History of Appointments to the Supreme Court

History of Appointments to the Supreme Court

[T h e m e m o ra n d u m w h ic h fo llo w s , p r e p a r e d b y th e O ffic e o f L e g a l C o u n s e l a t th e re q u e s t

o f th e A tto r n e y G e n e r a l, s u r v e y s f o u r g e n e r a l a s p e c ts o f th e p ro c e s s o f a p p o in tin g

J u s tic e s o f th e S u p r e m e C o u r t: (1 ) th e q u a litie s P r e s id e n ts h a v e s o u g h t in S u p r e m e

C o u r t n o m in e e s; (2 ) th e p ro c e s s o f r e c r u itin g a n d e v a lu a tin g p o te n tia l a p p o in te e s p r io r

to n o m in a tio n ; (3 ) th e m a n n e r in w h ic h th e S e n a te fu lfills its re s p o n s ib ilitie s in th e

a p p o in tm e n t p ro c e s s ; a n d (4 ) th e r e la tio n s h ip b e tw e e n th e '.'io c e s s o f c h o o s in g a

c a n d id a te a n d a s u c c e s s fu l c a n d i d a te ’s e v e n tu a l p e r f o r m a n c e o n th e C 'u r t. T h e m e m o ­

ra n d u m p a y s s p e c ia l a tte n tio n to th e ro le s p la y e d in th e a p p o in tm e n t p r o c e s s b y th e

A tto r n e y G e n e r a l a n d th e D e p a r tm e n t o f J u s tic e ]

March 5, 1980

M EM ORANDUM FOR T H E ATTORNEY G E N ER A L

I. Introduction

Aspirants to the Supreme Court, unlike presidential, vice-presidential,

and congressional candidates, are subject to no constitutional limitations

regarding age, citizenship, or residency. No statute requires that Jus­

tices even be lawyers, although every nominee so far has met this

criterion. Congress has considered bills to limit Supreme Court appoint­

ments either to persons under a particular age or to candidates with

prior judicial experience; no such limitation has ever been enacted. The

history of Supreme Court appointments is consequently a history of

presidential discretion limited formally only by the Senate confirmation

process, which also proceeds without direct constitutional guidance.

In response to your request, this Office has surveyed some of the vast

literature relevant to the history of Supreme Court appointments.1 We

have addressed four general questions: What qualities have Presidents

sought in Supreme Court nominees? How are potential appointees re­

cruited and evaluated prior to nomination? How does the Senate fulfill

its responsibilities in the appointment process? Is there a predictable

relationship between the process of choosing a candidate and a success­

ful candidate’s eventual performance on the Court? In surveying the

history of nominations and appointments, we have paid special attention

1 Secondary sources are cited in footnotes by au th o r and page number; a bibliography indicating the

full citation for each source is appended to this m em orandum . W e found the most useful general

review o f the history o f Suprem e C ourt appointm ents to be H. A braham , Justices and Presidents: A

PoliticalH isto ry o f A ppointm ents to the Suprem e C ourt (1974).

457

to the roles played in these processes by the Attorney General and the

Department of Justice.

No one formula for choosing the “best” Supreme Court Justice can

be deduced from a historical survey. Who are the best candidates with

respect to any particular vacancy will depend on a host of factors,

including the President’s political philosophy, his perceptions of the

role of the Court in American government, the crucial issues facing the

nation at a given moment in history, and the Court’s changing institu­

tional needs. Neither can a Justice’s post-appointment performance be

predicted with entire confidence based on his pre-appointment career.

The uniqueness of the Court’s institutional role, the wide range of vital

questions that the Justices adjudicate, and the need for each Justice to

collaborate with eight others in reaching what often are controversial

results, all necessarily affect any appointee’s eventual record in the

decision of cases. The aim of this memorandum is consequently not to

elaborate, in any definitive way, how a great Justice might now be

chosen; its aim is to identify the range of issues of which the President

at least ought to be aware in exercising his discretion, and which this

Department should consider if it is to be helpful in the appointment

process.

II. The Presidents’ Criteria

Under Article II, § 2, clause 2 of the Constitution, the President

“shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the

Senate, shall appoint . . . judges of the Supreme Court. . . .” All but

four Presidents—the exceptions so far including President Carter—have

successfully nominated at least one Supreme Court Justice. Presidents

have sometimes made their selection criteria explicit. George

Washington, for example, insisted on support of the Constitution, distin­

guished Revolutionary service, active political involvement, prior judi­

cial experience, geographic “suitability,” and either a good general

reputation or personal ties with the President himself.2 More often, the

criteria have been tacit and ad hoc. It is possible, however, based on

the history of, 104 successful Court appointments,3 to examine certain

factors that have weighed to some degree in all nominations.

A. A bility and Character

President Herbert Hoover asserted that his Supreme Court ap­

pointees were “chosen solely on the basis of character and mental

power,” 4 and every President, in explaining his nominations publicly,

2 A braham at 64.

3 T h e 104 successful appointm ents include three successful “ prom otions’* o f A ssociate Justices to

the post o f C h ief Justice. T h e tola! num ber o f persons to have served so far in the C ourt is 101.

A braham at 46-47.

4 T e g e r at 46.

458

has cited ability and character among his criteria for selection. Some

minimum of each is thus a sine qua non for a successful appointment.

The appropriate measure of “objective” merit, however, especially re­

garding judicial ability, may vary with the needs of the country and of

the Court when a vacancy occurs. With respect to some appointments,

the Court’s greatest need may be an exceptional intellectual leader, with

or without extensive political or administrative experience. At other

times, the Court may need a catalytic administrator or an effective

advocate more than it needs a truly brilliant thinker. An ideal candi­

date, of course, would be both intellectually gifted and politically

effective; the balance of these talents is likely, however, to vary even

within the pool of the nation’s best candidates.

