Opinion

Dan Carmichael McCarthan v. Director of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc.

  • 851 F.3d 1076
  • 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4485
  • 2017 WL 977029
Court
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Filed
Mar 14, 2017
Status
Published
On the bench
Carnes, Tjoflat, Hull, Marcus, Wilson, Pryor, Martin, Jordan, Rosenbaum
Nature of suit
ENB
Cited by
338 cases
Authority
More cited than 3.6%

holding that the fact that a court might reject a prisoner’s argument or that a procedural rule might bar its success does not render the remedy an inadequate means by which to challenge the legality of his sentence

How later courts described this case

  • holding that the fact that a court might reject a prisoner’s argument or that a procedural rule might bar its success does not render the remedy an inadequate means by which to challenge the legality of his sentence
  • concluding that petitioner ‘‘had a meaningful opportunity to present his claim’’ because he had ‘‘the chance to have precedent overruled en banc or by the [United States] Supreme Court’’
  • holding “that a change in caselaw does not make a motion to vacate a prisoner’s sentence ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (e))
  • holding the savings clause extends only to claims that cannot be effectively remedied under § 2255, even if the claim would have failed under circuit precedent at the time of conviction

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

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[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 12-14989

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 5:09-cv-00110-WTH-PRL

DAN CARMICHAEL MCCARTHAN,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

DIRECTOR OF GOODWILL INDUSTRIES-SUNCOAST, INC.,

Respondent - Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(March 14, 2017)

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, HULL, MARCUS, WILSON,

WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN, JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, JULIE CARNES, and

JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judge:

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This appeal requires us to decide whether a change in caselaw entitles a

federal prisoner to an additional round of collateral review of his sentence.

Congress gives a federal prisoner like Dan McCarthan one opportunity to move to

vacate his sentence unless that remedy is “inadequate or ineffective to test the

legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). When McCarthan pleaded guilty to

being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), he understood that the

district court would enhance his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act,

id. § 924(e). He did not appeal that sentence. When McCarthan later moved to

vacate his sentence, he again said nothing about the enhancement. After foregoing

those opportunities to complain about the enhancement of his sentence, McCarthan

petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. McCarthan argues that his earlier motion to

vacate was inadequate to test his objection to his sentence enhancement because

our caselaw about the Armed Career Criminal Act has changed. But because the

motion to vacate gave McCarthan an opportunity to challenge his sentence

enhancement, his remedy was not inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of

his sentence, regardless of any later change in caselaw.

For eighteen years, our Court has maintained that a change in caselaw may

trigger an additional round of collateral review, see Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d

1236 (11th Cir. 1999), but our precedents have ignored the text of the statute. As

2

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we struggled to apply our precedents, we employed a five-factor test and granted

relief only twice. See Mackey v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 739 F.3d 657

(11th Cir. 2014); Bryant v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 738 F.3d 1253 (11th

Cir. 2013). Because our precedents have failed to adhere to the text of section

2255(e), have not incurred significant reliance interests, and have proved

unworkable, today we overrule them. We join the Tenth Circuit in applying the law

as Congress wrote it, see Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578 (10th Cir. 2011)

(Gorsuch, J.), and hold that a change in caselaw does not make a motion to vacate

a prisoner’s sentence “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his

detention,” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). We affirm the dismissal of McCarthan’s petition

for a writ of habeas corpus.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2003, Dan McCarthan pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a

firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the maximum sentence for which is ten years

imprisonment, id. § 924(a)(2). The district court enhanced McCarthan’s sentence

under the Armed Career Criminal Act, id. § 924(e), on the ground that he had five

prior convictions for a “serious drug offense” or a “violent felony,” id. § 924(e)(1),

including one for escape. United States v. McCarthan, No. 8:02-cr-137 (M.D. Fla.

3

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June 4, 2003). McCarthan received a sentence of 211 months. Id. He did not

appeal. Id.

McCarthan later moved to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He alleged

that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel, but he did not challenge the

enhancement of his sentence. The district court denied the motion to vacate on the

merits. McCarthan v. United States, No. 8:04-cv-1288 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2004).

Both the district court and this Court denied his request for a certificate of

appealability. See id.

In 2009, the Supreme Court ruled that some forms of the crime of escape do

not qualify as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Chambers

v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 130 (2009). Chambers overturned our circuit

precedent, United States v. Gay, 251 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2001), that even

“walkaway” escape qualified as a violent felony. Id. at 954–55. Because Chambers

involved statutory interpretation, McCarthan could not bring a second motion to

vacate under section 2255(h). Instead, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Both the district court and the panel applied a test we

first enunciated in Wofford that would allow a federal prisoner to petition for a writ

of habeas corpus if a later decision of the Supreme Court abrogates circuit

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precedent that had foreclosed the prisoner’s argument when he first moved to

vacate his sentence.

The district court could have exercised jurisdiction over McCarthan’s

petition only if it fell within the saving clause of section 2255(e). McCarthan

argued that Chambers “ma[de] [him] actually innocent” of the sentencing

enhancement and made him eligible for relief under the saving clause. The district

court dismissed the petition because McCarthan’s other convictions ensured that

his sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum. McCarthan v. Warden, FCC

Coleman-Medium, 5:09-cv-110 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2012).

We affirmed the dismissal of McCarthan’s petition. McCarthan v. Warden,

FCI Estill, 811 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, op.

vacated, No. 12-14989 (11th Cir. May 24, 2016). The panel opinion explained that

McCarthan’s petition did not satisfy the requirements of the Wofford test because

he had at least three other convictions that triggered his enhanced sentence. Id. at

1256–57. But the panel disagreed about how to apply the Wofford test. Compare

id. at 1246–47, with id. at 1257–59 (Proctor, J., concurring).

McCarthan filed a petition for rehearing en banc, and we granted it. We

instructed the parties to brief three issues: (1) do our precedents erroneously

interpret the saving clause, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); (2) what is the correct

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interpretation of the saving clause; and (3) applying the correct standard, is

McCarthan entitled to petition for a writ of habeas corpus? Because both

McCarthan and the Warden argued that the Wofford test or some version of it is

correct, we appointed Taylor Meehan as amicus curiae to argue that our precedents

erroneously interpreted the saving clause. We thank Ms. Meehan for her superb

brief and oral argument in keeping with the highest tradition of the legal

profession.

On October 17, 2016, we granted McCarthan’s unopposed motion to

substitute the Director of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc. as the Respondent-

Appellee. McCarthan was transferred from FCI Estill to the custody of the Director

of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., a Bureau of Prisons Residential Reentry

Center (more commonly known as a halfway house). McCarthan is still “in

custody,” for purposes of our jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a prisoner may bring a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under

the saving clause of section 2255(e) is a question of law we review de novo.

Williams v. Warden, Federal Bureau of Prisons, 713 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir.

2013). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the remedy by motion

was “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” Turner v.

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Warden Coleman FCI (Medium), 709 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting

28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United States,

135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).

III. DISCUSSION

Since 1948, Congress has required that a federal prisoner file a motion to

vacate, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, instead of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, id.

§ 2241, to collaterally attack the legality of his sentence. See Pub. L. No. 80-773,

62 Stat. 869, 967–68. A motion to vacate allows a prisoner to contest his sentence

“upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such

sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or

is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Section 2255(e)

makes clear that a motion to vacate is the exclusive mechanism for a federal

prisoner to seek collateral relief unless he can satisfy the “saving clause” at the end

of that subsection:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who

is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section,

shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to

apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that

such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the

remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his

detention.

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Id. § 2255(e) (emphasis added). “[S]aving[, not savings,] is the precise word” for

“a statutory provision exempting from coverage something that would otherwise

be included,” Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage 797 (3d ed.

2011); it has nothing to do with saving a statute from unconstitutionality, see, e.g.,

28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (“saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which

they are otherwise entitled”).

To determine whether a change in caselaw can satisfy the saving clause of

section 2255(e), we consider three matters. First, we explain how we (and other

circuits) have interpreted the saving clause. Second, we explain why our

precedents fail to adhere to the text of the saving clause. Third, in the light of the

incongruity of the text and our precedents, we explain our decision to overrule our

precedents.

A. Our Precedents About the Saving Clause

Congress enacted section 2255 to address the “serious administrative

problems” caused by the requirement that habeas petitions be brought in the

district of incarceration, often far from where relevant records and witnesses were

located. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210–19 (1952). The motion to

vacate “afford[ed] the same rights in another and more convenient forum,” namely

the district where the prisoner was sentenced. Id. at 219. In 1996, Congress

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reformed the system of collateral review when it passed the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. The Act

made several changes to section 2255, including the addition of a bar on second or

successive motions, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h), and a statute of limitations, id. § 2255(f).

See 110 Stat. at 1220. But the Act did not alter the saving clause. See id.

This Circuit first considered the meaning of the saving clause eighteen years

ago in Wofford. Charlie Wofford, a federal prisoner, pleaded guilty to being a felon

in possession of a firearm and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

cocaine. Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1237. The district court and this Court denied his

first motion to vacate. Id. After several failed attempts to file successive motions to

vacate, Wofford petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under section 2241 and

argued that his illegal sentence created manifest injustice. Id. at 1238. Wofford

argued that because the bar on second and successive motions prevented the court

from reaching the merits of his new claims, he satisfied the saving clause. Id.

We denied Wofford relief, but our analysis paid scant attention to the text of

the saving clause. We began with the opinion of the Supreme Court in Hayman,

but concluded that it was “not very helpful” with respect to the “saving[] clause

language.” Id. at 1239. We then discussed the legislative history. Id. at 1239–41.

Early versions of the saving clause focused on practicable problems, but we “found

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nothing in the legislative history explaining why the relevant language was

changed or what the new language means.” Id. at 1241. Unsurprisingly, snippets

from the legislative history cut both ways—that the new language did not make

any substantive changes and that the new language was broader than the old

language—but we decided “the better view is that the saving[] clause is concerned

with more than the practical difficulties.” Id. We then canvassed the decisions of

our sister circuits. Id. at 1242–45. After we concluded that the approach of the

Seventh Circuit was “better reasoned than those of the other circuits, and its rule

has the advantage of being specific,” we applied a test that turned on an

intervening change in circuit precedent. Id. at 1244. We stated that “the only

sentencing claims that may conceivably be covered by the saving[] clause are those

based upon a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision overturning circuit

precedent.” Id. at 1245. But because Wofford’s petition did not rest upon a change

in caselaw, we denied him relief. Id.

In Gilbert, sitting en banc, we clarified that, under the Wofford test, the

saving clause does not apply to errors that do not cause a sentence to exceed the

statutory maximum. Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1323 (11th Cir. 2011)

(en banc). Ezell Gilbert pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute of

more than 50 grams of crack cocaine and more than 100 grams of marijuana. Id. at

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1298. Under the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines, the district court applied

the career offender enhancement and sentenced Gilbert to 292 months

imprisonment. Id. at 1300. The statutory maximum was life imprisonment. Id. at

1299. Years after we denied relief in his direct appeal and denied him a certificate

of appealability about the denial of his first motion to vacate, Gilbert invoked the

saving clause and petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. He argued that the district

court should not have applied the career offender guideline. Id. at 1301–02. On

rehearing en banc, we explained that the Wofford test was “only dicta” but, in any

event, could not help Gilbert. Id. at 1319–20. Because Gilbert challenged only the

use of the guidelines in determining his sentence and a prisoner cannot be actually

innocent of a sentence within the statutory range, Wofford did not apply. Id. at

1320 (“Gilbert’s position turns on treating sentences as convictions, and an

argument that depends on calling a duck a donkey is not much of an argument.”).

Because Gilbert’s sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum, we denied

relief. Id. at 1322–24.

A few years later, Williams revisited the Wofford test to address an alleged

error that caused the sentence to exceed the statutory maximum. Williams, 713

F.3d at 1334. Albert Williams was tried and convicted of being a felon in

possession of a firearm and was sentenced as a career offender under the Armed

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Career Criminal Act. Id. at 1335. Williams did not object to the enhancement

during sentencing or on direct appeal, and we affirmed his conviction. Id. After

Williams filed several meritless collateral attacks, the Supreme Court decided

Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), which narrowed the definition of

“violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act. Id. at 148. Williams argued

that under section 2255(e) the district court could hear his petition for a writ of

habeas corpus and decide his claim that his sentence now exceeded the statutory

maximum because some of his underlying convictions no longer qualified as

violent felonies. Williams, 713 F.3d at 1336. We reiterated that “the statute says

precious little about what it means for the original motion to have been

‘inadequate’ or ineffective.’” Id. at 1341. Applying the Wofford test, we

determined that circuit precedent would not have “squarely resolved” Williams’s

claim unless there was “adverse precedent . . . that would have made us unwilling

to listen.” Id. at 1343, 1347. But there was “no Circuit precedent on the books

during Williams’s collateral attack” that foreclosed his claim, so we denied him

relief. Id. at 1345, 1349.

In Bryant, we again applied the Wofford test and granted a prisoner relief

under the saving clause for the first time. Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1274. We distilled a

five-part test from our precedents. That is, a federal prisoner may file a petition for

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a writ of habeas corpus if (1) binding precedent foreclosed a claim at the time of

his first motion to vacate; (2) the Supreme Court overturned our binding precedent

that foreclosed the claim; (3) the new decision of the Supreme Court applies

retroactively on collateral review; (4) as a result of this retroactive decision, the

prisoner’s sentence is now contrary to the law; and (5) this kind of claim can be

brought under the saving clause. Id. Bryant pleaded guilty to being a felon in

possession of a firearm. Id. at 1258. He had three prior felony convictions,

including one for carrying a concealed firearm, and the district court imposed a

sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Id. at 1258–60.

Bryant’s first motion to vacate did not challenge his conviction for carrying a

concealed firearm. Id. at 1260. After Begay, the district court denied leave to file a

successive motion, and Bryant instead petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. Id.

Bryant satisfied each part of the Wofford test. Our precedent in United States

v. Hall, 77 F.3d 398 (11th Cir. 1996), held that a concealed-firearm offense was a

violent felony, id. at 401–02, which foreclosed Bryant’s argument when he filed

his first motion to vacate. Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1274. The later decision of the

Supreme Court in Begay “busted” that precedent. Id. at 1275. And we held that

Begay announced a substantive new rule that applied retroactively. Id. at 1276–77.

Bryant’s sentence was 235 months imprisonment, which exceeded the ten year

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statutory maximum for his crime without the enhancement. Id. at 1279. And we

held that the saving clause reaches more than claims of actual innocence; it extends

also to errors that cause a sentence to exceed the statutory maximum. Id. at 1281–

84.

