Langley v. United States

3Jn tbe Wniteb ~tates QCourt of jfeberal QCiaitns

No. 16-206 T

(Filed: February 3, 2017) FILED

FEB - 3 2017

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

U.S . COURT OF

) FEDERAL CLAIMS

GINA BRASHER LANGLEY, )

) Income Tax Refund; Lack of Subject

Plaintiff, ) Matter Jurisdiction; RCFC l 2(b)(1 );

) Failure to State A Claim; RCFC

v. ) 12(b)(6); Untimely Filing; RCFC

) 12(g); I.R.C. §§ 651 l(a), 6532(a),

THE UNITED STATES, ) 7422(a).

)

Defendant. )

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

Gina B. Langley, Neptune Beach, Fla., prose.

Brian J. Sullivan, Attorney of Record, Tax Division, United States Department of Justice,

with whom were Caroline D. Ciraolo, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and David I.

Pincus, Chief, Court of Federal Claims Section, and G. Robson Stewart, Assistant Chief,

Court of Federal Claims Section, for defendant.

OPINION

CAMPBELL-SMITH, Chief Judge

This is primarily an income tax refund claim. Plaintiff, Gina Langley, brings her

claim without counsel. Defendant is the Internal Revenue Service (defendant or IRS).

Plaintiff seeks an income tax refund for five tax years, 2004, 2009, 201 1, 2012, and

2013 . 1 For 2004, Ms. Langley filed a joint income tax return with her then-husband,

Barney Langley. For each of the remaining years, all of which were after the finalization

of her divorce from Mr. Langley, Ms. Langley filed an individual income tax return.

Ms. Langley also brings a property-related claim in which she seeks to have the

name of her ex-husband removed from the title to the former marital home, which is now

All references to a tax year are to the cotTesponding calendar year, January 1 to

December 31.

7014 1200 DODO 9093 6514

her home. In addition, Ms. Langley asks this court to declare that Suzanne Green, Mr.

Langley's divorce attorney, has no interest in her home. During the course of the

Langleys' divorce proceeding in Florida, Ms. Green secured an attorney's charging lien

on the marital home in response to Mr. Langley's non-payment of legal fees.

Defendant moved for the dismissal of plaintiffs income tax refund claims for four

years-2004, 2011, 2012, and 2013-as well as her property claims, for lack of

jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(l) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims

(RCFC). With regard to Ms. Langley's tax refund claims for these four years, for varying

reasons, defendant argues that each claim is untimely. As to Ms. Langley's property

claims against her ex-husband and Ms. Green, defendant argues the court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over such claims. For plaintiffs income tax refund claim for 2009,

defendant concedes jurisdiction, but argues that Ms. Langley has failed to state a claim

for which relief may be granted, and requests dismissal under RCFC 12(b)( 6).

As explained below, defendant's RCFC 12(b)(l) amended motion is GRANTED.

Defendant's RCFC 12(b)(6) amended motion with regard to Ms. Langley's income tax

refund claim for 2009 is DENIED. Ms. Langley's income tax refund claim for 2009 is

dismissed sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction under RCFC 12(h)(3). Under RCFC

12(b)(l) and 12(h)(3), the complaint is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction without

prejudice.

I. Background'

A. Ms. Langley's Cases in Florida State Court

Throughout her claims, plaintiff makes reference to events stemming from her

divorce proceedings initiated in 2004, as well as other litigation in the Florida state

courts. A limited review of relevant events will assist in understanding plaintiffs

complaint before this court.

In September 2004, plaintiff and her then-husband, Barney Joseph Langley, began

divorce proceedings in Duval County, Florida, for which proceedings Mr. Langley was

represented by Attorney Suzanne W. Green. App. 40-42, 3 ECFNo. 1-2 (Sept. 22, 2004

Attorney engagement letter between Mr. Langley and Ms. Green). Ms. Langley asserts

that her divorce from Mr. Langley became final on June 21, 2006. Comp!.'\[ 27, ECF No.

1.

2

The facts recited here are taken from the complaint and supplemental complaint

and attachments thereto. The court makes no finding of fact in this opinion.

3

The record citations are to the page numbers automatically affixed to the top of

every page by the court's CM/ECF system.

2

Mr. Langley apparently did not pay his legal fees, and with his consent, Ms.

Green sought an attorney's charging lien on property owned, at least in part, by Mr.

Langley. App. 29 if 6 (Consent Motion for Charging Lien and Motion to Determine

Amount of and to Enforce Charging Lien, In re: The Man"iage of Gina B. Langley, Wife,

and Barney Joseph Langley, Husband, No. 16-2004-DR-009042 (Fla. Circuit Ct. Duval

Cty. Mar. 17, 2006)). On May 9, 2006, a Florida circuit judge granted Ms. Green her

charging lien, App. 32-33, and Ms. Green recorded her lien on May 15, 2006, App. 26-

27.

According to the "Attorney's Judgment and Amended Charging Lien Against

Barney Langley," Ms. Green's attorney's charging lien was issued on the property

located at 700 Oak Street, Neptune Beach, Florida. App. 26-27. ("By Court Order dated

the 9th of May, 2006 and recorded ... [in] Duval County, Florida, an attorney's Charging

Lien was granted against any and all real or personal property of Barney Langley,

including but not limited to real property located at 700 Oak Street, Neptune beach,

Florida 32266 .... "). According to contact information Ms. Langley provided to this

court, 700 Oak Street is her current home. See Comp!. 10. Plaintiff asserts that Ms.

Green obtained her attorney's charging lien "without [her] knowledge or consent."

Comp!. if 2. Indeed, review of the Consent Motion prepared and filed by Ms. Green

reveals no mention of Ms. Langley. See App. 29-30.

As a separate matter, plaintiff held an interest in property on which the mortgagor,

Oceanside Bank, foreclosed. See Oceanside Bank v. Langley, No. 16-2009-CA-00-1429-

XXXX-MA (Fla. Circuit Ct. Duval Cty. Jan. 7, 2010). 4 In January 2010, a Certificate of

Sale was entered, in which the Clerk of Court

certifies that notice of public sale of the property described in the final

judgment ... the property was offered for public sale .... The highest and

best bid received for the property in the amount of 100.00 was submitted by

Oceanside Bank to whom the property was sold.

App. 106.