Because the number of capable individuals is much greater inevitably

than the number of places to be filled, few nominations have occurred

in which a candidate’s outstanding ability alone appears to have de­

cided his nomination. There are, however, exceptions. Although Presi­

dent Hoover wanted a “non-controversial western Republican” to suc­

ceed Oliver Wendell Holmes,5 he was persuaded by a long list of labor

and business leaders, scholars, and Senators that Chief Judge Benjamin

N. Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals was the only fit

successor. The final straw breaking Hoover’s resistance appears to have

been the emphatic endorsement of Senator William E. Borah of Idaho,

the Republican chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who

reportedly told Hoover, “Cardozo belongs as much to Idaho as to New

York,” and “[g]eography should no more bar the judge than the pres­

ence of two Virginians—John Blair and Bushrod Washington—should

have kept President Adams from naming John Marshall to be Chief

Justice.” 6 When reminded that a Jewish Justice, Louis Brandeis, al­

ready sat on the Court, Borah said, “Anyone who raises the question of

race [sic] is unfit to advise you concerning so important a matter.” 7 A

similar chorus of support induced President Roosevelt to appoint Felix

Frankfurter as Cardozo’s successor. Roosevelt, like Hoover, wanted a

Westerner on the Court, although, had he found one to succeed

Cardozo, Frankfurter—already a Roosevelt adviser—likely would have

received a subsequent Roosevelt nomination.

Not only is objective merit rarely the decisive criterion, but some of

the nation’s greatest Justices were apparently chosen without obvious

primary regard for their intellectual potential. Joseph Story, for exam­

ple, who probably ranks second only to John Marshall in his impact on

American law, was the fourth nomination submitted by President

Madison for the seat after two confirmed appointees (Levi Lincoln and

John Quincy Adams) had declined the position and a third nominee had

* A braham at 191.

• A braham al 192.

7 A braham al 192.

459

been rejected by the Senate. In the end, it is uncertain what led

Madison to Story, although it is known that Story’s uncle was a close

friend of the President.8

Conversely, some candidates whose pre-appointment careers prom­

ised considerable success based on objective merit performed with little

distinction once appointed. The clearest recent example is Charles Evan

Whittaker, an outstanding commercial lawyer from Missouri, who had

served briefly on both the U.S. District Court and Court of Appeals,

and who had won the strong support of Attorney General Brownell.

President Eisenhower appointed W hittaker to the Supreme Court in

1957; he resigned ^ years later with few significant Supreme Court

opinions to his credit.9

To a President interested in demonstrated merit, prior judicial experi­

ence may appear a useful index. Fifty-eight of the 101 individuals to

serve on the Supreme Court had served earlier on a state or on a lower

federal tribunal. This asset, in this century, appears to have appealed

more to Republican than to Democratic Presidents. Of the 23 individ­

uals with prior judicial experience appointed to the Supreme Court

since 1900, only eight were appointed by Democrats, although, of the

44 persons named to the Court in this century, Democrats have named

18. The 43 persons to serve without prior judicial experience on the

Supreme Court since its inception include John Marshall, Joseph Story,

Roger Taney, Charles Evans Hughes, Louis Brandeis, Harlan Fiske

Stone (when appointed Associate Justice), Felix Frankfurter, William

Douglas, Robert Jackson, and Earl W arren—a list that clearly demon­

strates the absence of any necessary correlation between judicial experi­

ence and capacity for distinguished service.

Presidents have not viewed judicial service as a prerequisite to nomi­

nation. However, all but one of the 101 persons to sit on the Court

reached the Court after careers in politics or public service of some

sort.10 Although a record of judicial service may be helpful in facilitat­

ing an assessment of a candidate’s performance as a legal thinker,

Presidents appear historically to have been at least as concerned with a

person’s demonstrated acquaintance with the nation’s needs and public

processes, and sustained prior exposure to the pressures of public life.

Some history of functioning in a pressurized environment may help

assure that a nominee’s effectiveness and independence on the Court

8 A braham at 79-81.

9 A braham at 247-48.

10 T h e one exception is G eo rg e Shiras, Jr.. a P ittsburgh co rp o rate law yer appointed to the C ourt in

1892 by Benjamin H arrison. All five academ icians to reach the C ourt (four o f them appointed by

F D R ) had considerable experience in public life in addition to their academ ic backgrounds. Fourteen

A ttorneys G eneral have been nom inated to the C ourt. N ine w ere successfully appointed—Taney,

C lifford, M oody, M cK enna, M cR eynolds, Stone, Jackson, M urphy and C lark. T w o w ere rejected by

the Senate and tw o w ithdrew before confirm ation. O ne, Edw in M. Stanton, was confirm ed, but died

before taking his seat. A braham at 52; Schm idhauser at 82-83.

460

will not be overcome by public criticism or the magnitude of the issues

that the Court confronts.

