Bechard v. United States

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No. 16-1177C (Pro Se) FEB - 6 20li

(Filed: February 6,2017 | Not for Publication)

U.S. COURT OF

Keywords: Pro Se Complaint FEDERAL oLAIMS

RYAN THOMAS BECHARD, Sovereign Citizen; Subject Matter

Jurisdiction; Motion to Transfer;

Plaintiff, Frivolous Claims.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

Ryan Thomas Bechqrd, Mondovi, WI, Plaintiff pro se.

Rebecca S. Kruser, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, U.S. Department of

Justice, Washington, DC, with whom werc Claudia Burke, Assistant Director, Robert E.

Kirschman, .Ir., Director, and, Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attomey

General, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

KAPLAN, Judge.

The pro se plaintiff in this case, Ryan Thomas Bechard, filed this action on

September 21, 2016. Compl. at l, Docket No. 1. Mr. Bechard's complaint is captioned as

a "[v]erified [b]ill in [e]quity for [r]elease of [t]rustee, [a]ccounting, [d]eclaratory,

[s]pecial, [s]upplementary and [g]eneral [r]elief." Id. He asserts a number of interrelated

causes of action stemming from his beliefthat a corporation was created in his name

through his birth certificate and social security number and that this "person-corporation"

is "indebted and underwritten by insurance companies ofthe German Empire according

to the'Trading With The Enemy Act."'Id. at 13. Mr. Bechard requests certain equitable

relief with respect to, among other things, his alleged trustee status. He also seeks a

declaratory judgment and money damages based on his allegations of trustee status,

asserts a variety oftort claims, and alleges generalized violations of unspecified

Constitutional provisions.

Cunently before the Court is the govemment's motion to dismiss the complaint

pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) ofthe Rules of the Court ofFederal Claims

(RCFC), Docket No. 14, as well as a Motion to Transfer that Mr. Bechard filed on

October 24. 2016. Docket No. 8. In his motion to transfer, Mr. Bechard asserts that

"[a]djudication of matters involving trusts can only be done in exclusive jurisdiction of

Equity, which, within a Federal Court, pursuant to the Constitution, can only be before an

Article III Judee." Mot. to Transfer at l. Mr. Bechard thus requests that this case be

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assigned to an Article III judge or transferred to the United States Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit. Id.

For the reasons set forth below, the govemment's motion to dismiss is

GRANTED and Mr. Bechard's motion to transfer is DENIED.T

BACKGROTJND

The allegations in Mr. Bechard's complaint are difficult to follow, but appear to

be grounded on a set ofbeliefs held by members of the so-called "sovereign citizen"

movement. See. e.g., Gmvatt v. United States, 100 Fed. CL.279,282-83 & n.1 (201 1)

(citing Brvant v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 524 F. Supp. 2d753,758-59 (W.D. Va. 2007))

(describing tenets ofthe sovereign citizen movement); see also Rivera v. United States,

105 Fed. Cl. 644,64H7 (2012). Thus, the complaint is predicated on the notion that Mr.

Bechard is what he terms a "surety debtor and trustee to the 'United States'/ColB

[i.e., "certificate of live birth] person-corporation business entity." Compl. at 15.

Specifically, Mr. Bechard claims that although he was led to believe that his birth

certificate and social security number were "just for informational purposes only, a tax ID

number," in reality, "pursuant to the 'Federal Reserve Act', 'Trading With the Enemy

Act' and'Emergency Banking Act', [he] was fraudulently set up to be a surety debtor

and trustee to tle 'United States'/ColB person-corporation business entity underwritten

and indebted by a social insurance policy of the German Empire." Id. Mr. Bechard asserts

that he mistakenly "accepted [the] office oftrustee and 'acted as trustee'to an implied

trust by use ofthe numbers on [his social security] card to get ajob and open bank

accounts." Id. at 15-16.

