional provision to assess the “deprivations of liberty”—

most notably, pretrial detention—“that go hand in hand

with criminal prosecutions.” 510 U. S., at 274; see id., at

290 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) (“[R]ules of recov-

ery for such harms have naturally coalesced under the

Fourth Amendment”).

As reflected in Albright’s tracking of Gerstein’s analysis,

pretrial detention can violate the Fourth Amendment not

only when it precedes, but also when it follows, the start of

legal process in a criminal case. The Fourth Amendment

prohibits government officials from detaining a person in

the absence of probable cause. See supra, at 6. That can

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 9

Opinion of the Court

happen when the police hold someone without any reason

before the formal onset of a criminal proceeding. But it

also can occur when legal process itself goes wrong—when,

for example, a judge’s probable-cause determination is

predicated solely on a police officer’s false statements.

Then, too, a person is confined without constitutionally

adequate justification. Legal process has gone forward,

but it has done nothing to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s

probable-cause requirement. And for that reason, it can-

not extinguish the detainee’s Fourth Amendment claim—

or somehow, as the Seventh Circuit has held, convert that

claim into one founded on the Due Process Clause. See

590 Fed. Appx., at 643–644. If the complaint is that a

form of legal process resulted in pretrial detention unsup-

ported by probable cause, then the right allegedly in-

fringed lies in the Fourth Amendment.6

For that reason, and contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s

view, Manuel stated a Fourth Amendment claim when he

——————

6 The opposite view would suggest an untenable result: that a person

arrested pursuant to a warrant could not bring a Fourth Amendment

claim challenging the reasonableness of even his arrest, let alone any

subsequent detention. An arrest warrant, after all, is a way of initiat-

ing legal process, in which a magistrate finds probable cause that a

person committed a crime. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U. S. 384, 389

(2007) (explaining that the seizure of a person was “without legal

process” because police officers “did not have a warrant for his arrest”);

W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on

Law of Torts §119, pp. 871, 886 (5th ed. 1984) (similar). If legal process

is the cut-off point for the Fourth Amendment, then someone arrested

(as well as later held) under a warrant procured through false testimony

would have to look to the Due Process Clause for relief. But that runs

counter to our caselaw. See, e.g., Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State

Penitentiary, 401 U. S. 560, 568–569 (1971) (holding that an arrest

violated the Fourth Amendment because a magistrate’s warrant was

not backed by probable cause). And if the Seventh Circuit would reply

that arrest warrants are somehow different—that there is legal process

and then again there is legal process—the next (and in our view unan-

swerable) question would be why.

10 MANUEL v. JOLIET

Opinion of the Court

sought relief not merely for his (pre-legal-process) arrest,

but also for his (post-legal-process) pretrial detention.7

Consider again the facts alleged in this case. Police offic-

ers initially arrested Manuel without probable cause,

based solely on his possession of pills that had field tested

negative for an illegal substance. So (putting timeliness

issues aside) Manuel could bring a claim for wrongful

arrest under the Fourth Amendment. And the same is

true (again, disregarding timeliness) as to a claim for

wrongful detention—because Manuel’s subsequent weeks

in custody were also unsupported by probable cause, and

so also constitutionally unreasonable. No evidence of

Manuel’s criminality had come to light in between the

roadside arrest and the County Court proceeding initiat-

ing legal process; to the contrary, yet another test of Man-

uel’s pills had come back negative in that period. All

that the judge had before him were police fabrications

about the pills’ content. The judge’s order holding Manuel

for trial therefore lacked any proper basis. And that

means Manuel’s ensuing pretrial detention, no less than

his original arrest, violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

Or put just a bit differently: Legal process did not expunge

Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claim because the process he

received failed to establish what that Amendment makes

essential for pretrial detention—probable cause to believe

——————

7 Even the City no longer appears to contest that conclusion. On

multiple occasions during oral argument in this Court, the City agreed

that “a Fourth Amendment right . . . survive[d] the initiation of pro-

cess” at the hearing in which the county judge found probable cause

and ordered detention. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31; see id., at 33 (concurring

with the statement that “once [an] individual is brought . . . before a

magistrate, and the magistrate using the same bad evidence says, stay

here in jail . . . until we get to trial, that that period is a violation of the

Fourth Amendment”); id., at 51 (stating that a detainee has “a Fourth

Amendment claim” if “misstatements at [such a probable-cause hear-

ing] led to ongoing pretrial seizure”).

