Opinion

In the Interest of: B.G., Appeal of: CYF

Court
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Feb 7, 2017
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 3.4%

dependency adjudication is appealable after both a determination of dependency and a disposition of the child

How later courts described this case

  • dependency adjudication is appealable after both a determination of dependency and a disposition of the child
  • holding that County agency need not make “reasonable” efforts to locate absent, noncustodial parent whose whereabouts are unknown prior to obtaining finding of dependency
  • couple, whose care and control of child was in question, did not waive right to counsel when trial court failed to advise couple of their right to counsel and couple failed to affirmatively waive their right on the record

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

J-A10015-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: B.G. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: ALLEGHENY COUNTY No. 1596 WDA 2015

CHILDREN YOUTH AND FAMILIES

Appeal from the Order Entered May 30, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Family Court, at No(s): CP-02-DP-0000797-2015

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PANELLA, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED FEBRUARY 07, 2017

Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”)

appeals from the order entered on May 30, 2015, adjudicating as dependent

B.G. (“Child”), a minor male from Guatemala, who was living with his adult

cousin, B.G. (“Adult Cousin”), pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

6302(1) and (4). We affirm.1

1

This Court previously quashed CYF’s appeal from the May 30, 2015 order

as inoperative, in light of the trial court’s order entered on June 29, 2015,

granting reconsideration of the May 30 dispositional order. In the order

entered on September 14, 2015, the trial court denied reconsideration, thus

necessitating that CYF file a notice of appeal anew. See Pa.R.A.P.

1701(b)(3) (“[T]he time for filing a notice of appeal. . . begins to run anew

after the entry of the decision on reconsideration, whether or not that

decision amounts to a reaffirmation of the prior determination of the trial

court….”) CYF timely filed the present appeal on October 14, 2015, along

with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

In its notice of appeal, however, CYF purports to appeal from the denial of

the motion for reconsideration. That is incorrect. The appeal lies from the

May 30 dispositional order. The grant of reconsideration simply acted to toll

the period for filing an appeal until a decision on the reconsideration was

J-A10015-16

The trial court summarized the background of the appeal as follows.

B.G. (“Child”) came to the attention of the [c]ourt when

Petitioner Casa San Jose filed an application to file a

private dependency petition, alleging the following:

[Child] was hospitalized with a form of tuberculosis in

December. Because he is an unaccompanied minor, [B.G.

(“Adult Cousin”)] is not his guardian. [Adult Cousin]

wasn’t able to make medical decisions for him. He had a

temporary legal guardian, which expired shortly

afterwards. [Adult Cousin] has brought him to his

monthly appointments at the Allegheny County Health

Department TB Clinic but hasn’t followed up on any of the

other needed care. He should be receiving care to check

the stability of his spine as well as appointments to check

that the medication isn’t damaging his vision. [Adult

Cousin] is his caregiver but he is planning to go back to

Guatemala in the next few months, leaving [Child] alone

in the U.S. without a caretaker, income or documents to

work, [Child]’s health will be in danger.1

The Court adjudicated Child dependent on May 22, 2015.2 On

appeal, the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and

Families (“CYF”) takes issue with the [trial court’s] decision to

adjudicate Child dependent and other matters related to that

adjudication.

___________________________________________________

1

Application to File Private Dependency Petition, Petition for

Dependency, and Request for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status,

3 (April 22, 2015) (hereinafter referred to as the “Private

Dependency Petition”).

2

Order of Adjudication [dated] (May 22, 2015). [The order was

filed on May 30, 2015.]

Trial Court Opinion, 11/20/15, at 1.

granted. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(3); Pa.R.C.P. 1930.2. We have corrected the

caption accordingly.

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Further, in its opinion dated November 20, 2015, the trial court set

forth the following factual background and procedural history regarding this

appeal, which we incorporate herein, as follows.

I. Factual Background.

The [c]ourt incorporates the following findings from its May

22, 2015 order adjudicating Child dependent:3

Participants

12. Child was born [in] June 1997. He currently resides in

Allegheny County in the home of his adult cousin, [Adult

Cousin].

13. Child is unmarried.

14. From birth to approximately age 15, Child resided in a town

of approximately 5000 residents in Guatemala.

15. Child entered the Unite[d] States as an undocumented

immigrant. He was picked up at the border by immigration

authorities and was initially held in a juvenile shelter. The

immigration authorities designated [Adult Cousin] as Child’s

sponsor and sent Child to Allegheny County to live in [Adult

Cousin’s] care, pending further immigration proceedings.

16. Child began residing with [Adult Cousin] in December 2013.

17. [Adult Cousin] resides in Allegheny County, and has resided

in the United States for approximately six years. Previously, he

resided in the same town in Guatemala where Child resided.

18. [Adult Cousin] is employed. He works six days per week for

ten hours per day.

19. [Adult Cousin] does not have any form of court-issued

authorization to obtain health care or consent to medical

treatment for Child.

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20. Child’s Mother is [C.P.G. (“Mother”)]. [Mother] resides in

Guatemala in the town where Child resided previously. Mother

speaks a Mayan dialect. She does not speak Spanish or English.

Mother does not know how to read or write.

21. Mother was not able to provide the Court with a mailing

address. There is no post office in her town. The nearest post

office is approximately five hours away. Mother did not know

how mail could be addressed to her to receive it there.

22. Mother does not have access to email and is not familiar with

the internet. Mother believed that internet access might be

available in another town, but not in the town where she lives.

23. Mother did not receive a copy of the Application and Petition

filed in this matter. Although [Adult Cousin] speaks with her on

the phone regularly and has told her about court proceedings

involving Child, it appears likely that the proceedings discussed

were federal immigration proceedings, not this dependency

matter.

24. Through counsel, Mother waived notice of this proceeding.

25. Child’s Father is [A.G.G. (“Father”)]. Father lives in the same

household with Mother.

