United States v. David Bronstein

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 12, 2016 Decided March 3, 2017

No. 16-3003

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLANT

v.

DAVID BRONSTEIN, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

On Interlocutory Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:15-cr-00048)

Daniel J. Lenerz, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s

Office, argued the cause for Appellant. With him on the briefs

were Elizabeth Trosman, John P. Mannarino, and James M.

Perez, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause

and filed the brief for Appellees.

Before: BROWN and SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

2

As we recently said, “[f]or more than sixty-five years, a

federal statute has restricted the public’s conduct of expressive

activity within the building and grounds of the Supreme

Court.” Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1149 (D.C. Cir.

2015). The statute at issue in Hodge—a fraternal twin of the

one at issue here, see, e.g., S. REP. NO. 81-719, at 1828

(1949)—was challenged under the Constitution’s

void-for-vagueness doctrine. We rejected that claim. See

799 F.3d at 1171–73. Now, we consider whether portions of

its statutory sibling are unconstitutionally vague.

The statute here is 40 U.S.C. § 6134. Entitled “Firearms,

fireworks, speeches, and objectionable language in the

Supreme Court Building and grounds,” it provides:

It is unlawful to discharge a firearm, firework or

explosive, set fire to a combustible, make a

harangue or oration, or utter loud, threatening,

or abusive language in the Supreme Court

Building or grounds.

Id. The district court below held the terms “harangue” and

“oration” unconstitutionally vague. United States v.

Bronstein, 151 F. Supp. 3d 31, 41–44 (D.D.C. 2015).

The district court concluded that, for constitutional

purposes, “harangues” and “orations” do not exist as

such—they “cannot be determined without reference to

subjective perceptions and individual sensitivities.” See, e.g.,

id. at 42 (referring to “harangue”); see also id. at 42 n.9, 44.

The vagueness analysis, however, is objective. It turns on the

tools of statutory interpretation.

Employing the tools of statutory interpretation, we hold 40

U.S.C. § 6134 gives a core meaning to both “harangue” and

3

“oration.” This core meaning is delivering speeches of

various kinds to persons within the Supreme Court’s building

and grounds, in a manner that threatens to disturb the

operations and decorum of the Court. In the context of the

Supreme Court’s building and grounds, the terms’ core

meaning proscribes determinable conduct. Thus, the district

court erred in striking the terms as void for vagueness.

I.

Factual Background 1

Appellees spent April Fools Day of 2015 interrupting an

oral argument session of the U.S. Supreme Court. Before

argument began, all of the Appellees were seated within the

courtroom, and all of them must have heard the following

announcement from a Supreme Court police officer:

Welcome to the Supreme Court of the United

States. During today’s oral arguments it is

important that you remain seated and silent.

When the first case breaks, please remain

silent. If you are remaining for the second

case, remain seated. If you are leaving,

silently exit the Courtroom. . . . Please alert one

of the police officers if you observe anything

suspicious, and in the event of an emergency,

please remain calm and follow the directions of

a police officer. Thank you.

1

The district court relied upon the statement of facts set forth in the

Government’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. See

Bronstein, 151 F. Supp. 3d at 34 n.1. Neither the Government nor

the Appellees dispute the district court’s recitation, so we rely upon

it here.

4

Bronstein, 151 F. Supp. 3d at 34–35 (emphasis added). None

of these repeated admonitions to remain seated and silent

deterred Appellees, however.

After the Supreme Court’s Marshal gaveled the Court into

session and “audience members to their seats, . . . only one

member of the audience,” Appellee Belinda Rodriguez,

“remained standing.” Id. at 35. She raised her arm into the

air and said, “We rise to demand democracy. One person, one

vote!” Id. After Supreme Court police removed Appellee

Rodriguez from the courtroom, Appellee Matthew Kresling

stood up and said, “We rise to . . . Money is not speech. One

person, one vote!” Id. Then, upon Kresling’s removal,

Appellee Yasmina Mrabet raised an arm in the air while

saying, “Justices, is it not your duty to protect our right to

self-government? The first . . . overturn Citizens United.

