Ruthie Allen v. Allstate Insurance Company

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

RUTHIE ALLEN, UNPUBLISHED

March 16, 2017

Plaintiff-Appellee,

and

BEAUMONT HEALTH SYSTEM,

Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 330808

Oakland Circuit Court

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, LC No. 2014-142268-NF

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and METER and FORT HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, appeals as of right the order of judgment entered

by the trial court after its earlier denial of defendant’s motion for summary disposition, and grant

of plaintiff Ruthie Allen’s and intervening plaintiff Beaumont Heath System’s (“Beaumont”)

motions for summary disposition, on the issue of liability. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The material facts of this case are not in dispute. In 2000, plaintiff moved to Louisiana

from Michigan with her husband. In June 2013, plaintiff decided to separate from her husband,

who was emotionally abusive. Accordingly, at that time, she began to make arrangements to

move in with her daughter, Tara Hunter, who lived on Shaun Road in West Bloomfield,

Michigan.1 Plaintiff’s “arrangements” included the following: (1) she discussed moving into

1

It is noteworthy in this case that plaintiff clearly confirmed during her deposition and

examination under oath that it was her intent, as early as June 2013, to become a permanent

Michigan resident.

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Hunter’s residence with Hunter before traveling to Michigan in July 20132; (2) plaintiff moved

items—including clothing, shoes, small appliances, china, glassware, pots and pans, kitchen

utensils, home movies, photo albums, and other possessions that she did not want to leave behind

in Louisiana—into a bedroom designated for her use in Hunter’s house when she traveled to

Michigan in July 2013; (3) she changed her address with her bank, credit card companies, cell

phone company, and the federal government for her Social Security Disability benefits; (4) she

either changed the address on her DTE utility bill to the Shaun Road address, or opened a DTE

account in her name under the Shaun Road address3; (5) she ordered new checks that listed the

Shaun Road address; and (6) she ordered winter-related items and had them delivered to the

Shaun Road address so that she would not have to transport them during her final trip from

Louisiana to Michigan. Between June 2013 and September 2013, she also told several friends

and family members that she intended to permanently move to Michigan. However, plaintiff did

not change her driver’s license when she was in Michigan in July 2013 because her “thought

process was [she] was going to change it when [she] was here for good,” and “[she] knew in July

[that she] was going to have to go back to Louisiana for a time.”

Plaintiff originally intended to return to Michigan in August 2013 after she went back to

Louisiana in July 2013. However, she discovered that she needed to undergo a liver biopsy. As

a result, she stayed in Louisiana until September 2013 for that procedure and related follow-up

appointments. In September 2013, plaintiff purchased a one-way ticket to Michigan on a

Greyhound bus.

On September 12, 2013, plaintiff boarded the bus with her purse and three or four

suitcases full of additional possessions, intending to travel to Michigan and “[t]o move in with

[her] daughter . . . .” Plaintiff never told her husband that she was moving to Michigan, and she

left for the bus station while he was away from the home that they shared in Louisiana. At her

deposition, she confirmed that the purpose of the trip was to permanently move to Michigan, and

that she had no intention of returning to Louisiana to live or to collect anymore of her personal

possessions. Rather, “[a]nything [she] left was left.”

On September 14, 2013, the bus on which plaintiff was riding drove off the side of I-75

North near Cincinnati, Ohio, struck a fence and tree, and came to rest on its side. Plaintiff

sustained significant injuries as a result of the accident. She was airlifted by helicopter from the

accident scene to a medical center in Cincinnati, Ohio. She remained at that hospital for a week

2

Plaintiff testified that she came to Michigan in July 2013 with her husband for approximately

one week. She said the purpose of the trip was “[her husband’s] daughter’s birthday.” During

the trip, plaintiff stayed with Hunter at the Shaun Road address, and her husband stayed with his

children. She testified that her and her husband routinely stayed in separate locations when they

visited Michigan because “[t]hat was our relationship.”