B. Political and L egal Philosophy

Because intellect is rarely the sole determinant of a Supreme Court

nomination, and because most Presidents have attached great impor­

tance to the Supreme Court’s role in legitimating particular policies or

national goals, the acceptability of a candidate’s personal philosophy is

often another sine qua non for nomination. As with “merit,” however,

what constitutes an acceptable philosophy may depend on the times, on

the President’s attitude towards the Court, and on a candidate’s fitness

in other respects. For example, political considerations, such as reward­

ing partisan activity or defusing potential political opposition, may

argue in favor of a particular nomination, although the appointing

President could have identified a more personally compatible choice. In

the case of Earl Warren, nominated by President Eisenhower for the

Chief Justiceship in 1953, the President was likely impressed by

Warren’s political and administrative experience and skill, his positions

on particular issues (such as the 1937 Court-packing bill and the 1952

steel seizure case), and his campaign service both to Eisenhower and to

Thomas E. Dewey before him. However, Warren was also obstructing

the takeover of California Republican politics by more partisan leader­

ship, including Vice-President Nixon. Perhaps, had it not been for this

last factor, Eisenhower would have turned to Governor Dewey or to

Chief Justice Vanderbilt of the New Jersey Supreme Court for the

vacant post.11 In any event, Eisenhower did not know W arren’s philos­

ophy well (he sent Attorney General Brownell to interview him before

the nomination), and disagreed with the philosophy eventually mani­

fested in Warren’s decisions.

At particular times in history, the importance of a single issue to the

nation’s welfare or to a President’s program has seemed so great that a

candidate’s position on that issue, rather than his philosophy as a whole,

became the litmus test of his acceptability. Obvious examples include

the cause of Unionism under Lincoln, the constitutionality of green­

backs as legal tender under Grant, and the legitimacy of extensive

government regulation under Franklin Roosevelt. The single-issue test,

however, hardly guarantees a particular justice’s pattern of thought.

For example, the fervent antitrust position of Attorney General James

Clark McReynolds undoubtedly recommended the idea of his nomina­

tion highly to President Wilson. However, once on the Court,

McReynolds proved to be an unabashed conservative, and virtually all

of his other positions were opposed to Wilsonian prpgressivism.

11 A braham at 235-37.

461

Consequently, those Presidents most deeply interested in appointing

politically compatible Justices have focused neither on single-issue posi­

tions, nor on partisan identification, but on the overall pattern of a

candidate’s values and opinions. As explained by Theodore Roosevelt

to Senator Lodge, in a much-quoted 1906 letter discussing the potential

appointment of Justice Lurton: “ [T]he nominal politics of the man has

nothing to do with his actions on the bench. His real politics are all

important.” 12

The clearest recent expression of this approach to the selection of

Supreme Court justices was offered by Presidential candidate Nixon, in

discussing what he would do to replace Chief Justice Warren:

The President cannot and should not control the decisions

of the Supreme Court. . . . There are two important

things I would consider in selecting a replacement to the

Court. First, since I believe in a strict interpretation of the

Supreme Court’s role, I would appoint a man of similar

philosophical persuasion. Second, recent Court decisions

have tended to weaken the peace forces as against the

criminal forces in this country. I would, therefore, want

to select a man who was thoroughly experienced . . . in

the criminal laws and its [sic] problems.13

Nixon said he wanted:

strict constructionists who saw their duty as interpreting

and not making law. They would see themselves as care­

takers of the Constitution and . . . not super-legislators

with a free hand to impose their social and political view­

points on the American people.14

When they are measured against these standards, there is no reason

to think that, on balance, Nixon would be disappointed with his ap­

pointees’ performances on the Court. The most obvious exception may

be Justice Blackmun’s decision in the abortion cases, a decision no one

could likely have anticipated.15 Chief Justice Burger also has written or

joined in strong pro-integration decisions.

One reason why a nominee’s performance may eventually surprise

the President who appointed him is the potential confusion, in the

recruitment process, between a candidate’s political and judicial phi­

losophies. Franklin Roosevelt, for example, wanted ardent New Deal

supporters on the Court. One such clear supporter was Felix Frank­

12 Schubert at 40.

, 3 A shby at 366, (quoting Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) at 130).

14 id.-

16 It should also be noted that N ixon's ability to appoint a personally com patible Justice w as most

sharply curtailed by the time he nom inated Justice Blackmun, because the failure o f the H aynsw orth

and C arsw ell nom inations m ade it politically necessary to locate a noncontroversia) m oderate.

A braham at 9.

462

furter. The central theme, however, of Justice Frankfurter’s judicial

philosophy proved to be judicial restraint. He believed that the consti­

tutional distribution of powers among the branches of the federal

govenment and between the federal and state governments required the

Court to avoid decisions that he deemed merely the imposition of its

own value choices on political authorities who were constitutionally

empowered to decide the same value questions differently. This defer­

ence to the elected branches enabled Frankfurter, as a Justice, fully to

support the New Deal legislative program. However, Frankfurter’s

record in interpreting the Bill of Rights would appear far less libertar­

ian than that of other FDR appointees, especially Douglas, Black, and

Murphy, despite similar personal philosophies, because his judicial phi­

losophy was so much less expansive.

In this vein, it should especially be noted that shorthand labels for

candidates’ philosophies can be misleading. President Nixon advocated

“strict constructionism,” but appointed at least one Justice, William

Rehnquist, whose clear views of the constitutionally mandated distribu­

tion of powers, like most theories on the subject, is not compelled

either by the language of the Constitution or by judicial precedent. For

this reason, Rehnquist, though politically conservative, has been viewed

by some as a judicial activist.16 Conversely, Hugo Black, generally

considered one of the nation’s greatest liberal jurists, reached strongly

libertarian results through “strict construction” of the First Amend­

ment. 17

A President should also recognize, if his aim is to affect the general

direction of Court decisions, that his purpose can not always be best

accomplished by an intellectually gifted person adhering unwaveringly

to the President’s or to any other doctrinaire point of view .18 Critical

to any Justice’s potential influence is his ability to function effectively

in a collegial decisionmaking context. Because a Supreme Court Justice

is wedded to his colleagues for life, a gift for diplomacy, including a

willingness to compromise when necessary, will make his presence

more tolerable and his eventual contributions more persuasive. The

indicia of political acceptability cannot be viewed wholly apart from

the criteria of ability. A record of public or civic service; a strong,

confident, and tolerant personality; and a mature temperament joined

with legal ability and intellect mark not only the gifted potential judge,

but also the effective institutional advocate.