26. Although Father resides with Mother, he is frequently away

from the household either working or looking for work. He

returns to the household about once per month.

27. At the time of this hearing, Father was away looking for

work. Mother did not know his specific whereabouts.

28. Casa San Jose is a social service agency that is operated by

the Sisters of St. Joseph. The agency assists Latino immigrants

who reside in Allegheny County. Among other things, the agency

provides service coordination and advocacy, tutoring, mentoring,

assistance with translation, occasional assistance with

transportation.

29. Casa San Jose has provided services to Child and [Adult

Cousin] since the summer of 2014. Services provided have

included assistance getting Child enrolled in school, assistance in

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obtaining well-child health care at a free clinic, transportation to

some medical appointments, and attendance with Child and

[Adult Cousin] at some medical appointments to assist with

English/Spanish translation.

30. Casa San Jose does not have legal custody of Child and does

not have any form of authority to obtain health care or consent

to medical treatment for Child.

Child’s Care and Treatment in Allegheny County:

31. Child is enrolled in Gateway School District. He attends ninth

grade and is assigned to an English as a Second Language

program.

32. Child has a heart murmur that requires monitoring.

33. In approximately November 2014 [Adult Cousin] became

aware of an abscess on Child’s back and sought medical

treatment for him.

34. Child was hospitalized at Forbes Regional Hospital for

approximately two weeks and was discharged in December

2014.

35. Child was diagnosed with tuberculosis of the spine (“TB”),

also known as Pott’s Disease. Child’s condition is not contagious.

36. Child’s condition does require a medication treatment

regimen that lasts six to nine months.

37. Child receives treatment for his TB through the Allegheny

County Health Department. The Health Department delivers

medications to Child’s home daily and provides “Direct Observed

Therapy.” The Health Department also provides dosages of the

necessary medications for the weekends.

38. Child also attends appointments for monitoring at the Health

Department’s TB clinic.

39. Child is currently in the sixth month of his treatment

regimen. His treatment for the TB is not yet completed.

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40. One of the medications initially prescribed to Child for the TB

can affect vision. That medication has been changed.

41. When Child was hospitalized, hospital staff recognized that

no one involved in Child’s care had legal authority to obtain and

consent to treatment for Child. The hospital arranged for an

agency that typically provides guardianship services for elderly

clients to be appointed as Child’s temporary legal guardian.

42. Child’s discharge plan from Forbes Regional Hospital included

recommendations for cardiology, neurology and orthopedic

follow-up appointments. None of this recommended follow-up

has occurred.

43. The appointed temporary legal guardian did not take

responsibility for ensuring that follow-up treatment occurred.

The temporary guardianship has now expired.

44. The Allegheny County Health Department apparently has

been willing to provide TB treatment to Child despite the

absence of an adult with legal authority to consent to treatment.

However, the lack of an adult with legal authority to consent to

treatment has posed difficulties for Child.

45. For example, at one appointment at the TB clinic, a blood

draw was needed. The TB clinic director was initially unwilling to

permit it because no adult with legal authority to consent was

present. A Casa San Jose staff member who was present at the

appointment successfully advocated with the clinic and

persuaded the clinic to perform the blood draw.

46. Although [Adult Cousin] believes he has taken Child to all

necessary medical appointments, Casa San Jose staff testified

credibly that [Adult Cousin] has missed appointments because of

his work schedule.

47. [Adult Cousin] has not made arrangements for any of the

follow-up medical care that was recommended when Child was

discharged from Forbes Regional Hospital.

48. There is a free health clinic that provides health care to the

Latino immigrant community. Child has received some services

from this clinic. The clinic can sometimes arrange for

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appointments with specialists who donate time to the health

clinic.

49. Although Child has received some services from the free

clinic, he did not attend any appointments there from the end of

summer 2014 to April 2015. Because Child was not attending the

free clinic regularly, no appointments with specialists occurred

there prior to the initiation of these proceedings.

50. While exploring options to ensure that Child received his

needed health care, Casa San Jose staff learned that the federal

Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”) offers a form that

parents can sign before a notary to authorize another adult to

obtain health care for their child.

51. Casa San Jose did not attempt to pursue this option with

Child’s parents, because [Adult Cousin] is not reliably available

to take Child to needed appointments. [Adult Cousin] has

directly stated as much to Casa San Jose staff on more than one

occasion.

52. It is also difficult for [Adult Cousin] to bear full responsibility

for Child’s health care because of language barriers and because

of [Adult Cousin’s] limited experience with obtaining regular

medical treatment of any kind.

53. [Adult Cousin] plans to return to Guatemala by the end of

2015.

54. Ms. Melinda Sala, attorney for the Allegheny County Health

Department, attended the first day of this hearing and brought

with her Child’s records of treatment from the TB clinic. Ms. Sala

stated that she was unable to release Child’s records in response

to a subpoena she received because she could not determine

who functions as Child’s legal guardian. However, Ms. Sala was

willing to submit the records directly to this Court, and the Court

accepted the records so submitted.

55. Ms. Laurel Phillips, CYF Supervisor, testified credibly that she

was unable to obtain Child’s records from his treatment at

Forbes Regional Hospital.

Child’s Care and Treatment in Guatemala:

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56. There is no medical care available in Child’s town in

Guatemala. The nearest doctor is five hours away by bus.

57. Child received a set of basic immunizations in Guatemala

when he was young.

58. Other than his immunizations, Child has never received

routine health care in Guatemala and has never seen a doctor

there.

59. The medical care Child needs for his TB is not available to

him in Guatemala.

60. Mother would not be able to provide adequate care for Child

if he were to return to her care.

61. Child left Guatemala to travel to the United States

approximately two years ago, when Child was 15 years old.

62. Mother provided Child with some money for the trip in order

to buy food. However, Mother sent Child on the trip by himself,

not accompanied by any adult.