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 11

Opinion of the Court

he committed a crime.8

III

Our holding—that the Fourth Amendment governs a

claim for unlawful pretrial detention even beyond the

start of legal process—does not exhaust the disputed legal

——————

8 The dissent goes some way toward claiming that a different kind of

pretrial legal process—a grand jury indictment or preliminary exami-

nation—does expunge such a Fourth Amendment claim. See post, at 9,

n. 4 (opinion of ALITO, J.) (raising but “not decid[ing] that question”);

post, at 10 (suggesting an answer nonetheless). The effect of that view

would be to cut off Manuel’s claim on the date of his grand jury indict-

ment (March 30)—even though that indictment (like the County

Court’s probable-cause proceeding) was entirely based on false testi-

mony and even though Manuel remained in detention for 36 days longer.

See n. 2, supra. Or said otherwise—even though the legal process he

received failed to establish the probable cause necessary for his contin-

ued confinement. We can see no principled reason to draw that line.

Nothing in the nature of the legal proceeding establishing probable

cause makes a difference for purposes of the Fourth Amendment:

Whatever its precise form, if the proceeding is tainted—as here, by

fabricated evidence—and the result is that probable cause is lacking,

then the ensuing pretrial detention violates the confined person’s

Fourth Amendment rights, for all the reasons we have stated. By

contrast (and contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, see post, at 9, n. 3),

once a trial has occurred, the Fourth Amendment drops out: A person

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support both a conviction

and any ensuing incarceration does so under the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307,

318 (1979) (invalidating a conviction under the Due Process Clause

when “the record evidence could [not] reasonably support a finding of

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”); Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U. S.

199, 204 (1960) (striking a conviction under the same provision when

“the record [wa]s entirely lacking in evidence” of guilt—such that it

could not even establish probable cause). Gerstein and Albright, as

already suggested, both reflected and recognized that constitutional

division of labor. See supra, at 6–8. In their words, the Framers

“drafted the Fourth Amendment” to address “the matter of pretrial

deprivations of liberty,” Albright, 510 U. S., at 274 (emphasis added),

and the Amendment thus provides “standards and procedures” for “the

detention of suspects pending trial,” Gerstein, 420 U. S., at 125, n. 27

(emphasis added).

12 MANUEL v. JOLIET

Opinion of the Court

issues in this case. It addresses only the threshold inquiry

in a §1983 suit, which requires courts to “identify the

specific constitutional right” at issue. Albright, 510 U. S.,

at 271. After pinpointing that right, courts still must

determine the elements of, and rules associated with, an

action seeking damages for its violation. See, e.g., Carey v.

Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 257–258 (1978). Here, the parties

particularly disagree over the accrual date of Manuel’s

Fourth Amendment claim—that is, the date on which the

applicable two-year statute of limitations began to run.

The timeliness of Manuel’s suit hinges on the choice be-

tween their proposed dates. But with the following brief

comments, we remand that issue to the court below.

In defining the contours and prerequisites of a §1983

claim, including its rule of accrual, courts are to look first

to the common law of torts. See ibid. (explaining that tort

principles “provide the appropriate starting point” in

specifying the conditions for recovery under §1983); Wal-

lace v. Kato, 549 U. S. 384, 388–390 (2007) (same for

accrual dates in particular). Sometimes, that review of

common law will lead a court to adopt wholesale the rules

that would apply in a suit involving the most analogous

tort. See id., at 388–390; Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S.

477, 483–487 (1994). But not always. Common-law prin-

ciples are meant to guide rather than to control the defini-

tion of §1983 claims, serving “more as a source of inspired

examples than of prefabricated components.” Hartman v.

Moore, 547 U. S. 250, 258 (2006); see Rehberg v. Paulk,

566 U. S. 356, 366 (2012) (noting that Ҥ1983 is [not]

simply a federalized amalgamation of pre-existing common-

law claims”). In applying, selecting among, or adjust-

ing common-law approaches, courts must closely attend to

the values and purposes of the constitutional right at

issue.

With these precepts as backdrop, Manuel and the City

offer competing views about what accrual rule should

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 13

Opinion of the Court

govern a §1983 suit challenging post-legal-process pretrial

detention. According to Manuel, that Fourth Amendment

claim accrues only upon the dismissal of criminal charges—

here, on May 4, 2011, less than two years before he

brought his suit. See Reply Brief 2; Brief for United

States as Amicus Curiae 24–25, n. 16 (taking the same

position). Relying on this Court’s caselaw, Manuel analo-

gizes his claim to the common-law tort of malicious prose-

cution. See Reply Brief 9; Wallace, 549 U. S., at 389–390.