16 See generally Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 H arv. L. Rev. 293 (1976).

17 Rubin, Judicial Review in the United States, 40 La. L. Rev. 67, 77 (1979).

18 F o r a highly elaborate, m athem atically based theory for guiding Presidents in the selection of

Justices w ho will influence C ourt dispositions, see S. T eger, Presidential Strategy fo r the Appointm ent o f

Supreme Court Justices (1976) (unpublished U. o f R ochester Ph.D . thesis. L ibrary o f Congress).

463

C. E nhancing the R epresentativeness o f the C ou rt

In narrowing the pool of potential nominees, Presidents have fre­

quently considered what category of individuals might enhance public

perceptions of the “representativeness” of the Court. The primary

measure of representativeness, as pursued by the Presidents, has been

geographical. Although the Constitution does not require regional bal­

ance, a desire for it underlies, in part, the constitutional designation of

the President to nominate Supreme Court Justices. It is recorded that,

during the debate on this provision, James Madison urged the Constitu­

tional Convention, “The Executive magistrate would be considered as a

national officer, acting for and equally sympathizing with every part of

the United States.” 19 In a variety of constitutional provisions, the

Framers clearly sought to avoid sectional domination of the Govern­

ment, and it might be argued that, in seeking geographical balance on

the Court, a President is respecting a value implicit in our constitutional

system.

Geographic balance was most clearly a presidential consideration

with respect to Supreme Court appointments through the late 19th

century. In selecting the original members of the Court, George Wash­

ington chose representatives of New York, Pennsylvania, Massachu­

setts, Virginia, and South Carolina. As the country moved westward,

each President, starting with Jefferson, began to seek seats first for

Justices from states west of the Alleghenies, then from west of the

Mississippi, and finally, with Lincoln’s appointment of Stephen J. Field

of California, from the Far West. Andrew Jackson, who made seven

nominations, tried scrupulously to have represented each circuit in the

nation’s growing judicial system. The balance of Northerners and

Southerners was also of obvious political significance, both before and

after the Civil War. Part of President Hayes’ program of

postreconstruction reconciliation was the appointment of a Southerner

(although Northern-born), William Woods, to the Court in 1880. The

symbolism was consummated in 1887 by President Cleveland’s appoint­

ment of Lucius Q. C. Lamar, the first “real” Southerner to reach the

Court since 1853, and a former member of both the Confederate Army

and the government of the Confederacy.20

In this century, although remaining of some concern, the emphasis on

regionalism has been less obvious. Some Presidents have more or less

disavowed its importance. Theodore Roosevelt wrote, “I have grown

to feel, most emphatically, that the Supreme Court is a matter of too

great importance to me to pay heed to where a man comes from.” 21

19 Pad o v er at 405.

20 A braham at 131.

21 A braham at 146.

464

Roosevelt appointed, within a 4-year period, two Justices from Massa­

chusetts, Oliver Wendell Holmes and William H. Moody. A similar

“imbalance” occurred under Presidents Coolidge and Hoover, who

appointed three New York Justices—Chief Justice Hughes and Associ­

ate Justices Stone and Cardozo. This imbalance, lasting 8 years, oc­

curred notwithstanding Hoover’s reluctance, before picking Cardozo,

to choose another New Yorker for the Court.

The Supreme Court currently includes two Minnesotans (both ap­

pointed by Nixon), and one Justice each from New Jersey, Ohio,

Colorado, Maryland,22 Virginia, Arizona, and Illinois. The most recent

New Englander to serve on the Court was Chief Justice Stone, who

died in 1946. The most recent representative pf the Deep South was

Hugo Black, who died in 1971, although in selecting Justice Powell to

succeed Black, President Nixon emphasized Powell’s southern origins.

Although not explicitly contemplated during the constitutional de­

bates, Presidents, for political reasons or otherwise, have also sought

“balance” with respect to other criteria as well: partisan affiliation,

religion, and, most recently, race. There continue to be strong pressures

to appoint a woman Justice.

It is arguable that such considerations as race, religion, ethnicity, or

sex are offensive criteria in the choice of Justices, because they distract

from the idea of simply choosing the “best” persons for the Court or

from the constitutional grant of total discretion to the nominating

President. It is also arguable, however, that diversity on the Court

boosts public confidence in the legitimacy of the Court’s decisions. In

addition, presidential concerns for diversity may properly affirm egali­

tarian ideals in the society at large and the value of diversity itself.

As the record now stands, of the 101 people to serve on the Court,

all have been men, 100 have been white, 95 have been of Anglo-Saxon

descent, 95 have been native-born, and almost all have been Protes­

tant.23 Roger Taney, a Catholic and the first non-Protestant appointed,

served from 1836 to 1864. Thereafter, one seat on the Court was held

by a Catholic from 1894 to the present, except for a 7-year period

between 1949 and 1956.24 Louis Brandeis, the first Jewish Justice, was

appointed in 1916. At least one seat on the Court between 1916 and

1969 was held by a Justice who was Jewish.25 Thus, except for a

pattern of regional diversity, the history of the Court reveals a largely

homogeneous membership when measured according to the most obvi­

ous criteria of social background.

22 T hough appointed from N ew York, Justice M arshall w as b o m and started his legal c aree r in

Baltimore. A shby at 320-26.