63. Child’s trip to the United States required two or three days of

walking to reach the desert.

64. Child then needed to cross the desert and continue through

Mexico to reach the United States.

65. The trip from Guatemala to the United States is quite

dangerous.

66. Child’s family lives in extreme poverty in Guatemala. The

area where the family lives is not safe. There is gang activity

there. Kidnappings are not uncommon. The area is quite isolated

and receives little government assistance.

II. Procedural Background.

On April 22, 2015, Petitioner Casa San Jose filed an

Application to File Private Dependency Petition, Petition for

Dependency, and Request for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status

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with this [c]ourt. On May 13, 2015, the [c]ourt conducted a

hearing on Petitioner’s application and determined Petitioner

alleged sufficient facts to support a petition for dependency.4

During the hearing, the [c]ourt granted an oral motion by CYF to

intervene,5 determined that Petitioner was not a party to the

proceedings,6 and determined that Adult Cousin was a party and

had a right to be represented by counsel.7

The [c]ourt held a two-day adjudicatory hearing on the

petition on May 15, 2015 and May 22, 2015. Following the

conclusion of the hearing, the [c]ourt determined Child was

dependent pursuant to subsections (4) and (1) of the Juvenile

Act. The [c]ourt’s order to that effect was entered on the docket

on May 26, 2015.

In addition to the issue of dependency, the [c]ourt heard

testimony during the adjudicatory hearing on Petitioner’s request

to determine Child’s eligibility to pursue Special Immigrant

Juvenile (“SIJ”) status. SIJ is a federal immigration status

available to foreign children in the United States who have been

abused, abandoned, or neglected.8 To obtain SIJ status, a child

must first apply to a state court for an order finding that he or

she meets the statutory and regulatory requirements.9 Second,

he or she must submit a petition to U.S. Citizenship and

Immigration Services, which makes the final immigration

decision.10 In this matter, the [c]ourt found that Child met the

eligibility requirements to apply to the federal government for

SIJ status because he is under 21, unmarried, a dependent child,

and because reunification with his parents is not viable due to

neglect and it is not in his best interest to return to Guatemala.

The [c]ourt’s order to that effect was entered on the docket on

May 26, 2015.11

The [c]ourt proceeded to a dispositional hearing on May

27, 2015. A final dispositional order was entered on May 30,

2015.12 On June 25, 2015, CYF filed both a timely notice of

appeal of that order and a motion for reconsideration.13 On June

29, 2015, the [c]ourt granted CYF’s motion for reconsideration

and later scheduled a status conference for August 19, 2015 to

discuss with counsel the merits of the May 30, 2015 final order.

The Superior Court quashed CYF’s appeal on August 13, 2015

because this [c]ourt’s June 29, 2015 order granting

reconsideration rendered the appeal inoperative.14

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___________________________________________________

3

Order of Adjudication, ¶12-66 (May 22, 2015). As discussed in

Section III (B), the [c]ourt found some facts relevant to Child’s

dependency and some relevant to Child’s eligibility to apply to

the federal government for special immigrant juvenile status.

4

The [c]ourt made this finding pursuant to Pa.R.J.C.P. No.

1321(a)(2).

5

Tr. 2:19-3:12, 12:5-23 (May 13, 2015).

6

The [c]ourt made this finding pursuant to Pa.R.J.C.P. No. 1321.

7

Adult Cousin is a party to the dependency proceedings because

the dependency petition called into question his care and control

of Child. See Part 111.D below.

8

SIJ is an immigration status under the Immigration Act of

1990, as amended by the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims

Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (“TVPRA”), and codified

at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).

9

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 C.F.R. § 284.11 (this regulation

must be read in conjunction with the 2008 amendments to 8

U.S.C. § 1101, as the regulation has not been updated to reflect

those amendments).

10

See generally, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status:

Information for Juvenile Courts, U.S. Citizenship an

Immigration Services,

http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Green%20Card/

Green%20Card%20 Through

%20a%%20Job/Information_for_Juvenile-Courts—Final.pdf,

alternatively may be linked through http://www.uscis.gov/green-

card/special-immigrant-juveniles/speciall-immigrant-juveniles-

sij-status (last visited November 13, 2015).

11

Compare Order of Special Immigrant Juvenile Status

Eligibility (May 22, 2015), with, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (SIJ

status statutory requirements), and 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (SIJ

status regulatory requirements).

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12

See In Re: C.A.M., 399 A.2d 786 (Pa. Super. 1979)

(dependency adjudication is appealable after both a

determination of dependency and a disposition of the child).

13

CYF earlier appealed Adult Cousin’s standing to participate in

the dependency proceedings. That appeal was quashed as

untimely on July 15, 2015. See 913 WDA 2015 (docketed June

12, 2015).

14

See Pa.R.A.P. 170! and accompanying notes.

See Trial Court Opinion, 11/20/15, at 2-8.

This timely appeal followed. CYF filed a concise statement of errors on

appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

On appeal, CYF raises the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it

proceeded with the adjudication hearing without proper

notification to parents?

2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it

granted [Adult Cousin] standing to participate as a party in the

Juvenile Dependency proceeding?

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it

adjudicated [Child] dependent when there was insufficient

evidence presented to support a finding of dependency?

4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a

matter of law when it considered and relied on testimony

presented solely for the purpose of determining whether the

child meet[s] Special Immigrant Juvenile Status and used that

testimony as findings of fact for an adjudication of dependency?

CYF’s Brief, at 4.2

2

We note that CYF stated its issues somewhat differently in its concise

statement, and it changed the order of the issues. In its first and second

issues, respectively, as framed in its concise statement, CYF asserted that

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The relevant standard and scope of review in child dependency

matters is as follows.

We accept the trial court’s factual findings that are supported by

the record, and defer to the court’s credibility determinations.