The final judgment is not in the record, and the location of the property sold at

auction is unclear. However, as Ms. Langley cutTently lives in the property located at

700 Oak Street, the court finds it likely that Oceanside Bank foreclosed on another

4

Oceanside Bank named five defendants in this action, Gina Langley, Barney

Langley, Target National Bank, Discover Bank, and Suzanne Green P.A. See App. 106

(case caption). The complaint is not in the record, but Ms. Green's answer is included.

See App. 109-110.

3

property. In a list of marital assets the Langleys owned at the time of their August 2004

separation, they showed two other properties, respectively located at 314 Third Street and

605 10th Avenue, North with both addresses presumably located in Neptune Beach,

Florida. Suppl. App. 130, ECF No. 8. The exact location of the foreclosed upon

property, however, is immaterial to this court's decision.

B. Ms. Langley's Cases in the United States Tax Court

Prior to filing her income tax refund claims in this court, plaintiff filed two

separate actions in the United States Tax Court, one for tax year 2004, and one for tax

years 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010. As explained infra Part LE, neither case precludes the

filing of Ms. Langley's complaint in this court.

1. Income Tax Year 2004 - Section 6015(±) Claim

In November 2012, Ms. Langley filed a petition in the United States Tax Court

seeking relief under 26 U.S.C. (Internal Revenue Code, hereafter I.R.C.) § 6015(±) (2012)

for income tax years 2004 through 2010. See Langley v. Comm'r, No. 27396-12 (T.C.

Nov. 12, 2014) (Order of Dismissal), affd per curiam, 612 F. App'x 585 (11th Cir.

2015), cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 840 (2016). Section 6015(±) addresses relief from joint and

several liability on a jointly filed return, otherwise known as innocent spouse relief.

Because Ms. Langley filed a joint income tax return for tax year 2004 only, that is the

sole year for which she could have qualified for relief under section 6015(±). See

Langley, No. 27396-12, at 1, 3. The Tax Court dismissed Ms. Langley's petition for lack

of jurisdiction, as it was not timely filed. Id. at 3.

2. Income Tax Years 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010-Section 6330(d) Claim

In June 2013, the IRS sent plaintiff a "Notice of Determination Concerning

Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330" for four tax years, 2006, 2008,

2009, and 2010. See Suppl. App. 112-116. Section 6330(d)(1) provides that a "person

may ... petition the Tax Court for review of such determination." The IRS informed

plaintiff that if she wanted to "dispute this determination in court, [she] must file a

petition with the United States Tax Court within 30 days from the date of this letter,"

Suppl. App. at 67, which Ms. Langley did on July 24, 2013, id. at 104-111 (Petition).

In January 2015, the Tax Court issued its decision. See Langley v. Comm'r, 109

T.C.M. (CCH) 1050, No. 17267-13L, 2015 WL 392980 (Jan. 13, 2015). According to

the Tax Court, the IRS issued a supplemental Notice of Determination in November

2014, in which the IRS stated that there were no outstanding balances due for tax years

2008 and 201 O; thus the court dismissed those claims as moot. See Langley, 2015 WL

4

392980, at *5. But the Tax Court sustained the proposed levy to collect unpaid balances

for the remaining tax years, 2006 (for $121.48 due) and 2009 (for $3,374.96 due). See id.

C. Ms. Langley's Case Filings In This Court

1. Original Complaint

Plaintiff filed her complaint on Febtuary 10, 2016, to which she attached 156

pages of supporting documents. 5 See Comp!., ECF Nos. 1 ("original complaint"), 1-2

("appendix"). Plaintiff requested three forms of relief, including one tax refund claim

and two property claims. Ms. Langley's requests are included below.

Tax Refund Claim

Petitioner most respectfully request[ s] this Court order the IRS [to] refund

the federal taxes due to Petitioner that totals $51,0683.84 (A pages 15

through 23) plus interest as claimed in Petitioner's Petition served to the

government on 11-9-15 USSC in Petitioner's statement of the case 15-6929

(A pages 4 through 14) that the government waived it[]s right to oppose on

11-23-15. (A page two).

Comp!. 9 (second request for relief). The internal citations are to documents attached to

the complaint, and the reference to the U.S. Supreme Court Case No. 15-6929 is a

reference to Ms. Langley's innocent spouse relief claim for tax year 2004 before the Tax

Court, for which she ultimately sought certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. See

Langley v. Comm'r, No. 27396-12 (T.C. Nov. 12, 2014)( Order of Dismissal), affd per

curiam, 612 F. App'x 585 (11th Cir. 2015), cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 840 (2016).

Property Claims

Order Barney Langley, Petitioner's x spouse, be removed from the title to

Petitioner's home [in which] he gave his interest to Suzanne Green in

5 The court has reviewed Ms. Langley's filings with care. The court notes that some

of the pages filed by Ms. Langley are partial documents, and many pages include

significant hand written annotations or marked out passages, which renders some

documents difficult to understand. The filings include numerous documents from Ms.

Langley's previous legal actions in Florida, her two United States Tax Court actions,

including her appeals to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit and the United States Supreme Court, and various correspondence between Ms.

Langley and the Internal Revenue Service for multiple tax years. The court further notes

that there are duplicate documents in the filings.

5

September 2004 and abandoned in 2009 so that Petitioner can either sell or

repair her homestead.

Comp!. 9 (first request for relief).

This court order that Suzanne W Green has no interest in [her] homestead,

Order the judgment recorded by State of Florida on 3-15-15 void, and order

Suzanne Worrall Green pay Petitioner the Yi of escrow funds totaling

$39,581.96 plus interest since June 8, 2005 and any damages this Court

would deem appropriate for the taking of Petitioner['s] private property by

an elected official of the state of Florida . . . . Petitioner claimed

$1,200,000.00 in damages from the government for loss of use in the

uncompensated taking of petitioner's property.

Comp!. 9-10 (third request for relief).

2. Amended Complaint Deemed a Supplemental Complaint

On May 10, 2016, the Clerk's Office received a filing from Ms. Langley titled

"Plaintiffs Prayer for Refund ofFederal 1040 Tax that [Defendant] Waived It[]s Right to

Respond on November 23, 2015 in USSC Case 15-6929 as Claimed in this Claim on

February 8, 2016 #2 and Plaintiffs Objection to the Conflicting Erroneous Notice(s) to

the Plaintiff from the Defendant." See ECF No. 8 at 1. Ms. Langley's filing totaled 162

pages, including 14 pages for the motion, and 148 pages of attached documents. An

initial review of plaintiffs May 10, 2016 filing resulted in the filing of Ms. Langley's

submission, by leave of the court, as an amended complaint. See ECF No. 8 (docket

text). Upon further review of plaintiffs filing, the court has now determined that some of

the attached documents are duplicative, already having been filed with Ms. Langley's

February 2016 complaint; whereas some of the documents are newly filed.