In a similar appeal, we also granted Brian Mackey relief. Mackey, 739 F.3d

at 663. He argued that as a result of Begay, his convictions for carrying a concealed

firearm no longer supported his sentence as an armed career criminal. Id. at 660.

Under the Wofford test as explicated in Bryant, we again granted relief. Id. at 658,

663.

Since then, additional wrinkles have arisen. In Samak, a federal inmate

imprisoned in our Circuit, but sentenced in another, the Fifth, petitioned for a writ

of habeas corpus. Samak v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 766 F.3d 1271, 1275

n.3 (11th Cir. 2014). The Wofford test required us to review Fifth Circuit precedent

and determine whether the law of that other circuit foreclosed Jamal Samak’s

petition. Id. at 1275. We denied relief because the relevant Fifth Circuit precedent

actually supported Samak’s claim at the time of his first motion to vacate. Id. But a

separate concurring opinion called for a reconsideration of our precedent in Bryant

and the adoption of an interpretation rooted in the plain text of the saving clause.

Id. at 1275–76 (W. Pryor, J., concurring). And in Cortes-Morales, a federal

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prisoner argued that the saving clause should extend beyond changes in caselaw to

retroactive legislation that amended the New York sentencing statutes. Cortes-

Morales v. Hastings, 827 F.3d 1009, 1015 (11th Cir. 2016). We held that Jorge

Cortes-Morales was not eligible for resentencing under the revised New York laws

and avoided the question whether or not the saving clause could be extended to

retroactive amendments to state legislation. Id. at 1016. But a separate concurring

opinion reiterated that because Bryant is a “monster of our creation, untethered to

the text” there is “no principled basis for determining its ultimate reach.” Id. (W.

Pryor, J., concurring).

Several other circuits have divined similarly atextual tests for satisfying the

saving clause. In Davenport, which we cited in Wofford, the Seventh Circuit

engaged in a pragmatic analysis that adequate “should mean” that “a prisoner [has]

a reasonable opportunity to obtain a reliable judicial determination of the

fundamental legality of his conviction and sentence.” In re Davenport, 147 F.3d

605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998). And the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have required

proof of actual innocence of a charged offense, in addition to other factors, to

obtain relief under the saving clause. See, e.g., Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303,

307–08 (6th Cir. 2012); Reyes–Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th

Cir. 2001); In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333–34 (4th Cir. 2000). The Second Circuit

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holds that “inadequate or ineffective” means “the set of cases in which the

petitioner cannot, for whatever reason, utilize § 2255, and in which the failure to

allow for collateral review would raise serious constitutional questions.” Triestman

v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 377 (2d Cir. 1997). The Third Circuit focuses on

when the second or successive limitations would cause a “complete miscarriage of

justice.” In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). And in the Eighth and

Ninth Circuits, a prisoner must not have had an unobstructed procedural shot at

presenting that claim, defined to include changes in law. See Harrison v. Ollison,

519 F.3d 952, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2008); Abdullah v. Hedrick, 392 F.3d 957, 963 (8th

Cir. 2004). Judge Martin’s dissent places great weight on the majority of circuits

having arrived at the same result, regardless of their reasoning, Martin Dissent at

88, 98 n.7, but our inquiry must begin with the text.

Only the Tenth Circuit has adhered to—or even seriously considered—the

text of the saving clause. In Prost, the Tenth Circuit held that “the plain language

of § 2255 means what it says and says what it means: a prisoner can proceed to

§ 2241 only if his initial § 2255 motion was itself inadequate or ineffective to the

task of providing the petitioner with a chance to test his sentence or conviction.”

Prost, 636 F.3d at 587. The intervening change in caselaw does not mean that the

“process was ineffective or inadequate to test his argument.” Id. at 580. And then-

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Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook reached the same conclusion contrary to the circuit

precedent that binds his court: “A motion under § 2255 could reasonably be

thought ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention’

if a class of argument were categorically excluded, but when an argument is

permissible but fails on the merits there is no problem with the adequacy of

§ 2255.” Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 597 (7th Cir. 2013) (Easterbrook, C.J.,

concerning the circulation under Circuit Rule 40(e)).

In Bryant, we briefly considered this textual interpretation of the saving

clause and dismissed it as “in tension with this Court’s precedent.” 738 F.3d at

1287. But as the Tenth Circuit correctly explained, our precedent in Wofford did

not address the “textual and structural clues” that support the contrary reasoning in

Prost. 636 F.3d at 593. With the benefit of our experience, we now take this

opportunity to reconsider our interpretation of the saving clause.

B. The Text of the Saving Clause

The saving clause provides a federal prisoner relief only when his “remedy

by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28

U.S.C. § 2255(e). When we read this text, several terms offer important clues about

its meaning: “remedy,” “to test,” “inadequate or ineffective,” and “detention.”

Careful review of these terms and the whole text makes clear that a change in

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caselaw does not trigger relief under the saving clause. Whether circuit precedent

“was once adverse to a prisoner has nothing to do with whether his motion to

vacate his sentence is ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his

detention.’” Samak, 766 F.3d at 1276 (W. Pryor, J., concurring).

McCarthan’s claim that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum is

exactly the kind of claim that a motion to vacate is designed to “remedy,”

notwithstanding adverse precedent. “Remedy” as used in the saving clause does

not promise “relief.” A “remedy” is “[t]he means by which a right is enforced or

the violation of a right is prevented, redressed, or compensated.” Remedy, Black’s

Law Dictionary 1526 (3d ed. 1933). “Relief” is “the assistance, redress, or benefit

which a complainant seeks at the hands of the court.” Relief, Black’s Law

Dictionary 1523 (3d ed. 1933). The “means” are not inadequate when circuit

precedent forecloses relief on a claim. The remedy of a motion to vacate permitted

McCarthan to bring his claim and seek en banc or Supreme Court review to change

the substantive rule of law. That a court might reject a prisoner’s argument does

not render his “remedy by motion” an inadequate “means by which” to challenge

the legality of his sentence. A procedural rule that might prevent success on a

particular motion does not render the remedy an inadequate “means” so long as it

is capable of “enforc[ing]” or “redress[ing]” the right. The motion to vacate is an

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adequate remedy for McCarthan because if he succeeds, the court must “vacate and

set the judgment aside” and either release or retry him. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).

The distinction between remedy and relief is reflected throughout our system

of habeas corpus. For example, a procedural bar might prevent relief, but that bar

does not render the motion itself an ineffective or inadequate remedy. See, e.g.,

Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 147–48 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.). The

prisoner may still bring the claim. Likewise, a state prisoner must “exhaust[] the

remedies available in the courts of the State” before petitioning for a federal writ of

habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). In this context,

remedy must refer to the available process—not substantive relief—because a

prisoner who received relief in state court would have no reason to file a habeas

petition. That McCarthan’s argument was foreclosed by precedent (as opposed to

being wrong, untimely, procedurally barred, or unexhausted) is irrelevant. The

motion to vacate provided an adequate remedy to challenge the legality of his

sentence.

McCarthan also could have “tested” the legality of his detention in his first

motion to vacate. That is, he could have made the argument that his prior

convictions did not qualify him for an enhanced sentence under the statute. “To

test” the legality of his detention and satisfy the saving clause, a prisoner is not

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required “to win” his release. “To test” means “to try.” Test, 11 Oxford English

Dictionary 220 (1st ed. 1933). To try a claim, a “petitioner [must have] an

opportunity to bring his argument,” Prost, 636 F.3d at 584. The opportunity to test

or try a claim, however, neither guarantees any relief nor requires any particular

probability of success; it guarantees access to a procedure. Id.; see also Taylor v.

Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 835–36 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[To test] implies a focus on

procedures rather than outcomes. Judges sometimes err, but this does not show that

the procedures are inadequate; it shows only that people are fallible.”). To

determine whether a prisoner satisfies the saving clause, we ask only whether the

motion to vacate is an adequate procedure to test the prisoner’s claim. And to

answer this question, we ask whether the prisoner would have been permitted to

bring that claim in a motion to vacate. In other words, a prisoner has a meaningful

opportunity to test his claim whenever section 2255 can provide him a remedy.

Despite circuit precedent, McCarthan could have tested the legality of his

detention by requesting that we reconsider our precedent en banc or by petitioning

the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The panel opinion stated that the

purpose of the Wofford test is “to prevent us from entertaining § 2241 petitions by

federal prisoners who could have at least theoretically successfully challenged an

ACCA enhancement in an earlier proceeding,” McCarthan, 811 F.3d at 1245, and

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Judge Rosenbaum’s dissent argues that “a prisoner must have a ‘meaningful

opportunity’ to present his claim,” Rosenbaum Dissent at 139–40. But if

McCarthan had raised his claim earlier, perhaps he could have been the successful

litigant that Deondery Chambers or Larry Begay later came to be. For example,

Chambers raised the same claim McCarthan does, namely that his conviction for

escape was not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Chambers,

555 U.S. at 123. And he too faced binding circuit precedent that foreclosed this

claim. See United States v. Chambers, 473 F.3d 724, 725–26 (7th Cir. 2007), rev’d,

555 U.S. 122 (2009). But he nevertheless presented his claim and won relief in the

Supreme Court. Chambers, 555 U.S. at 126–27. Similarly, in the context of

procedural default, we do not excuse a defendant’s failure to raise a claim even if

the claim was “unacceptable to that particular court at that particular time.” Engle

v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 132 n.35 (1982) (citation omitted); Moore v. Zant, 885 F.2d

1497, 1507–08 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Engle . . . indicated that petitioners might have a

duty to anticipate changes in the law at the threat of having later claims based on

those changes barred by principles of procedural default.”). It is unclear why the

chance to have precedent overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court would not

qualify as a theoretically successful challenge or meaningful opportunity.

McCarthan, like Chambers, had a meaningful opportunity to present his claim and

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test the legality of his sentence before the court of appeals and before the Supreme

Court. A test often failed can nevertheless be an adequate test.

Adverse circuit precedent also did not make McCarthan’s first motion to

vacate his sentence “inadequate or ineffective” to challenge his sentence.

“Inadequate or ineffective” instead connotes that the saving clause permits a

prisoner to bring a claim in a petition for habeas corpus that could not have been

raised in his initial motion to vacate. The term “inadequate,” as defined in the

phrase “inadequate remedy at law,” means “unfitted or not adapted to the end in

view.” Inadequate Remedy at Law, Black’s Law Dictionary 940 (3d ed. 1933); see

also Jordan Concurring at 67 (providing a definition of “inadequate” as “lacking in

effectiveness”). And “ineffective” means “[o]f such a nature as not to produce . . .

the intended [] effect.” Ineffective, 5 Oxford English Dictionary 239 (1st ed. 1933).

That a particular argument is doomed under circuit precedent says nothing about

the nature of the motion to vacate. The motion to vacate is still “adapted to the

end” of testing the claim regardless of the claim’s success on the merits.

The word “or” in “inadequate or ineffective” does not overpower the

ordinary meaning of the words, which have similar definitions. We are hard

pressed to imagine a remedy that is “lacking in effectiveness” but not “ineffective,”

or “of such a nature as not to produce the intended effect” but not “inadequate.”

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Although the disjunctive “or” may suggest separate meanings for the two terms,

Jordan Concurring at 66–67; Rosenbaum Dissent at 127–28, it does not require

mutual exclusivity. The word “or” commonly introduces a synonym or

“definitional equivalent.” See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:

An Interpretation of Legal Texts 122 (2012). That construction may be an example

of the “ill-conceived but lamentably common belt-and-suspenders approach” to

legal writing, id. at 176–77, but it is the better reading of the text when the terms

share the same ordinary meaning. Judge Rosenbaum’s dissent disagrees because

the phrase “or ineffective” is not set off by commas, Rosenbaum Dissent at 128,

but commas are not necessary. See, e.g., Scalia & Garner, supra, at 122 (“The

award of exemplary or punitive damages is the exception, not the rule.”); Fed. R.

Evid. 407 (“When measures are taken that would have made an earlier injury or

harm less likely to occur . . .”). That the definitions overlap does not require that

we ignore the ordinary meaning of the text, and it does not support the dissent’s

conclusion that “ineffective” must mean “constitutionally deficient.” Rosenbaum

Dissent at 131.

A motion to vacate is not often an inadequate or ineffective remedy. But a

motion to vacate could be “inadequate or ineffective to test” a prisoner’s claim

about the execution of his sentence because that claim is not cognizable under

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section 2255(a). See, e.g., Hajduk v. United States, 764 F.2d 795, 796 (11th Cir.

1985). The motion to vacate is “of such a nature” that it will “not . . . produce . . .

the intended [] effect,” Ineffective, 5 Oxford English Dictionary 239 (1st ed. 1933),

because the prisoner does not challenge his sentence and the appropriate remedy is

not vacatur. Or, if the sentencing court no longer exists, the remedy by motion

could be “inadequate or ineffective to test” the prisoner’s claim because the motion

may be brought only in that venue. But when a prisoner’s argument about the

legality of his sentence conflicts with circuit precedent, a motion to vacate is

neither inadequate nor ineffective to test his argument.

The word “ineffective” also carries this meaning elsewhere in the statute: a

state prisoner may avoid the exhaustion requirements if “circumstances exist that

render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii). The Supreme Court stated that this exception applies only if

“there is no opportunity to obtain redress in state court or if the corrective process

is so clearly deficient as to render futile any effort to obtain relief.” Duckworth v.

Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) (emphasis added). Because there was no claim that

the “postconviction procedures [were] inadequate to adjudicate” the claim, the

prisoner did not qualify for the exception. Id. at 4. So too here. The remedy by

motion is not ineffective unless the procedure it provides is incapable of

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adjudicating the claim. We cannot “engraft[] an exception onto the habeas statute

not envisioned by Congress [and] inconsistent with the clear mandate of the Act.”

Id. at 5.

In other areas of the law, adequacy and effectiveness focus on process and

do not require any likelihood of success on the merits. For example, a litigant with

an “adequate” remedy at law cannot seek equitable relief, even if his legal claim

has little chance of success. Samak, 766 F.3d at 1285 (W. Pryor, J., concurring).

Similarly, in the context of the Sixth Amendment, defense counsel is not

“ineffective” even if his arguments are “doomed.” Brown, 719 F.3d at 597

(Easterbrook, C.J., concerning the circulation under Circuit Rule 40(e)). Judge

Rosenbaum’s dissent takes this analogy too far when it asserts that because the

ineffective assistance of counsel creates a constitutional deficiency under the Sixth

Amendment, the term “ineffective” means “constitutionally deficient.” Rosenbaum

Dissent at 132–33.

When circuit precedent forecloses a prisoner’s claim, “it may very well

mean circuit law is inadequate or deficient. But that does not mean the § 2255

remedial vehicle is inadequate or ineffective to the task of testing the argument.”