We accord great weight to this function of the hearing judge

because he is in the position to observe and rule upon the

credibility of the witnesses and the parties who appear before

him. Relying upon his unique posture, we will not overrule [the

trial court’s] findings if they are supported by competent

evidence.

In re R.P., 957 A.2d 1205, 1211 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations and

quotations omitted) (brackets in original). We must accept the trial court’s

factual findings if they are supported by competent evidence. See In the

Interest of J.O.V., 686 A.2d 421, 422 (Pa. Super. 1996). This Court is not

bound by the trial court’s inferences or conclusions of law. See In re:

R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).

The proper standard of review in dependency cases is abuse of

discretion. See id. “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of

judgment; if, in reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the

law, or the judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either

manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will,

the trial court abused its discretion by adjudicating Child dependent when

there was insufficient evidence presented to support a finding of dependency

under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(1) and (4), and that the trial court erred as a

matter of law by adjudicating Child dependent when there was no competent

evidence presented on the record to support the allegations as alleged in the

private dependency petition. We find the issues preserved for our review.

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discretion has been abused.” Bulgarelli v. Bulgarelli, 934 A.2d 107, 111

(Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

Section 6302 of the Juvenile Code defines a “dependent child” in as

one who:

(1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence,

education as required by law, or other care or control necessary

for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals. A

determination that there is a lack of proper parental care or

control may be based upon evidence of conduct by the parent,

guardian or other custodian that places the health, safety or

welfare of the child at risk[.] . . .

(2) has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law;

(3) has been abandoned by his parents, guardian, or other

custodian;

(4) is without a parent, guardian, or legal custodian;

(5) while subject to compulsory school attendance is habitually

and without justification truant from school;

(6) has committed a specific acts or acts of habitual

disobedience of the reasonable and lawful commands of his

parent, guardian or other custodian and who is ungovernable

and found to be in need of care, treatment or supervision;

(7) is under the age of ten years and has committed a

delinquent act;

(8) has been formerly adjudicated dependent, and is under the

jurisdiction of the court, subject to its conditions or placements

and who commits an act which is defined as ungovernable in

paragraph (6);

(9) has been referred pursuant to section 6323 (relating to

informed adjustment), and who commits an act which is defined

as ungovernable in paragraph (6);

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(10) is born to a parent whose parental rights with regard to

another child have been involuntarily terminated under 23

Pa.C.S. § 2511 (relating to grounds for involuntary termination)

within three years immediately preceding the date of birth of the

child and conduct of the parent poses a risk to the health, safety

or welfare of the child.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302.

This Court has clarified the definition of “dependent child” further.

The question of whether a child is lacking proper parental care or

control so as to be a dependent child encompasses two discrete

questions: whether the child presently is without proper parental

care and control, and if so, whether such care and control are

immediately available.

In re G., T., 845 A.2d 870, 872 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal quotations and

citations omitted).

Additionally, we note that “[t]he burden of proof in a dependency

proceeding is on the petitioner to demonstrate by clear and convincing

evidence that a child meets that statutory definition of dependency.” Id.

(citation omitted).

With regard to a dependent child, this Court has explained that

[a] court is empowered by 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(a) and (c) to make

a finding that a child is dependent if the child meets the

statutory definition by clear and convincing evidence. If the court

finds that the child is dependent, then the court may make an

appropriate disposition of the child to protect the child’s physical,

mental and moral welfare, including allowing the child to remain

with the parents subject to supervision, transferring temporary

legal custody to a relative or public agency, or transferring

custody to the juvenile court of another state. 42 Pa.C.S. §

6351(a).

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In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 617 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc) (citation

omitted).

First, CYF contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law when

it proceeded with the adjudicatory hearing without proper notice to the

parties, in contravention of the Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court

Procedure.

With regard to the notice issue, CYF contends that the trial court failed

to comply with the rules regarding the service of notice on the parties,

particularly Child’s parents. CYF cites Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court

Procedure 1331, and 1360 and 1360(C).

With regard to service to parties, Rule 1331 states:

A. Copy. Upon the filing of a petition, a copy of the petition shall

be served promptly upon the child, the child’s guardian, the

child's attorney, the guardian’s attorney, the attorney for the

county agency, and the county agency.

Pa.R.J.C.P. 1331. The comment to the Rule instructs that if the parent is not

the child's guardian the parent is still to receive service of the petition.

Rule 1360 directs that the court “shall issue a summons compelling all

parties to appear for the adjudicatory hearing.” Pa.R.J.C.P. 1360. See also

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6335. The requirements for the summons are as follows:

C. Requirements. The summons shall:

(1) be in writing;

(2) set forth the date, time, and place of the adjudicatory

hearing;

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(3) instruct the child and the guardian about their rights to

counsel, and if the child’s guardian is without financial resources

or otherwise unable to employ counsel, the right to assigned

counsel;

(4) give a warning stating that the failure to appear for the

hearing may result in arrest; and

(5) include a copy of the petition unless the petition has been

previously served.

Pa.R.J.C.P. 1360(C).

Rule 1361 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure also

mandate the provision of an Adjudicatory Notice to the parties, and that the

serving party show proof of service by filing an affidavit of service. If the

serving party does not file an affidavit of service, then “the serving party

shall advise the court of what efforts were made to notify a person. The

court may proceed to a hearing upon a showing of reasonable efforts to

locate and notify all persons pursuant to Rule 1360.” Pa.R.J.C.P. 1363(D).

Prior to commencing the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court is

required to ascertain whether the notice requirements of Rules 1360 and

1361 were met. See Pa.R.J.C.P. Rule 1406(A)(1)(a).

The trial court addressed the notice issue as follows.