3

She seemed to explain at her examination under oath that she initiated a DTE account in her

name at the Shaun Road address “as of July 2013.” She testified that “everything that I had that

had to have mail come to me I had the address changed to Shaun Road” “either in July or August

of [2013].”

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before being airlifted once again to Beaumont Hospital in Royal Oak, Michigan, where she

remained until November 2013. In November, she spent approximately one week in a

rehabilitation center, but then returned to Beaumont Hospital after she went into a coma. She

was discharged from Beaumont on December 20, 2013, at which time she moved into the home

of her son, Anthony Muhammad, in West Bloomfield, Michigan. Plaintiff did not move into

Hunter’s home when she was discharged from the hospital because Hunter’s landlord would not

permit modifications to the house that were required for plaintiff’s care (i.e., alterations

necessary for wheelchair access and a hospital bed).

At the time of the accident, Hunter held a no-fault insurance policy issued by defendant.

The policy provided personal protection insurance (“PIP”) coverage to individuals who qualified

as the policy holder’s “resident relative.”

In August 2014, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant. She alleged that (1) on

September 14, 2013, she was injured in rollover accident that occurred while she was occupying

a Greyhound bus that was “traveling interstate”; (2) when the accident occurred, she was covered

by the no-fault insurance policy that defendant issued to Hunter, plaintiff’s “resident relative”;

(3) defendant was liable to pay plaintiff certain benefits under the policy; and (4) defendant had

unreasonably neglected, failed, or refused to pay those benefits, despite receiving reasonable

proof of the expenses. Accordingly, plaintiff requested a judgment against defendant. Later,

Beaumont intervened as a plaintiff and also filed a complaint against defendant, alleging that

defendant was liable for the medical expenses that Beaumont had incurred when it treated

plaintiff after the accident because defendant is the highest priority automobile insurer under the

no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. In response, defendant denied that it was liable for any

benefits to plaintiff under Hunter’s insurance policy.

Subsequently, the parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition under MCR

2.116(C)(10), concurring that there were no genuine issues of material fact. Based on the

undisputed facts, the trial court was left with determining plaintiff’s domicile at the time of the

accident, and defendant’s liability, as a matter of law. In their motions and responses, the parties

disputed, inter alia, the correct standards for determining whether plaintiff was domiciled with

Hunter—and, therefore, covered by Hunter’s insurance policy through defendant—at the time of

the accident and the correct application of the law to the undisputed facts. Plaintiff also

contended that defendant had waived any affirmative defense regarding her residency or

domicile by failing to plead it in its answer.

After holding a hearing on the parties’ motions, the trial court granted plaintiff’s and

Beaumont’s motions for summary disposition and denied defendant’s motion. The trial court

first rejected plaintiff’s claim “that ‘lack of residency’ is an affirmative defense which must be

pled or it is waived pursuant to MCR 2.111(E).” Next, the trial court rejected defendant’s

arguments regarding the standards that govern the determination of an adult’s domicile for

purposes of the no-fault act. Instead, it adopted the law advocated by plaintiff and Beaumont and

ultimately concluded:

It is undisputed that in June or July 2013 Plaintiff visited her daughter

Hunter in Michigan and left some items at Hunter’s home including small

appliances, china, glassware, utensils, movies and photo albums. Plaintiff also

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testified she maintained a room at Hunter’s home. It is further undisputed that

Plaintiff bought a one-way bus ticket from Louisiana to Michigan in September

2013 for the date of travel the accident occurred, changed her address on some

bills and banking, and intended to move-in with Hunter. Similar to the facts in

[Williams v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 202 Mich App 491; 509 NW2d 821

(1993)], Plaintiff had abandoned her domicile in Louisiana to acquire domicile in

Michigan at the time she was involved in the accident.