One person, one vote!” Id. Upon Mrabet’s restraint and

removal, Appellee Richard Saffle stood and stated, “Justices, is

it not your job to ensure free, fair elections?” Id. Like his

cohorts, he too was restrained and removed from the courtroom

by police. Id. After Saffle’s disruption, Chief Justice

Roberts warned the remaining audience members that

“[a]nyone else interested in talking will be admonished that it’s

within the authority of this Court to punish such disturbances

by criminal contempt.” Id. Nevertheless, Appellee David

Bronstein began singing “immediately” after the Chief

Justice’s warning. Id. Bronstein sang, “We who believe in

freedom shall not rest; we who believe in freedom shall not

rest.” Id. Bronstein, too, was removed and restrained. Id.

All of the Appellees were placed under arrest and subsequently

transported to a U.S. Capitol Police station. Id. In total, the

Appellees’ spectacle “lasted approximately two to four

minutes.” Id.

5

Two days later, the U.S. Attorney’s Office charged

Appellees with violations of: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 1507 2 (Count

One); and (2) 40 U.S.C. § 6134 (Count Two), the statute

quoted above. See 151 F. Supp. 3d at 35. Appellees moved

to dismiss Count Two, claiming 40 U.S.C. § 6134 is facially

unconstitutional. See id. at 36. Count Two charged

Appellees with violating the statute’s prohibitions on

“mak[ing] a harangue or oration . . . in the Supreme Court

Building,” and “utter[ing] loud . . . language in the Supreme

Court Building.” See id. at 35. 3 The Appellees’ motion to

dismiss Count Two alleged, inter alia, 4 the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

renders § 6134’s prohibitions on “mak[ing] a harangue or

oration” and “utter[ing] loud . . . language” unconstitutionally

vague. See id. at 36.

II.

2

This statute proscribes demonstrating “in or near a building

housing a court of the United States” “with the intent of interfering

with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice, or with

the intent of influencing any judge, juror, witness, or court officer in

the discharge of his duty.” 18 U.S.C. § 1507. This statute is not at

issue in this appeal.

3

The Government twice filed a Superseding Information, clarifying

the portions of 40 U.S.C. § 6134 at issue. See Appellant App. 012,

015, 026, 092; Bronstein, 151 F. Supp. 3d at 36 (“Count Two now

contains no reference to ‘abusive’ or ‘threatening’ language or the

Supreme Court grounds as a whole—it simply charges Defendants

with ‘unlawfully mak[ing] a harangue or oration or utter[ing] loud

language in the Supreme Court Building.’”).

4

After the Government filed its second Superseding Information,

Appellees “informed the Court that they no longer intended to

challenge Count Two on First Amendment grounds,” which was part

of their motion to dismiss. See Bronstein, 151 F. Supp. 3d at 36.

Accordingly, only Appellees’ void-for-vagueness challenge is

before us here.

6

Proceedings Below

After an oral hearing on the motion, the district court

issued an order and accompanying opinion granting in part and

denying in part the Appellees’ motion to dismiss. The district

court first considered whether “loud” in § 6134 was

unconstitutionally vague. The district court did not strike

“loud” as unconstitutionally vague; it adopted a narrowing

construction. Id. at 41. Under the district court’s reading,

“[t]he Government may prosecute Defendants for having

‘utter[ed] loud . . . language in the Supreme Court Building,’

but only insofar as their utterances disturbed or tended to

disturb the normal operations of the U.S. Supreme Court.” 5

Id. The district court gave neither “harangue” nor “oration” a

narrowing construction. Rather, the district court struck these

words from § 6134 as unconstitutionally vague. See id. at 44.

The Government appealed the district court’s decision.

III.

Standard of Review

Whether “harangue” or “oration” is unconstitutionally

vague within § 6134 involves only “pure questions of law.”

See Hodge, 799 F.3d at 1171. As such, our review is de novo.

Id. at 1155. The vagueness inquiry implicates a number of

interpretive principles. Explaining them here will help

illuminate our interpretation of § 6134.