23 A braham at 53.

24 This g roup includes Justices E. D. W hite, M cK enna, Butler, M urphy, and Brennan. A braham at

56-57.

25 This group includes Justices C ardozo, Frankfurter, and G oldberg. A braham at 58.

465

D. O th er C riteria

Ability, character, and philosophical or representative suitability

hardly exhaust the list of criteria evident in the nominations made to

the Court thus far. Age and health, of course, have played major parts.

The appointment of a younger person to the Court may help assure a

new Justice’s continued influence over a long period, or at least help

assure the Court of the continued aid of a physically vigorous individ­

ual. In one case, perhaps, a President used old age as a criterion.

William Howard Taft’s appointment in 1910 of the 66-year-old Edward

D. White to be Chief Justice may have been motivated, in part, by

Taft’s desire to assure the subsequent occurrence of a vacancy that he

himself could assume after his Presidency.26

Other considerations in the choice of nominees may include friend­

ship, the rewarding of political partisanship or of particular public

service, the effective elimination of a political opponent, placating po­

litical opposition or securing political support. None of these alone has

likely secured the position of a Supreme Court Justice; however, each

has been among the motivations underlying the selection of particular

nominees from pools of otherwise qualified persons.

The presence of ulterior motives in the nominating process or a close

association between a nominee and the appointing President of course

need not correlate with the candidate’s unsuitability on other grounds.

Among the justices appointed by the Presidents of whom they were

close personal or political allies are Roger Taney (Jackson), Stephen

Field (Lincoln), Harlan Fiske Stone (Coolidge), and Felix Frankfurter

(FDR), all of whom would have qualified under any set of criteria.

However, although no clear formula exists for the selection of a great

future Justice or one set formula to identify a fit nominee, the Presi­

dent’s thinking perhaps may usefully be guided by a set of general

principles. With respect to criteria closely related to a person’s likely

performance on the Court, some high degree of ability, character,

health, and philosophical compatibility ought to be viewed as a set of

threshold requirements. Having identified a pool of qualified finalists,

the President could then—without undermining public confidence in his

choice—consider other criteria, e.g., geographic suitability, background

(sex, race), or rewarding public service, that might legitimately play a

part in his ultimate selection. To the extent his criteria might be consid­

ered personal or political favoritism, he should be all the more careful

that his choice be defensible when measured against other candidates

and against criteria related to likely performance. Though no President

can guarantee greatness in his appointees, he can likely avoid serious

disappointment by soliciting a variety of suggestions for any vacancy,

evaluating candidates across a wide range of criteria, and, in analyzing

26 A braham at 159.

466

his personal preferences, bearing in mind the Court’s needs and public

perceptions of the Court.27

III. Identification and Evaluation of Nominees

Because presidential acquaintance and selection criteria rarely limit

the pool of eligible candidates for the Supreme Court to one, Presidents

ordinarily rely to some degree on the assistance and advice of others in

choosing their nominees. Analytically, such assistance may be viewed

as coming in two stages: first, the identification of suitable candidates

for the Court; second, the more exacting evaluation of the serious

contenders.

A. Identification o f Potential Nominees

Potential sources of information concerning suitable candidates are

almost endless. Solicited or unsolicited suggestions may come from the

President’s advisers, both official and unofficial, as well as from Mem­

bers of Congress, sitting members of the judiciary, legal scholars, state

bar representatives, concerned private citizens and candidates them­

selves.

Some instances are known in which Congress pilayed a strong role,

invited or otherwise, in the candidate identification process. In perhaps

the most dramatic instance, Thomas Jefferson, in his search for a

Supreme Court Justice to come from west of the Appalachians, asked

each Member of Congress to suggest two names. He selected Thomas

Todd of Kentucky, the one person named as first or second choice by

every Member of Congress from the new Seventh Circuit, which com­

prised Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee. Later in the 19th century,

Congress mounted notable, though uninvited campaigns for President

Lincoln’s 1862 nomination of Samuel M iller28 and for President

Grant’s 1869 nomination of Edwin M. Stanton.29 Although these are

exceptional examples of congressional activism, suggestions by individ­

ual Members of Congress, particularly from the leadership, are un­

doubtedly common.

Suggestions from sitting judges or Justices may also be expected.

Indeed, in one case, the entire incumbent Supreme Court wrote to the

President to urge the nomination of a particular candidate: John Camp­

bell of Alabama, who was nominated for the Court in 1853 by Presi­

27 A President should also be aw are o f the extent to w hich an appointm ent may, as a m atter o f

political fact, “change the law.'* T h e re are issues, such as federalism, affirm ative action, the death

penalty, abortion rights, and school desegregation, on w hich law yers and political scientists perceive

the current C ourt in flux. T h e balance o f C o u rt opinion on issues in these areas may be affected by a

new Justice, although Presidents typically have not been successful in making new law through

individual appointm ents. This is attributable not only to the unpredictability o f an individual's view s

and behavior, discussed above, but also to the Justices' ordinary adherence to precedent, by w hich

most Justices consider them selves guided, if not bound.