For these reasons and those further stated by Plaintiff, the Court finds that

Plaintiff’s domicile at the time of the accident was in Michigan and coverage

applies pursuant to the policy and No-Fault Act. Defendant’s motion for

summary disposition is denied, Plaintiff’s motion is granted as well as Beaumont

Health System’s motion.

Subsequently, the trial court entered an “order of judgment,” stating that the parties had

come to an agreement on the issue of damages and ordering monetary judgments in favor of

plaintiff and Beaumont. It also entered an order staying execution of the judgment pending

appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s grant or denial of summary disposition.

Moraccini v Sterling Hts, 296 Mich App 387, 391; 822 NW2d 799 (2012). “A motion under

MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint.” Cannon Twp v Rockford Pub

Sch, 311 Mich App 403, 411; 875 NW2d 242 (2015). When reviewing such a motion, this Court

may only consider, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, the evidence that

was before the trial court, which consists of “the ‘affidavits, together with the pleadings,

depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence then filed in the action or submitted by the

parties.’ ” Calhoun Co v Blue Cross Blue Shield Michigan, 297 Mich App 1, 11; 824 NW2d 202

(2012), quoting MCR 2.116(G)(5). Under MCR 2.116(C)(10), “[s]ummary disposition is

appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Latham v Barton Malow Co, 480 Mich 105, 111; 746

NW2d 868 (2008). “There is a genuine issue of material fact when reasonable minds could

differ on an issue after viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”

Allison v AEW Capital Mgt, LLP, 481 Mich 419, 425; 751 NW2d 8 (2008).

Generally, the determination of domicile is a question of fact, but when “the underlying

facts are not in dispute, domicile is a question of law for the court.” Fowler v Auto Club Ins

Ass’n, 254 Mich App 362, 364; 656 NW2d 856 (2002).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant contends that the trial court misapplied the governing common law principles

of domicile and, therefore, erroneously concluded that plaintiff was domiciled with Hunter and

covered under the insurance policy issued by defendant at the time of the accident. We disagree.

“[A] personal protection insurance policy . . . applies to accidental bodily injury to the

person named in the policy, the person’s spouse, and a relative of either domiciled in the same

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household, if the injury arises from a motor vehicle accident.” MCL 500.3114(1) (emphasis

added). Likewise, “[p]ersonal protection insurance benefits are payable for accidental bodily

injury suffered in an accident occurring out of this state, if the accident occurs within the United

States . . . , and the person whose injury is the basis of the claim was at the time of the accident a

named insured under a personal protection insurance policy, his spouse, [or] a relative of either

domiciled in the same household . . . .” MCL 500.3111 (emphasis added). It is undisputed that

plaintiff sought benefits under Hunter’s policy as a resident relative, not as a named insured.4

Thus, the sole issue in this case is whether plaintiff was domiciled in Hunter’s home at the time

of the accident, such that she was entitled to PIP benefits under Hunter’s insurance policy.

The no-fault act does not define the term “domiciled,” but the word “domicile” “has a

precise, technical meaning in Michigan’s common law, and thus must be understood according

to that particular meaning.” Grange Ins Co of Michigan v Lawrence, 494 Mich 475, 492-493;

835 NW2d 363 (2013). This common law meaning of “domicile” is as follows: (1) “the place

where a person has his true, fixed, permanent home, and principal establishment, and to which,

whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning,” or (2) the “place where a person has

voluntarily fixed his abode not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present

intention of making it his home, either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of

time.” Id. at 493 (quotation marks and citations omitted). “[O]ur common law has recognized

that from the time of a person’s birth—from childhood through adulthood—a person can only

have a single domicile at any given point in time,” but an individual may have more than one

residence at a given time. Id. at 494.

For purposes of distinguishing “domicile” from “residence,” this Court has

explained that “domicile is acquired by the combination of residence and the

intention to reside in a given place. . . . If the intention of permanently residing in

a place exists, a residence in pursuance of that intention, however short, will

establish a domicile.” The traditional common-law inquiry into a person’s

“domicile,” then, is generally a question of intent, but also considers all the facts

and circumstances taken together. [Id. at 494-495 (citation omitted).]