A law is vague when “it fails to give ordinary people fair

notice of the conduct it punishes, or [is] so standardless that it

5

The Government does not challenge the district court’s limiting

construction of “loud,” and we do not address it here.

7

invites arbitrary enforcement.” Johnson v. United States, 135

S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015). The void-for-vagueness doctrine

“developed from the rule of construction that penal statutes are

to be construed strictly in favor of the accused.” Note,

Indefinite Criteria of Definiteness in Statutes, 45 HARV. L.

REV. 160, 160 n.2 (1931). The doctrine grew to take on

constitutional status, allowing a court to not merely “save” an

indefinite statue with judicial construction, but to strike the

statute as unconstitutional when its vagueness transgressed the

guarantees of the Due Process Clause within the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments. See generally Anthony G.

Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the

Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960) (analyzing the

myriad constitutional values and issues of judicial

administration informing the void-for-vagueness doctrine’s

use); see also id. at 75 (“[T]he doctrine of unconstitutional

indefiniteness has been used by the Supreme Court almost

invariably for the creation of an insulating buffer zone of added

protection at the peripheries of several of the Bill of Rights

freedoms.”).

Consistent with its origins, a statute’s vagueness is either

susceptible to judicial construction or is void for vagueness

based on the application of traditional rules for statutory

interpretation. See Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 355 n.5

(1964) (“The determination whether a criminal statute

provides fair warning of its prohibitions must be made on the

basis of the statute itself and other pertinent law, rather than on

the basis of an ad hoc appraisal of the subjective expectations

of particular defendants.”); see also United States v. Williams,

553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008) (explaining terms void for vagueness

lack “statutory definitions, narrowing context, or settled legal

meanings”). These rules “consistently favor[] that

interpretation of legislation which supports its

constitutionality.” See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91,

8

98 (1945). “Only if no construction can save the Act from this

claim of unconstitutionality are we willing to” strike the

statute. Id. at 100. To be clear, this is no legislative

giveaway. By limiting construction to “the statute itself and

other pertinent law, rather than . . . ad hoc appraisal,” see

Bouie, 378 U.S. at 355 n.5, the doctrine spurns attempts to save

a statute from unconstitutional vagueness based on

“speculative” tests “detached from statutory elements” that do

not “craft a principled and objective standard.” See Johnson,

135 S. Ct. at 2558.

At first blush, tension appears between a vagueness

inquiry viewed from the vantage point of “ordinary people,”

and a vagueness analysis carried out with the standard tools of

statutory interpretation. Yet this tension is assuaged by

understanding what the doctrine means by “fair notice,”

“vagueness,” and the vantage point of “ordinary people.”

To provide “fair notice,” “[g]enerally, a legislature need

do nothing more than enact and publish the law, and afford the

citizenry a reasonable opportunity to familiarize itself with its

terms and to comply.” Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516,

532 (1982). “Even trained lawyers may find it necessary to

consult legal dictionaries, treatises, and judicial opinions

before they may say with any certainty what some statutes may

compel or forbid. All the Due Process Clause requires is that

the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct

themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden.” Rose v.

Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975). As far as we can tell, no

Supreme Court decision has ever struck a statute as

unconstitutionally vague merely because it uses terms that, at

the moment, may not be widely used. See Peter W. Low and

Joel S. Johnson, Changing the Vocabulary of the Vagueness

Doctrine, 101 VA. L. REV. 2051, 2055 (2015) (“We are aware

of no United States Supreme Court case where a statute has

9

been held unconstitutionally vague because socialization

notice was lacking.”); cf. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v.

Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 274 (7th Cir. 1986)

(“We do not believe that we have the power to declare a

constitutional statute invalid merely because we, or for that

matter everybody, think[s] the statute has become obsolete.”).

Similarly, a term is not saved from being void for vagueness

merely because the present moment’s vernacular clearly

understands some of its applications—the question is whether

the term provides a discernable standard when legally

construed. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 612

614 (1971) (explaining that “annoying” was unconstitutionally

vague because its statutory use specified “no standard of

conduct at all,” even as the state supreme court characterized

“annoying” as a “widely used and well understood word”); see

also Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561 (reaffirming Coates while

stating that some conduct, like “spitting in someone’s face,”

would “surely” be understood as “annoying”).