Prost, 636 F.3d at 590. A prisoner has an adequate procedure to raise any claim

attacking his sentence, even if that claim is foreclosed by circuit precedent. Our

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precedent may later prove to be “right or wrong as a matter of substantive law, but

the saving[] clause is satisfied so long as the petitioner had an opportunity to bring

and test his claim.” Id. at 585. When a prisoner’s motion attacks his sentence based

on a cognizable claim that can be brought in the correct venue, the remedy by

motion is adequate and effective to test his claim.

The term “detention” in the saving clause carries a broader meaning than

the term “sentence” that appears elsewhere in the statute. Section 2255(a) allows a

prisoner to challenge only his “sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). But the saving

clause preserves challenges to a prisoner’s “detention” that would otherwise go

unremedied. Id. § 2255(e). When Congress uses “different language in similar

sections,” we should give those words different meanings. See Iraola & CIA, S.A.

v. Kimberly–Clark Corp., 232 F.3d 854, 859 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Scalia &

Garner, supra, at 170. When Congress enacted section 2255, the word “detention”

meant “[k]eeping in custody or confinement,” Detention, 3 Oxford English

Dictionary 266 (1st ed.1933), or “[t]he act of keeping back or withholding, either

accidentally or by design, a person or thing,” Detention, Black’s Law Dictionary

569 (3d ed. 1933). Because someone can be “[kept] in custody” without a criminal

sentence, or “with[eld]” contrary to the terms of the sentence, it is clear that the

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meaning of “detention” covers circumstances of confinement other than those

attributable to the sentence.

When a prisoner attacks aspects of his detention in ways that do not

challenge the validity of his sentence, then the saving clause may provide him

access to a different remedy. For example, a prisoner may concede the validity of

his sentence but raise claims about the execution of his sentence—that is, “about

his good-time credits or the revocation of his parole, which involve the ‘act of

keeping back or withholding’ the prisoner.” Samak, 766 F.3d at 1280 (W. Pryor, J.,

concurring).

This reading of the text comports with the traditional distinction between a

motion to vacate and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A motion to vacate

covers only challenges to the validity of a sentence, but the saving clause and a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus cover challenges to the execution of a sentence.

Cf. Antonelli v. Warden, U.S.P. Atlanta, 542 F.3d 1348, 1351 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008)

(“It is well-settled that a § 2255 motion to vacate is a separate and distinct remedy

from habeas corpus proper. . . . A prisoner in custody pursuant to a federal court

judgment may proceed under § 2241 only when he raises claims outside the scope

of § 2255(a), that is, claims concerning execution of his sentence.”) (internal

citations omitted); United States v. Flores, 616 F.2d 840, 842 (5th Cir. 1980)

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(“[The prisoner’s] appropriate remedy is under § 2255, not 28 U.S.C. § 2241, since

the alleged errors occurred at or prior to sentencing.”). Because Congress used

“sentence” in one part of the statute and “detention” in another, we should interpret

the statute to preserve the traditional distinction between those terms and the

procedures by which they are challenged.

McCarthan’s petition does not fall within the text of the saving clause.

Nothing in the text suggests that Congress gave special status to claims foreclosed

by binding circuit precedent, as opposed to claims that are procedurally defaulted

or substantively wrong. See Samak, 766 F.3d at 1295 (W. Pryor, J., concurring)

(“Bryant does not even attempt to offer a plausible interpretation of the text of the

saving[] clause.”). Neither McCarthan’s failure to bring this claim earlier nor his

odds of success on the merits are relevant to the saving clause inquiry. Because

McCarthan filed a traditional claim attacking his sentence that he could have

brought in a motion to vacate, the remedy by motion is adequate and effective to

test the legality of his detention.

The whole text of section 2255 confirms our reading of the saving clause.

“[T]here can be no justification for needlessly rendering provisions in conflict if

they can be interpreted harmoniously.” Scalia & Garner, supra, at 180. Allowing a

prisoner with a claim that is cognizable in a motion to vacate to access the saving

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clause nullifies the procedural hurdles of section 2255 and undermines the venue

provisions.

If the saving clause “guarantee[d] multiple opportunities to test a conviction

or sentence,” then the bar against second and successive motions under section

2255(h) would become a nullity. Prost, 636 F.3d at 585. Only prisoners who

satisfy the exceptions of section 2255(h) may collaterally attack their sentences

more than once. Section 2255(h) “speaks directly” to the question of “[h]ow often

to rerun a search for error.” Taylor, 314 F.3d at 835. Judge Martin’s dissent argues

that our interpretation “has made a rule” that “insulate[s] [our] mistakes from . . .

review,” Martin Dissent at 101, but, as always, every error we make in affirming

the denial of a motion to vacate is subject to review on petition for certiorari. And

we did not make the rule that bars consideration of second or successive motions.

Congress did. The legislative branch defined both the appropriate sentence for

McCarthan’s crime and the rules for challenging the legality of that sentence.

Congress recognized that courts would make mistakes, but provided for successive

motions only in specific circumstances. The statute limits each prisoner to a “single

collateral attack, unless the conditions of [2255(h)] have been met.” Taylor, 314

F.3d at 835. McCarthan neither alleges that “newly discovered evidence”

establishes his innocence nor that “a new rule of constitutional law, made

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retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable” warrants relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). He cannot bring a second

collateral attack.

The saving clause does not create a third exception. “Where Congress

explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional

exceptions are not to be implied.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001)

(quoting Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980)). The specific

language of section 2255(h), enacted nearly 50 years after the saving clause, limits

the reach of the saving clause. See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1308 (“An ambiguous or

general statutory provision enacted at an earlier time must yield to a specific and

clear provision enacted at a later time.”). If Congress wanted an exception for all

intervening changes in law, it could have said so. Elsewhere in the statute,

Congress refers to any “right” that is new and retroactively applicable. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255(f)(3). But section 2255(h) speaks only to “a new rule of constitutional law.”

Id. § 2255(h)(2). This material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning.

See Scalia & Garner, supra, at 170. Judge Martin’s dissent argues that Congress’s

failure to repeal the saving clause permits courts to create a third exception for new

rules of statutory interpretation that arise after a prisoner has used his first motion

to vacate. Martin Dissent at 96. But to read the bar on successive motions (or other

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procedural bars to relief) to trigger the saving clause makes the statute self-

defeating. See, e.g., Brown, 719 F.3d at 599 (Easterbrook, C.J., concerning the

circulation under Circuit Rule 40(e)). And we are not persuaded that relying on

equity to limit the third exception to claims of actual innocence, Jordan Concurring

at 69–74, does any less violence to the statutory text that creates only two

exceptions. Congress did not create any exception to section 2255(h) for non-

constitutional changes in law, so we may not craft one.

Section 2255 includes other procedural hurdles that the Wofford test fails to

respect. For example, the Wofford test runs roughshod over the statute of

limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). A federal prisoner has one year to move to vacate

his sentence under section 2255. But when a prisoner uses the saving clause to

bring a claim that is cognizable in a motion to vacate, he bypasses his statute of

limitations and gains limitless time to press claims that prisoners who meet the

requirements of section 2255 do not receive.

The motion to vacate was intended to be a substitute remedy for the writ of

habeas corpus, see Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962); Hayman, 342

U.S. at 219, but permitting federal prisoners to file habeas petitions based on an

intervening change in statutory interpretation provides those prisoners with a

superior remedy. Allowing a prisoner to use the saving clause to bring a statutory

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claim in a habeas petition circumvents the bar on successive petitions. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255(h). It does away with the one-year statute of limitations. Id. § 2255(f). It

renders the process for obtaining permission to file a second or successive motion,

id. § 2253(b), and that for obtaining a certificate of appealability, id. § 2253(c)(1),

a nullity. A prisoner who brings a constitutional claim under section 2255(h), in

contrast, must overcome these procedural hurdles. The Wofford test unravels this

carefully tailored scheme. It makes no sense to allow a federal prisoner to evade

the statutory framework by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Several of the separate opinions raise a version of the argument that a

previously adequate remedy may later become inadequate, but these temporal

arguments fail in the light of the whole text. Judge Rosenbaum’s dissent states that

“as a practical matter” a “right . . . cannot be vindicated until after the Supreme

Court announces the new rule.” Rosenbaum Dissent at 184. But this argument

ignores that litigants often make novel arguments in the hope that a court will

adopt them as a matter of first impression or in a rejection of past precedent. Judge

Martin’s dissent and Judge Jordan’s concurring opinion argue that the “present

tense” of the saving clause requires that we ask whether section 2255 “is adequate

or ineffective to test” “at the time the petition is filed in federal court.” Martin

Dissent at 91; Jordan Concurring at 64 (We “assess inadequacy and ineffectiveness

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as of the time [a petitioner] files his § 2241 habeas corpus petition, and not as of

the time when he submitted his initial § 2255 motion.”). But whether the remedy

“is” inadequate or ineffective must refer to the nature of the remedy, not to one

specific motion, or else the motion becomes inadequate every time a procedural

rule like the statute of limitations or procedural default prevents success. The

procedural bars mean nothing if they can be avoided through the saving clause.

The saving clause does not allow access to section 2241 whenever a claim is

untimely or procedurally defaulted otherwise the statute would render itself

inadequate or ineffective. The same must be true for the bar on second or

successive motions. Contrary to Judge Martin’s dissent, Martin Dissent at 97–100,

the means also do not somehow become inadequate or ineffective when circuit

precedent is abrogated after a prisoner has filed his first motion to vacate. When

Congress limits a prisoner to a single motion to vacate, it does not render the

“remedy by motion inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention,”

28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); it instead limits each prisoner to one test.

Allowing a federal prisoner to bring a successive claim in a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus also defies the logic of the venue provisions. A federal

prisoner must file a motion to vacate in the court that tried and sentenced him,

where he can challenge issues about his trial and sentencing. See id. § 2255(a). In

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contrast, he must bring a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district in which

he is imprisoned, where he can challenge his detention. See id. § 2241(d). The

United States Attorney who participated in sentencing defends challenges to the

prisoner’s trial and sentencing. Id. § 2255(a). But the warden of the prison defends

challenges to the prisoner’s detention. Id. § 2241(d).

Allowing a prisoner to bring an ordinary attack on his sentence in the district

where he is detained eviscerates this structure. It resurrects the problems that

section 2255 was enacted to solve, such as heavy burdens on courts located in

districts with federal prisons, inconvenience for witnesses who must travel far from

where the prisoner was tried to the place where he is detained, the requirement

that wardens defend resentencing. See Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219, 213. It also

creates new procedural and jurisdictional wrinkles for district courts tasked with

implementing relief that the statute does not contemplate. See Hill v. Sepanek,

Civil No. 14-85-ART, 2017 WL 73338, at *5–9 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 6, 2017) (Thapar,

J.) (“[P]ractical problems . . . arise under any construction of the saving[] clause

that does not comport with its plain meaning.”); Love v. Hogsten, Civil Action No.

1:09–cv–2134–JEC, 2012 WL 3822194, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 4, 2012) (J. Carnes,

J.) (“Insisting that what is essentially a § 2255 claim . . . be instead deemed a

§ 2241 claim [shifts] the venue . . . from the district of sentencing to the district in

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which the petitioner is confined[,] . . . meaning that there is the potential for

multiple § 2241 saving[] clause claims in multiple districts, creating confusion,

duplicative effort, and potentially inconsistent results.”). Allowing access to the

saving clause to bring ordinary sentencing challenges disregards Congress’s

decision to bifurcate the system of collateral review between challenges to a

prisoner’s sentence and challenges to the execution of a prisoner’s sentence.

Limiting the saving clause to claims that are not cognizable or that cannot be

remedied under section 2255 respects the entire system of federal collateral review.

The government and some of the separate opinions argue that our

interpretation renders the saving clause meaningless, see Jordan Concurring at 81;

Martin Dissent at 100, but we disagree. The saving clause has meaning because not

all claims can be remedied by section 2255. A prisoner sentenced by a federal

court, for example, may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the

execution of his sentence, such as the deprivation of good-time credits or parole

determinations. See, e.g., Hajduk, 764 F.2d at 796. The saving clause also allows a

prisoner to bring a petition for a writ of habeas corpus when the sentencing court is

unavailable. Other circuits have held that a prisoner may file a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus if his sentencing court has been dissolved. See Prost, 636 F.3d at

588 (explaining that for military prisoners “the resort to § 2241 is the norm rather

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than the exception . . . due to the evanescent nature of court martial proceedings:

the sentencing court literally dissolves after sentencing and is no longer available

to test a prisoner's collateral attack”). Or, as our sister circuit has held, perhaps

practical considerations (such as multiple sentencing courts) might prevent a

petitioner from filing a motion to vacate. See Cohen v. United States, 593 F.2d 766,

771 & n.12 (6th Cir. 1979). “But only in those kinds of limited circumstances is

[the remedy by motion] ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his

detention.’” Samak, 766 F.3d at 1278 (W. Pryor, J., concurring) (quoting 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255(e)).

Judge Rosenbaum’s dissent and Judge Jordan’s concurring opinion argue

that our interpretation conflicts with the text of the statute because, in their view, a

prisoner can petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the execution of his

sentence without accessing the saving clause. Rosenbaum Dissent at 114–25;

Jordan Concurring at 76–77. But they misinterpret “a prisoner who is authorized to

apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section,” id. § 2255(e), to mean only a

prisoner bringing a claim under section 2255(a). Rosenbaum Dissent at 114–25;

Jordan Concurring at 74–75. The use of the broader word “detention” suggests that

the saving clause applies to claims about the execution of a sentence because we

would expect the clause to say “sentence” if it only applied to sentencing claims.

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And the phrase “a prisoner who” highlights that the prohibition on petitioning for a

writ of habeas corpus applies to a kind of person, namely “a prisoner in custody

under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress,” id. § 2255(a), not a kind

of claim. The better interpretation of “pursuant to this section” is in opposition to

prisoners authorized pursuant to a different section, such as “a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court” in the neighboring section of the code,

id. § 2254(a).

Despite the dissent’s attempt to limit the meaning of “authorized” to portions

of section 2255 that contain affirmative grants to the prisoner, as opposed to

processing instructions to the court, Rosenbaum Dissent at 114–19, the text will

not bear this interpretation. The phrase “pursuant to this section” refers to all of

section 2255, not the first subsection alone. An ordinary speaker of English would

not understand a prisoner who lacks permission to file a second or successive

motion to be any more “authorized to apply for relief” than a prisoner with a claim

outside of section 2255(a). But if that prisoner can instead petition for a writ of

habeas corpus, then section 2255(h) becomes a nullity. Our interpretation that a

prisoner is “authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section,” id.