Accordingly, “[a]ll relevant factors must be considered in ascertaining domicile.” Dairyland Ins

Co v Auto Owners Ins Co, 123 Mich App 675, 681; 333 NW2d 322 (1983).

“The Workman-Dairyland multifactored framework comprises the one now commonly

employed by Michigan courts when a question of fact exists as to where a person is domiciled.”

Grange, 494 Mich at 497 n 1; see also id. at 497, 501. In Workman v Detroit Auto Inter–Ins

4

Hunter’s insurance policy provided PIP coverage to individuals who qualified as the policy

holder’s “resident relative.” “Relative” is defined under the policy as “a person related by blood,

marriage, or adoption.” “Resident” is defined, in relevant part, as “a person who physically

resides in the household of the policy holder named on the Policy Declaration with the intention

to continue living there.” The parties do not dispute that Hunter’s insurance policy provided

coverage consistent with that required by law under MCL 500.3111 and MCL 500.3114(1).

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Exch, 404 Mich 477, 496-497; 274 NW2d 373 (1979), the Michigan Supreme Court set forth the

following nonexclusive factors for courts to consider in determining an individual’s domicile:

(1) the subjective or declared intent of the person of remaining, either

permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time, in the place he

contends is his “domicile” or “household”; (2) the formality or informality of the

relationship between the person and the members of the household; (3) whether

the place where the person lives is in the same house, within the same curtilage or

upon the same premises; (4) the existence of another place of lodging by the

person alleging “residence” or “domicile” in the household. [Workman, 404 Mich

at 496-497 (citations omitted).]

The following factors are also relevant in ascertaining an individual’s domicile:

(1) the person’s mailing address; (2) whether the person maintains possessions at

the insured’s home; (3) whether the insured’s address appears on the person’s

driver’s license and other documents; (4) whether a bedroom is maintained for the

person at the insured’s home; and (5) whether the person is dependent upon the

insured for financial support or assistance. [Williams v State Farm Mut Auto Ins

Co, 202 Mich App 491, 494-495; 509 NW2d 821 (1993), citing Dobson v Maki,

184 Mich App 244, 252; 457 NW2d 132 (1990), and Dairyland, 123 Mich App at

682.]

See also Grange, 494 Mich at 497, 497 n 41. The applicable “factors should be weighed or

balanced with each other because no one factor is determinative.” Fowler, 254 Mich App at 364;

see also Grange, 494 Mich at 497.

In Williams, this Court applied the Workman-Dairyland factors to facts strikingly similar

to this case. The plaintiff in that case moved from Michigan to Nevada in 1984, acquiring an

apartment and job in the area, obtaining a Nevada driver’s license and car insurance, and opening

an account at a nearby bank. Williams, 202 Mich App at 492. Later, the following events

occurred:

On December 31, 1987, plaintiff informed his parents that he was moving

back to Michigan. Plaintiff quit his job, closed his bank account in Nevada and

opened another one in Michigan, relinquished his apartment, forwarded his mail

to his parents’ address in Michigan, and loaded his personal belongings in his

truck. On March 8, 1988, plaintiff left Nevada to move to Michigan.

On the way to Michigan, plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident in

Oklahoma on March 11, 1988. At the time of the accident, plaintiff had Nevada

car insurance and Nevada license plates. Plaintiff also had personal belongings in

his bedroom at his parents’ house in Grant, Michigan, that he had left before

moving to Nevada. After plaintiff arrived in Michigan, he moved into his

parents’ home rent-free for four months. [Id. at 492-493.]