CYF complains that the [c]ourt should not have proceeded with

the adjudicatory hearing because the Petitioner failed to formally

notify Parents of the petition. The [c]ourt questions whether CYF

is the appropriate party to raise this issue. Mother waived notice

through her counsel,39 and Father has not appealed. The [c]ourt

does not see how CYF was prejudiced by the [c]ourt’s decision to

proceed. Assuming the Superior Court wishes to address this

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issue, the [c]ourt will briefly discuss its reasons for moving

forward with the adjudicatory hearing:

The Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure allow the [c]ourt to

conduct an adjudicatory hearing if reasonable efforts have been

made to notify the parties of the proceeding.40 Here, the

Petitioner admittedly failed to provide notice to Parents.41 The

[c]ourt addressed this problem by instructing counsel to make

phone contact with Parents between the first and second days of

the adjudicatory hearing.42 This effort to provide notice

succeeded. Mother participated fully in the second day of the

adjudicatory hearing. The [c]ourt located and arranged for an

interpreter capable of communicating with Mother and also made

appointed counsel immediately available.

As Mother credibly testified, although Father lives in the

same household with Mother, he is away looking for work for

most of every month, was away at the time of the hearing and

was unable to participate.

It became apparent from Mother’s testimony that

circumstances would not likely have permitted any other form of

notice. Parents do not receive mail in their village, and Mother’s

testimony supports the conclusion that they do not receive mail

at all. The internet is not available. Mother does not read or

write any language and speaks only Chuj, a rare Mayan dialect.43

Under these circumstances, the actual telephonic notice provided

seems both reasonable to the [c]ourt and more effective than

delivery of a written copy of the petition that Mother could not

have read.

For these reasons, the [c]ourt felt reasonable efforts were

made to notify Parents of and involve them in the adjudicatory

hearing.44

___________________________________________________

38

Tr. 45:1-47:23, 60:10-62:15, 64:16-67:4, 71:22-79:5 (May

15, 2015) (sorting relevance of testimony); 35:6-36:7, 47:17-

49:17, 55:23-56:19, 57:14-58:9 (May 22, 2015) (sorting

relevance of testimony); 113:9-121:18 (May 22, 2015)

(explaining disposition).

39

Tr. 103: 10-18 (May 22, 2015).

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40

Pa.R.J.C.P. No. 1363.

41

Tr. 112:25-113:14 (May 15, 2015).

42

Tr. 175:14-176:24 (May 15, 2015); Tr. 6:6-7:22 (May 22,

2015).

43

Tr. 53:11-55:7 (May 22, 2015) (reading and writing); Tr.

175:18-176:24 (May 15, 2015) (Chuj dialect).

44

The Court is not aware of any case law guidance regarding the

adequacy of efforts to provide notice of a dependency

proceeding since the Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure for

Dependency Matters became effective in 2007. Previous case law

does not even recognize an obligation to make reasonable efforts

to locate and provide notice to an absent parent. Cf. In re J.C.,

603 A.2d 627 (Pa. Super. 1992) (holding that County agency

need not make “reasonable” efforts to locate absent,

noncustodial parent whose whereabouts are unknown prior to

obtaining finding of dependency). The [c]ourt suggests that it is

wise to leave discretion to trial courts to determine what is

reasonable in the context of the specific circumstances an

individual case presents. Here, the [c]ourt was faced with a child

who had been out of his parents’ care for almost two years and

who had not received medical care recommended six months

earlier. While the [c]ourt must and does respect a parent’s

custodial rights, the [c]ourt must not risk a child’s well-being in

so doing. The [c]ourt believes it exercised discretion reasonably

under these circumstances.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/20/15, at 15-16.

Importantly, the trial court found that Mother, through her counsel,

waived notice and testified at the hearing. Father was out of town and

unavailable, and does not challenge the provision of notice to him or the

adjudication and disposition order in any way. We agree, and find no abuse

of the trial court’s discretion in holding the hearing despite the failure of CYF

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to strictly adhere to the notice provisions of the Pennsylvania Rules of

Juvenile Court Procedure and the Juvenile Act under the circumstances of

the instant case.

Next, we address CYF’s second issue, alleging Adult Cousin’s lack of

standing to participate as a party to the proceedings. CYF argues that the

Pennsylvania Rule of Juvenile Court Procedure dictate the procedure

necessary for a non-party to gain party status as follows.

Rule 1133. Motion to Intervene

A. Contents. The motion to intervene shall include:

(1) the name and address of the person moving to

intervene;

(2) the relationship of the intervening person to the child;

(3) the contact between the child and the intervening

person;

(4) the grounds on which intervention is sought; and

(5) the request sought.

B. Action by court. Upon the filing of a motion to intervene and

after a hearing, the court shall enter an order granting or

denying the motion.

Pa.R.J.C.P. 1133.

We agree with CYF that our case law establishes that, where the child

in question has a legal custodian, it is the care being given to the child in

question at the time of the filing of the dependency petition that is the focus

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of the Juvenile Act, not whether the Child previously experienced an

abandonment by his natural parents.

“[T]he Juvenile Act focuses on the care and control afforded a child,

regardless of the status of the provider: natural parent, foster parent, or

parent substitute.” In re L.J., 691 A.2d 520, 526 (Pa. Super. 1997). See

also In re Michael Y., 530 A.2d 115 (Pa. Super. 1987). Thus, we have

instructed that a legal custodian is treated on par with a parent for purposes

of the dependency inquiry, and should be included in the proceedings.

In fact, this Court further stated that

[a]lthough the Juvenile Act does not define “party,” case law

from this Court has conferred the status of party to a

dependency proceeding on three classes of persons: (1) the

parents of the juvenile whose dependency status is at issue; (2)

the legal custodian of the juvenile whose dependency status is at

issue[;] or (3) the person whose care and control of the juvenile

is in question. . . . These categories logically stem from the fact

that upon an adjudication of dependency, the court has the

authority to remove a child from the custody of his or her

parents or legal custodian. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ [sic] 6351. Due

process requires that the child’s legal caregiver, be it a parent or

other custodian, be granted party status in order to be able to

participate and present argument in the dependency

proceedings. . . .