For the above stated reasons, the court finds that Ms. Langley's February 2016

complaint was sufficient to assert her claim for relief and plaintiffs May 10, 2016 is

more appropriately categorized as a supplemental filing to her original complaint.

Accordingly, the court shall DEEM plaintiffs amended complaint (ECF No. 8) as a

supplemental complaint (pages 1-14) and supplemental appendix (pages 15-162) to be

included in this matter. 6

6 The Clerk's Office is directed to deem plaintiffs amended complaint, ECF No. 8,

as a supplemental complaint, filed by leave of the court, as of the date it was submitted in

this matter.

6

D. Defendant's Motions to Dismiss

On May 10, 2016, defendant filed a RCFC 12(b)(l) motion to dismiss Ms.

Langley's original complaint, filed in February 2016. Def. 's MTD, ECF No. 9. Plaintiff

filed a response on May 23, 2016. ECF No. 13.

Defendant electronically filed its motion to dismiss within minutes of the Clerk's

Office filing plaintiffs amended complaint by leave of the court. ECF No. 8. With the

court's leave, defendant filed an amended motion to dismiss on June 10, 2016, in which it

responded to new information filed by plaintiff in her amended complaint, herein deemed

her supplemental complaint. Def.' s Am. MTD, ECF No. 15. Plaintiff filed her response,

ECF No. 16, and defendant filed a reply, ECF No. 17. Plaintiff attempted to file a sur-

reply, without seeking leave of court to do so, which the court did not accept for filing.

See Order, Aug. 1, 2016, ECF No. 18.

E. This Court's August 1, 2016 Dismissal Order and Defendant's Motion for

Clarification

On August 1, 2016, the court issued a decision granting defendant's amended

motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint. Judgment entered that same day. ECF No. 21.

See Opinion and Order, Aug. 1, 2016, ECF No. 20 ("Dismissal Order"), withdrawn and

vacated, Order, Aug. 12, 2016, ECF No. 23. The court found that it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over plaintiffs property claims against either her ex-husband, Mr. Langley,

or his divorce attorney, Ms. Green. Dismissal Order 5-6. The court also found that it

lacked jurisdiction over Ms. Langley's income tax refund claims under I.R.C. § 6512(a).

Id. at 6-8. Section 6512(a) states that

[i]f the Secretary has mailed to the taxpayer a notice of deficiency under

section 6212(a) (relating to deficiencies of income ... taxes) and if the

taxpayer files a petition with the Tax Court within the time prescribed in

section 6213(a) ... , no credit or refund of income tax for the same taxable

year ... to which such petition relates, in respect of which the Secretary has

determined the deficiency shall be allowed or made and no suit by the

taxpayer for the recovery of any part of the tax shall be instituted in any court

except--

I.R.C. § 6512(a). The court further found that Ms. Langley's complaint did not fall

within the limited exceptions to the prohibition on filing a claim in any court, including

this court, for a claim heard by the Tax Court for the same taxable year. Dismissal Order

8 (citing I.R.C. § 6512(a)(l)). Accordingly, the court granted defendant's amended

motion to dismiss the complaint. Id.

7

On August 12, 2016, by leave of court, defendant filed a motion for clarification.

Def. 's Mot. Clarification, ECF No. 22. Defendant maintained that while dismissal of

plaintiffs complaint was proper, section 6512(a) did not provide a proper basis for

dismissal. Id. at 1. Specifically, defendant explained that section 6512(a) does not apply

unless the IRS first mailed plaintiff a "notice of deficiency," and defendant insists that the

IRS never mailed Ms. Langley a notice of deficiency. Id. at 1, 3.

Defendant acknowledged that one of Ms. Langley's Tax Court actions was in

response to a "collection due proceeding" (CDP) instituted by the IRS against Ms.

Langley. Id. at 3 (citing Tax Court case no. 17267-13L for tax years 2006, 2008, 2009,

and 2010). But, defendant asserted, there is no statutory bar to prevent plaintiff from

filing a complaint in this court after the Tax Court has adjudicated a CDP for the same

tax years. Id. at 2. Accordingly, argued defendant, section 6512(a) provides no bar to

plaintiffs complaint in this court.

The court granted defendant's motion for clarification, withdrew its August 1,

2016 decision, and directed the Clerk of Court to vacate judgment. Order, Aug. 12, 2016,

ECFNo. 23.

By leave of court, Ms. Langley filed a response which consisted of a 13-page

brief, a 2-page Table of Contents, and 173 pages of attached documents. ECF No. 24.

Ms. Langley took the position that the IRS did issue a notice of deficiency to her. Id. at 2

(citing to her "Exhibit 5, page two, and three."). Review of the entirety of plaintiffs

marked Exhibit 5 shows that neither of the documents on which plaintiff relies originated

from the IRS, and neither is a Notice of Deficiency. See id. at 48-57.

By leave of court, defendant filed a reply. ECF No. 27. Defendant states that

while the documents provided by plaintiff include a "notice of determination," they do

not include a "notice of deficiency," as is required for the applicability of section 6512(a).

Id. at 2. Defendant is correct, Ms. Langley's documents do include an IRS Notice of

Determination for tax years 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010. See ECF No. 24, at 79.

Having reviewed the information in the parties' briefing on defendant's motion for

clarification, the court now turns to defendant's amended motion to dismiss the

complaint, ECF No. 15.

II. Legal Standards

Pursuant to the Tucker Act, this court has limited jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.

1491(a)(l) (2012).

8

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render

judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the

Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive

department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States,

or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.

28 U.S.C. 149l(a)(l).

The Tucker Act serves as a waiver of sovereign immunity and provides a

jurisdictional grant, but it does not create a substantive cause of action. See Jan's

Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

"[B]ecause the Tucker Act itself does not create a substantive cause of action, 'in order to

come within the jurisdictional reach and the waiver of the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must

identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages."'

Id. (quoting Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane in

relevant part)).