§ 2255(e), if he is “in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of

Congress,” id. § 2255(a), avoids this nullity. But most importantly, even if a

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prisoner with a claim based on the execution of his sentence could petition for a

writ of habeas corpus without the saving clause, the saving clause would still apply

to situations in which a federal sentencing court dissolves or access to the remedy

by motion is impractical. The interpretation presented by Judge Rosenbaum’s

dissent and Judge Jordan’s concurring opinion proves nothing about whether a

prisoner with a claim based on a change in caselaw or a prisoner with a claim

based on actual innocence satisfies the saving clause.

Judge Rosenbaum’s dissent contends that our interpretation of the saving

clause violates the Suspension Clause, U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 9, cl. 2, Rosenbaum

Dissent at 133–35, but we disagree. We have no need to use the saving clause as a

fount of constitutional avoidance in this appeal, see Rosenbaum Dissent at 110,

140, because there is no constitutional violation to avoid. The Suspension Clause

provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,

unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”

U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 9, cl. 2. Our interpretation of the saving clause cannot suspend

the writ because the Original Writ in the Supreme Court remains available, habeas

corpus at common law did not apply to prisoners sentenced by a court of

competent jurisdiction, and the decision of the Supreme Court in Felker v. Turpin,

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518 518 U.S. 651 (1996), upheld a bar on successive motions against constitutional

challenge.

Nothing in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act “strangle[s]

the power of the Supreme Court to grant an Original Writ.” Samak, 766 F.3d at

1291 (W. Pryor, J., concurring) (citing Felker, 518 U.S. at 658). “The Act cannot

transgress the constitutional rights of prisoners who allege that they have been

erroneously sentenced or unfairly tried when the Supreme Court retains its power

to grant an Original Writ. The Supreme Court affirmed this proposition as early as

1868 . . . and as recently as 1996.” Id. at 1292 (citing Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8

Wall.) 85, 105 (1868); Felker, 518 U.S. at 651). Judge Rosenbaum’s dissent argues

that the Original Writ is not an adequate substitute for the common law writ

because it would be impractical and the Supreme Court rarely grants the writ.

Rosenbaum Dissent at 164–66. But “judgments about the proper scope of the writ

are ‘normally for Congress to make.’” Felker, 518 U.S. at 664 (citing Lonchar v.

Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996)). And because the Constitution does not even

require Congress to create inferior courts, U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1, it makes no

sense to assert that a remedy within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

is insufficient to satisfy the Suspension Clause.

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To argue that section 2255 suspends the writ ignores that at common law,

the writ of habeas corpus would not have been available at all to prisoners like

McCarthan. And the Supreme Court has never held that the constitutional

requirements of the Suspension Clause increase over time. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr,

533 U.S. 289, 300–301 (2001); Felker, 518 U.S. at 663–64. Traditional habeas

corpus dealt with only “serious abuses of power by a government, say a king’s

imprisonment of an individual without referring the matter to a court.” Lonchar,

517 U.S. at 322. “As limited by the act of 1789, [the writ] did not extend to cases

of imprisonment after conviction, under sentences of competent tribunals. . . .” Ex

Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 101. Judge Rosenbaum’s dissent relies heavily

on Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), but this reliance is misplaced. In

Boumediene, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of habeas corpus for

executive detainees “where no trial has been held” and distinguished decisions

like Felker in which a prisoner sought relief from a judgment imposed in a “fair,

adversary proceeding.” Id. at 732, 774, 782. Because McCarthan would not have

had the right to habeas corpus under the common law, his inability to file a second

collateral attack after a change in caselaw cannot possibly constitute a suspension

of the writ.

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Judge Rosenbaum’s dissent argues that the Suspension Clause requires the

availability of successive petitions for new rules of statutory interpretation,

Rosenbaum Dissent at 109, but as the decision of the Supreme Court in Felker

reminds us, the writ has not been suspended whenever a prisoner cannot file a

successive collateral attack. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

creates parallel procedures for federal and state prisoners: federal prisoners bring

collateral attacks under section 2255, and state prisoners bring collateral attacks

under section 2254. Both remedies include a nearly identical bar on successive

attacks, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b); 2255(h), but only the federal remedy includes a

saving clause. In Felker, the Supreme Court held that the bar on second or

successive collateral attacks by state prisoners did not violate the Suspension

Clause. 518 U.S. at 664. Because the Supreme Court has approved limitations on

successive petitions without a saving clause, those same limitations with a saving

clause must be constitutional. Citing the separation of powers to limit the

application of Felker to state prisoners, Rosenbaum Dissent at 159–61, is

“interpretive jiggery-pokery,” King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2500 (2015)

(Scalia, J., dissenting), that conveniently ignores the dissent’s own insistence that

“limited government powers” also animate habeas corpus, Rosenbaum Dissent at

108.

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Contrary to Judge Rosenbaum’s dissent, retroactivity doctrine does not

undermine this conclusion; indeed, it is unclear why retroactivity is even relevant.

When the Supreme Court makes a right retroactively available on collateral

review, it does not mean that a prisoner is constitutionally entitled to have a court

review a violation of that right on the merits. See, e.g., Bousley v. United States,

523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (“Though petitioner’s claim is [retroactive], there are

nonetheless significant procedural hurdles to its consideration on the merits.”).

Retroactivity means that a court is no longer barred from applying a new rule on

collateral review, not that a court must create a vehicle for collateral review

because there is a new rule. Procedural barriers like procedural default, id., the

statute of limitations, or the bar on successive motions may prevent litigation about

a violation of that new rule. That a procedural rule prevents litigating an error does

not create a constitutional crisis, let alone a suspension of the writ. See, e.g.,

Felker, 518 U.S. at 664 (“The added restrictions which the Act places on second

habeas petitions . . . do not amount to a ‘suspension’ of the writ.”). Our current,

erroneous precedent is not dictated by constitutional avoidance concerns. If

anything, we conform our precedent to the Constitution by rejecting an atextual

judicial invention and faithfully interpreting the text of the statute.

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C. Precedent and Stare Decisis

We recognize that overturning precedent is and should be a rare occurrence.

Our Court follows the principles of stare decisis as described by the Supreme

Court. See Glazner v. Glazner, 347 F.3d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

Courts “should not lightly overrule past decisions,” Moragne v. States Marine

Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970), because “[s]tability and predictability are

essential factors in the proper operation of the rule of law,” Bonner v. City of

Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981). Stare decisis is especially

important when we construe statutes because “Congress remains free to alter what

we have done.” John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139

(2008) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989)).

But stare decisis “is not an inexorable command.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501

U.S. 808, 828 (1991); Bryan A. Garner, et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 388

(2016) (“[S]tare decisis isn’t an ineluctable doctrine to be applied with procrustean

rigor.”). We may overrule precedent that is “plainly and palpably wrong” if

overruling the precedent would not “result in more harm than continuing to follow

the erroneous decision.” Garner, et al., supra, at 388. Our Court has held that “we

must follow the Supreme Court’s instruction that stare decisis should be abandoned

where, as here, ‘a prior judicial ruling should come to be seen so clearly as error

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that its enforcement was for that very reason doomed.’” Glazner, 347 F.3d at 1216

(quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854

(1992)). If the statutory and doctrinal underpinnings have eroded and there has not

been significant reliance on the precedent, it may be abandoned. Kimble v. Marvel

Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2410–11 (2015). The same is true if a decision has

“proved unworkable.” Id.

In this instance, we take the rare step of overruling our precedents for three

reasons. First, they are wholly divorced from the text. Second, reliance interests are

minimal. And third, our precedents have proved unworkable. Continuing to follow

these erroneous precedents would do more harm than good.

First, our precedents are not faithful to the text of the statute. As discussed

above, the Wofford test is “plainly and palpably wrong.” See Garner, et al., supra,

at 388. Even our colleagues writing separately agree that our precedents are wrong.

Rosenbaum Dissent at 107 (“I agree with the Majority that we incorrectly

interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) on at least five occasions.”); Martin Dissent at 90

(“I have always believed that Wofford was wrong and that this Court’s rulings on

saving[] clause cases that have since followed Wofford are wrong as well.”);

Jordan Concurring at 59 (“I agree with the majority’s ultimate conclusion that the

‘saving clause’ of § 2255(e) does not permit sentencing claims . . . [b]ut my

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reading of the ‘saving clause’ is broader.”); Wilson Dissent at 82 (agreeing with

Judge Jordan’s textual analysis but extending it to a prisoner whose sentence

exceeds the statutory maximum). We have previously decided to overturn our

precedent when the statute is “clear and unambiguous,” Glazner, 347 F.3d at 1215,

or the precedent is “inconsistent” with the text of the statute, United States v. Svete,

556 F.3d 1157, 1166 (11th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Our decisions in Wofford, Gilbert,

Williams, and Bryant ignored the text. When we first addressed the saving clause,

“we went straight to the legislative history of the clause to divine its meaning, but

unsurprisingly could find no clues.” Samak, 766 F.3d at 1276 (W. Pryor, J.,

concurring). And as we applied this rule, we never returned to a careful

consideration of the text. See Williams, 713 F.3d at 1341 (“[T]he statute says

precious little about what it means for the original motion to have been

‘inadequate’ or ‘ineffective.’”); Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1307 (“This is one of those

times when it is easier to determine something that a provision does not mean

. . . .”). Because our precedents are so far removed from the text of the statute,

there is less reason to defer to them.

Nor is there a settled consensus about the meaning of the saving clause. The

Tenth Circuit adheres to the text, Prost, 636 F.3d at 584–87, but most of our sister

circuits have focused on legislative purpose and avoided rigorous textual analysis.

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As a result, a wide variety of interpretations of the saving clause exists amongst the

circuits. For example, the Fifth Circuit has refused to apply the saving clause to

sentencing errors, In re Bradford, 660 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2011), our Circuit

has extended the saving clause only to sentencing errors that exceed the statutory

maximum, Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1274, and the Seventh Circuit has extended the

saving clause to all sentencing errors, including those under the then-mandatory

sentencing guidelines, Brown, 719 F.3d at 587. Although several circuits have

adopted some version of a “circuit busting” test, they do not agree on its contours.

Some require actual innocence, see, e.g., Wooten, 677 F.3d at 307–08, others

require “complete miscarriage of justice,” In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251, and

others focus on constitutional avoidance, Triestman, 124 F.3d at 376. And our

dissenting colleagues propose new tests based on constitutional avoidance,

Rosenbaum Dissent at 107–108, or fundamental defect, Martin Dissent at 93. This

is not a situation where our precedents align with a uniform interpretation.

Second, reliance interests for our precedents are minimal. As a fundamental

matter, rules about collateral review do not create significant reliance interests. In

areas of law like property and contracts, reliance interests are particularly strong.

Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2410. And of course, individuals rely on criminal law

because it regulates primary conduct. But unlike rules of property, where court

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decisions are “retrospective and may affect titles purchased on the faith of their

stability,” Garner, et al., supra, at 422 (quoting Minn. Mining Co. v. Nat’l Mining

Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 332, 334 (1865)), the availability of collateral review does

not prompt reliance. Whether a federal prisoner receives one round of collateral

review or two does not impact his decision-making. He cannot rely on an

unanticipated change in law. And if he intentionally withheld an argument for a

second bite at the apple, he would not have preserved it.

Our current test is relatively recent and has rarely led to a grant of relief.

Although we have been applying some version of the test for intervening changes

in law since Wofford, we did not grant relief until Bryant. When we considered the

matter en banc in Gilbert, we still referred to the Wofford test as “dicta.” 640 F.3d

at 1319. And it has been used to grant relief only one other time, in Mackey.

“[G]overning decisions” are more easily overturned “if the precedent is

particularly recent and has not generated any serious reliance interests” or if it has

“sustained serious erosion from our recent decisions.” Al-Sharif v. United States

Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., 734 F.3d 207, 212 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks

and citations omitted).

There is not even a clear consensus about what the Wofford test entails, even

among the parties to this appeal who favor its retention. McCarthan argues in favor

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of the Wofford test as applied in Bryant but quibbles over the meaning of step four.

The warden agrees that the Wofford test is correct but describes its analysis as a

three-part test: “(1) a Supreme Court decision of statutory construction has

changed controlling circuit law retroactively; (2) in a way that establishes a

fundamental defect in the prisoner’s conviction or sentence and renders his

continued detention illegal; and (3) the prisoner had no reasonable opportunity for

a judicial remedy of that fundamental defect in another proceeding.” And the

National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae first describes

Wofford as a four-factor test, and then proposes a new test: “whether the prisoner

had a genuine opportunity to raise his claim in an adequate and effective fashion.”

This cacophony highlights that we do not face a problem of overturning a long-

established, settled test. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how someone could rely

on a test so inscrutable. And when reliance interests are minimal, a court may

overrule its own precedent. Garner, et al., supra, at 401, 408–09.

Third, our precedents have proved unworkable. Wofford has placed a heavy

burden on courts in this Circuit. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of prisoners have

filed petitions citing the Wofford test in the various districts where federal prisons

are located in this Circuit. These doomed collateral attacks have required wardens

to defend decades-old sentencing determinations and resurrected the exact

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problems that Congress attempted to solve when it created the remedy by motion.

Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219.

And the Wofford test is burdensome to apply. For example, deciding whether

circuit precedent foreclosed an argument, whether the Supreme Court abrogated

that precedent, and whether that decision applies retroactively on collateral review

can be a difficult and controversial task. See, e.g., McCarthan, 811 F.3d at 1247–

50 (discussing the argument that circuit precedent about a Georgia statute did not

foreclose McCarthan from challenging a Florida statute); In re Watkins, 810 F.3d

375, 380 (6th Cir. 2015) (describing the circuit split regarding whether Johnson v.

United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), applies retroactively on collateral review).

In this appeal, the panel disagreed about how to apply the Wofford test to

McCarthan. The separate concurring opinion stated that “the cumbersome nature of

that test leads to just the type of confusion we have here,” namely that the steps of

the analysis overlap. McCarthan, 811 F.3d at 1257 (Proctor, J., concurring). In

Samak, we had to apply the law of another circuit to answer these questions

because a federal inmate imprisoned in our circuit was sentenced in another. 766

F.3d at 1275 n.3. In Cortes-Morales, we were asked to decide whether the logic of

the Wofford test should extend to retroactive amendments to state legislation. 827

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F.3d at 1016. Hard questions with no predictable answers will continue to arise if

we insist on applying a test unbound by the text.