In re L.C., II, 900 A.2d 378, 381 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted).

The trial court provided the following reasoning.

[T]he Superior Court recognizes three classes of persons

as having standing in dependency proceedings:

(1) the parents of the juvenile whose dependency status

is at issue; (2) the legal custodian of the juvenile whose

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dependency status is at issue, or (3) the person whose

care and control of the juvenile is in question.45

Here, Adult Cousin falls squarely into the third class

because the Private Dependency Petition directly called into

question his care and control of Child. Specifically, the petition

alleged:

[Adult Cousin] has brought [Child] to his monthly

appointments at the Allegheny County Health Department

TB Clinic but hasn’t followed up on any of the other

needed care. [Child] should be receiving care to check

the stability of his spine as well as appointments to check

that the medication isn’t damaging his vision.46

CYF did not dispute that these allegations raised the issue of the

adequacy of Adult Cousin’s care. Rather, CYF argued that the

petition did not question Adult Cousin’s care because petitioner

failed to check the line for subsection (1) on the form petition

that Petitioner used.47 This argument elevates form over

substance and merits no relief. Rule 1126 of the Rules of

Juvenile Court Procedure instructs a trial court not to dismiss a

matter because of a defect in form unless the court is notified of

the defect prior to the adjudicatory hearing and the defect is

prejudicial to the rights of a party. Here, CYF timely notified the

[c]ourt of the alleged defect by filing its May 14, 2015

Emergency Motion for Reconsideration. CYF, however, failed to

establish that it suffered any prejudice because of this defect.49

Furthermore, the [c]ourt’s recognition of Adult Cousin as a

person with party standing fell within the scope of the [c]ourt’s

duty to protect the rights of litigants who come before it.

Section 6337 of the Juvenile Act grants parties in juvenile

matters the right to be represented by counsel.50 The section

further requires the [c]ourt to ascertain whether an

unrepresented party appearing before the [c]ourt is aware of

this right.51 It seems clearly inherent in this duty to notify

parties of their right to counsel that the [c]ourt has a

corresponding duty to determine whether an unrepresented

person appearing before the [c]ourt is a party who should be

informed of this right. 52

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Because the adequacy of Adult Cousin’s care and control of

Child was challenged in the Private Dependency Petition, the

[c]ourt appropriately recognized his standing to participate as a

party in the adjudicatory hearing.

___________________________________________________

45

CYF Emergency Motion for Reconsideration, ¶ 4 (May 14,

2015) (citing In re L.C., II, 900 A.2d 378, 381 (Pa. Super.

2006)).

46

Private Dependency Petition, 3 (April 22, 2015).

47

Tr. 20:2-14 (May 15, 2015), Subsection (4) was the only line

checked on the form petition. Private Dependency Petition, 2

(April 22, 2015).

48

Pa.R.J.C.P. 1126.

49

Prejudice might have occurred had petitioner failed to mention

in the text of the private dependency petition that Adult Cousin

failed to provide Child with adequate parental care and control,

leaving other parties unable to anticipate that claim when

preparing to litigate the adjudicatory hearing. See, e.g., In re

R.M., [567 Pa. 646, 653-655, 790 A.2d 300, 305 (2002)] (due

process requires that a dependency petition provide a

“reasonable factual specificity” of the facts of the matter(s) so

that a party may adequately prepare a response and defense).

50

42 Pa.C.S. § 6337.

51

Id.; see also, Pa.R.J.C.P. 1406(A)(1)(b)(requiring the court

to determine whether unrepresented parties have been informed

of their right to counsel under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6337). The Superior

Court has held that a Court’s failure to advise an unrepresented

party of this right is grounds for reversal. See, In re Manuel,

566 A.2d 626 (Pa. Super. 1989) (couple, whose care and control

of child was in question, did not waive right to counsel when trial

court failed to advise couple of their right to counsel and couple

failed to affirmatively waive their right on the record).

52

While no affirmative duty to determine party status appears in

the Juvenile Act or the Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure, this

means of fulfilling the [c]ourt’s required duties under Section

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J-A10015-16

6337 comports with the purpose of the Juvenile Act. See, e.g.,

42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(4) (identifying one purpose of Act as “[to

provide means through which the provisions of [the Juvenile Act]

are executed and enforced and in which the parties are assured

a fair hearing and their constitutional and other legal rights are

recognized and enforced”).

Trial Court Opinion, 11/20/15, at 17-18.

We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in finding that Adult

Cousin had standing to participate as a party to the proceedings, as a

caregiver of the juvenile child whose care and control was in question under

the circumstances of the instant case.

Next, we address the fourth issue raised in CYF’s brief. CYF complains

that the trial court allowed testimony, over the objection of CYF’s counsel,

regarding the conditions Child experienced in Guatemala for purposes of

making a finding with regard to SIJ status. CYF asserts that the trial court

then used the testimony as facts to establish Child’s dependency under 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(1) and (4). CYF claims that the trial court erred as a

matter of law and abused its discretion when it considered evidence and

relied on testimony presented solely for determining whether Child met SIJ

status in its findings of fact for an adjudication of dependency.

The trial court provided the following reasoning with regard to this

issue.

In this matter, Petitioner Casa San Jose requested both an

adjudication of dependency and findings necessary to permit

Child to apply to the federal government for special immigrant

juvenile status.35 The [c]ourt found that Child meets the

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eligibility criteria for SIJ status and entered an order to that

effect following adjudication.36

On appeal, CYF does not challenge the [c]ourt’s order

regarding Child’s eligibility for SIJ status.37 CYF complains only

that the [c]ourt mistakenly relied on testimony related to Child’s

request for SIJ eligibility findings to support the [c]ourt’s

conclusion that Child is a dependent child. This complaint lacks

merit. The [c]ourt properly considered facts relevant to

dependency when adjudicating Child dependent and considered

facts relevant to SIJ status when finding Child eligible to apply

for SIJ status.