The trial court concluded that the plaintiff was domiciled with his parents in Michigan when the

accident occurred and granted summary disposition in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 493-495. The

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Williams majority agreed, concluding, based on its application of the Workman-Dairyland

factors, that “it is overwhelmingly clear that plaintiff was domiciled in his parents’ household.”

Id. at 494-495.5

The dissenting opinion disagreed. Id. at 495-496 (SHEPHERD, J., dissenting). It focused

on common law principles governing domicile, including that two elements are generally

required to establish domicile (intent and physical presence), and that an “old domicile is not

relinquished until the person is physically present at the intended new location.” Id. at 496.

Accordingly, the dissent concluded, without any consideration of the Workman-Dairyland

factors, that the plaintiff was not domiciled in his parents’ residence, and was not entitled to PIP

benefits under their no-fault insurance policy, because the “plaintiff, at the time of injury, had not

yet arrived at his parents’ home in Michigan.” Id. at 498.

In this case, defendant contests the ongoing viability of the Workman-Dairyland factors

after the Michigan Supreme Court’s emphasis on the traditional common law principles of

domicile in Grange. Likewise, it argues that the majority opinion in Williams is no longer

binding precedent given the majority’s reliance on the Workman-Dairyland factors, and that the

Williams dissent should be followed in this case given its exclusive focus on common law

principles. Contrary to defendant’s characterization of the opinion, Grange did not invalidate the

Workman-Dairyland factors, or otherwise undermine the majority opinion in Williams.

As defendant emphasizes, the trial court and this Court, which were reversed in Grange,

applied the Workman-Dairyland factors (1) to conclude that a child at issue in that case had two

domiciles, one with each parent, when the accident occurred, and, therefore, (2) to require the

father’s insurance company to reimburse the mother’s insurance company for 50% of the PIP

benefits and processing expenses that the mother’s insurance company had paid for the child.

Grange, 494 Mich at 484-485. However, defendant fails to recognize that the Michigan

Supreme Court actually declared that a consideration of the surrounding factual circumstances—

accomplished though a consideration of the Workman-Dairyland factors—is not appropriate in

cases where an individual’s domicile is established as a matter of law, as in the case of a child.6

It did not generally hold that consideration of the Workman-Dairyland factors is not appropriate

in determining an adult’s domicile. To the contrary, the Michigan Supreme Court made it clear

throughout Grange that the Workman-Dairyland factors remain relevant and applicable in

5

However, this Court found that the trial court improperly attributed “ ‘special weight’ to [the]

plaintiff’s intent to be domiciled in Michigan.” Williams, 202 Mich App at 493-495.

6

See id. at 511 (“Where a court order sets a child’s custody or domicile by operation of law, the

factual circumstances or the parents’ or child’s intentions are irrelevant to the domicile

determination.”); id. at 511 n 74 (“A domicile set by operation of law—for example, by court

order—obviates the need to engage in an analysis of the Workman-Dairyland factors, which

were designed to help determine a person’s domicile when it was an open or contested

question.”); id. at 514 (“[T]he lower courts . . . erred by applying the Workman factors that are

inapplicable to a person whose domicile is set by operation of law.”).

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determining the domicile of an adult whose domicile is not set by operation of law.7

Furthermore, the Court did not generally reject the Workman opinion or analysis. It only

rejected Workman to the extent that courts have erroneously understood and applied the case.

See Grange, 494 Mich at 500-501. It is also noteworthy that the Grange Court clearly

established, at multiple points in its opinion, the limited issues before it and its circumscribed

holdings, neither of which are directly applicable to the issue in this appeal. Grange, 494 Mich

at 481, 492. Likewise, it is clear from its explanation of the principles applicable the

determination of a child’s domicile that its discussion and reliance on the common law rules,

exclusive of the Workman-Dairyland factors, was strictly due to the fact that the domicile issues

in Grange involved domiciles that were acquired by operation of law, as opposed to domiciles

acquired by origin/nativity or by choice. See id. at 501-503.8

Accordingly, there is absolutely no indication in Grange—especially in light of its clear

references to the fact that the Workman-Dairyland factors remain relevant and applicable in

cases involving an adult whose domicile is not set by operation of law—that the majority opinion

in Williams has been overruled or disavowed. Therefore, we reject defendant’s reliance on