28 Schubert at 41-44.

20 A braham at 118.

467

dent Pierce.30 Chief Justices may more routinely offer their views on

nominations. The most active campaigner among Chief Justices was

likely William Howard Taft. Taft had appointed six men to the Court

during his tenure as President, and appears to have been principally

responsible for selecting three nominees, including himself as Chief

Justice, for President Harding.31 More recently, Chief Justice Burger is

known at least to have supported the nominations of Associate Justices

Blackmun and Powell.32

Where Presidents have turned to Cabinet officers for advice, it is

common for the Attorney General to play a major role both in suggest­

ing and in evaluating nominees. George Washington initiated the prac­

tice by asking Edmond Randolph to prepare a list of candidates for the

bench.33 In recent decades, Attorneys General Cummings and Biddle

(for FDR), Brownell (for Eisenhower), Robert Kennedy (for John

Kennedy), Mitchell (for Nixon), and Levi (for Ford) all performed

significant “screening” functions during the nominations process. How­

ever, just as no legal provision limits presidential criteria for candidate

selection, there are no formal limitations or requirements binding the

President to any particular system of identifying Supreme Court candi­

dates.34

B. Evaluation o f Nominees (Herein, the Roles o f the Departm ent o f Justice

and o f the American Bar Association)

Whoever is responsible for identifying plausible candidates, the func­

tion remains of evaluating the serious contenders according to the

President’s criteria. In 1789, when the Judiciary Act established a

federal bench comprising 19 judges, the evaluation process could rely

with some success on the personal knowledge of the President and of

his close advisers. Even for a nine-member Supreme Court, however,

this is no longer a wholly satisfactory option. The far greater pool of

available talent today and the intensity of public scrutiny to which

nominees are currently subjected make it desirable to follow a more

rigorous and dependable information-gathering process.

A tradition is now well established of active Attorney General and

Department of Justice participation in the process of evaluating Su­

preme Court nominees. The exact pattern of participation has varied

with different Presidents. The Attorney General, with whatever De­

30 A braham at 104.

31 A braham at 21, 155.

32 W oodw ard and A rm strong at 87, 160.

33 R ogers at 38.

34 F o r a time, in the early 19th century, the D epartm ent o f Stale w as assigned the function of

offering the President recom m endations concerning all appointm ents. Even after A ttorney G eneral

C ushing in 1853 reassumed the assignment for his office w ith respect to judicial appointm ents,

A tto rn ey G eneral Bates, under Lincoln, was still able to com plain that the Secretary o f the T reasury

had been instrum ental in making many appointm ents “w ithout any reference to legal and judicial

qualifications." R ogers at 39.

468

partment assistance he seeks, may initiate a study of potential nominees.

The Department also plays a special role in marshalling the recommen­

dations of private groups and individuals, most notably—since the Ei­

senhower Administration—of the American Bar Association (ABA)

Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary (the ABA Committee).

The practice of soliciting formal ABA views on Supreme Court

nominations began with President Eisenhower’s 1956 nomination of

Judge William J. Brennan, Jr. to replace Justice Minton. The President

had assigned to Attorney General Brownell and the Department of

Justice the task of recommending a nominee to meet four specific

criteria: an exemplary personal and professional reputation for legal and

community leadership; good health; relative youth; and ABA “recogni­

tion.” He also expressed a preference for giving most serious consider­

ation to the promotion of an outstanding lower court judge.35

Brownell, to whom Judge Brennan was strongly recommended by New

jersey’s Chief Justice Vanderbilt, the New Jersey Bar Association, the

American Judicature Society, and a host of other organizations,36 sub­

mitted Brennan’s name to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for a full-

field investigation and to the ABA Committee for its assessment of

professional qualifications. The results of the ABA and FBI investiga­

tions were presented to the Attorney General for his consideration and

eventual review with the President.37

FBI full-field checks on proposed nominees are routine. Since the

Brennan appointment, however, the mode of ABA input has varied

from nomination to nomination. Through the Johnson Administration,

it was typical practice to afford the ABA a very brief investigation

period prior to the announcement of a nomination. The resulting time

pressure apparently made it difficult for the ABA to rely successfully,

in its view, on any precise system of ranking nominees. For example,

with Justice Goldberg’s nomination in 1962, the Committee decided to

abandon any statement seeming to rank or quantify the nominee’s

suitability, and instead offered the statement that the nominee was

“highly acceptable from the point of view of professional qualifica­

tions.” 38

For undisclosed reasons, President Nixon abandoned the practice of

consulting the ABA prior to announcing his nominees, a decision that,

with respect to the President’s attempts to find a successor to Justice

Fortas, seemingly contributed to controversial results both for the

President and for the ABA. The ABA Committee, like the general

public, learned of the Nixon nominations only from the President’s

announcements. With the invitation of the Senate Judiciary Committee,

35 R ogers at 39-40; A braham at 235.

36 A braham at 245.

37 R ogers at 40.

38 Walsh at 556.

469

the ABA Committee first reviewed the qualifications of Judge Clement

F. Haynsworth, Jr., the first Nixon nominee to the Fortas seat. The

Committee unanimously found Haynsworth “highly qualified” for the

post, a conclusion that it later ratified only 8-4 after public disclosures

during the confirmation process indicated possible insensitivity on

Judge Haynsworth’s part to financial conflicts of interest.

When the Senate defeated the Haynsworth nomination, President

Nixon, acting again on the recommendation of Attorney General

Mitchell, nominated Judge G. Harrold Carswell, a former U.S. district

judge in the Northern District of Florida who had recently been ap­

pointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Mitchell was

reported to have said of Carswell, “He is almost too good to be

true.” 39 Sensitized by the Haynsworth debate and apparently hoping

to avoid dissent on the degree of a nominee’s suitability, the ABA

Committee, in assessing Carswell’s background, reverted to a “quali-

fied”/ “not qualified” system of evaluation, and reported Carswell

“qualified.” When Carswell, during the confirmation process, was at­

tacked for mediocre judicial talent and hostility to civil rights, and

ultimately defeated, the prestige o f the ABA also suffered, although

ABA Committee Chairman Lawrence E. Walsh defended the Commit­

tee’s assessment in light of its investigation into Carswell’s performance

on the Fifth Circuit.40

President Nixon again did not consult the ABA Committee before

announcing his third nominee to the Fortas seat, Judge Harry A.