An element of that tort is the “termination of the . . .

proceeding in favor of the accused”; and accordingly, the

statute of limitations does not start to run until that ter-

mination takes place. Heck, 512 U. S., at 484, 489. Man-

uel argues that following the same rule in suits like his

will avoid “conflicting resolutions” in §1983 litigation and

criminal proceedings by “preclud[ing] the possibility of the

claimant succeeding in the tort action after having been

convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution.” Id., at

484, 486; see Reply Brief 10–11; Brief for United States as

Amicus Curiae 24–25, n. 16. In support of Manuel’s posi-

tion, all but two of the ten Courts of Appeals that have

recognized a Fourth Amendment claim like his have in-

corporated a “favorable termination” element and so

pegged the statute of limitations to the dismissal of the

criminal case. See n. 4, supra.9 That means in the great

majority of Circuits, Manuel’s claim would be timely.

The City, however, contends that any such Fourth

Amendment claim accrues (and the limitations period

starts to run) on the date of the initiation of legal pro-

cess—here, on March 18, 2011, more than two years before

Manuel filed suit. See Brief for Respondents 33. Accord-

ing to the City, the most analogous tort to Manuel’s consti-

——————

9 The two exceptions—the Ninth and D. C. Circuits—have not yet

weighed in on whether a Fourth Amendment claim like Manuel’s

includes a “favorable termination” element.

14 MANUEL v. JOLIET

Opinion of the Court

tutional claim is not malicious prosecution but false ar-

rest, which accrues when legal process commences. See

Tr. of Oral Arg. 47; Wallace, 549 U. S., at 389 (noting

accrual rule for false arrest suits). And even if malicious

prosecution were the better comparison, the City contin-

ues, a court should decline to adopt that tort’s favorable-

termination element and associated accrual rule in adjudi-

cating a §1983 claim involving pretrial detention. That

element, the City argues, “make[s] little sense” in this

context because “the Fourth Amendment is concerned not

with the outcome of a prosecution, but with the legality of

searches and seizures.” Brief for Respondents 16. And

finally, the City contends that Manuel forfeited an alter-

native theory for treating his date of release as the date of

accrual: to wit, that his pretrial detention “constitute[d] a

continuing Fourth Amendment violation,” each day of

which triggered the statute of limitations anew. Id., at 29,

and n. 6; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 36; see also Albright, 510

U. S., at 280 (GINSBURG, J., concurring) (propounding a

similar view). So Manuel, the City concludes, lost the

opportunity to recover for his pretrial detention by waiting

too long to file suit.

We leave consideration of this dispute to the Court of

Appeals. “[W]e are a court of review, not of first view.”

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005). Be-

cause the Seventh Circuit wrongly held that Manuel

lacked any Fourth Amendment claim once legal process

began, the court never addressed the elements of, or rules

applicable to, such a claim. And in particular, the court

never confronted the accrual issue that the parties contest

here.10 On remand, the Court of Appeals should decide

——————

10 The dissent would have us address these questions anyway, on the

ground that “the conflict on the malicious prosecution question was the

centerpiece of Manuel’s argument in favor of certiorari.” Post, at 2.

But the decision below did not implicate a “conflict on the malicious

prosecution question”—because the Seventh Circuit, in holding that

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 15

Opinion of the Court

that question, unless it finds that the City has previously

waived its timeliness argument. See Reply to Brief in

Opposition 1–2 (addressing the possibility of waiver); Tr.

of Oral Arg. 40–44 (same). And so too, the court may

consider any other still-live issues relating to the contours

of Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful pretrial

detention.

* * *

For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the

Seventh Circuit and remand the case for further proceed-

ings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

——————

detainees like Manuel could not bring a Fourth Amendment claim at

all, never considered whether (and, if so, how) that claim should resem-

ble the malicious prosecution tort. Nor did Manuel’s petition for

certiorari suggest otherwise. The principal part of his question pre-

sented—mirroring the one and only Circuit split involving the decision

below—reads as follows: “[W]hether an individual’s Fourth Amendment

right to be free from unreasonable seizure continues beyond legal

process.” Pet. for Cert. i. That is exactly the issue we have resolved.

The rest of Manuel’s question did indeed express a view as to what

would follow from an affirmative answer (“so as to allow a malicious

prosecution claim”). Ibid. (And as the dissent notes, the Seventh

Circuit recounted that he made the same argument in that court. See

post, at 2, n. 1.) But as to that secondary issue, we think (for all the

reasons just stated) that Manuel jumped the gun. See supra, at 11–14.

And contra the dissent, his doing so provides no warrant for our doing

so too.

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 14–9496

_________________

ELIJAH MANUEL, PETITIONER v. CITY OF JOLIET,

ILLINOIS, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[March 21, 2017]

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.