As described here, “fair notice” is consonant with the

longstanding principles of statutory construction. Citizens are

charged with generally knowing the law, and what a law means

is a function of interpreting the statute. These

principles—possessing general knowledge of the law and

judicial reliance upon legal interpretation—bring “vagueness”

and the “ordinary person’s” vantage point into focus.

Even as the vagueness inquiry refers to a law’s meaning to

the “ordinary person,” a statutory term is not rendered

unconstitutionally vague because it “do[es] not mean the same

thing to all people, all the time, everywhere.” See, e.g., Roth

v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957). When interpreting

a statutory term, we are not concerned with vagueness in the

sense that the term “requires a person to conform his conduct to

an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard,” whose

10

satisfaction may vary depending upon whom you ask. See,

e.g., Coates, 402 U.S. at 614. Rather, a statute is

unconstitutionally vague if, applying the rules for interpreting

legal texts, its meaning “specifie[s]” “no standard of conduct . .

. at all.” Id.; see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,

Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 n.7 (1982) (setting

forth the distinction articulated in Coates as describing what

“the complainant must prove” “to sustain . . . a challenge” on

vagueness grounds); Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky,

234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914) (holding a law is void for vagueness

when it offers no “standard of conduct that [was] possible to

know” (emphasis added)). “As a general matter,” the

vagueness doctrine does “not doubt the constitutionality of

laws that call for the application of a qualitative standard . . . to

real-world conduct; ‘the law is full of instances where a man’s

fate depends on his estimating rightly . . . some matter of

degree.’” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561 (quoting Nash v. United

States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913)). Accordingly, when the

vagueness doctrine assesses a legal term’s meaning to

“ordinary people,” it is assessing meaning with the elementary

rule of statutory interpretation: Words receive their “plain,

obvious and common sense” meaning, “unless context

furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.” See

Joseph Story, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

UNITED STATES 157–58 (1833).

With these neutral principles in mind, we can assess

whether § 6134’s “harangue” and “oration” are void for

vagueness. Properly interpreted, they are not.

IV.

“Harangue” And “Oration” In 40 U.S.C. § 6134 Prohibit

Public Speeches Within The Supreme Court’s Building And

Grounds

11

Both “harangue” and “oration” have long been illustrative

of public speeches. As all of the district court’s references to

“harangue” and “oration” within current dictionaries confirm,

both words involve making a speech to a public assembly.

See Bronstein, 151 F. Supp. at 41–42; id. at 43–44. As the

Government’s Brief observes, dictionaries at the time § 6134

was enacted confirm a similar harmony. See Gov’t Reply Br.

10 n. 1 & 11 n. 2 (citing dictionaries from the late 1940’s and

1950’s showing that both “harangue” and “oration” describe

speech to a public audience). Indeed, “harangue” and

“oration” were used to define “speech” itself in American

dictionaries around the First Amendment’s ratification. See

We the People Found., Inc. v. United States, 485 F.3d 140, 148

n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing dictionaries from 1785 and 1790

defining “speech” by, inter alia, “harangue” and “oration”).

That “harangue” and “oration” may not roll off the average

person’s tongue today does not alter their possession of a

settled meaning around public speeches.

It is true, as their dictionary definitions show, that

“harangue” and “oration” can cover different facets of public

speeches—“orations” can include formal speeches, while

“harangues” can include angry or vehement speeches. But we

are interpreting a statute, not restating a dictionary. Our

search here is not for every facet of “harangue” or “oration,”

but their meaning within the statute at issue. The question is

whether the terms “converge upon [certain] behavior” that is

“useful as a descript[or] of the ‘core’ behavior to which the

statute may constitutionally be applied.” See United States v.

Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1991). They do

indeed.