A. RCFC 12(b)(l)

If subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, plaintiff must establish the court's

jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Revnolds v. Army & Air Force Exch.

Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988). When a jurisdictional challenge is raised in a

motion to dismiss, "the allegations stated in the complaint are taken as true and

jurisdiction is decided on the face of the pleadings." Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d

1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Shearin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1195, 1195-96

(Fed. Cir. 1993)). However, the comt may look beyond the pleadings and "inquire into

jurisdictional facts" to determine whether jurisdiction exists. Rocovich v. United States,

933 F.2d 991, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1991). If the court determines that it lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, it must dismiss the complaint. RCFC 12(h)(3).

B. RCFC 12(b)(6)

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under RCFC 12(b)(6)

the complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v.

Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court must accept

the factual allegations as true, but the court is not required to accept the plaintiffs legal

conclusions. Id.

9

C. Pro Se Litigants

A pro se complaint is to be liberally construed, and plaintiffs' filings must be held

to 'less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]'" Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)); Durr v. Nicholson, 400 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir.

2005) (stating a "background interpretive principle ... is that prose pleadings are to be

liberally construed"). "Pro se petitioners are not expected to frame issues with the

precision of a common law pleading." Roche v. United States Postal Serv., 828 F.2d

1555, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

While leniency will be extended with respect to the formalities of filing, pro se

plaintiffs are not entitled to the relaxation of jurisdictional requirements. See Kelley v.

Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("[W]here the question

is the calculation of the time limitations placed on the consent of the United States to suit,

a court may not similarly take a liberal view of that jurisdictional requirement and set a

different rule for pro se litigants only.").

III. Discussion

A. Plaintiffs Income Tax Refunds

Ms. Langley brings income tax refund claims totaling $51,0683.84 plus interest

for five income tax years-specifically 2004, 2009, 2011, 2012, and 2013. Comp!. 9;

Suppl. Comp!. I. Prior to considering defendant's amended motion to dismiss, the court

first reviews defendant's various RCFC 12 motions for compliance with RCFC 12(g).

I. RCFC 12(g)- Multiple Rule 12 Motions to Dismiss

As explained in the court's rules,"[ e]xcept as provided in RCFC 12(h)(2) or (3), a

party that makes a motion under [RCFC 12] must not make another motion under [RCFC

12] raising a defense or objection that was available to the party but omitted from its

earlier motion." RCFC 12(g)(2).

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 10, 2016, ECF No. 9, an Amended

Motion to Dismiss on June 10, 2016, ECF No. 15, and a Motion for Clarification on

August 12, 2016, ECF No. 22. Although defendant styled its August 2016 motion only

as one for "clarification," defendant for the first time moved for RCFC 12(b)(6)

dismissals for Ms. Langley's tax refund claims for 2011, 2012, and 2013. See Def.'s

Mot. Clarification 4. That defendant made these arguments for the first time in its motion

for clarification renders this motion a second amended RCFC 12 motion to dismiss the

complaint, and the court treats it as such. Defendant's RCFC 12 arguments are

summarized in the table below.

10

Defendant's RCFC 12 Arguments

(Change from immediately preceding motion noted with bold italicized font)

Tax Motion to Dismiss, Amended MTD, Motion for

Year ECFNo. 9 ECFNo.15 Clarification,

ECFNo.22

2004 None 12(b)(l) without 12(b)(1) with prejudice

preiudice

2009 12(b)(l) without 12(b)(6) with prejudice 12(b)(6) with prejudice

prejudice

2011 12(b)(l) without 12(b)( 1) without 12(b)(6) with prejudice

prejudice prejudice

2012 12(b)(l) without 12(b)(l) without 12(b)(6) with prejudice

prejudice prejudice

2013 12(b)(l) without 12(b)(1) without 12(b)(6) with prejudice

prejudice prejudice

The question is whether defendant's arguments offered for the first time in either

its amended motion to dismiss or its motion for clarification comply with RCFC

12(g)(2). 7

As to plaintiffs income tax year 2004 claim, defendant did not address it in its

original motion to dismiss. Review of plaintiffs complaint shows that she requested a

tax refund of $51,068.84, and cited to appendix pages 15 through 23 in support of this

claim. See Comp!. 9 (second request for relief). Review of the cited appendix shows

signed, completed Fonns 843 (Claim for Refund and Request for Abatement) for four tax

years, 2009, 2011, 2012, and 2013, but no Form 843 for tax year 2004. See App. 20-23.

Nonetheless, plaintiff asserts in her supplemental complaint that her tax refund claims

covered five tax years, in particular, 2004, 2009, 2011, 2012, and 2013 and reasserts that

her tax refund claims total $51,068.84. See Suppl. Comp!. 1. Plaintiff described each tax

refund claim, specifying the tax year and dollar amount for each claim, and provided an

explanation for her claim with a citation to the attached documents. See id. at 7-8.

Unlike her original complaint, plaintiffs supplemental complaint clarified that Ms.

Langley sought a refund for tax year 2004 and set forth the basis for that claim. For these

reasons, the court finds that defendant's RCFC 12(b)(l) without prejudice argument for

income tax year 2004 in its amended motion to dismiss was not available at the time it

filed its original motion to dismiss, and thus, is permissible under RCFC 12(g)(2).

As to plaintiffs tax year 2009 claim, defendant takes the position in its amended

motion to dismiss that the court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim, but that plaintiff

7

There is no RCFC 12(g) issue with regard to defendant's amended motion to

dismiss Ms. Langley's property claims, as it made no change in its Rule 12 arguments for

those claims.

11

failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Def.' s Am. MTD 11-13.

Defendant bases its change in argument on an IRS document plaintiff filed with her

supplemental complaint showing that the "IRS formally disallowed the claim for refund

[for tax year 2009] on April 14, 2016." Id. at 3 (citing ECF No. 8, at 57-58). The IRS

document on which defendant relies was not included with plaintiffs original complaint.

Because the document on which defendant relies was not available at the time defendant

filed its original motion to dismiss, the court finds that defendant's RCFC 12(b)(6) with

prejudice argument in its amended motion to dismiss for income tax year 2009 is

permissible under RCFC 12(g)(2).

The court turns next to defendant's motion for clarification. For tax year 2004,

defendant now seeks a RCFC 12(b)(1) dismissal with prejudice, rather than without

prejudice. See Def. 's Mot. Clarification 4. Defendant offers no explanation for this

change, and points to no information previously not available when it filed its amended

motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court finds that this argument is precluded by RCFC

12(g)(2).