I join JUSTICE ALITO’s opinion in full but write separately

regarding the accrual date for a Fourth Amendment

unreasonable-seizure claim. JUSTICE ALITO suggests that

a claim for unreasonable seizure based on a warrantless

arrest might not accrue until the “first appearance” under

Illinois law (or the “initial appearance” under federal

law)—which ordinarily represents the first judicial deter-

mination of probable cause for that kind of arrest—rather

than at the time of the arrest. See post, at 1, 9 (dissenting

opinion); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U. S. 384 (2007)

(taking a similar approach). Which of those events is the

correct one for purposes of accrual makes no difference in

this case, because both the arrest and the first appearance

occurred more than two years before petitioner filed suit.

See ante, at 4; see also Wallace, supra, at 387 (petitioner’s

claim was untimely regardless of whether it accrued on

day of arrest or first appearance).

I would leave for another case (one where the question is

dispositive) whether an unreasonable-seizure claim would

accrue on the date of the first appearance if that appear-

ance occurred on some day after the arrest. I think the

answer to that question might turn on the meaning of

“seizure,” rather than on the presence or absence of any

form of legal process. See post, at 7–8 (describing the

ordinary meaning of “seizure”).

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 1

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 14–9496

_________________

ELIJAH MANUEL, PETITIONER v. CITY OF JOLIET,

ILLINOIS, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[March 21, 2017]

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,

dissenting.

I agree with the Court’s holding up to a point: The pro-

tection provided by the Fourth Amendment continues to

apply after “the start of legal process,” ante, at 1, if legal

process is understood to mean the issuance of an arrest

warrant or what is called a “first appearance” under Illi-

nois law and an “initial appearance” under federal law.

Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 725, §§5/109–1(a), (e) (West Supp.

2015); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 5. But if the Court means

more—specifically, that new Fourth Amendment claims

continue to accrue as long as pretrial detention lasts—the

Court stretches the concept of a seizure much too far.

What is perhaps most remarkable about the Court’s

approach is that it entirely ignores the question that we

agreed to decide, i.e., whether a claim of malicious prose-

cution may be brought under the Fourth Amendment. I

would decide that question and hold that the Fourth

Amendment cannot house any such claim. If a malicious

prosecution claim may be brought under the Constitution,

it must find some other home, presumably the Due Pro-

cess Clause.

I

The question that was set out in Manuel’s petition for a

2 MANUEL v. JOLIET

ALITO, J., dissenting

writ of certiorari and that we agreed to decide is as

follows:

“[W]hether an individual’s Fourth Amendment right

to be free from unreasonable seizure continues beyond

legal process so as to allow a malicious prosecution

claim based upon the Fourth Amendment. This ques-

tion was raised, but left unanswered, by this Court in

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U. S. 266 (1994). Since then,

the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth,

Tenth, Eleventh, and D. C. Circuits have all held that

a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim is

cognizable through 42 U. S. C. §1983 (“Section 1983”).

Only the Seventh Circuit holds that a Fourth

Amendment Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim

is not cognizable.” Pet. for Cert. i (emphasis added).

The question’s reference to “a malicious prosecution

claim” was surely no accident. First, the conflict on the

malicious prosecution question was the centerpiece of

Manuel’s argument in favor of certiorari.1 Second, unless

——————

1 The Court defends this evasion on the ground that it is resolving

“the one and only Circuit split involving the decision below.” Ante, at

15, n. 10. That is flatly wrong. As the Seventh Circuit acknowledged,

its decision in this case and an earlier case on which the decision here

relied, Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F. 3d 747 (2001), conflict with deci-

sions of other circuits holding that a malicious prosecution claim may

be brought under the Fourth Amendment. The decision below states:

“Manuel argues that we should reconsider our holding in Newsome and

recognize a federal claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth

Amendment regardless of the available state remedy. By his count, 10

other Circuits have recognized federal malicious-prosecution claims

under the Fourth Amendment.” 590 Fed. Appx. 641, 643 (2015). The

court refused to overrule Newsome and said that “Manuel’s argument is

better left for the Supreme Court.” Ibid.

Manuel’s petition for a writ of certiorari repeatedly made the same

point. See Pet. for Cert. 2 (“The Seventh Circuit stands alone among

circuits in not allowing a federal malicious prosecution claim grounded

on the Fourth Amendment”); id., at 10 (“Ten Federal Circuits Correctly

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 3

ALITO, J., dissenting

Manuel is given the benefit of the unique accrual rule for

malicious prosecution claims, his claim is untimely, and he

is not entitled to relief.