For purposes of judicial economy, the [c]ourt heard

testimony related to dependency and SIJ status during the same

proceeding. The [c]ourt’s decision to do so did not differ from

common practice in proceedings without juries where the court

serves as finder of fact. For instance, in dependency matters, the

[c]ourt frequently hears testimony on adjudication and

disposition in the same hearing. Similarly, in termination of

parental rights matters, the [c]ourt frequently hears testimony

on grounds for termination and the child’s needs and welfare in

the same hearing. Just as in those cases, this [c]ourt considered

all admissible evidence, sorted it, relied on the portions relevant

to dependency to make the dependency determination, and

relied on the portions relevant to SIJ to make the SIJ

determination. Furthermore, the [c]ourt took considerable and

specific care to distinguish the testimony relevant to dependency

from the testimony relevant to SIJ status during the hearing,

during the [c]ourt’s announcement of its ruling on the record,

and in the written findings of fact contained in the order of

adjudication.38

For these reasons, CYF is mistaken about the [c]ourt’s

application of the facts and the Superior Court should affirm.

___________________________________________________

35

See generally, Private Dependency Petition (April 22, 2015).

36

See, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Eligibility, CP-02-DP-

0000797-2015 (May 22, 2015).

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J-A10015-16

37

While this court is not aware of any published decisions by the

Superior Court regarding how Pennsylvania trial courts should

handle requests for SIJ status findings, state appellate courts

have addressed the interplay between the federal immigration

process and state juvenile courts. E.g., H.S.P. v. J.K., 121 A.3d

849 (N.J. 2015); see also, Special Immigrant Juvenile

Status: Information for Juvenile Courts, supra fn. 10.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/20/15, at 14-15 (footnotes in original).

“Questions concerning the relevancy of evidence are within the sound

discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear

abuse of discretion.” Sprague v. Walter, 656 A.2d 890, 907 (Pa. Super.

1995) (citation omitted).

After careful review of the record in this matter, for the reasons set

forth by the trial court, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in

allowing testimony, over the objection of CYF’s counsel, regarding the

conditions Child experienced in Guatemala for purposes of making a finding

with regard to SIJ status in this matter.

Finally, we address CYF’s third issue: whether there was insufficient

evidence upon which to find Child dependent. CYF asserts that there was no

evidence to support a finding that Child is dependent under § 6302(4) of the

Juvenile Act, regarding lack of a parent, guardian, or legal custodian. With

regard to its finding of dependency under § 6302(4), the trial court provided

the following reasoning.

The Juvenile Act rests on the recognition that children are

vulnerable and the state has an obligation to protect them.19

This obligation includes ensuring that children are in the legal

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custody of a responsible adult. Unlike adults, children cannot

legally take care of and provide for themselves. Unless

emancipated, children generally cannot enter contracts, rent an

apartment, enroll themselves in school, or apply for public

benefits. Children are limited in their capacity to obtain

employment and control bank accounts. When a child is sick,

that child generally cannot provide consent to be treated.20 The

law expects adults, typically parents, to exercise legal authority

on behalf of children.

Given the importance of the legal role adults play on behalf

of children, the General Assembly wisely included children who

lack such a responsible adult within the Juvenile Act’s definition

of “dependent child.”21 Thus, when a child lacks a parent,

guardian, or legal custodian and comes to the attention of the

state, the [c]ourt can rectify the situation by adjudicating the

child dependent and awarding temporary legal custody to a

qualified individual, a licensed agency, or a public agency such

as CYF.22 Adjudication on this basis does not require proof that

the Child has suffered some specific harm, or faces some future

harm. The General Assembly recognized that the mere lack of a

parent, legal custodian, or guardian itself warrants the state's

intervention.

In this matter, Child does not have a responsible adult

available to exercise legal authority on his behalf. It was

undisputed that Adult Cousin is not Child’s legal custodian, and

that a prior guardianship was no longer in effect.23 While Child

does have living parents (“Parents”), they are not present in

Allegheny County, or in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or

in the United States of America. Parents live in a small

Guatemalan village, some 1,800 miles away from Allegheny

County. Mother testified that Parents do not receive mail and do

not have access to the internet. Mother testified she might be

able to receive mail if it was sent to the next village, which is a

five to six hours from Parents’ home.24 Even phone

communication with Parents is difficult, as Parents only speak

Chuj. Chuj is a 2,000 year-old rare Mayan dialect spoken by

43,000 people worldwide.25 Court staff and administration

worked diligently to locate and secure qualified Chuj interpreters

for this matter, none of whom reside in Pennsylvania. These

circumstances make it effectively impractical and impossible for

- 26 -

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Parents to exercise legal authority on behalf of Child here in

Allegheny County.26

These facts by themselves and without anything more,

warranted an adjudication of dependency. As discussed above,

adjudication under subsection (4) does not require proof that the

lack of a legal custodian has caused or will cause the Child harm.

Even though this evidence was not necessary for adjudication,

the [c]ourt heard ample testimony during the hearing to

conclude that Child has been harmed by his lack of a legal

custodian. When Child was hospitalized in November 2014 at

Forbes Regional Hospital for tuberculosis of the spine, the

hospital could only provide Child with emergency care because

Child lacked a legal custodian to consent to additional medical

treatment.27 While the hospital successfully had a temporary

guardian appointed for Child, the evidence at the hearing

demonstrated that the temporary guardian failed to exercise

appropriate and necessary legal authority following Child’s

discharge from the hospital. The county health department

followed up with Child’s tuberculosis treatment, but the

temporary guardian failed to facilitate or provide consent for

Child's other necessary follow-up medical care.28 Child also

nearly was refused a simple blood draw at the county

tuberculosis cl¡nic.29

Given the above, the [c]ourt properly concluded that Child

lacks a parent guardian, or custodian -- a status the General

Assembly clearly recognized as warranting an adjudication of

dependency.30

________________________________________________________

19

See generally, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b).