As to income tax years 2011, 2012, and 2013, defendant's motion for clarification

for the first time asks this court to dismiss Ms. Langley's tax refund claims under RCFC

12(b)(6) with prejudice, just as it requested for tax year 2009 in its amended motion to

dismiss. Defendant explains that,

[p]laintiffs claims for these years [2009, 2011, 2012, and 2013] are based

on [26 U.S.C.] § 165, a purported casualty loss stemming from a lien placed

on her property. But a lien is not a casualty loss .... Thus, even if this court

has jurisdiction over plaintiffs tax refund suit for years 2009, 2011, 2012,

and 2013, plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim for these years upon

which relief can be granted, and this court must dismiss plaintiffs complaint

as to those tax years under Rule 12(b)(6).

As with its argument for tax year 2004, defendant offered no explanation for this

change, and cited to no infonnation previously not available when it filed its amended

motion to dismiss. In addition, review of the court's docket shows that plaintiff filed no

documents with this court between the filing on July 14, 2016 of defendant's reply in

support of its amended motion to dismiss, and the filing of defendant's motion for

clarification on August 12, 2016.

Review of plaintiffs complaint and supplemental complaint shows that she

referred to an alleged casualty loss in both pleadings. See Comp!. if 41 (making reference

to "the refund due to me for the $408,000.00 casualty loss Petitioner suffered on the

conversion of Petitioner's assets by the state of Florida during divorce proceedings ...

12

.");Suppl. Comp!. 2 ("Plaintiff filed simultaneously ... 1040X for each of the tax years

2008, 2009, 2010, 2011and2012 for the Plaintiffs 2010 $408,000 loss .... "); Suppl.

Comp!. 11 ("The Defendant's erroneous lien on my homestead, requested to preserve the

amounts in escrow, is still recorded without Plaintiffs consent in the Defendant's

judgment for 'making disbursements' that resulted in Plaintiffs 2010 $408,000.00

casualty loss." 8 (internal citations omitted)). Thus, in making new RCFC 12 arguments

in its motion for clarification, defendant raises defenses or objections that were available

to it when it filed its amended motion to dismiss.

To make a RCFC 12(b)(6) argument for tax years 2011, 2012, and 2013,

defendant must have done so in either its original motion to dismiss or its amended

motion to dismiss. Defendant did not do so. Thus, defendant cannot make a RCFC

12(b)(6) objection in its motion for clarification, "that was available ... but omitted from

its earlier motion." RCFC 12(g)(2).

Pursuant to RCFC 12(g)(2), the court will consider all of defendant's RCFC 12

arguments set forth in its amended motion to dismiss, but none of the RCFC 12

arguments set forth in its motion for clarification.

2. Income Tax Year 2004

According to her supplemental complaint, Ms. Langley's tax refund claim for

2004 is the same innocent spouse relief claim she asserted previously in the Tax Court.

See Suppl. Comp!. 7 (citing "USSC case 15-6929," a reference to the appellate history

for Tax Court case no. 27396-12); see also supra Part I.B.1.

Defendant argues that Ms. Langley's 2004 tax refund claim is untimely because

she did not file a "timely administrative claim for refund with the IRS in accordance with

[26 U.S.C.] § 651 l(a)." Def. 's Am. MTD. 9-10. Thus, defendant contends, "her tax

refund suit as to 2004 is defective under [26 U.S.C.] § 7422(a)." Id. at 10.

Under I.RC. § 7422(a), a plaintiff may not bring a tax refund claim in any court,

including this court, "until a claim for refund ... has been duly filed with the Secretary,

according to the provisions of law in that regard." I.R.C. § 7422(a). Further, under

I.RC. § 6511 (a), any claim for refund of an overpayment of tax "shall be filed by the

taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax

was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later." I.R.C. § 6511(a).

8 Ms. Langley mischaracterizes the lien on her home. There is nothing in the record

to suggest that the IRS ever held a tax lien on her home. Rather, the only lien on her

home reflected in the record is an attorney's charging lien held by Ms. Green. See supra

Part I.A.

13

Defendant states that Ms. Langley "filed her administrative claim for refund for

tax year 2004 in 2011, six years after her return was filed and five years after the tax was

paid." Def.'s Am. MTD 9-10 (citing ECF No. 8, at p. 23 ("B9")). The document on

which defendant relies is the 2004 Account Transcript prepared by the IRS, in which it

lists all activity in the taxpayer's account for tax year 2004. As reflected in the Account

Transcript, the Langleys filed their joint tax return on May 30, 2005, and remitted their

final tax payment on February 24, 2006. See Suppl. App. 23.

Under I.R.C. § 651 l(a), Ms. Langley's administrative claim was due the later of

three years after the return was filed, which would have been May 30, 2008, or two years

after the tax was paid, which would have been February 25, 2008. The later date, May

30, 2008, was the due date for filing Ms. Langley's administrative claim with the IRS to

obtain a refund for tax year 2004. But according to the 2004 Account Transcript, and as

defendant has pointed out, Ms. Langley did not file her claim for Innocent Spouse Relief

until April 18, 2011, almost three years past the due date. 9 See Suppl. App. 23.

Defendant is correct that because jurisdiction in this court is limited, plaintiff must

show that prior to filing in this court, she filed a timely administrative claim with the

Internal Revenue Service, as provided in I.R.C. §§ 651 l(a) and 7422(a). The failure to

do so deprives this court of its jurisdiction over such tax refund claim.

As this court has stated,

[i]t is well-settled that satisfaction of these filing requirements[§ 7422(a) and

§ 651 l(a) are] a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in the Court of Federal

Claims. Sun Chem. Corp. v. United States, 698 F.2d 1203, 1206 (Fed. Cir.

1983) ("It is a well-established rule that a timely, sufficient claim for refund

is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a refund suit.") (citations omitted) ....

Martinez v. United States, No. 13-107T, 2013 WL 3940958, at *3 (Fed. Cl. July 25,

2013). This jurisdictional rule for a claim brought under I.R.C. § 6015(f), like Ms.

9 Documents in the record suggest that Ms. Langley first filed an Innocent Spouse

Relief claim on June 5, 2009, not April 18, 2011. See ECF No. 24, at 168-170

(Completed Form 8857 Request for Innocent Spouse Relief, dated May 18, 2009); ECF

No. 24, at 119 (Oct. 22, 2012 IRS letter referencing a Form 8857 filed on June 5, 2009).