A

I would first consider what I take to be the core of the

question presented—whether a “malicious prosecution

claim may be brought under the Fourth Amendment.” See

ibid. Manuel asked us to decide that question because it

may be critical to his ultimate success in this lawsuit.

Why is that so?

The statute of limitations for Manuel’s claim is Illinois’s

general statute of limitations for personal-injury torts, see

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U. S. 384, 387 (2007), which requires

suit to be brought within two years of the accrual of the

——————

Hold That Malicious Prosecution is Actionable as a Fourth Amend-

ment, Section 1983 Claim”); ibid. (“[E]ight circuits have held that

malicious prosecution is cognizable through a Section 1983 Fourth

Amendment claim”). All of the decisions that are cited as being in

conflict with the decision below involved malicious prosecution claims

and are described as such. See id., at 10–11.

It is certainly true that the question whether a malicious prosecution

claim may be brought under the Fourth Amendment subsumes the

question whether a Fourth Amendment seizure continues past a first or

initial appearance, but answering the latter question does not by any

means resolve the Circuit split that Manuel cited and that we took this

case to resolve. Suppose that the Seventh Circuit were to hold on

remand that a Fourth Amendment seizure may continue up to the date

when trial begins but no further. Such a holding would be consistent

with the Court’s holding in this case, but there would still be a conflict

between Seventh Circuit case law and the decisions of other Circuits (on

which Manuel relied, see ibid.), holding that a standard malicious

prosecution claim (which requires a termination favorable to the de-

fendant) may be brought under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g.,

Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F. 3d 91, 99 (CA1 2013); Manganiello

v. New York, 612 F. 3d 149, 160–161 (CA2 2010); McKenna v. Philadel-

phia, 582 F. 3d 447, 461 (CA3 2009); Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F. 3d 636,

647 (CA4 2012); Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F. 3d 294, 308 (CA6 2010);

Grider v. Auburn, 618 F. 3d 1240, 1256 (CA11 2010).

4 MANUEL v. JOLIET

ALITO, J., dissenting

claim, see Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 735, §5/13–202 (West 2010).

Here is the chronology of relevant events in this case:

 March 18, 2011: Manuel is arrested and brought be-

fore a county court judge, who makes the required

probable-cause finding because Manuel was arrested

without a warrant.

 March 31, 2011: Manuel is indicted by a grand jury.

 April 8, 2011: Manuel is arraigned.

 May 4, 2011: An assistant state’s attorney moves to

dismiss the charges, and the motion is granted.

 May 5, 2011: Manuel is released from jail.

 April 22, 2013: Manuel files his complaint.

Since the statute of limitations requires the commence-

ment of suit within two years of accrual, Manuel’s claim is

untimely unless it accrued on or after April 22, 2011. And

the only events in the above chronology that occurred

within that time frame are the dismissal of the charge

against him and his release from custody. A claim of

malicious prosecution “does not accrue until the criminal

proceedings have terminated in the plaintiff ’s favor.”

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 489 (1994); see 3 Re-

statement (Second) of Torts §653 (1976). None of the other

common-law torts to which Manuel’s claim might be com-

pared—such as false arrest or false imprisonment—has

such an accrual date. See Wallace, supra, at 397 (holding

that a claim for false imprisonment under the Fourth

Amendment accrues when “the claimant becomes detained

pursuant to legal process”). Therefore, if Manuel’s case is

to go forward, it is essential that his claim be treated like

a malicious prosecution claim.

B

Although the Court refuses to decide whether Manuel’s

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 5

ALITO, J., dissenting

claim should be so treated, the answer to that question—

the one that the Court actually agreed to review—is

straightforward: A malicious prosecution claim cannot be

based on the Fourth Amendment.

“The first inquiry in any §1983 suit,” the Court has

explained, is “to isolate the precise constitutional viola-

tion with which [the defendant] is charged.” Baker v.

McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 140 (1979). In this case, Manuel

charges that he was seized without probable cause in

violation of the Fourth Amendment. In order to flesh out

the elements of this constitutional tort, we must look for

“tort analogies.” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261, 277

(1985). Manuel says that the appropriate analog is the

tort of malicious prosecution, so we should look to the

elements of that tort.

To make out a claim for malicious prosecution, a plain-

tiff generally must show three things: (1) “that the crimi-

nal proceeding was initiated or continued by the defendant

without ‘probable cause,’ ” W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, P. Keeton,

& D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 876 (5th

ed. 1984) (Prosser and Keeton) (emphasis added), (2) “that

the defendant instituted the proceeding ‘maliciously,’ ” id.,

at 882, and (3) that “the proceedings have terminated in

favor of the accused,” 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts

§653(b); see also Heck, supra, at 489.