Grange to contend that the majority opinion in Williams, 202 Mich App 491, is no longer valid,

and to contend that this Court should apply common law domicile principles without considering

the Workman-Dairyland factors. Contrary to defendant’s claims, this Court must consider the

Workman-Dairyland factors in determining plaintiff’s domicile at the time of the accident and

follow Williams as binding precedent. MCR 7.215(C)(2), (J)(1).

Consistent with Williams, the trial court properly concluded, based on the Workman-

Dairyland factors, that plaintiff’s domicile was in Michigan with Hunter rather than in Louisiana

7

See id. at 497 (“In Workman, the seminal case in which we interpreted the phrase ‘domiciled in

the same household’ as used in MCL 500.3114(1), we considered whether the claimant, the

insured’s adult daughter-in-law, was domiciled in the same household as the insured. After

noting that no caselaw interpreted the phrase, ‘domiciled in the same household,’ we articulated

a flexible multi-factor test to aid courts in determining domicile, in which no one factor is

determinative.”) (emphasis added); id. at 497 n 41 (“The Workman–Dairyland multifactored

framework comprises the one now commonly employed by Michigan courts when a question of

fact exists as to where a person is domiciled.”); id. at 501 (“Workman and its progeny applying

the traditional domicile test defined domicile in relation to an adult but, for reasons that we will

explain, these factors are not helpful in determining a child’s domicile.”) (emphasis added); id. at

502 (“Typically, as indicated in the preceding discussion and demonstrated by the Workman

factors, an adult acquires a new domicile by choosing one of his or her choice, which makes the

question of intent a preeminent concern in determining an adult’s domicile.”); id. at 511 n 74.

8

Notably, the Grange Court stated, “Thus, while intent is critical for determining the domicile of

an adult, a child’s intent regarding domicile is simply irrelevant, and the traditional factors

applied in determining an adult’s domicile are likewise irrelevant. Instead, the child’s domicile

is determined by reference to the domicile of his or her parents.” Grange, 494 Mich at 503

(emphasis added).

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with her husband when the accident occurred. The first Workman factor weighs in favor of a

finding that plaintiff was domiciled in Hunter’s residence, as there is no dispute that plaintiff’s

declared intent, at the time of the accident, was to return to Hunter’s home as her domicile, just

as the plaintiff in Williams clearly informed his parents that he was moving back to Michigan

from Nevada. See Workman, 404 Mich at 496-497; Williams, 202 Mich App at 492. The record

confirms that plaintiff subjectively intended to leave her husband and live with Hunter in

Michigan, that she expressed this intent to several friends and family members between June

2013 and September 2013, and that she continued to possess this intent when she boarded the

bus in September 2013. The second Workman factor also weighs in favor of a finding that

plaintiff was domiciled with Hunter. Like the plaintiff in Williams, who had made arrangements

with his parents to move into their home upon his arrival in Michigan, the deposition testimony

clearly shows that plaintiff had a close relationship with Hunter and had made formal

arrangements to live in Hunter’s home, which included, inter alia, either opening a DTE account

in plaintiff’s name at the Shaun Road address, or transferring her account to that address. See

Workman, 404 Mich at 496-497; Williams, 202 Mich App at 492. The third Workman factor is

unclear, as plaintiff had established a bedroom in Hunter’s residence, but was traveling to

Michigan from her previous home in Louisiana with the last set of possessions that she intended

to move from Louisiana to Michigan when the accident occurred. Arguably, though, plaintiff

established a residence inside Hunter’s home when she was physically present and moved

possessions into her bedroom at Hunter’s residence, intending to reside there permanently, in

July 2013. See Workman, 404 Mich at 496-497.