Even the questions of the Wofford test that seem straightforward prove

difficult. The Wofford test requires that we determine whether the current sentence

exceeds the statutory maximum. The panel opinion in this appeal went to great

lengths to distinguish this inquiry from the merits of the motion to vacate. The

difference, according to the panel, is that the Wofford test looks at both “invalid

predicate convictions that a federal prisoner could not have challenged in his initial

§ 2255 petition because any challenge was squarely foreclosed by binding Circuit

precedent that the Supreme Court only subsequently overturned (‘squarely

foreclosed convictions’)” and “invalid predicate convictions that a defendant could

have, but failed to, challenge earlier (‘erroneously counted convictions’),” but the

merits inquiry looks only at the former. McCarthan, 811 F.3d at 1251. In the final

part of the Wofford test, we are expected to resolve “whether the saving[] clause in

§ 2255(e) reaches” the kind of claim presented, Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1274, but this

circular standard is meaningless when the issue is one of first impression.

All of these difficult and convoluted determinations are made in a threshold

jurisdictional analysis. The labyrinthian analysis required by our precedents is not

a prudent use of judicial resources. See Duckworth, 454 U.S. at 4 (“Creating a new

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exception” means that “[s]ignificantly more time and resources would be

consumed as district and appellate courts examined the merits to determine

whether a claim met the requisite level of validity.”). True, it is often “more

important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”

Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil &

Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). But the Wofford test

repeatedly unsettles the law in this Circuit.

Because the Wofford test ignores the text of the saving clause, induces no

reliance, and burdens our courts, it does more harm than good. “[T]his weighing of

alternative harms is the normal assessment in deciding whether to overrule

precedent.” Garner, et al., supra, at 388. In contrast, being faithful to the text of the

saving clause makes our task simple, predictable, and sensible. This appeal

presents the rare circumstance where we should overturn our precedents.

Contrary to McCarthan’s argument, this appeal presents no problems of

justiciability. McCarthan argues that because both parties accept the Wofford test

and “[n]either party stands to obtain meaningful relief from a re-consideration of

[it],” this Court lacks jurisdiction to reconsider its precedents. See U.S. Const. Art.

III, § 2, cl. 1. Nonsense. As the Warden correctly responds, there is a live case or

controversy about whether McCarthan is entitled to relief, “notwithstanding any

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agreement on the rules to be applied.” We have a responsibility to interpret the law

correctly. And the Supreme Court has modeled the use of an amicus curiae to aid

in this endeavor. See Miscellaneous Order, Irizarry v. United States, 552 U.S.

1135 (2008) (inviting Peter B. Rutledge to brief and argue the case, as amicus

curiae, in support of the judgment below); Miscellaneous Order, United States v.

Beckles, 137 S. Ct. 23 (2016) (inviting Adam K. Mortara to brief and argue the

case, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below). We must interpret the

statute that governs this appeal and apply it to the parties before us. We have done

so.

A motion to vacate is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of a

prisoner’s detention only when it cannot remedy a particular kind of claim. Even if

a prisoner’s claim fails under circuit precedent, a motion to vacate remains an

adequate and effective remedy for a prisoner to raise the claim and attempt to

persuade the court to change its precedent, and failing that, to seek certiorari in the

Supreme Court. McCarthan does not qualify for the saving clause because his

claim that escape is not a violent felony is cognizable under section 2255. Because

he “was free to bring” this claim about the interpretation of his sentencing law in

his initial motion to vacate, the remedy by motion was an “adequate and effective

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means for testing such an argument.” Prost, 636 F.3d at 580. He cannot now use

the saving clause to make that claim in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all the above reasons, we overrule the Wofford test as applied in Bryant

and Mackey and AFFIRM the order denying McCarthan’s petition for a writ of

habeas corpus.

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ED CARNES, Chief Judge, concurring:

I join in full the opinion of the Court and write separately only to emphasize

a point that it makes in passing.

Judge Rosenbaum’s dissenting opinion says, in effect, that there should be

another exception to the bar on second and successive § 2255 motions to permit

claims based on a new decision about the scope of a criminal statute that the

Supreme Court has made retroactively applicable to cases on first collateral

review. But Congress has not said that. The place to have said it, of course, would

have been in § 2255(h), which contains the two exceptions to the bar on second

and successive motions. Congress could have simply added a third exception to

the list so that subsection (h) would have read:

A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in

section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to

contain--

(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in

light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to

establish by clear and convincing evidence that no

reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of

the offense; or

(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases

on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was

previously unavailable, or

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(3) a new rule of statutory law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable.

Simple as that would have been, Congress did not do it. Instead, it limited the

exceptions to two.

The dissenting opinion would have us “improve” the statute by writing in

the exception that it favors, but we cannot do that. As the Supreme Court has

instructed us: “It is for Congress, not this Court, to amend the statute if it believes

that the interplay of [some provisions] of § 2255 unduly restricts federal prisoners’

ability to file second or successive motions.” Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353,

359–60, 125 S. Ct. 2478, 2483 (2005).

There is more at stake here than an issue of statutory interpretation. The

question is one of the proper role of the judiciary. As we have explained, “Our oft-

stated rule against judicial revision of statutes finds plenty of anchor weight in the

bedrock principle that we are a country of laws, not one ruled by the musings,

whether pragmatic or otherwise, of the black-robed class.” T-Mobile S., LLC v.

City of Milton, Ga., 728 F.3d 1274, 1285 (11th Cir. 2013); see also id. at 1284

(“We are interpreting a statute, not designing one. Although we, like most judges,

have enough ego to believe that we could improve a good many statutes if given

the chance, statutory construction does not give us that chance if we are true to the

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judicial function. Our duty is to say what statutory language means, not what it

should mean, and not what it would mean if we had drafted it.”); Friends of the

Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1224 (11th Cir. 2009)

(“[W]e are not allowed to add or subtract words from a statute; we cannot rewrite

it.”); Wright v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir. 2002)

(“Our function is to apply statutes, to carry out the expression of the legislative will

that is embodied in them, not to ‘improve’ statutes by altering them.”); Harris v.

Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 976 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“We will not do to the

statutory language what Congress did not do with it, because the role of the judicial

branch is to apply statutory language, not to rewrite it.”).

The dissent invokes the separation of powers, but that constitutional doctrine

is best served by respecting the fundamental principle that it is the role of

Congress, not the Courts, to decide what the statutory law is to be, and Congress

has done that in § 2255(h). We honor the separation of powers doctrine when we

resist the temptation, irresistible as it may seem, to judicially revise statutes to suit

our sense of sound policy.

The dissenting opinion repeatedly protests that it is not an example of

“judicial activism,” using that phrase more than a dozen times to answer an

unstated charge. And with painful accuracy, that opinion charges me with being

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among the judges who have attempted to improve the saving clause of § 2255(e)

by interpretation. See Rosenbaum Dissent at 192. Mea culpa. As the author of the

Wofford opinion and its dicta, I am the one who laid out the seedbed from which

the weeds have grown around this issue in our circuit. Having to watch for the past

17 years as my woefully wrong Wofford opinion worked its mischief is the price I

have paid for my sin, or at least for that particular one. And no one knows sin like

an old sinner.

Which brings to mind the various formulations that other judges have used

to admit their mistakes. Nearly everyone’s favorite is Justice Frankfurter’s:

“Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it

comes late.” Henslee v. Union Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600,

69 S. Ct. 290, 293 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). But there are other ways of

phrasing judicial repentance. See, e.g., Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v.

Owens, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 547, 561 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“As for my

own culpability in overlooking the issue, I must accept that and will take it with me

to the grave.”); Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 639–40, 68 S. Ct.

747, 763 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“I see no reason why I should be

consciously wrong today because I was unconsciously wrong yesterday.”). I prefer

to put it more colloquially: Wofford was a screw up. To repeat the error by

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revising that opinion’s revision of the saving clause in another attempt to improve

the text of the statute would be another screw up. Once is enough for me.

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JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The text of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) has remained unchanged since 1948, despite

Congress’ significant overhaul of federal collateral review in 1996. Given the

difficult task of deciphering language designed for a bygone era in a post-AEDPA

world, it is no wonder that federal courts have struggled to reach a uniform

understanding. Recognizing that the meaning of § 2255(e) “is not easy of

solution,” United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221

(1952), I offer my own perspective.

I agree with the majority’s ultimate conclusion that the “saving clause” of

§ 2255(e) does not permit sentencing claims like the one asserted by

Mr. McCarthan. But my reading of the “saving clause” is broader than the one

articulated by the majority. In my view, the “saving clause” allows a federal

prisoner to seek a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if § 2255

relief is unavailable to him and a new (and governing) interpretation of the statute

of conviction demonstrates that he never committed a crime. Because the

majority’s reading of § 2255(e) apparently forecloses a habeas remedy in such

circumstances, I concur only in the judgment.

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I

Suppose that Congress enacts a new criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 999.99,

and makes a violation of that statute punishable by up to ten years in prison. The

Department of Justice believes that persons who commit acts A and B violate

§ 999.99, and sets out to prosecute persons who have committed those acts.

A federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida indicts Joe Unlucky

for violating § 999.99 by committing acts A and B. At trial, Mr. Unlucky argues

that, when read properly, the statute does not criminalize acts A and B. The

district court rejects the argument and instructs the jury that it may return a verdict

of guilty if it finds that Mr. Unlucky committed acts A and B. Because the

government puts on undisputed evidence that Mr. Unlucky did in fact commit acts

A and B, the jury finds him guilty, and the district court sentences him to eight

years in prison. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirms, and rejects Mr. Unlucky’s

reading of the statute. The Supreme Court denies certiorari.

Mr. Unlucky then files a timely motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255. Because his contention about the scope of § 999.99 has already been

rejected on direct appeal, and there have been no intervening changes in governing

law, he is not able to reassert the same claim again. See generally Rozier v. United

States, 701 F.3d 681, 684 (11th Cir. 2012) (“At least where there has been no

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intervening change in controlling law, a claim or issue that was decided against a

defendant on direct appeal may not be the basis for relief in a § 2255

proceeding.”). So Mr. Unlucky alleges in his motion that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance at sentencing. The district court holds an evidentiary

hearing, rejects the ineffectiveness claim on the merits, and grants a certificate of

appealability. The Eleventh Circuit subsequently affirms the district court’s denial

of Mr. Unlucky’s motion to vacate, and the Supreme Court again denies certiorari.

Two years later, the Supreme Court decides a case just like Mr. Unlucky’s,

and holds that a person who commits acts A and B does not violate § 999.99. This

decision by the Supreme Court, of course, means that § 999.99 never criminalized

acts A and B, for “[a] judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement

of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise

to that construction.” Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312–13

(1994). The decision, moreover, is fully retroactive to cases on collateral review

under Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998).

So it turns out that Mr. Unlucky never committed the federal offense with

which he was charged and for which he was convicted. Yet he sits in a federal

prison with about four years left to serve on his sentence for a non-existent crime.

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Mr. Unlucky thinks about filing another § 2255 motion based on the new

Supreme Court decision, but quickly finds out that he cannot do so. The problem

is that AEDPA permits a second or successive motion to vacate only where newly

discovered evidence establishes “by clear and convincing evidence that no

reasonable factfinder would have found the [person] guilty of the offense,” or

where there is a “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” See 28

U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1)–(2). Mr. Unlucky does not have any newly discovered

evidence, and the new Supreme Court decision interpreting § 999.99 is statutory,

not constitutional. See In re Thomas, 823 F.3d 1345, 1349 (11th Cir. 2016) (“We

have held that [the] Supreme Court has not announced a new rule of constitutional

law when it has merely interpreted an existing statute.”). He therefore cannot

satisfy the requirements of § 2255(h) for filing a second or successive motion to

vacate.

Not wanting to waste more years of his life in prison for a non-existent

crime, Mr. Unlucky, relying on the “saving clause” of § 2255(e), files a habeas

corpus petition pursuant to § 2241. He requests that the district court vacate his

conviction based on the new Supreme Court decision and order his release from

custody.

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In this setting, can Mr. Unlucky use the “saving clause” to seek habeas

corpus relief? I think so.

II

Comprised of a single, bedeviling sentence with various clauses, § 2255(e)

states as follows:

[1] An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner

who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this

section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has

failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him,

or that such court has denied him relief, [2] unless it also appears that

the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality

of his detention.

(brackets added).

The first clause of § 2255(e) is the “authorization clause,” and the second

clause—the one that has proven most difficult to figure out—is the “saving

clause.” As I hope to explain, Mr. Unlucky can use the “saving clause” to file a

habeas corpus petition because a “remedy by [§ 2255] motion is inadequate or

ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”

A

“Congress’ use of a verb tense is significant in construing statutes,” United

States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992), so I begin with the verbs that Congress

chose to use in § 2255(e). As Judge Martin correctly points out in her dissenting

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opinion, see Martin Dissent at 90–91, Congress’ choice of the word “is” in the

“saving clause” is significant.

The “authorization clause” twice employs the past tense (“has failed” and

“has denied”), while the “saving clause” uses a single present-tense verb (“is”)

right before the words “inadequate or ineffective.” Because Congress used a

present-tense verb in the “saving clause,” it seems to me that we must look at

Mr. Unlucky’s present situation, and not at what happened in the past, to determine

whether a § 2255 motion “is” currently “inadequate or ineffective.” See Jennifer

Case, Text Me: A Text-Based Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), 103 Ky. L. J.

169, 194 (2014–15) (“Another textual mistake that the circuit courts often make

when interpreting § 2255(e)’s [s]aving[ ] [c]lause is to replace the verb ‘is’ with

the word ‘was.’. . . When the linking verb is read (as Congress wrote it) in the

present tense, the prisoner cannot access § 2241 unless § 2255 is—at the moment

her § 2241 petition is filed in federal court—inadequate [or] ineffective to test the

detention’s legality.”).

Contrary to the majority’s approach, we must assess inadequacy and

ineffectiveness as of the time Mr. Unlucky files his § 2241 habeas corpus petition,

and not as of the time when he submitted his initial § 2255 motion. Otherwise,

“Congress[’] use of different sets of verbs, with distinct tenses . . . would be

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pointless[.]” Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2040 (2012). See

also Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 448 (2010) (“Consistent with normal

usage, we have frequently looked to Congress’ choice of verb tense to ascertain a

statute’s temporal reach.”); 1 U.S.C. § 1 (“In interpreting the meaning of any Act

of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . . words used in the present

tense include the future as well as the present.”).

This temporal approach to the “saving clause” is not only linguistically

proper, it is also historically sound. Before AEDPA, when res judicata did not bar

successive § 2255 motions to vacate, see generally Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S.