There is a severe mismatch between these elements and

the Fourth Amendment. First, the defendants typically

named in Fourth Amendment seizure cases—namely, law

enforcement officers—lack the authority to initiate or

dismiss a prosecution. See Prosser and Keeton 876. That

authority lies in the hands of prosecutors. A law enforce-

ment officer, including the officer responsible for the de-

fendant’s arrest, may testify before a grand jury, at a

preliminary examination, see Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 725,

§§5/109–3(b), 5/109–3.1(b) (West 2010), or hearing, see

Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 5.1, and at trial. But when that

6 MANUEL v. JOLIET

ALITO, J., dissenting

occurs, the officer is simply a witness and is not responsi-

ble for “the decision to press criminal charges.” Rehberg v.

Paulk, 566 U. S. 356, 371 (2012).

Second, while subjective bad faith, i.e., malice, is the

core element of a malicious prosecution claim, it is firmly

established that the Fourth Amendment standard of

reasonableness is fundamentally objective. See Ashcroft v.

al-Kidd, 563 U. S. 731, 736 (2011). These two standards—

one subjective and the other objective—cannot co-exist. In

some instances, importing a malice requirement into the

Fourth Amendment would leave culpable conduct unpun-

ished. An officer could act unreasonably, thereby violating

the Fourth Amendment, without even a hint of bad faith.

In other cases, the malice requirement would cast too wide

a net. An officer could harbor intense personal ill will

toward an arrestee but still act in an objectively reason-

able manner in carrying out an arrest.

Finally, malicious prosecution’s favorable-termination

element makes no sense when the claim is that a seizure

violated the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amend-

ment, after all, prohibits all unreasonable seizures—

regardless of whether a prosecution is ever brought or how

a prosecution ends. A “Fourth Amendment wrong” “is

fully accomplished,” United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S.

338, 354 (1974), when an impermissible seizure occurs.

The Amendment is violated and the injury is inflicted no

matter what happens in any later proceedings.

Our cases concerning Fourth Amendment claims

brought under 42 U. S. C. §1983 prove the point. For

example, we have recognized that there is no favorable-

termination element for a Fourth Amendment false im-

prisonment claim. See Wallace, 549 U. S., at 389–392.2

——————

2 In Wallace, the Court noted that “[f]alse arrest and false imprison-

ment overlap” and decided to “refer to the two torts together as false

imprisonment.” 549 U. S., at 388–389.

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 7

ALITO, J., dissenting

An arrestee can file such a claim while his prosecution is

pending—and, in at least some situations—will need to do

so to ensure that the claim is not time barred. See id., at

392–395. By the same token, an individual may seek

damages for pretrial Fourth Amendment violations even

after a valid conviction. For example, in Haring v. Prosise,

462 U. S. 306, 308 (1983), the respondent pleaded guilty to

a drug crime without raising any Fourth Amendment

issues. He then brought a §1983 suit, challenging the

constitutionality of the search that led to the discovery of

the drugs on which his criminal charge was based. The

Court held that respondent’s suit could proceed—despite

his valid conviction. Id., at 323; see also Heck, 512 U. S.,

at 487, n. 7 (“[A] suit for damages attributable to an alleg-

edly unreasonable search may lie even if the challenged

search produced evidence that was introduced in a state

criminal trial resulting in the §1983 plaintiff ’s still-

outstanding conviction”).

The favorable-termination element is similarly irrele-

vant to claims like Manuel’s. Manuel alleges that he was

arrested and held based entirely on falsified evidence. In

such a case, it makes no difference whether the prosecu-

tion was eventually able to gather and introduce legiti-

mate evidence and to obtain a conviction at trial. The

unlawful arrest and detention would still provide grounds

for recovery. Accordingly, there is no good reason why the

accrual of a claim like Manuel’s should have to await a

favorable termination of the prosecution.

For all these reasons, malicious prosecution is a strik-

ingly inapt “tort analog[y],” Wilson, 471 U. S., at 277, for

Fourth Amendment violations. So the answer to the

question presented in Manuel’s certiorari petition is that

the Fourth Amendment does not give rise to a malicious

prosecution claim, and this means that Manuel’s suit is

untimely. I would affirm the Seventh Circuit on that

basis.

8 MANUEL v. JOLIET

ALITO, J., dissenting

II

Instead of deciding the question on which we granted

review, the Court ventures in a different direction. The

Court purports to refrain from deciding any issue of time-

liness, see ante, at 10, but the Court’s opinion is certain to

be read by some to mean that every moment of pretrial

confinement without probable cause constitutes a violation

of the Fourth Amendment. And if that is so, it would seem

to follow that new Fourth Amendment claims continue to

accrue as long as the pretrial detention lasts.