The longstanding principles of statutory interpretation

hold that “a word is known by the company it keeps.” Jarecki

12

v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961). So it is with

“harangue” and “oration” in this statute. The prohibitions

surrounding “harangue” and “oration” demonstrate concern

with disruptions of the Supreme Court’s order and decorum.

These prohibitions include the use of “firearm[s],”

“firework[s],” “explosive[s]” and “set[ting] fire to a

combustible.” See 40 U.S.C. § 6134. After the

“combustible” clause, the statute’s language shifts to “make a

harangue or oration,” and “utter loud, threatening, or abusive

language.” Id.

These sundry prohibitions are not merely various

noises—they all tend to disrupt the Court’s operations. That

concern should illuminate the construction of “harangue” and

“oration.” See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,

110 (1972) (holding that a statute’s words, even when “marked

by flexibility and reasonable breadth, rather than meticulous

specificity,” are clear based on “what the ordinance as a whole

prohibits”). By keeping this concern in mind, the use of

“harangue” and “oration” within the statute comes into view;

they refer to public speeches that tend to disrupt the Court’s

operations, and no others. See id. at 113 (“Rockford does not

claim the broad power to punish all ‘noises’ and ‘diversions.’ .

. . Rather, there must be demonstrated interference with school

activities.”); Griffin v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d

1309, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Challenged terms must be read

in context of the regulation as a whole, and we have little doubt

that visitors of ordinary intelligence reading [the applicable

law] would understand what behavior was expected of them on

VA property—particularly on the grounds of a national

cemetery.”); Coppock v. Patterson, 272 F. Supp. 16, 19 (S.D.

Miss. 1967) (interpreting a statute employing prohibitions very

similar to the formulation in § 6134; holding “[i]n view of the

foregoing we have no doubt that a State infringes no

Constitutional limitation when it prohibits . . . harangues [and]

13

orations . . . on the grounds occupied by its Capitol buildings,

its office buildings, and its executive mansion.” (emphasis

added)). An oral argument, for example, could be considered

a public speech within the Supreme Court. But oral

arguments do not tend to disrupt the Court’s operations (well,

arguably). A tour guide’s “speech” to Court tourists would

similarly not fall within the statute’s ambit, as it does not tend

to disrupt the Court’s operations and decorum. The same

contextual limit is part of the other prohibitions within § 6134.

A security officer that discharges his firearm to protect the

Court, for example, does not tend to disrupt the Court’s

operations.

By employing two words that cover public speeches of

myriad forms within a statute focused on the Supreme Court’s

building and grounds, Congress’s use of “harangue” and

“oration” indicates these terms are meant to cover any form of

public speeches that tend to disrupt the Supreme Court’s

operations. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 112 (“Although the

prohibited quantum of disturbance is not specified in the

ordinance, it is apparent from the statute’s announced purpose

that the measure is whether normal school activity has been or

is about to be disrupted.”).

Section 6134’s scope is apparent from its title; applying to

“Firearms, fireworks, speeches, and objectionable language in

the Supreme Court Building and grounds.” See 40 U.S.C. §

6134 (emphasis added). Congress, admittedly, did not add

this title until 2002, but it is nevertheless proper to consider it.

See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1083 (2015)

(“While these headings are not commanding, they supply cues

. . . .”). The terms within § 6134 fulfill the proscriptions set

forth in its title. Some of the title’s terms are terms within the

statute itself. The title’s references to “speeches” and

“objectionable language,” respectively, point directly to the

14

respective statutory phrases “make a harangue or oration,” and

“utter loud, threatening, or abusive language.” The

relationship between the title and the statute’s language

confirms our construction of the text.