The IRS denied this claim on June 16, 2009, because there were no outstanding payments

due for tax year 2004. See ECF No. 24, at 171. It is unclear why this earlier June 2009

Form 8857 is not reflected in Ms. Langley's 2004 Account Transcript. Regardless, even

if the court were to credit Ms. Langley with having first filed on June 5, 2009 her

administrative claim for a refund for tax year 2004, that claim would still be untimely

because it was filed more than one year after the May 30, 2008 due date.

14

Langley's, does not allow for exceptions. See Barker v. United States, No. 05-1143T,

2006 WL 2472656, at *2 (Fed. Cl. July 19, 2006) (finding that the restrictions of26

U.S.C. § 6511 "apply to all refund claims, including claims based on the innocent spouse

provisions" (citing Yuen v. United States, 825 F.2d 244, 245 (9th Cir. 1987); Choate v.

United States, 218 F.R.D. 677, 678-79 (S.D. Cal. 2003)).

Because Ms. Langley filed her 2004 administrative claim with the IRS sometime

after the May 30, 2008 due date, it was untimely. Under I.R.C. §§ 651 l(a) and 7422(a),

the court lacks jurisdiction to hear her tax refund claim for 2004. For this reason,

defendant's RCFC 12(b)(l) amended motion to dismiss Ms. Langley's tax refund claim

for 2004 is GRANTED.

3. Income Tax Year 2009

Although defendant concedes jurisdiction for Ms. Langley's 2009 tax refund

claim, Def.'s Am. MTD 11, the court has an independent obligation to satisfy itself that it

has jurisdiction to hear the claim. See RCFC 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any

time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.");

PIN/NIP, Inc. v. Platte Chem. Co., 304 F.3d 1235, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[A] court

must satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction to hear and decide a case before proceeding to

the merits."); View Eng'g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 115 F.3d 962, 963 (Fed. Cir.

1997) ("[C]ourts must always look to their jurisdiction, whether the parties raise the issue

or not."). Accordingly, prior to considering defendant's RCFC 12(b)(6) amended motion

to dismiss, the court considers whether it has jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim.

a. Whether the Court has Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs

Claim

Ms. Langley completed and signed a Claim for Refund and Request for

Abatement (Form 843) for tax year 2009 on October 29, 2015. 10 See Suppl. App. 24.

Defendant claims that it "appears" that the IRS disallowed Ms. Langley's claim on April

14, 2016. Def.'s Am. MTD 10 n.8. As defendant explained,

[b ]ased on information plaintiff provided on May 10, 2016, it appears that on

April 14, 2016, the IRS did disallow her claim for refund for 2009 filed on

October 29, 2015. Thus, her claim for refund for 2009 appears to be timely

10 According to the IRS, it received this claim on November 30, 2015. See Suppl.

App. 57. That Ms. Langley may have mailed her Form 843 after the date on which she

signed the Form, and that even less time may have elapsed between the filing of the Form

843 with the IRS and the filing of her Complaint with this court, does not bear on the

court's determination of jurisdiction.

15

Id. Defendant's reference to information provided on May 10, 2016 is a reference to

plaintiffs supplemental complaint and supplemental appendix, ECF No. 8.

Defendant is conect that Ms. Langley included an April 14, 2016 IRS letter in

which the IRS disallowed her income tax year 2009 claim, due to its untimely filing. See

Suppl. App. 57. To be clear, the IRS disallowed Ms. Langley's 2009 tax refund claim on

April 14, 2016, two months after Ms. Langley filed her complaint in this court on

February 10, 2016. Although the court generally determines jurisdiction at the time the

original complaint is filed, the Federal Circuit has recognized limited exceptions to this

general rule, and determined jurisdiction based on a supplemental pleading. See Cent.

Pines Land Co., L.L.C. v. United States, 697 F.3d 1360, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2012). As

the Federal Circuit explained,

[g]enerally, "'jurisdiction of the court depends upon the state of things at the

time of the action brought.'" Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., 541 U.S.

567, 570 (2004) (quoting Mollan v. TotTance, 9 Wheat. 537, 539, 6 L.Ed.

154 (1824)). [However,] we have held that certain circumstances may exist

in which a supplemental complaint can cure a defect in subject matter

jurisdiction ... [But], if a statute contains an express prohibition against

filing suit, then a supplemental complaint cannot cure the lack of jurisdiction

existing at the onset. Black, 93 F.3d at 790 (citing McNeil v. United States,

508 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1993), and Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S.

20, 25-26 (1989)). It would defeat the purpose of the prohibition to permit

a plaintiff to file his complaint during the prohibited period and then, after

the prohibited period expired, rely on a supplemental complaint to cure the

jurisdictional defect. Id.

Section 6532(a)(l) of the Internal Revenue Code states that

[n]o suit or proceeding under section 7422(a) for the recovery of any internal

revenue tax ... shall be begun before the expiration of 6 months from the

date of filing the claim required under such section unless the Secretary

renders a decision thereon within that time ....

26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(l) (2012). Under Central Pines Land Company, jurisdiction in this

case is determined at the time plaintiff filed her original complaint, not at the time she

filed her supplemental complaint. Ms. Langley filed her Form 843 for tax year 2009 no

earlier than October 29, 2015, six months from which was April 29, 2016. Because Ms.

Langley filed her complaint on February 10, 2016, she did so prior to the expiration of

the six month period required by section 6532(a)(l). Ms. Langley's complaint was thus

16

untimely, and for that reason, the court lacks jurisdiction over her tax refund claim for

2009. Under RCFC 12(h)(3), the court DISMISSES Ms. Langley's income tax refund

claim for 2009 for lack of jurisdiction.

In the alternative and for the sake of completeness, the court considers defendant's

RCFC 12(b)(6) argument.

b. Defendant's RCFC 12(b)(6) Amended Motion to Dismiss

In defendant's view, Ms. Langley's refund claim for tax year 2009 stems from an

amended tax return Ms. Langley timely filed for tax year 2010. See Def. 's Am. MTD 4.