A

That proposition—that every moment in pretrial

detention constitutes a “seizure”—is hard to square with

the ordinary meaning of the term. The term “seizure”

applies most directly to the act of taking a person into

custody or otherwise depriving the person of liberty. It is

not generally used to refer to a prolonged detention.

Dictionary definitions from around the time of the adop-

tion of the Fourth Amendment define the term “seizure” as

a single event—and not a continuing condition. See, e.g., 2

N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Lan-

guage 67 (1828) (Webster) (defining “seizure” as “the act of

laying hold on suddenly”); 1 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of

the English Language (6th ed. 1785) (defining “seizure” as

“the act of taking forcible possession”); 1 T. Dyche & W.

Pardon, A New General English Dictionary (14th ed. 1771)

(defining “seize” as “to lay or take hold of violently or at

unawares, wrongfully, or by force”). As the Court has

explained before, “[f]rom the time of the founding to the

present, the word ‘seizure’ has meant a ‘taking posses-

sion.’ ” California v. Hodari D., 499 U. S. 621, 624 (1991)

(quoting 2 Webster 67). And we have cautioned against

“stretch[ing] the Fourth Amendment beyond its words and

beyond the meaning of arrest.” 499 U. S., at 627. The

Members of Congress who proposed the Fourth Amend-

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 9

ALITO, J., dissenting

ment and the State legislatures that ratified the Amend-

ment would have expected to see a more expansive term,

such as “detention” or “confinement,” if a Fourth Amend-

ment seizure could be a long event that continued

throughout the entirety of the pretrial period.

In my view, a period of detention spanning weeks or

months cannot be viewed as one long, continuing seizure,

and a pretrial detainee is not “seized” over and over again

as long as he remains in custody.3 Of course, the damages

resulting from an unlawful seizure may continue to mount

during the period of confinement caused by the seizure,

but no new Fourth Amendment seizure claims accrue after

that date.4 Thus, any possible Fourth Amendment claim

that Manuel could bring is time barred.

——————

3 By the Court’s logic, there is no apparent reason why even a judg-

ment of conviction should cut off the accrual of new Fourth Amendment

claims based on the use of fabricated evidence. The Court writes that

“[n]othing in the nature of the legal proceeding establishing probable

cause makes a difference for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”

Ante, at 11, n. 8. “[I]f the proceeding is tainted—as here, by fabricated

evidence—and the result is that probable cause is lacking,” the Court

continues, “then the ensuing pretrial detention violates the confined

person’s Fourth Amendment rights, for all the reasons we have stated.”

Ibid. Although the Court inserts the word “pretrial” in this sentence,

its logic provides no reason for that limitation. If a Fourth Amendment

seizure continues as long as a person is detained, there is no reason

why incarceration after conviction cannot be regarded as a continuing

seizure. The Court asserts that the Fourth Amendment “drops out of

the picture” after trial, ibid., but it does not explain why this is so.

There are facilities that house both pretrial detainees and prisoners

serving sentences. If a detainee is transferred following conviction from

the section for detainees to the section for prisoners, does the transfer

render this person “unseized”?

4 There is authority for the proposition that a grand jury indictment

or a determination of probable cause after an adversary proceeding may

be an intervening cause that cuts off liability for an unlawful arrest.

See Wallace v. Kato, 494 U. S. 384, 390 (2007); Prosser and Keeton 885.

I would not decide that question here.

10 MANUEL v. JOLIET

ALITO, J., dissenting

B

The Court is mistaken in saying that its decision “fol-

lows from settled precedent.” Ante, at 1. The Court reads

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U. S. 266 (1994), and Gerstein v.

Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), to mean that the Fourth

Amendment can be violated “when legal process itself goes

wrong,” ante, at 9, but the accuracy of that interpretation

depends on the meaning of “legal process.” The Court’s

reading is correct if by “legal process” the Court means a

determination of probable cause at a first or initial ap-

pearance. See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 725, §5/109–1 (West

Supp. 2015); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 5(b). When an arrest

warrant is obtained, the probable-cause determination is

made at that time, and there is thus no need for a repeat

determination at the first or initial appearance. But when

an arrest is made without a warrant, the arrestee, gener-

ally within 48 hours, must be brought before a judicial

officer, County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44,

56 (1991), who then completes the arrest process by mak-

ing the same determination that would have been made as

part of the warrant application process. See Ill. Comp.