"From research into this subject," Mr. Bechard also believes that the bottom

portion ofhis birth certificate, which allegedly is not included in his Certificate of Live

Birth, contains "the corporation and banking information." Id. at 16. He claims, however,

that he has only been given the upper portion. Id. Thus, he alleges that during an August

14,2014 t:rp to the Wisconsin Vital Records office in Madison, Wisconsin, he was

denied access to his complete original birth certificate. Id. He also describes an order he

placed with the Wisconsin Vital Records office to obtain the "long form" of his birth

certificate and how the Wisconsin Registrar allegedly told him that this long form could

not be provided "because it contains confidential information." Id. at 17.

Furthermore, Mr. Bechard alleges that on October 20,2014, he sent a "Notice of

Claim" to the "Office of the Attomey General . . . as prescribed by the Trading With the

Enemy Act," which contained his and his family members' birth certificates and social

security cards. Id. atlT. Apparently, this package was retumed to him on December 14,

2014.Id. at 1 8. Mr. Bechard also describes his attempts to terminate the supposed trusts

and establish himself instead as a beneficiary through the use of Intemal Revenue Service

forms. Id. at 18. Mr. Bechard has apparently also requested that the Department of State

I Mr. Bechard has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court GRANTS that

motion solely for purposes of dismissing his complaint.

place him on the "Blue List" for "Diplomatic Passports, Diplomatic Immunities photo ID

and other minor items." ld. at 18-19.

Based on these allegations, Mr. Bechard seeks to be discharged as trustee on the

grounds that the alleged trusteeship and debt were induced by fraud. Id. at 23. He

requests an accounting and that he be established as a beneficiary to funds he believes are

in this trust. See id. at 13,18,21,26-27. Similarly, Mr. Bechard requests that the

"person-corporation estates" ofhis wife, children, and deceased family members be

placed "in the proper office ofcestui que trust." Id. at 19-20. Mr. Bechard also requests a

cout order commanding Wisconsin's Vital Records Department to deliver his "original

ink pen impressed 'Certificate of Live Birth' instruments." Id. at 27. In addition, Mr.

Bechard requests money damages relating to tort claims of fraud and libel. Id. at 28. He

further asks the Court to order that the Secretary of State place him and his family

members on a "diplomatic list" or "Blue List," pursuant to 8 C.F.R. $ 101.3, and that they

be provided with "other items, benefits or privileges pertaining to [their] 'non-citizen

national' status and 'diplomatic agenVofficer' level immunities and privileges." Id. at 29.

Finally, Mr. Bechard requests that a hearing be held as soon as possible "on the grounds

ofviolations ofrights under the Constitution," and that the Court award him any other

reliefrequired by the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act or any other source of law. Id.

at29-30.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

In deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court

accepts as true all undisputed facts in the pleadings and draws all reasonable inferences in

favor of the plaintiff. Trusted Integration. Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d I 159, t 163

(Fed. Cir, 201 1). The court may "inquire into jurisdictional facts" to determine whether it

has jurisdiction. Rocovich v. United States , 933 F .2d 991 , 993 (Fed. Cir. 1 991 ). It is well

established that complaints that are filed by pro se plaintiffs, like this one, are held to

"less strhgent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kemer,

404 U.S. 519,520 (1972). Nonetheless, even pro se plaintiffs must persuade the court

that jurisdictional requirements have been met. Bemard v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 497,

499,af?d,98 F. App'x 860 (Fed. Cir.2004).

Pursuant to the Tucker Act, the United States Court ofFederal Claims has

jurisdiction to "render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either

upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation ofan executive

department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for

liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. $ 1491(a)

(2012). The Tucker Act serves as a waiver of sovereign immunity and ajurisdictional

grant, but it does not create a substantive cause of action, Jan's Helicopter Serv.. Inc. v.

Fed. Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299,1306 (Fed. Cir.2008). A plaintilf, therefore, must

establish that "a separate sowce of substantive law . . . creates the right to money

damages." Id. (quoting Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167 , ll72 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en

banc in relevant part)).

The primary relief Mr. Bechard seeks in his complaint is equitable in nature.