As defendant stated,

[p]laintiffs claim for 2009 stems from a carry back of a purported casualty

loss that occurred in 2010. Plaintiff bases this casualty loss on either the

foreclosure of one ... property in 2010 or a lien placed on [another] property

in 2010. (Campi. ... U.S. Court of Fed. CL Campi. Cover Sheet, stating "IRS

Refund due and interest due from State of Fl. Official and int. damages for

loss of use.") Plaintiff further states that"[ d]efendant's erroneous lien on my

homestead ... resulted in [p]laintiffs 2010 $408,000 casualty loss." (Am.

Campi., ECF No. 8, at p. [11].)

Id. The foreclosure and the lien to which defendant refers are the subjects of earlier legal

actions in the state of Florida. See supra Part I.A. It is unclear from the record how Ms.

Langley atTived at the asserted loss of $408,000, or whether Ms. Langley attributes this

loss to either the lien or the foreclosure separately, or to both events. Regardless, a precise

understanding of Ms. Langley's assetied casualty loss is not necessary to the court's

decision.

Defendant ai·gues that a "foreclosure or a lien is not ... a casualty loss." Def.'s

Am. MTD 12 (citing First Atlas Funding Corp. Through Kersting, 23 Cl. Ct. at 139-40;

Vance v. Comm'r oflnternal Revenue, 36 T.C. 54 7 (1961) (finding that a finance

company's repossession of furniture where timely payments were not made was not a

casualty loss to taxpayer)). Defendant futiher argues that as defined in I.R.C. § I 65(a)-

the relevant provision for evaluating the casualty losses that Ms. Langley has asse1ied-

such losses would not qualify as a tax deductible casualty loss.

Section 165(a) allows deductions for "any loss sustained during the taxable

year and not compensated for by insurance or othe1wise." 26 U.S.C. §

165(a); see also Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r oflnternal Revenue, 499 U.S.

554, 567 (1991). Section 165(c)(3) states that "[i]n the case of an individual,

the deduction under subsection (a) shall be limited to ... losses of prope1iy

not connected with a trade or business or a transaction entered into for profit,

17

if such losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from

theft." 26 U.S.C. § 165(c)(3); see also Maher v. Comm'r of Internal

Revenue, 680 F.2d 91, 91 (11th Cir. 1982).

Id. at 11.

It is not clear to the court, however, that Ms. Langley's amended return for tax

year 2010 claimed a deduction only for an impermissible casualty loss, as defendant

urges. Among the documents Ms. Langley filed with her supplemental complaint was an

August 1, 2014 letter that the IRS sent to Ms. Langley after it had reviewed her Form

1040X for tax year 2010. See Suppl. App. 58. In its letter, the IRS stated:

Thank you for your amended return received 4/15/2014.

We have adjusted your 2010 account per your amended return, however there

was a change made to your tax decrease. Our records show your tax decrease

as $1,483.00 and not the amount of $497.86 as you indicated on line 21 of

your amended return.... You will be receiving a letter regarding your

carryback claims under separate cover.

Because the IRS adjusted Ms. Langley's taxes based on her 2010 amended tax

return, the court cannot conclude, as defendant has, that Ms. Langley sought a tax refund

exclusively for an impermissible casualty loss. Accordingly, the court cannot conclude

that a carry back of this claim to tax year 2009 is based solely on an impermissible

casualty loss.

For this reason, defendant's RCFC 12(b)(6) amended motion to dismiss Ms.

Langley's tax refund claim for 2009 for failure to state a claim is DENIED.

4. Income Tax Years 2011, 2012 and 2013

Defendant argues that the court lacks jurisdiction over Ms. Langley's tax refund

claims for 2011, 2012, and 2013, because she filed her complaint in this court

prematurely. Specifically, the government contends plaintiff filed suit prior to either of

the statutory conditions precedent to filing an income tax refund suit-namely the

expiration of six months from the date of filing an administrative request or the rendering

of an IRS decision prior to the time of filing suit. See Def.'s Am. MTD 10 (citing l.R.C.

§§ 6532(a), 7422(a)).

With regard to the six month time period, Ms. Langley signed Forms 843 on either

October 29, 2015 (for income tax years 2011 and 2013) or November 7, 2015 (for

18

income tax year 2012). See Suppl. App. 25-27. Assuming that the date on each Form

843 coffesponds to the filing date, the earliest Ms. Langley could have filed a timely

complaint in this court for all three tax years would have been six months after November

7, 2015, or May 7, 2016. As Ms. Langley filed her complaint in this court on February 6,

2016, her complaint was untimely.

With regard to a rendered IRS decision, defendant has argued-and the court

agrees-that "[t]here is no indication that the IRS disallowed the claims for refund for

2011, 2012, and 2013 that would allow plaintiff to file her complaint prior to the

expiration of the six month period." Def.' s Am. MID 10.

Accordingly, the court lacks jurisdiction over Ms. Langley's tax refund claims for

2011, 2012, and 2013. See l.R.C. §§ 6532(a), 7422(a)). Defendant's RCFC 12(b)(l)

amended motion to dismiss Ms. Langley's income tax refund claims for 2011, 2012, and

2013 for lack of jurisdiction is GRANTED.

As explained supra Part III.A. I, the court will not consider defendant's alternative

RCFC 12(b)( 6) arguments for these tax years. The court notes that even if defendant's

RCFC 12(b)(6) arguments were properly before this court, they would not have been

persuasive.

In reviewing the Forms 84 3 that Ms. Langley filed, it appears that the tax refund

claimed for 2012 may have been based on the 2010 amended tax return, as defendant

argues. In the explanation section on the relevant Form 843, Ms. Langley refeffed to her

"casualty loss claimed in 2010." See Suppl. App. 26. But as explained in the court's

discussion of plaintiffs 2009 tax refund, supra Part III.A.3.b, the court cannot conclude

that the tax refund claim based on Ms. Langley's amended tax return for 2010 was based

on an impermissible casualty loss only.

In addition, the Forms 843 for tax years 2011 and 2013 make no mention of the

2010 casualty loss, and instead refer to an overpayment in 2013, resulting in a tax refund

for that year. See Suppl. App. 25, 27. A June 24, 2014 IRS notice confirmed that Ms.

Langley made an overpayment for tax year 2013, which it did not refund to Ms. Langley,

but instead applied to three earlier tax years-2008, 2010, and 2011-for which it

claimed Ms. Langley owed payment. See id. at 28. Examination of both the Forms 843

for tax years 2011 and 2013, and the IRS notice for tax year 2013, suggests that the

refunds Ms. Langley claimed for tax years 2011 and 2013 were unrelated to her 2010

amended return or her alleged casualty loss. Because this assertion was the sole basis for

defendant's RCFC 12(b)(6) argument, that argument would have been unavailing. See

Def.'s Mot. Clarification 4.