224, 230–31 (1924), federal prisoners sometimes claimed that they could file a

§ 2241 habeas corpus petition because a motion to vacate would be “inadequate or

ineffective” within the meaning of the last paragraph of § 2255 (which is identical

to what is now § 2255(e)). In response to such claims, at least some federal courts

analyzed whether, at the time of the filing of the § 2241 petition, a § 2255 motion

was “inadequate or ineffective.” A good example is the discussion by the former

Fifth Circuit in a case where the prisoner, having twice been denied § 2255 relief

on a claim relating to his plea, filed a § 2241 habeas corpus petition. The former

Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the § 2241 petition because the prisoner

could file another § 2255 motion and have it considered by the sentencing court:

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Neither of these [two § 2255] post conviction proceedings is

subject to res judicata as such. Consequently, even though the

petitioner may have presented this contention to the sentencing court

on previous occasions, he is free to assert it again. We have no doubt

that the District Court for the Western District of North Carolina will

accord a full and fair hearing and, if appropriate, a right of appeal to

the Fourth Circuit in the event that its decision on the merits is

adverse to petitioner[.]

Birchfield v. United States, 296 F.2d 120, 122 (5th Cir. 1961) (emphasis added and

citations omitted).1

B

The majority says that the word “or” (in the phrase “inadequate or

ineffective”) merely introduces “ineffective” as a “synonym or ‘definitional

equivalent’” for “inadequate” (which the majority has replaced with “inadequate

remedy at law”). See Maj. Op. at 22–23. Like Judge Rosenbaum, see Rosenbaum

1

For other cases applying a similar temporal scope to the “saving clause,” see, e.g.,

United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952) (“Nothing has been shown to warrant our

holding at this stage of the proceeding that the [§] 2255 procedure will be ‘inadequate or

ineffective’ if respondent is present for a hearing in the [d]istrict [c]ourt on remand of this case.”)

(emphasis added); Waugaman v. United States, 331 F.2d 189, 191 (5th Cir. 1964) (rejecting

prisoner’s argument that a § 2255 motion would be “inadequate or ineffective”: “But if and when

[the claims] are presented with sufficient factual particularity, we are confident that the Southern

District of Ohio and if necessary on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, would

take cognizance of two things. . . . There is, therefore, every assurance that the sentencing [c]ourt

and the Sixth Circuit will accord the hearing the law requires and will grant the relief which the

circumstances justify.”) (emphasis added); and Johnson v. United States, 447 F.2d 516, 517 (5th

Cir. 1971) (dismissing habeas corpus petition because prisoner had not sought to file a § 2255

motion to vacate: “Nevertheless, we note that Johnson has never had his case for post-conviction

relief heard on the merits. Our decision is in no way intended to preclude Johnson from filing a

properly designated § 2255 motion in the District Court for the District of Wyoming.”)

(emphasis added).

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Dissent at 127–28, I disagree. The Supreme Court has told us that the “ordinary

use [of the word ‘or’] is almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it connects

are to be given separate meanings.” Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384,

2390 (2014) (rejecting an argument that would “construe . . . two entirely distinct

statutory phrases that the word ‘or’ joins as containing an identical element”). So,

grammatically, words separated by “or” should not be read as duplicative of one

another.

Even if the majority is correct that “inadequate” and “ineffective” are

interchangeable, I’m not sure its textual analysis is correct. When a statutory term

or phrase is undefined, courts try to ascertain its ordinary understanding at the time

of enactment. See, e.g., Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). Because

the majority looks to 1948—when the provision that is now § 2255(e) was first

enacted—to determine the ordinary meaning of “inadequate” and “ineffective,” I

will do the same and consider what those words meant almost seven decades ago.

In the 1940s and 1950s, the word “inadequate” meant “[i]nsufficient;

disproportionate; lacking in effectiveness or in conformity to a prescribed standard

or measure.” Black’s Law Dictionary 902 (4th ed. 1951) (emphasis added). See

also The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 573 (3d ed. 1944) (“Not

adequate (to purpose); insufficient.”); Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 419

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(2d ed. 1949) (“Not adequate; deficient; insufficient.”). So, contrary to the

majority’s suggestion, one definition of “inadequate” is tied to the ultimate effect,

i.e., the result.

The word “ineffective,” like the word “inadequate,” was also not limited to

process in the 1940s and 1950s. Indeed, some definitions linked the word with

results. For example, one dictionary defined “ineffective” as “[n]ot producing the

desired effect[.]” The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 583 (3d ed.

1944) (emphasis added). According to another dictionary, “ineffective” meant

“[n]ot effective; productive of no effect; ineffectual[.]” Webster’s New Collegiate

Dictionary 428 (2d ed. 1949) (emphasis added).2

So, even if we assume that the words “inadequate” and “ineffective” meant

(and mean) the same thing, that assumption does not help the majority. There is a

strong textual argument that the phrase “inadequate or ineffective” is concerned

with both procedure (i.e., process) and substance (i.e., results). The phrase can

easily be read to have some relationship, some connection, to the ability of a

2

Insofar as “to test” is concerned, one dictionary in the 1940s and 1950s defined “test” as

to “[p]ut to the test, make trial of[.]” The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 1266

(3d ed. 1944). Another used a similar definition: “[t]o put to the test or proof; to try.” Webster’s

New Collegiate Dictionary 878 (2d ed. 1949).

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§ 2255 movant to file a motion to vacate, as well as his ability to obtain a desired

substantive result.

C

Returning to our fictional case, Mr. Unlucky is unable to file a second or

successive § 2255 motion to vacate based on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of

§ 999.99. That is because § 2255(h) only permits a second or successive motion

to vacate when there is newly discovered evidence demonstrating, by clear and

convincing evidence, that no reasonable factfinder would have found the person

guilty of the offense, or where there is a new rule of constitutional law, made

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable. As noted earlier, Mr. Unlucky does not have newly discovered

evidence, and his claim is not based on a new rule of constitutional law.

If Mr. Unlucky, who is innocent of the charge that has landed him in prison,

cannot even file a second or successive § 2255 motion—and by definition cannot

succeed on such a motion—then “the remedy by motion” is presently “inadequate

or ineffective” to test the legality of his detention. See In re Davenport, 147 F.3d

605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A procedure for postconviction relief can fairly be

termed inadequate when it is so configured as to deny a convicted defendant any

opportunity for judicial rectification of so fundamental a defect in his conviction as

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having been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense. It could indeed . . . be thought

an inadequacy of constitutional dimensions.”); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251

(3d Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the “saving clause” may be broad enough to allow

a § 2241 habeas corpus petition where “a defendant [is] imprisoned for a crime that

an intervening decision [later] negates”). As I see it, Mr. Unlucky has satisfied the

“saving clause,” and can file a habeas corpus petition pursuant to § 2241 which

relies on the new Supreme Court decision interpreting § 999.99. Cf. United States

ex rel. Leguilllou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681, 684 (3d Cir. 1954) (interpreting the last

paragraph of the former version of § 2255: “[W]e think the remedy by motion can

be ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of . . . detention’ only if it can be

shown that some limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a [§] 2255

proceeding from affording the prisoner a full hearing and adjudication of his claim

of wrongful detention.”).3

3

There are some other pre-AEDPA decisions analyzing what makes a § 2255 remedy

“inadequate or ineffective,” but they are not of much help here because in those cases there was a

court available to consider the prisoner’s motion to vacate. See, e.g., Adam v. Hagan, 325 F.2d

719, 720 (5th Cir. 1963) (holding that the distance between the place of confinement and the

sentencing court does not make a § 2255 motion “inadequate or ineffective”); Scott v. Welch,

192 F.2d 676, 677 (4th Cir. 1951) (concluding that the denial of IFP status does not render a

§ 2255 motion “inadequate or ineffective”). Cf. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381–83 (1977)

(interpreting a similar “saving clause” in a provision of the D.C. Code and ruling that a post-

conviction remedy is not “inadequate or ineffective” just because it is resolved by an Article I

court).

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D

In order to avoid constitutional problems, the “saving clause” of § 2255(e)

must have some meaning. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 776 (2008);

Swain, 430 U.S. at 381–82; United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952).

We have a duty to “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute,”

Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001), and if the “saving clause” did not

amount to anything in a post-AEDPA world, Congress likely would not have

carried it over wholesale in 1996. What makes this case hard is figuring out the

proper interplay (and balance) between the “saving clause” of § 2255(e) and the

restrictions that § 2255(h) places on second or successive motions to vacate. The

content of the “saving clause” must be meaningful, but not so broad that it

swallows § 2255(h).

My solution is to draw upon the undisputed—but too often forgotten—

principle that “habeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable remedy,” Schlup v. Delo,

513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995), and read the “saving clause” to allow an innocent person

like Mr. Unlucky to obtain § 2241 habeas relief. First, from the earliest days of the

Republic, the Supreme Court has granted habeas corpus relief and ordered the

discharge of federal prisoners where the facts alleged by the government did not

constitute a federal crime. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 136 (1807) (Marshall,

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C.J.) (“[A]s the crime [of treason] with which the prisoners stand charged has not

been committed, the court can only direct them to be discharged.”). Second, the

importance of innocence runs deep in our habeas jurisprudence, and there is

nothing more inequitable than having a person serve a sentence in a federal prison

for a non-existent crime. That is why the Supreme Court, pre-AEDPA, ruled that

claims of innocence based on new statutory interpretations can be asserted under

§ 2255. See Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) (“If this contention

[about the intervening change in law] is well taken, then Davis’ conviction and

punishment are for an act that the law does not make criminal. There can be no

room for doubt that such a circumstance inherently results in a complete

miscarriage of justice and present[s] exceptional circumstances that justify

collateral relief under § 2255.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Even those who advocated for a narrower scope of federal habeas review

prior to AEDPA recognized that the writ should be available in cases where “a

convicted defendant makes a colorable showing that an error, whether

constitutional or not, may be producing the continued punishment of an innocent

man.” Henry Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?: Collateral Attacks on Criminal

Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 160 (1970). I cannot believe that a federal

court, with the “saving clause” available, would deny habeas corpus relief to a

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person who does not have a § 2255 remedy available but can show, based on a new

(and governing) decision, that he never committed a federal crime. 4

Reading the “saving clause” to allow only claims of statutory innocence

under § 2241 does relatively little harm to the structure of § 2255. It gives the

“saving clause” a narrow but important scope, and does not do too much violence

to § 2255(h)’s restrictions on second or successive motions to vacate.

The line I have drawn, admittedly, is not perfect. If Mr. Unlucky is able to

seek habeas corpus relief because a new (and governing) statutory ruling shows

that he never committed a crime, why shouldn’t the writ also be available—as

Judges Martin and Rosenbaum contend—when a new statutory decision by the

Supreme Court makes it clear that a defendant’s sentence exceeds the statutory

maximum? I confess that I don’t have very good answers to that question, but

equity—with its concern for justice—does not always draw clean lines, and the

finality concerns embodied in § 2255(h) cannot be ignored. If we are going to

allow any federal prisoners to use the habeas remedy pursuant to the “saving

clause” of § 2255(e), it should be those who are languishing in prison despite

having never committed a crime. A criminal justice system run by fallible human

4

Innocence is so strong a concept that, when sufficiently proven, it even constitutes a

judge-made vehicle for avoiding hurdles like procedural default and untimeliness. See, e.g.,

McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931–35 (2013); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 522

(2006).

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beings can tolerate most non-capital sentencing errors, but it cannot, I submit,

refuse to hear the claims of those incarcerated for non-existent offenses.

III

The majority, understanding that § 2255(e)’s “saving clause” must allow for

habeas corpus relief in some circumstances to avoid being illusory, carves out

some territory where it posits that the “saving clause” can override § 2255(h)’s

restrictions. It offers two main examples of scenarios where § 2241 can be used.

First, the majority says that § 2255(e) may be used by federal prisoners challenging

determinations about parole or good-time credits. See Maj. Op. at 27, 35–36.

Second, the majority, like the Tenth Circuit in Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578,

588 (10th Cir. 2011), says that § 2255(e) allows a federal prisoner to file a habeas

petition when his or her sentencing court is no longer available, such as when a

military prisoner’s tribunal has been dissolved. See id. at 35–36. The problem is

that these examples ignore the “authorization clause” of § 2255(e).

As explained in Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 338 (1963), the

“motion” that § 2255(e) refers to is a motion to vacate filed by a federal prisoner in

the federal court that imposed the sentence. See also Yirkovsky v. Gonzales, 2007

WL 2476766, at *1 (D.S.D. Aug. 27, 2000) (“Petitioner is ‘authorized to apply for

relief by motion’ pursuant to [ ] § 2255 because he is a prisoner in custody

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pursuant to a federal conviction and sentence who may move the [sentencing]

court that imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence[.]”). As

a result, § 2255(e) “operates to bar a § 2241 habeas petition only if § 2255

authorizes the prisoner to bring a . . . motion [to vacate]. Importantly, if the

[a]uthorization [c]lause is not satisfied, subsection (e) plays no role in determining

whether a prisoner can bring his habeas petition.” Case, Text Me, 103 Ky. L. J. at

187.5

The majority incorrectly assumes that prisoners challenging determinations

about parole and good-time credits, or attacking a sentence imposed by a military

tribunal that no longer exists, can file a motion to vacate under § 2255. In the

words of § 2255(e)’s “authorization clause,” prisoners in these two scenarios were

never “authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section [i.e.,

§ 2255]” in the first place. And I’m not sure that prisoners sentenced in dissolved

territorial courts are any different. A statutory “saving clause” (like the one in

§ 2255(e)) is a carve-out from the general requirements of a statute, and if the

statute does not apply to begin with, then the “saving clause” never comes into

play.

5

Judge Rosenbaum aptly explains in her dissenting opinion that not all federal collateral

claims are “authorized” by motion under § 2255. See Rosenbaum Dissent at 117–22. And,

significantly, not all federal prisoners are authorized to file a § 2255 motion. Instead, “[o]nly

federal prisoners who have been ‘sentence[d]’ by a federal court are eligible.” See id. at 118.

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A

Federal prisoners challenging determinations about parole and good-time

credits can seek habeas corpus relief pursuant to § 2241. See, e.g., Granville v.

Hogan, 591 F.2d 323, 324 (5th Cir. 1979) (good-time credits); Gomori v. Arnold,

533 F.2d 871, 874–75 (3d Cir. 1976) (calculation of release date); Zannino v.

Arnold, 531 F.2d 687, 690–91 (3d Cir. 1976) (parole); Halprin v. United States,

295 F.2d 458, 459 (9th Cir. 1961) (parole). But that does not mean that those

prisoners can do so because of § 2255(e).

In fact, prisoners challenging determinations about parole or good-time

credits have always had to proceed under § 2241 and have never been able to file

motions to vacate under § 2255. See, e.g., Hajduk v. United States, 764 F.2d 795,

796 (11th Cir. 1985) (“A challenge to the lawfulness of the parole commission’s

actions cannot be brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Hajduk’s ex post facto

argument is nothing more than a challenge to the lawfulness of the parole

commission’s actions, not the lawfulness of the sentence imposed by the court.