The phrase in which “harangue” and “oration” appear also

confirms Congress’s interest in proscribing public speeches

that tend to disrupt the Court’s operations—rather than the

particularities of “harangues” or “orations.” These clauses

employ “make” and “utter,” respectively. The statute does

not proscribe “harangue or oration;” rather, it does not allow

one to “make a harangue or oration.” 40 U.S.C. § 6134

(emphasis added). Similarly, the statute does not proscribe

“loud, threatening, or abusive language,” but forbids one to

“utter loud, threatening, or abusive language.” 40 U.S.C. §

6134 (emphasis added). By deploying the terms “make” and

“utter,” Congress made making a speech or uttering language

that tends to disturb the Court’s operations the respective

triggers of criminality—not the eccentricities of “harangue,”

“oration,” “loud,” “threatening,” or “abusive.” The statute’s

genesis confirms this usage. See, e.g., Hodge, 799 F.3d at

1150 (explaining this statutory scheme was enacted to further

“the government’s long-recognized interests in preserving

decorum in the area of a courthouse and in assuring the

appearance (and actuality) of a judiciary uninfluenced by

public opinion and pressure”); see United States v. Grace, 461

U.S. 171, 182 (1983); see also Hodge v. Talkin, 949 F. Supp.

2d 152, 162–63 (D.D.C. 2013) (detailing the statutory

scheme’s genesis), overruled on other grounds, 799 F.3d at

1173; see also H.R. REP. NO. 81-814, at 3 (1949) (explaining

Congress sought to “prohibit[] . . . [the] making of speeches,

etc., in the [Supreme Court] building or grounds”) (emphasis

added); S. REP. NO. 81-719, at 2 (1949) (“Various acts, such as

. . . making speeches . . . are prohibited . . . by the bill.”

(emphasis added)). As well-established descriptors of myriad

15

public speeches, it makes sense for Congress to deploy both

“harangue” and “oration” within a statutory phrase targeting all

public speeches that tend to disrupt the Court’s operations.

The district court, however, viewed the convergence of

“harangue” and “oration” on a single meaning as indicative of

their respective vagueness. See, e.g., Bronstein, 151 F. Supp.

3d at 42 (“For all the Court can tell, an additional requirement

of pomposity, vehemence, or bombast was meant to

differentiate ‘harangue’ from its clausal neighbor, ‘oration.’”).

We appreciate the district court’s reluctance to confound

statutory terms. But, “[s]ometimes drafters do repeat

themselves and do include words that add nothing of

substance, either out of a flawed sense of style or to engage in

the ill-conceived but lamentably common belt-and-suspenders

approach.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, READING

LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 176–77 (2012)

(emphasis in original). This is why the surplusage canon of

statutory interpretation must be applied with the statutory

context in mind. See id. at 179 (“Finally, when a drafter has

engaged in the retrograde practice of stringing out synonyms

and near-synonyms (e.g., transfer, assign, convey, alienate, or

set over), the bad habit is so easily detectible that the canon can

be appropriately discounted: Alienate will not be held to mean

something wholly distinct from transfer, convey, and assign,

etc.”) (citing GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 294–97

(3d ed. 2011) (s.v. “Doublets, Triplets, and

Synonym-Strings”)) (emphasis in original). When a statute’s

text, context, and history all converge on certain terms

possessing a settled legal meaning, the Court should effectuate

it. The alternative—following a presumption of legislative

precision over the Constitution’s precipice—does not vindicate

substance. It privileges theory.

16

Turning to the facts here, a person of ordinary intelligence

could read this law and understand that, as a member of the

Supreme Court’s oral argument audience, making disruptive

public speeches is clearly proscribed behavior—even in

staccato bursts, seriatim. And yet, in a coordinated fashion,

each Appellee is alleged to have directed a variation of the

same message to the Justices of the Supreme Court and the

assembled audience. Their coordinated standing, facing the

bench, and messaging indicate the Appellees were addressing

the Court and gallery. Cf. MY COUSIN VINNY (20th Century

Fox 1992) (Judge Chamberlain Haller: “Don’t talk to me

sitting in that chair! . . . When you’re addressing this court,

you’ll rise and speak to me in a clear, intelligible voice.”).

Viewed objectively, these alleged acts could easily be

considered speeches to a public assembly that tended to disrupt

the Court’s operations—conduct covered by § 6134’s

prohibition of “make a harangue or oration.”

V.

The district court erred in striking “harangue” and

“oration” as unconstitutionally vague. We therefore reverse

and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this

opinion.

Reversed.