Blackmun of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Chief

Justice Burger supported Blackmun’s nomination, and the candidate

was interviewed by Attorney General Mitchell and the Assistant A ttor­

neys General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel and the Tax

Division.41 The ABA Committee again conducted a post-announce­

ment evaluation. It adopted a “not qualified”/ “not opposed”/ “meets

high standards of integrity, judicial temperament, and professional com­

petence” system of ranking, seeking to avoid the appearance of a

plenary endorsement for a merely acceptable candidate and emphasiz­

ing the assertedly nonideological character of its endorsement for a

highly qualified candidate.42 The ABA Committee turned in its most

extensive report ever on a Supreme Court nominee for Judge

Blackmun, finding that he met “high standards of integrity, judicial

temperament, and professional competence.” 43 The Senate unani­

mously confirmed the Blackmun nomination on May 12, 1970.

These events, however, did not conclude the Nixon Administration’s

history o f difficulties with the ABA. In September, 1971, Justices Black

38 A braham at 6.

40 W alsh at 556-57.

41 W o o d w ard and A rm strong at 86.

■« W alsh at 560.

« W alsh at 560.

470

and Harlan resigned, leaving the President the task of replacing two of

the Court’s most highly esteemed members. Attorney General Mitchell

had written in July, 1970, to ABA Committee Chairman Walsh that the

Administration would henceforth submit lists of Supreme Court candi­

dates to the Committee for its evaluation prior to nomination, an

announcement that won high acclaim in light of the ABA’s rigorous

work on the Blackmun nomination.44 The President’s first suggested

candidate was Rep. Richard H. Poff of Virginia, who received the

Committee’s highest recommendation, but the President withdrew his

name from consideration when the press reported his past anti-civil

rights statements.

The Administration’s next submission was a list of six names, includ­

ing California Court of Appeals Judge Mildred Lillie, Arkansas munici­

pal bond lawyer Herschel H. Friday, D.C. Superior Court Judge Sylvia

Bacon, Sen. Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, and Judges Charles

Clark and Paul H. Roney of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit. The first two were the President’s top choices—Mr. Friday

was a close friend of Attorney General Mitchell and had been recom­

mended by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun—and the Com­

mittee devoted almost all its investigative work to them.45 The A ttor­

ney General had recommended the submission of their names notwith­

standing reservations expressed by White House Counsel John Dean

and Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist concerning their judicial

experience and lack of constitutional law background.46 The results

were a unanimous vote of “not qualified” for Judge Lillie and a 6-6 tie

between “not qualified” and “not opposed” for Mr. Friday. News of

the ABA actions reached the press within hours of its report to the

Attorney General; the ABA urged the President to “add some people

with stature” to his list.47 The Administration informed the ABA in a

letter from the Attorney General to Chairman Walsh that it could no

longer rely on the confidentiality of the Committee, and would return

to its practice of submitting nominations directly to the Senate.48

According to two commentators, Attorney General Mitchell acted

prior to the ABA Committee’s formal vote to solicit the acceptance by

another candidate, former ABA president Lewis F. Powell, Jr., of his

nomination to the Black seat.49 Mitchell and Deputy Attorney General

Kleindienst recommended to the President his eventual nominee for the

Harlan seat, Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist.50 Subsequent to the

44 A braham at 28.

45 A braham at 10, 29.

46 W oodw ard and A rm strong at 159.

47 A braham at 10.

49 A braham at 30.

49 W oodw ard and A rm strong at 160.

50 W oodw ard and A rm strong at 161.

471

President’s announcement of his choices, the ABA Committee voted

unanimously that Powell met “high standards of integrity, judicial tem­

perament, and professional competence.” Eight members of the Com­

mittee voted the same endorsement of Rehnquist, with four voting “not

opposed.” Powell was confirmed by the Senate almost immediately,

and Rehnquist, within several weeks.

In contrast to this stormy history, the Department of Justice and the

ABA enjoyed a smooth relationship during the process of evaluating

candidates in 1975 to succeed Justice William O. Douglas. President

Ford and Attorney General Levi returned to the practice of submitting

names to the Committee for its evaluation prior to nomination. On the

day of Douglas’ retirement, Levi submitted a list of candidates to the

ABA Committee.51 The Committee unanimously gave Levi’s first

choice, Judge John Paul Stevens of Chicago, its highest rating. Judge

Stevens was subsequently nominated and confirmed without difficulty.

These events underscore significant questions of how best to make

use of the assistance and resources of private parties in the evaluation of

Supreme Court candidates and, at the same time, maintain the full

scope of presidential discretion that the Constitution provides for the

nomination of Supreme Court Justices. ABA assistance can undoubt­

edly be helpful in the evaluation of Supreme Court candidates, al­

though how best to accomplish its role has itself been a subject of long

debate by the ABA Committee. The Committee describes its function

as limited to an examination of “professional competence, judicial tem­

perament, and integrity,” 52 about which it is undoubtedly able to

express an educated point of view. As time permits, the Committee’s

investigation includes interviews with judges, scholars, lawyers, public

officials, and other parties likely to have information regarding a nomi­

nee’s qualifications, plus a review of the nominee’s writings by teams of

law school professors and practicing lawyers. The ABA Committee’s

conclusions based on this kind of thorough study may be a useful guide

to the President or his advisers in applying the President’s criteria

during the nomination process.