Such an action must be brought as a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2241.”). As a result, Judge Rosenbaum is correct that such prisoners

do not come within the “authorization clause” of § 2255(e), and therefore do not

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need the “saving clause” to avail themselves of a habeas remedy. See Rosenbaum

Dissent at 121–22.

B

The same is true of prisoners challenging a conviction secured in a military

tribunal. Like federal prisoners who wish to challenge determinations about parole

and good-time credits, federal prisoners convicted and sentenced in military

tribunals have long been able to file traditional habeas corpus petitions. See, e.g.,

United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 350 (1969); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S.

137, 139–142 (1953); Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 129 (1950); Carter v.

McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 366–67 (1902); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 68–69

(1866); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 199 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc).

Allowing a federal military prisoner to file a petition for writ of habeas

corpus makes sense because a court-martial (or similar military tribunal) “is a

special body convened for a specific purpose, and when that purpose is

accomplished its duties are concluded and the court is dissolved.” McClaughry v.

Deming, 186 U.S. 49, 64 (1902). Access to habeas for such prisoners, however,

does not come from (or run into the limitations of) § 2255, which is reserved for

federal prisoners convicted in, and sentenced by, federal courts.

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As noted, the majority cites the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Prost with

approval, but in my opinion this aspect of Prost is flawed. Prost relied on an

earlier Tenth Circuit decision, Ackerman v. Novak, 483 F.3d 647 (10th Cir. 2007),

as support for its suggestion that a military prisoner may resort to the “saving

clause” and file a § 2241 petition where a § 2255 motion “ha[s] to be brought in

the (now nonexistent) sentencing court, [and] that remedial mechanism [is]

necessarily inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of his detention . . . .”

Prost, 636 F.3d at 588. But the panel in Prost missed the holding of Ackerman.

In Ackerman, a federal prisoner convicted by a military court-martial sought

authorization from the Tenth Circuit, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a), to file a second or

successive habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Ackerman, 483

F.3d at 648–49. The Ackerman panel first explained, in no uncertain terms, that a

prisoner convicted in, and sentenced by, a military tribunal can seek collateral

review only by way of a habeas corpus petition under § 2241. See id. at 649. Such

a prisoner cannot use § 2254 because that provision is reserved for prisoners in

state custody, and cannot use § 2255 because his military tribunal has dissolved

and cannot entertain a collateral attack. See id. at 649–50 & n.2. The Ackerman

panel concluded that, because a military court-martial is not a “court of the United

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States” within the meaning of § 2244(a), the prisoner did not need to obtain circuit

authorization to file a § 2241 habeas corpus petition. See id. at 651–53.

Ackerman, then, provides no support for the claim by Prost, and by the

majority here, that a military prisoner needs the “saving clause” of § 2255(e) to file

a § 2241 habeas corpus petition. Simply stated, a military prisoner has a § 2241

remedy that is available independent of § 2255. See Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526

U.S. 529, 537 n.11 (1999) (“[O]nce a criminal conviction has been finally

reviewed within the military system, and a servicemember in custody has

exhausted other avenues provided under the [Code of Military Justice] to seek

relief from his conviction, he is entitled to bring a habeas corpus petition, see 28

U.S.C. § 2241(c), claiming that his conviction is affected by a fundamental defect

that requires that it be set aside.”) (citations omitted); Palomera v. Taylor, 344 F.2d

937, 938 (10th Cir. 1965) (“A motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is not proper here

because the petitioner was sentenced by a military court-martial convened in

1944.”).

C

As for prisoners convicted in territorial courts that no longer exist, that is a

more nuanced matter. But it is not clear to me that such prisoners need the “saving

clause” to file a § 2241 habeas corpus petition. First, if the territorial courts in

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question are created by the legislature of the territory, then they are not “courts

established by an Act of Congress” within the meaning of § 2255(a). See In re

Moran, 203 U.S. 96, 104 (1906) (Territory of Oklahoma); Connella v. Haskell, 158

F. 285, 287 (8th Cir. 1907) (same). Such courts, therefore, could never entertain a

§ 2255 motion in the first place, meaning that the “authorization clause” of

§ 2255(e) would not be satisfied. Second, if territorial jurisdiction is being

exercised by federal district courts located in the territory pursuant to an act of

Congress, then those district courts can entertain a § 2255 motion to vacate, and

the scenario suggested by the majority—that of a sentencing court that no longer

exists—is more imagined than real. See Madsen v. Hinshaw, 237 F.2d 370, 371

(9th Cir. 1956) (Territory of Alaska).

In the relatively unusual scenario where a territory becomes a state, and the

federal courts in the new state refuse to entertain § 2255 motions by prisoners

previously convicted of territorial crimes, a motion to vacate may be “inadequate

or ineffective” within the meaning of the “saving clause.” See, e.g., Spaulding v.

Taylor, 336 F.2d 192, 193 (10th Cir. 1964) (federal district court in Alaska,

following admission to statehood, refused to consider motion to vacate, thereby

allowing prisoner convicted of territorial crime to seek a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to § 2241). Even in such circumstances, however, there are more

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questions than answers. For example, in a case very similar to Spaulding, the

former Fifth Circuit explained that the state courts of Alaska, following Alaska’s

admission to statehood, were willing to consider post-conviction motions filed by

prisoners previously convicted of territorial offenses. See Hutson v. Zeigler, 362

F.2d 200, 204 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1966). As a result, those prisoners had to proceed

under § 2254 in federal court but first had to exhaust their claims in the Alaska

state courts. See id. at 204.

Given this tapestry, I do not understand what possible application the

“saving clause” has under the majority’s rationale. It seems to me that the majority

has come dangerously close to sapping the “saving clause” of any meaning.

IV

I read the “saving clause” of § 2255(e) to permit § 2241 habeas corpus

petitions by federal prisoners who can no longer file a motion to vacate and who,

based on a new (and governing) statutory decision, are in custody despite never

having committed a crime. Because Mr. McCarthan is not asserting such a claim

of innocence, I concur in the judgment.

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WILSON, Circuit Judge, joined by JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I would reverse the denial of Dan McCarthan’s claim and remand for the

district court to consider the merits in the first instance. I am, for the most part,

persuaded by Judge Jordan’s interpretation of the savings clause. I agree with his

textual analysis of the clause, but I believe the equitable nature of the Great Writ

dictates a different result than he reaches.

Judge Jordan states that the equitable nature of the Writ leads him to

conclude that the savings clause applies to a prisoner who asserts a claim of actual

innocence but not to a prisoner who, like McCarthan, argues that his sentence

exceeds the statutory maximum. In my opinion, the savings clause applies to both

types of prisoners. A prisoner who is actually innocent is in the same position as a

prisoner whose sentence exceeds the statutory maximum—each prisoner is being

deprived of his liberty even though no law authorizes the deprivation. As my

colleague Judge Hill once said: “If a petitioner can show that he is illegally

incarcerated, he is entitled to release. Fairness requires it. Justice is the ultimate

goal in the grant of the Writ.” Rozier v. United States, 701 F.3d 681, 690 (11th

Cir. 2012) (Hill, J., dissenting).

Justice demands that, at the very least, McCarthan receive a chance to “test

the legality of his detention.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).

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MARTIN, Circuit Judge, joined by JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

Dan McCarthan was sentenced to serve 211 months (17.5 years) in prison

based on this Court’s mistake of the law. Mr. McCarthan had been convicted of

felony offenses earlier in his life, and he was found with a firearm, so he was due

to go to prison. Ordinarily, a felon convicted of possessing a firearm faces up to

10 years in prison, but no more. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). On the other hand, when

the person has three earlier convictions for crimes that are either a “violent felony”

or a “serious drug offense,” the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), id. § 924(e),

increases his sentence to no less than 15 years and up to life. Because Mr.

McCarthan was sentenced under ACCA as though he had three qualifying

convictions, he got a sentence that was seven and one-half years longer than the

statute would have otherwise allowed. He got this much longer sentence because

in his past he had been convicted of walkaway escape,1 and Eleventh Circuit

precedent characterized walkaway escape as a “violent felony.” See United States

1

In 1992, Mr. McCarthan was convicted of escape in Florida for walking away from an

unsecured correctional facility without permission. The PSR describes his escape conviction as

follows:

According to court records, on February 14, 1988, the defendant signed out for

work from the Tampa Community Corrections Center with a return time of 1:30

a.m. on February 15, 1998 [sic]. He failed to return to [sic] by 1:30 a.m., as

required. The defendant returned to the center at 12:58 p.m. on February 15, 1998

[sic]. The escape report was canceled. At 3:30 p.m. on February 15, 1988, the

defendant left the center without permission, and an escape report was again

initiated.

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v. Gay, 251 F.3d 950, 953–55 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). But this Court’s

ruling in Gay was wrong. Well after Mr. McCarthan began serving his 17.5-year

sentence, the Supreme Court taught us that escape is not a “violent felony.” Its

decisions in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008), and

Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009), overturned our

decision in Gay. See United States v. Lee, 586 F.3d 859, 874–75 (11th Cir. 2009).

Mr. McCarthan is now asking us to make right what we caused to go wrong

when he got his 17.5-year sentence. The panel that first heard Mr. McCarthan’s

case (I was a member) applied Eleventh Circuit precedent. See McCarthan v.

Warden, FCI Estill, 811 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2016). Under that precedent, the

panel concluded that he could not satisfy the jurisdictional test our Court created

for habeas cases in which a prisoner is seeking relief from a wrongly imposed

ACCA sentence. So we denied him relief. Id. at 1256–57. The government did

not seek rehearing from our ruling. Indeed, the United States subscribed to this

Circuit’s habeas jurisprudence as set out in the McCarthan panel opinion, and

anyway it had won.

Nevertheless, a majority of this Court voted to vacate the panel’s opinion

and hear Mr. McCarthan’s case en banc. Since the government never asked us to

rehear his case, one might think en banc rehearing would be good news for Mr.

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McCarthan. But today’s majority opinion not only does nothing to change Mr.

McCarthan’s loss into a win, it puts relief out of reach for others who have been

sentenced based on a legal mistake. In other words, this Court voted to rehear Mr.

McCarthan’s case not because the Court believed the panel was wrong in its

application of our circuit precedent, but instead because the Majority wanted to

overturn that precedent. Before today, the path to relief for prisoners like Mr.

McCarthan has been narrow, indeed. Today’s majority opinion cuts off that path

entirely.

The Majority concludes that Mr. McCarthan’s claim cannot be recognized

under the federal statute that governs postconviction challenges by federal

prisoners. My colleagues in dissent say that the law recognizes his claim, and

would remand Mr. McCarthan’s case to be evaluated anew on the merits. My view

is slightly different, so I write separately to say how I believe Mr. McCarthan’s

case should turn out, and why.

I. THE SAVINGS CLAUSE

The majority opinion characterizes this case as a rather dry and complex

exercise in statutory construction. A reader could almost miss the fact that what

we are talking about is who, among the hundreds of thousands of human beings

incarcerated in U.S. prisons, will have access to relief under a writ of habeas

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corpus.2 The writ of habeas corpus is of such fundamental importance to this

nation’s legal system that it is known as the Great Writ. See Ex parte Bollman, 8

U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.). The writers of our Constitution

recognized the importance of the writ of habeas corpus when they enshrined its

existence in that document. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The Great Writ is the tool

meant to be available to any person who finds himself in jail when he ought not be

there.

In 1948, for reasons explained by the Majority and Judge Rosenbaum, 28

U.S.C. § 2255 was enacted. Then in 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (AEDPA) added limitations to § 2255 which remain in effect today.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, once a federal prosecution results in a final conviction,

the prisoner is generally allowed to challenge the legality of his detention only

through a § 2255 motion, and not through a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See

28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section,

shall not be entertained . . . .”). Significant to many cases like Mr. McCarthan’s is

that the relief offered by § 2255 is narrowly defined and tightly administered. A

2

The Department of Justice estimates that in 2015 (the latest year for which it has

published statistics), there were 328,500 people in federal correctional custody. See Bureau of

Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Correctional Populations in the United States, 2015, at 12

(Dec. 2016).

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prisoner is generally allowed to challenge his conviction and sentence by way of a

§ 2255 motion just one time, id. § 2255(h), and that challenge generally must be

made within one year of his conviction becoming final, id. § 2255(f). While the

statute’s goals of tight deadlines and finality might seem desirable, they were

implemented at the same time the federal prison population was exploding; federal

sentences were getting longer; and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines were requiring

judges to make many rulings before arriving at the sentence imposed.3 So it is a

fact of life for these prisoners that they can sit in jail for years or even decades

before the Supreme Court comes to tell inferior federal courts (like this one) about

a mistake the court made when a sentence was imposed. This has happened to Mr.

McCarthan and so many others. This Court was wrong when it said that Mr.

McCarthan’s earlier conviction for walkaway escape required his sentence to be

(significantly) longer than the ten-year cap called for by the statute that otherwise

would have governed his sentence. So while this case is about how we construe

the words of a statute, it is also about whether Mr. McCarthan and those like him

should continue to bear the burden of the mistake the federal courts made in

3

Sections 2255(f) and (h) were passed in 1996 as part of AEDPA. In 1990, there were

58,838 people incarcerated in federal prisons; a decade later, that number had risen to 133,921.

See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prisoners in 2000 2 (Aug. 2001). As

mentioned above, the latest available data show that there are now approximately 328,500 people

in federal prison. Supra note 2.

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sentencing him. I part ways with the Majority, because I think not. And while the

Majority highlights the rule in the Tenth Circuit, the fact is that most every other

U.S. Court of Appeals to have reached this question thinks not as well.

The History of Section 2255 in the Eleventh Circuit

Section 2255 generally allows a prisoner to bring a new attack (the statute

uses the term “second or successive motion”) on his conviction only if his claim

falls into one of the two narrow categories in § 2255(h). That is: (1) a claim of

actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence, id. § 2255(h)(1); or (2) a

claim based on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable,” id.

§ 2255(h)(2).

Prisoners like Mr. McCarthan, who want to challenge their detention on the

basis of a new, retroactive statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court, do not

fall under either category of § 2255(h). He is hanging his hat on a new rule of

statutory not constitutional law. Since he cannot proceed under § 2255(h), he

seeks to proceed under the “savings clause” 4 of § 2255(e). The savings clause says

4

My colleagues who I join in writing about Mr. McCarthan’s case have adopted the term

“saving clause” as opposed to the term this Court has always used: “savings clause.” See, e.g.,

Mackey v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 739 F.3d 657, 661 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[The]

exception to § 2255(e)’s bar on a § 2241 petition is commonly referred to as the ‘savings

clause.’”); Samak v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 766 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2014)

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a prisoner can bypass the constraints of § 2255(h) and file a habeas petition

challenging his detention if it “appears that the remedy by [§ 2255] motion is

inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” Id. § 2255(e). That

leaves us to decide for Mr. McCarthan (and many others): when is § 2255

“inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [a prisoner’s] detention”?