Stat., ch. 725, §§5/109–1(a), (b); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 4(a),

5(b). Thus, this appearance is an integral part of the

process of taking the arrestee into custody and easily falls

within the meaning of the term “seizure.” But other forms

of “legal process,” for example, a grand jury indictment or

a determination of probable cause at a preliminary exami-

nation or hearing, do not fit within the concept of a “sei-

zure,” and the cases cited by the Court do not suggest

otherwise.

Take Albright first. A detective named Oliver procured

a warrant for the arrest of Albright for distributing a

“look-alike” substance. See Albright v. Oliver, 975 F. 2d

343, 344 (CA7 1992). The warrant was based on infor-

mation given to Oliver by the purchaser of the substance.

Ibid. After learning of the warrant, Albright turned him-

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 11

ALITO, J., dissenting

self in, was booked, and was released on bond. Ibid.

Oliver testified at what Illinois calls a preliminary exami-

nation and apparently related the information provided by

the alleged purchaser. Ibid. The judge found probable

cause, but the charges were later dismissed. Ibid. Accord-

ing to the Seventh Circuit, probable cause was sorely

lacking, id., at 345, and Albright sued Oliver under 42

U. S. C. §1983, claiming that Oliver had violated his sub-

stantive due process right not to be prosecuted without

probable cause. All that this Court held was that Al-

bright’s claim had to be analyzed under the Fourth

Amendment, not substantive due process.

The Court now reads Albright to mean that a Fourth

Amendment seizure continues “after the start of ‘legal

process,” but three forms of what might be termed “legal

process” were issued in Albright: the arrest warrant, the

order releasing him on bond after his first appearance,

and the order holding him over for trial after the prelimi-

nary examination. I agree that Albright’s seizure did not

end with the issuance of the warrant (that would be ridic-

ulous since he had not even been arrested at that point) or

the first appearance, see ante, at 8–9, and n. 6, but it is

impossible to read anything more into the holding in

Albright. The terse plurality opinion joined by four Jus-

tices said no more; the opinion of Justice Scalia, who

joined the plurality opinion, referred only to Albright’s

“arrest,” 510 U. S., at 275 (concurring opinion); and Jus-

tices KENNEDY and THOMAS, who concurred in the judg-

ment, did so only because Albright’s “allegation of arrest

without probable cause must be analyzed under the

Fourth Amendment.” Id., at 281 (KENNEDY, J., concurring

in the judgment). To read anything more into Albright is

to adopt the position taken by just one Member of the

plurality, see id., at 279 (GINSBURG, J., concurring) (sei-

zure continues throughout the period of pretrial deten-

tion), and the two Justices in dissent, see id., at 307 (Ste-

12 MANUEL v. JOLIET

ALITO, J., dissenting

vens, J., dissenting) (same).

The other precedent on which the Court relies, Gerstein,

goes no further than Albright. All that the Court held in

Gerstein was that if there is no probable-cause finding by a

neutral magistrate before an arrest, there must be one

after the arrest. 420 U. S., at 111–116. The Court rea-

soned that “the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial

determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to ex-

tended restraint of liberty following arrest.” Id., at 114.

The Court said nothing about whether a claim for a sei-

zure in violation of the Fourth Amendment could accrue

after an initial appearance.

The Court thus is forced to rely on dicta—taken out of

context—from Gerstein. For example, the Court cites

Gerstein’s statement that “[t]he Fourth Amendment was

tailored explicitly for the criminal justice system,” and

that it “always has been thought to define the ‘process that

is due’ for seizures of person[s] . . . in criminal cases, in-

cluding the detention of suspects pending trial.” Id., at

125, n. 27. This statement hardly shows that a Fourth

Amendment seizure continues throughout a period of

pretrial detention, and the Court does not mention the

very next sentence in Gerstein—which suggests that the

Fourth Amendment might govern “only the first stage” of

a prosecution, eventually giving way to other protections

that are also part of our “elaborate system, unique in

jurisprudence, designed to safeguard the rights of those

accused of criminal conduct.” Ibid. (emphasis deleted). In

the end, Gerstein stands for the proposition that the

Fourth Amendment requires a post-arrest probable cause

finding by a neutral magistrate; it says nothing about

whether the Fourth Amendment extends beyond that or

any other “legal process.”

* * *

A well-known medical maxim—“first, do no harm”—is a

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 13

ALITO, J., dissenting

good rule of thumb for courts as well. The Court’s decision

today violates that rule by avoiding the question presented

in order to reach an unnecessary and tricky issue. The

resulting opinion will, I fear, inject much confusion into

Fourth Amendment law. And it has the potential to do

much harm—by dramatically expanding Fourth Amend-

ment liability under §1983 in a way that does violence to

the text of the Fourth Amendment. I respectfully dissent.