However, the fourth Workman factor plainly weighs in favor of a finding that plaintiff

was domiciled in Hunter’s home. See id. Several facts show that plaintiff had abandoned her

domicile in Louisiana and considered Hunter’s address her home address at the time of the

accident. Similar to the plaintiff in Williams, who had relinquished his apartment in Nevada,

forwarded his mail to his parent’s address, and packed his personal belongings in his truck,

Williams, 202 Mich App at 492, plaintiff changed her mailing address with her bank, credit card

companies, and the federal government for her Social Security Disability payments; moved

many personal possessions to Hunter’s residence in July 2013; packed any remaining

possessions that she intended to keep into her suitcases before boarding the Greyhound bus; and

left her residence in Louisiana without telling her husband. Additionally, one may reasonably

infer that plaintiff provided Hunter’s address to police after the accident, as it is included as

plaintiff’s address in the traffic crash report and witness statement, which further demonstrates

that plaintiff considered Hunter’s residence her home and had abandoned her Louisiana domicile

at the time of the accident. Therefore, at least three out of the four Workman factors weigh in

favor of a finding that plaintiff was domiciled with Hunter when the accident occurred.

Most of the Dairyland factors also weigh in favor of a finding that plaintiff was

domiciled with Hunter. Under the first factor, plaintiff had changed her mailing address to

Hunter’s address with several entities, including the federal government, before boarding the

Greyhound bus, just as the plaintiff in Williams had arranged for his mail to be forwarded to his

parents’ address. See Williams, 202 Mich App at 492, 494. Under the second factor, plaintiff

had moved clothing, shoes, and kitchen items to Hunter’s residence and had ordered and shipped

winter clothing to Hunter’s residence. See id. at 494. Notably, this shows a current maintenance

of personal possessions for daily living at Hunter’s residence, which is more significant than the

plaintiff’s maintenance of personal possessions in his bedroom at his parents’ house, which he

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had left there when he moved to Nevada. See id. at 493. The third factor may appear to weigh

against a finding that plaintiff was domiciled with Hunter, as Hunter’s address was not listed on

plaintiff’s driver’s license. See id. at 494-495. However, the plaintiff in Williams had Nevada

car insurance and Nevada license plates when the accident occurred. Id. at 493. Further, it is

noteworthy that plaintiff had not changed the address on her Louisiana driver’s license to her last

address in that state. Rather, at the time of her examination under oath, the address on her

driver’s license was her second-to-last address in Louisiana. Accordingly, this factor does not

appear to undermine a finding that plaintiff was domiciled in Hunter’s residence. The fourth

Dairyland factor weighs in favor of a finding of domicile, as the unrebutted testimony clearly

established that plaintiff had a designated bedroom in Hunter’s home. See id. at 495. However,

the fifth factor weighs against a finding that plaintiff was domiciled with Hunter, as there is no

evidence that plaintiff was dependent on Hunter for financial support or assistance. See id.

Consistent with this Court’s decision in Williams, applying the Workman-Dairyland

factors to the undisputed facts in this case shows, as a matter of law, that plaintiff had established

her domicile in Hunter’s home—and abandoned her domicile in Louisiana—at the time of the

accident. See Fowler, 254 Mich App at 364; Williams, 202 Mich App at 494-495. As a result,

the trial court properly concluded that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether

plaintiff was covered as a resident relative under Hunter’s insurance policy, see MCL 500.3111;

MCL 500.3114(1); Allison, 481 Mich at 425, such that plaintiff and Beaumont were entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability. See Latham, 480 Mich at 111.9

IV. CONCLUSION

The trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of plaintiff and Beaumont was

proper because there is no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff was domiciled in the same

household as Hunter when the accident occurred.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Riordan

/s/ Patrick M. Meter

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood

9

Given this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider plaintiff’s alternative argument on appeal.

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