Indeed, the premise of the complaint is that it is a "Bill in Equity," which seeks an order

releasing him and his family members as trustees of supposed trusts, ordering an

accounting, forming a constructive trust, and directing the Wisconsin registrar and the

Secretary of State to take certain actions. The Court of Federal Claims, however, lacks

jurisdiction to grant such equitable relief absent a "concurrent colorable claim for

monetary recovery." Wheeler v. United States, 1l F.3d 156, 159 (Fed. Cir. 1993)

(quoting Bobula v. U.S. Deo't of Justice,970 F.2d 854, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); see also

James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 580 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that the "Court of Federal

Claims has no power to grant affirmative non-monetary relief unless it is tied and

subordinate to a money judgmenf' (quotation omitted)).

In this case, Mr. Bechard has not made a colorable claim for monetary damages

because he has failed to identify any money-mandating statute that can serve as the basis

for such a claim. Further, his generic claims ofunspecified constitutional violations are

insufficient because this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate claims based on provisions

of the Constitution that are not money-mandating. See. e.g., LeBlanc v. United States, 50

F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that due process clauses and equal protection

clause do not provide a "suffrcient basis for jurisdiction because they do not mandate

payment of money by the govemment"). And his defamation and libel claims are beyond

this Court's jurisdiction because "[t]he plain language of the Tucker Act excludes from

the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction claims sounding in tort." Rick's Mushroom

Serv.. Inc. v. United States,521 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir.2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. $

la91(aX1).

In short, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims set forth in Mr. Bechard's

complaint. For that reason, the government's motion to dismiss pursuant to RCFC

l2(bXl) must be GRANTED.

II. Motion to Transfer

Mr. Bechard, as noted, filed a motion to transfer this case, "by the authority in 28

U.S.C. $ 1631 and RCFC rule 40.1." See Mot. to Transfer at I (emphasis omitted).

Specifically, he requests that this case be assigned to an Article III judge or transferred to

the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Id.

Section 1631 of Title 28 states that "[w]henever a civil action is filed in a court as

defined in section 610 of this title . . . and that court finds that there is a want of

jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest ofjustice, transfer such action . . . to any

other such court in which the action . . . could have been brought at the time it was filed

or noticed." The Federal Circuit has held that the "in the interest ofjustice" factor relates

"to claims which are nonfrivolous and as such should be decided on the merits."

Galloway Farms. Inc. v. United States, 834 F.2d 998, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing

Zinser Constr. Co. v. United States,753F.2d 1053, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).

The Court declines to transfer this case to the Federal Circuit or to any other

federal court. First, a transfer to the Federal Circuit would clearly be improper, as that

court is an appellate tribunal and lacks jurisdiction to hear original cases like the one Mr.

Bechard has brought here. See 28 U.S.C. 91295. Second, the Court declines to transfer

the case to a district court because Mr. Bechard's claims "lack[] an arguable basis either

in law or in fact" and are therefore frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,325

(1989). Indeed, Mr. Bechard filed similar claims in the United States District Court for

the Westem District of Wisconsin; and that court concluded that he had failed to

"articulate a non-frivolous cause of action or claim for relief over which this court has

jurisdiction." Bechard v. Rios, No. I4-CV-867-WMC, 2014 WL 7366226, at * I (W.D.

Wis. Dec. 24,2014). Other courts have also held that complaints based on "sovereign

citizen" theories are "nonsensical" and "frivolous." Gravatt, 100 Fed. Cl. at 288; see also

Troxelle v. United States, No. 10-312 C, 2010 WL 3982349, at *5 n.9 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 6,

2010) (declining to transfer plaintiffs claims that his birth certificate and registration

with the Social Security Administration constitute a taking of the use of his name by the

United States because such claims were frivolous and lacked any basis in law or in fact).

Finally, as noted, Mr. Bechard's Motion to Transfer also references RCFC 40.1.

This Rule addresses the intemal transfer ofcases between judges ofthe Court of Federal

Claims. It does not allow the ChiefJudge to assign ajudge from an Article III court to

this case, as Mr. Bechard apparently desires.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the foregoing, the govemment's motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED without

prejudice. The plaintiffls Motion to Transfer is DENIED. The Clerk is directed to enter

judgment accordingly. Each party shall bear its own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ELAINE D. KAPLAN

Judge