20

Cf. Minors’ Consent Act, 35 P.S. § 10101 et seq. (allowing

minors to consent to their own medical treatment in limited

circumstances).

21

42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(4) (‘dependent child’ includes a child who

“is without a parent, guardian, or legal custodian”).

22

42 Pa. C.S. § 6351(2).

23

Tr. 113:18 - 114:13 (May 15, 2015).

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J-A10015-16

24

Tr. 40:11-43:10 (May 22, 2015).

25

See, e.g. M. Paul Lewis, Gary F. Simons & Charles D. Fennig,

Ethnologue: Languages of the World, Chuj (18th ed. 2015),

available at http://www.ethnologue.com/language/cac.

26

The record reflects no attempt by Parents to exercise legal

decision-making authority on behalf of Child since they sent him

to the U.S. in 2013. Even when Child was hospitalized, the

record reflects no effort by Parents to act, or to explore possible

ways to delegate their legal decision-making authority to some

other responsible adult.

27

Minors’ Consent Act, 35 P.S. § 10104.

28

The parties stipulated that “Forbes Regional Hospital

recommended cardiology, neurology, and orthopedic as follow

upon discharge” and that the follow-up care did not occur. Tr.

30:14-31:18 (May 22, 2015).

29

Tr. 147:25-150:10 (May 15, 2015) (Casa San Jose staff

explaining difficulty in ensuring Child could have his blood drawn

because no one present at appointment had legal authority to

consent for the procedure).

30

This Court is unaware of any case law discussing the scope or

application of subsection (4) of the definition of “dependent

child”. For the reasons given, this Court believes subsection (4)

provides the basis for adjudication that most accurately matches

Child’s circumstances. However, if the Superior Court is not

inclined to provide guidance on subsection (4) at this time, this

Court would suggest that the circumstances also support an

adjudication based on subsection (1). Parents’ failure to even

attempt to exercise legal decision-making authority to help Child

receive necessary medical treatment in the U.S. demonstrates

their inadequate parental care or control of Child.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/20/15, at 10-12.

After careful review of the record in this matter, for the reasons set

forth by the trial court, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in

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J-A10015-16

finding that Child was dependent for lack of a parent, guardian, or legal

custodian under section 6302(4) of the Juvenile Act.

CYF also asserts that there was no evidence to support a finding that

Child is dependent under § 6302(1) of the Juvenile Act, regarding lack of

necessary parental care or control. With regard to its finding of dependency

under § 6302(1), the trial court provided the following reasoning.

If the only basis for Child's dependency had been lack of a

legal custodian, the [c]ourt could have adjudicated Child

dependent and awarded temporary legal custody to Adult

Cousin.31 However, the evidence presented during the

adjudicatory hearing also clearly demonstrated Child was

dependent pursuant to subsection (1) because Child’s caregiver,

Adult Cousin, failed to provide Child with adequate care and

control.

Child’s caregiver in the United States is Adult Cousin.

While Adult Cousin has taken Child to most of his tuberculosis

appointments, he failed to schedule or arrange appointments for

necessary follow-up care related to concerns about Child’s spine,

heart murmur, and vision problems.32 Casa San Jose staff, who

attend appointments with Child and Adult Cousin to help

translate, testified credibly that Child has missed medical

appointments because of Adult Cousin’s work schedule and that

Adult Cousin has failed to schedule and arrange follow-up

treatment for Child.33

Well-settled case law establishes that the question of

whether a child is dependent due to lack of proper parental care

or control encompasses two discrete questions: “whether the

child presently is without proper parental care and control, and if

so, whether such care and control are immediately available.”34

Here, Child lacked proper care or control from Adult Cousin

because of Adult Cousin’s failure to provide or obtain necessary

health care. The, [c]ourt quite reasonably found that such care

was not immediately available from Parents. Parents live 1,800

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J-A10015-16

miles away in Guatemala and were clearly not available to

assume immediate custody of Child.

___________________________________________________

31

42 Pa. C.S. § 6351(a)(2).

32

The parties stipulated that the recommended follow-up care

did not occur. Tr. 30:14-31:18 (May 22, 2015).

33

Tr. 109;2-112:7 (Casa San Jose Supervisor, Sister Janice);

and, Tr. 155:15-156:7 (Casa San Jose Staff Member, Grace

Muller).

34

In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 619 (Pa. Super. 2002).

Trial Court Opinion, 11/20/15, at 13-14.

After careful review of the record in this matter, for the reasons set

forth by the trial court, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in

finding that Child was dependent for lack of a parent, guardian, or legal

custodian under § 6302(1) of the Juvenile Act.

In the May 30, 2015 order, the trial court found that it is not in Child’s

best interests to be removed from the United States and returned to

Guatemala. The trial court resolved the issue of dependency in this case in

accordance with its obligation to determine the best possible result for Child

to insure that his long-term physical needs and essential medical care will be

met. The trial court’s decision to determine dependency and allow for Child

to have an appointed caregiver allows the caregiver to make important

medical decisions for Child. The record presented clear and convincing

evidence of dependency as a matter of law, as Child was without a parent or

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legal guardian who can provide for his needs and well-being. Accordingly, we

affirm the order of the trial court.3

Order affirmed. Motion to quash denied.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/7/2017

3

Adult cousin filed a motion to quash the appeal, arguing that CYF is not an

aggrieved party and that its Rule 1925(b) statement was too vague to

permit review. We summarily deny the motion.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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