A lot of ink has spilled and many lives have been touched as a result of this

Court’s work on how to apply the savings clause. The Court offered its first

interpretation of the savings clause in Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir.

1999). Wofford established that, in order for a prisoner to rely on the savings

clause, he had to show his claim had been “squarely foreclosed” by circuit law at

the time of his trial, appeal, and first § 2255 motion. 177 F.3d at 1244. In other

words, the prisoner was required to show that the courts in this Circuit would have

(Pryor, William, J., concurring) (“That exception—the ‘savings clause’—recognizes that a

motion to vacate a sentence may sometimes be inappropriate, that is, ‘inadequate or ineffective,’

so in that circumstance Congress allows a federal prisoner to ‘test the legality of his detention’ in

the traditional action against his custodian.”); Bryant v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 738

F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[The] exception to § 2255(e)’s bar on a § 2241 petition is

commonly referred to as the ‘savings clause.’”); Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1305–

06 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“The [] exception to the § 2255(e) bar on § 2241 petitions,

commonly referred to as the ‘savings clause,’ is the focus of our issue[.]”).

While I recognize that the Supreme Court used the term “saving clause” in Boumediene,

courts still use both “saving” and “savings” in this context. I will continue as we have, not

because of any value judgment about the Majority’s new term, but because I have grown

accustomed to the old.

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ruled against him on this claim at the time he was convicted and sentenced, and

when he appealed, and when he filed for postconviction relief by way of a § 2255

motion. To the extent I have been involved in these cases, I have always believed

that Wofford was wrong and that this Court’s rulings on savings clause cases that

have since followed Wofford are wrong as well. See Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1300

(Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Williams v. Warden, Fed.

Bureau of Prisons, 713 F.3d 1332, 1350–56 (11th Cir. 2013) (Martin, J.,

dissenting); Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1330–36 (Martin, J., dissenting).

Wofford’s “squarely foreclosed” requirement became the bedrock of this

Court’s savings clause jurisprudence. See Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1272 (“What makes

the § 2255 proceeding ‘inadequate or ineffective’ for petitioner Bryant is that he

had no ‘genuine opportunity’ to bring his § 924(e) claim because Circuit precedent

squarely foreclosed that claim throughout his trial, direct appeal, and first § 2255

motion.”). 5 Under this Court’s “squarely foreclosed” requirement, each time we

5

In Bryant, this Court created a five-part test a prisoner must pass before he is allowed to

access the savings clause to make a claim, like the one Mr. McCarthan makes here: that one of

his previous convictions was wrongly characterized as a “violent felony” under § 924(e) causing

him to receive a sentence of at least 15 years under § 924(e) rather than a sentence of no more

than 10 years under § 924(a). This five-part test is found nowhere in the words of the statute. It

was this five-part Bryant test that required the panel to deny relief to Mr. McCarthan.

The first step of the Bryant test is the “squarely foreclosed” requirement. See Bryant,

738 F.3d at 1274 (“[The petitioner] must establish that . . . throughout his sentencing, direct

appeal, and first § 2255 proceeding, our Circuit’s binding precedent had specifically addressed

[his] distinct prior state conviction that triggered § 924(e) and had squarely foreclosed [his]

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consider a prisoner’s claim for savings clause relief, we must look backward and

ask whether the petitioner’s original § 2255 proceeding was “inadequate or

ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” But the savings clause nowhere

requires us to do this. Rather, the savings clause says that the writ of habeas

corpus is preserved for cases in which § 2255 “is inadequate or ineffective to test

the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). The plain text of

the statute allows a prisoner to seek habeas relief when § 2255 is “inadequate or

ineffective” to bring his current challenge to the legality of his detention. When

the statute is read as Congress wrote it, in the present tense, it is clear that a

prisoner can bring a habeas petition if § 2255 is—at the time the petition is filed in

federal court—“inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of the detention.

The Majority is right when it says that the rules this Court created for these

cases have not worked well. I have seen the problems resulting from this circuit’s

“squarely foreclosed” rule play out over the years. For example, in Albert

Williams’s 2013 appeal, this Court left him to serve a 293-month sentence (more

§ 924(e) claim that he was erroneously sentenced above the 10–year statutory maximum penalty

in § 924(a).”). The second step of the Bryant test further enforces the “squarely foreclosed”

requirement. See id. (“[The petitioner] must establish that . . . subsequent to his first § 2255

proceeding, [a] Supreme Court[ ] decision . . ., as extended by this Court to [his] distinct prior

conviction, overturned our Circuit precedent that had squarely foreclosed [his] § 924(e) claim.”).

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than 24 years), rather than a sentence that, by law, should have been capped at 10

years. Williams, 713 F.3d at 1334. Relief had to be denied to him, this Court said,

because at the time he challenged his sentence on direct appeal, and then again at

the time he filed his § 2255 motion, our Court had never decided the issue of

whether his prior convictions for burglary should be considered “violent felonies”

to enhance his sentence. Id. at 1348. The Williams panel blinded itself to what the

state of the law was at the time we ruled on his § 2255 motion in 2013. We said

that because no Eleventh Circuit precedent had ruled on whether a Florida burglary

conviction is an ACCA-qualifying offense at the time of his direct appeal in 1999,

his claim was not “squarely foreclosed.” Id. That meant, so the logic went, that a

§ 2255 motion would not have been ineffective as a way to raise the claim, and so

Mr. Williams was not entitled to relief. Id. at 1345. For my part as a member of

the Williams panel, I asked how in the world this Court’s lack of having ruled on a

question in the past could possibly give us the power to keep Mr. Williams in

prison for more than 24 years when Congress never gave us the power to keep him

in prison for more than 10. Id. at 1353 (Martin, J., dissenting) (“The correct

question to ask is whether Mr. Williams was erroneously sentenced as an armed

career criminal in light of Begay. If he was, the federal courts never had

jurisdiction to sentence him above the 10 year maximum allowed by law. The

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existence or nonexistence of circuit precedent which conflicts with Begay cannot

operate to confer jurisdiction on this Court.”). Now years have passed and this

Court has only recently resolved the question of whether Florida burglary (the

same statute Mr. Williams was litigating back in 2013) is a “violent felony” for

purposes of ACCA, and held it is not. See United States v. Esprit, 841 F.3d 1235,

1237 (11th Cir. 2016). Meanwhile, Mr. Williams remains in prison based on this

mistake we made in lengthening his sentence. 6

I read § 2255 to allow a prisoner to file a habeas petition under the savings

clause when he shows that, at some point after his first § 2255 proceeding, there

was a retroactive decision from an authoritative federal court, which interpreted a

statute in a way that now reveals a fundamental defect in that prisoner’s conviction

or sentence. Both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits interpret the savings clause this

way. See Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2016) (“When seeking to

petition under § 2241 based on a misapplied sentence, the petitioner must show (1)

a case of statutory interpretation, (2) that is retroactive and could not have been

invoked in the initial § 2255 motion, and (3) that the misapplied sentence presents

an error sufficiently grave to be deemed a miscarriage of justice or a fundamental

6

Mr. Williams’s quest for relief on this issue continues. Since the Supreme Court gave

retroactive relief to some inmates serving sentences improperly enhanced under ACCA, this

Court granted Mr. Williams permission to file a second or successive petition on July 1, 2016.

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defect.”); Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013) (“First, the

prisoner must show that he relies on a statutory-interpretation case, rather than a

constitutional case. Second, the prisoner must show that he relies on a retroactive

decision that he could not have invoked in his first § 2255 motion. The third

condition is that the sentence enhancement have been a grave enough error to be

deemed a miscarriage of justice corrigible therefore in a habeas corpus

proceeding.” (quotations and citations omitted and alterations adopted)). See also

United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 274 (4th Cir. 2015) (Gregory, J.,

dissenting), reh’g en banc granted (Dec. 2, 2015) (“§ 2255 is ‘inadequate or

ineffective’ when the retroactively-applicable change in the law that the prisoner

seeks to take advantage of occurs subsequent to his first § 2255 motion. . . .[,] the

asserted error represents a fundamental defect, [and] the prisoner cannot satisfy the

gatekeeping provisions of § 2255 because he relies on a new rule that is not one of

constitutional law.” (quotation omitted and alterations adopted)).

The Legislative History of Section 2255 and

the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence

The legislative history of § 2255 and the Supreme Court’s habeas corpus

jurisprudence confirm this view. Before § 2255 became law in 1948, federal

prisoners who wanted to collaterally attack their conviction or sentence had to file

a petition for habeas corpus in the district where they were in prison. This caused

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the few district courts located near federal prisons to be overwhelmed with habeas

petitions. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213–15, 72 S. Ct. 263, 269–

70 (1952). Congress enacted § 2255 to address this problem. The new statute

“replaced traditional habeas corpus for federal prisoners . . . with a process that

allowed the prisoner to file a motion with the sentencing court.” Boumediene v.

Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 774, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2264 (2008).

The Supreme Court has told us more than once that § 2255 was “designed to

strengthen, rather than dilute, the writ’s protections.” Id. at 776, 128 S. Ct. at

2265. See also Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343, 94 S. Ct. 2298, 2304

(1974) (“Th[e] [legislative] history makes clear that § 2255 was intended to afford

federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal habeas corpus.”); id. at 344,

94 S. Ct. at 2304 (“Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose

to impinge upon prisoners’ rights of collateral attack upon their convictions.”); Hill

v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427, 82 S. Ct. 468, 471 (1962) (“[I]t conclusively

appears from the historic context in which § 2255 was enacted that the legislation

was intended simply to provide in the sentencing court a remedy exactly

commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas corpus in

the court of the district where the prisoner was confined.”); Hayman, 342 U.S. at

219, 72 S. Ct. at 272 (“[T]he sole purpose [of § 2255] was to minimize the

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difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in

another and more convenient forum.”). And beyond this admonition that § 2255

was not intended to weaken the Great Writ, it is critical that when Congress passed

§ 2255, it did not do away with traditional habeas corpus relief. Instead, it inserted

the savings clause to preserve the habeas remedy for those instances in which

§ 2255 “is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [a prisoner’s] detention.”

28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).

In 1996, Congress passed AEDPA to amend § 2255 by adding (among other

things) the § 2255(h) limitations on filing more than one motion under that statute.

At the same time, Congress did nothing to disturb the savings clause, and it

remains a part of the law. It seems obvious that if Congress meant to bar all

successive collateral attacks on convictions and sentences except for the two

categories allowed by § 2255(h), it would have simply repealed the savings clause.

It did not. I say AEDPA’s narrowing of the availability of the § 2255 remedy only

heightens the importance of the savings clause, whose express purpose is to ensure

that, in every case, federal collateral review remains “[]adequate [and] []effective.”

The Supreme Court told us in Boumediene—which was decided after AEDPA—

that the purpose of the savings clause is to “provid[e] that a writ of habeas corpus

would be available if the alternative process proved inadequate or ineffective.”

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Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 776, 128 S. Ct. at 2265. So when there are “challenges to

both convictions and sentences that as a structural matter cannot be entertained by

use of the 2255 motion,” § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective.” Webster v.

Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1139 (7th Cir. 2015).

The Importance of the Savings Clause Where Section 2255

Is “Inadequate or Ineffective”

There is clearly a gap in the protections offered by § 2255 in this

circumstance: when the Supreme Court interprets a statute in a way that shows a

prisoner’s conviction or sentence was wrongly imposed, and that Supreme Court

decision comes after the prisoner has already used up his first § 2255 proceeding.

For Mr. McCarthan and other prisoners in his situation, the Supreme Court has

given an interpretation of a statute that reveals they were sentenced to a term in

prison longer than that authorized by Congress. And yet because the Supreme

Court ruling comes after his first § 2255 proceeding is complete and because the

decision is one of statutory (not constitutional) interpretation, he does not qualify

to bring a second or successive motion under § 2255(h). So while Congress never

gave the executive or judicial branches of government the power to keep Mr.

McCarthan in jail this long, he has no remedy under § 2255. He has only the

savings clause door to habeas corpus relief.

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There are also other types of cases in which prisoners are serving sentences

much longer than called for by law, with no remedy under § 2255, who should

therefore be eligible for relief under the savings clause. For example, a prisoner

who was convicted for conduct that the law does not in fact criminalize.7 Another

example is prisoners who have been sentenced based on a mistaken application of

the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines at the time when sentencing judges were mandated

by law to follow them. See Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 587–88 (7th Cir.

2013) (holding that the savings clause allows a prisoner to challenge his detention

when a retroactive statutory-interpretation decision reveals the prisoner was

sentenced based on an erroneous application of the mandatory Sentencing

Guidelines, even where the sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum);

Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1330–36 (Martin, J., dissenting).

The Supreme Court has been clear that decisions “narrow[ing] the scope of a

criminal statute by interpreting its terms” are given retroactive effect “because

7

Every circuit to have considered the issue—except for the Tenth Circuit and now this

Circuit—has concluded that, at the least, the savings clause allows a prisoner to challenge his

detention when a retroactive statutory-interpretation decision from the Supreme Court shows that

the prisoner was convicted for conduct that the law does not in fact make criminal. See Trenkler

v. United States, 536 F.3d 85, 99 (1st Cir. 2008); Poindexter v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372, 378 (2d Cir.

2003); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251–52 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333–34

(4th Cir. 2000); Reyes–Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 903–04 (5th Cir. 2001); Wooten

v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303, 307–08 (6th Cir. 2012); Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586–87 (7th

Cir. 2013); Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190, 1192, 1194–95 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Smith, 285 F.3d

6, 8 (D.C.Cir. 2002).

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[such decisions] necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands

convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal or faces a punishment that

the law cannot impose upon him.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52,

124 S. Ct. 2519, 2522–23 (2004) (quotation omitted). When the Supreme Court

interprets a statute and applies its ruling retroactively, but a prisoner is barred from

relying on that interpretation merely because the Supreme Court decided the case

after his first § 2255 proceeding was done, § 2255 has certainly “proved

inadequate or ineffective,” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 776, 128 S. Ct. at 2265,

within the meaning of the savings clause. See Unthank v. Jett, 549 F.3d 534, 536

(7th Cir. 2008) (noting that the savings clause is available where “a glitch in

§ 2255 prevents application to [a petitioner’s] situation of a retroactive decision of

the Supreme Court”).

The Majority says my reading of the savings clause would allow prisoners to

make an end-run around the limitations on successive motions in § 2255(h). Maj.

Op. at 29–33. I say my reading just gives effect to the

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