19

B. Plaintiffs Property Claims

Remaining are Ms. Langley's two property claims. See Comp!. 9-10 (first and

third requests for relief); see also supra Part LC. Because Ms. Langley is proceeding

without counsel, the court is obliged to construe her complaint liberally. See Haines, 404

U.S. at 520-21; Durr, 400 F.3d at 1380. As the Federal Circuit has instructed, "[p]ro se

petitioners are not expected to frame issues with the precision of a common law

pleading." Roche, 828 F.2d at 1558.

Ms. Langley's claims to remove her ex-husband and Ms. Green from the title to

her home could be interpreted as quiet-title claims. 11 Defendant argues that this court

lacks jurisdiction over both property claims because this court's jurisdiction is limited to

claims against the United States. Thus, this court cannot hear a quiet-title claim. Def. 's

Am. MTD 6-7 (citing 28 U.S.C. 149l(a)(l); Price v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 560, 563

(2015); Dwen v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 76, 80 (2004)).

Defendant is correct. This court has limited jurisdiction; it may hear only claims

brought against the United States. 28 U.S.C. 149l(a)(l). Ms. Langley's property claims

are brought against two private individuals, her ex-husband, Barney Langley, and his

divorce attorney, Suzanne Green. Ms. Langley has articulated no property claim against

the United States. As an earlier court found,

[p] lainly stated, the court is without jurisdiction to entertain a standalone

claim to quiet title. Dwen v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 76, 80 (2004) (citing

Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 536, 538 (1983) ("This

court has the authority to issue money judgments only; it does not have the

authority to decide questions of title to land."); Baskett v. United States, 2

Cl. Ct. 356, 363 (1983) ("This court has no jurisdiction to quiet title to land

and thus, if plaintiffs seek to quiet title to the properties in question they are

in the wrong court."). The case law is replete with instances where it has

been recognized that a cause of action seeking possession of property falls

outside of the court's jurisdiction. Oak Forest, Inc. v. United States, 23 Cl.

Ct. 90, 94-96 (1991); Gila Gin Co. v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 1001, 1003,

1982 WL 25831 (1982); Yaist v. United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 281, 285-87, 656

F.2d 616 (1981); Bourgeois v. United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 32, 36 n.1, 545 F.2d

727 (1976).

Dwen, 62 Fed. Cl. at 80. To the extent Ms. Langley asks this court to quiet title to her

home, it is without jurisdiction to hear such claim or to provide the relief she seeks.

11 "A proceeding to establish a plaintiffs title to land by compelling the adverse

claimant to establish a claim or be forever es topped from asserting it." Action to quiet

title, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

20

Alternatively, Ms. Langley's claims could be construed as a request that this court

review the action taken by the Florida state court, when it granted Ms. Green an

attorney's charging lien on Ms. Langley's home. This court also lacks jurisdiction over

this claim. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 440 F. App'x 916, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2011)

(stating that the Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to review state court

decisions).

With regard to Ms. Langley's characterization of the attorney's charging lien

secured by Ms. Green as a "taking ... by an elected official of the state of Florida," Ms.

Langley has mischaracterized the facts. Comp!. 10. The record shows that Ms. Green

obtained the lien on Ms. Langley's home in her capacity as a private attorney

representing Mr. Langley in divorce proceedings. That Ms. Green may have been elected

to office in November 2014 does not disturb the charging lien she secured on Ms.

Langley's home in May 2006. By definition, a charging lien in the State of Florida may

only be secured by a private attorney, not by the state or a state official. As explained by

a Florida district court,

[c]harging liens are a creature of Florida common law. Zaklama v. Mount

Sinai Med. Ctr., 906 F. 2d 650, 652 (11th Cir. 1990). Such a lien is an

equitable right to have costs and fees due to an attorney for services rendered

in a suit secured by the judgment or recovery in that suit. Sinclair, Louis,

Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383,

1384 (Fla. 1983).

Gonzalez v. Am. Sec. Ins., Co., No. 15-cv-1515, 2016 WL 6901368, at *1 (M.D. Fla.

Nov. 1, 2016). While the comt is obliged to accept as true Ms. Langley's fact

allegations, it is under no such obligation with regard to her asserted legal conclusions,

including her conclusion that the lien on her home qualifies as a taking. See Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 ("[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained

in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions."). A dispute with a private individual

over an attorney's charging lien granted by the Florida state court is simply not a taking

by the state.

Finally, Ms. Langley seeks payment of escrow funds, over which apparently Ms.

Green has had some involvement or control since June 2005. See Comp!. 9-10 (third

request for relief); supra Part LC. Because Ms. Langley's divorce was initiated in 2004,

and finalized in 2006, the June 2005 event to which she refers occurred during her

divorce proceedings in a Florida state court. As stated before, this court lacks jurisdiction

to review any decision by a state court. See, e.g., Jones, 440 F. App'x at 918.

For these reasons, the comt finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Ms.

Langley's claims against her ex-husband, Barney Langley, or against his divorce

21

attorney, Suzanne Green. Defendant's RCFC 12(b)(l) amended motion to dismiss Ms.

Langley's property claims is GRANTED.

IV. Conclusion

As explained herein, the court hereby GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-

PART defendant's amended motion to dismiss, filed June 10, 2016, ECF No. 15.

Defendant's RCFC 12(b)(l) amended motion to dismiss Ms. Langley's income tax

refund claims for 2004, 2011, 2012, and 2013 and her property claims are GRANTED.

Defendant's RCFC 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Ms. Langley's tax refund claim for 2009

is DENIED. Ms. Langley's tax refund claim for 2009 is DISMISSED for lack of

jurisdiction sua sponte under RCFC 12(h)(3).

Accordingly, pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(l) and 12(h)(3), plaintiff's complaint is

DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice. The Clerk of Court shall enter

judgment for defendant. 12 No costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

12

Pursuant to Section I.C.2 of this opinion, the Clerk's Office is directed to DEEM

plaintiff's amended complaint, ECF No. 8, as a supplemental complaint, filed by leave of

the court, as of the date it was entered in this matter, May, 5, 2016.

22