However, extensive ABA input, especially before nomination, may

lead to criticism that an organization that is not responsible to any

public political process is exercising undue influence in the presidential

selection of nominees.53 The ABA Committee currently comprises 14

members—one member at-large and one practicing lawyer from each of

the geographic areas covered by the 11 judicial circuits, except for the

Fifth and Ninth, which areas—because of their size—have two mem­

bers each. There can be no assurance, however, that it fully represents

the American public, or even the American bar, given that nearly half

M A m erican Bar A ssociation at 2.

52 A m erican Bar A ssociation at 2.

53 A braham ait 23; G rossm an at 212-15; M urphy and P ritchett at 76-77; Schm idhauser at 28-33.

472

the lawyers in the United States do not belong to the ABA. Neither is

there any government control over the exhaustiveness of its survey or

the objectivity of its evaluation. Though consultation with the ABA

prior to nomination may confer advantages in the evaluation process, it

may risk the public’s perception that the selection process for the least

politically accountable branch of government is itself being removed a

step from public accountability.54

What is not open to question is that, whatever sources are consulted

prior to nomination, the pre-nomination investigation of any nominee

should be deep, broad, and disinterested enough to assure an informed

evaluation of the nominee’s professional qualifications, temperament,

health, and integrity. So long as the goals of the investigative process

and the advisory roles of the participants are clearly defined, it should

be possible to avoid the difficulties encountered during the Nixon

nominations and make the best possible use of information from all

sources.

IV. The Confirmation Process

Once the processes of candidate evaluation produce a nominee, the

President submits his choice for the “advice and consent” of the Senate.

For the first half of this century, it appeared that the Senate’s role in

materially influencing the selection of a Justice had ended; its confirma­

tion of presidential nominees was virtually automatic.55 Though equal

participation by the Senate and the President in choosing Justices may

be gone, however, the Senate has significantly reasserted its hand in the

selection of Justices since 1968. Since the conditional resignation of

Earl Warren from the Chief Justiceship, four presidential nominations

for the Chief or an Associate Justiceship have been withdrawn or were

defeated at least in part because of Senate action.56

The Senate’s procedure following nomination is straightforward.

Except in the cases of two ex-Senators, the Senate has always referred

Supreme Court nominations to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Since

54 It has been debated since 1973 w h eth er the reporting and o th er “sunshine’* provisions o f the

Federal A dvisory Com m ittee A ct, 5 U.S.C. A pp. § 10, apply to the A B A C om m ittee in its role o f

advising this D epartm ent. T h e Office o f Legal Counsel concluded in 1973 that the A ct does c o v er the

ABA Com m ittee, although the practical effects o f such co v erag e on the operation o f the C om m ittee

w ould be limited. This position was affirm ed in a February, 1974, letter from A ttorney G eneral Saxbe

to the. A BA Com m ittee. A fter fu rth er correspondence. A ttorney G eneral Saxbe inform ed the C om m it­

tee in O ctober, 1974, that O L C , under then Assistant A tto rn ey G eneral Scalia, had reexam ined the

issue and found that the A ct did not c o v er the ABA Com m ittee.

95 Prior to 1968, the Senate failed only once in this century to confirm a presidential nom ination to

the Suprem e C ourt: President H o o v er’s 1930 nom ination o f Judge John J. P arker to be an A ssociate

Justice. Sw indler at S36.

56 Justice Fortas w ith d rew his nom ination for the C h ief Justiceship in O ctober, 1968, after the

Senate failed to end a filibuster preventing a vote on his elevation. His action elim inated the

prospective vacancy to w hich President Johnson had nom inated Ju d g e H om er T h o rn b erry o f the

Fifth C ircuit. In 1969, the Senate defeated President N ixon's first nom inee to succeed Justice Fortas,

Judge C lem ent F. H aynsw orth, Jr. In 1970, it defeated his second nominee. Judge G . H arrold

Carsw ell. A braham at 266; Sw indler at 536.

473

President Coolidge’s nomination in 1925 of Harlan Fiske Stone to an

Associate Justiceship, the committee has usually interviewed the nomi­

nee in person.57 It is modern practice, since President Roosevelt’s 1938

nomination of Stanley Reed, for the committee to hold public hearings

on the nomination.58 If the committee recommends approval, as it

invariably has in recent decades, the nomination is sent to the floor for

debate and an eventual vote by the entire Senate. Confirmation requires

a majority vote.

The factors that may affect the results of a Senate confirmation vote

are innumerable; long and complex explanations have been written

concerning the politics of the confirmation process. Although the his­

tory is fascinating, this memo will only briefly consider the politics of

confirmation to underline the one relevant and perhaps obvious point

that Senators’ opposition to a candidate may not relate in any way to

the President’s criteria for choosing a suitable candidate for the Court.

This is understandable because Senators may well decide their votes

based on partisanship, individual animosity, opposition to a nomination

by constituent or special interest groups, ideological differences, or

intraparty politics.59

One commentator has usefully divided the reasons for Senate opposi­

tion to a candidate into three categories: reasons related to the charac­

ter, ability, or integrity of the candidate; reasons related to partisanship

or the candidate’s ideology; and reasons related to a candidate’s prior

identification with the unpopular side of a significant political contro­

versy.60 The stronger the opposition to a candidate, the more likely the

nominee is to face detractors on all of these grounds.

Relatively few nominees have been credibly opposed on grounds of

outright inability. Perhaps the nominee to fare worst in this respect was

George H. Williams, an undistinguished lawyer nominated unsuccess­

fully by President Grant in 1873. Most recently, Judge Carswell was

opposed in part because of alleged lack o f ability, although it would be

difficult to determine the relative importance to his defeat of the Sen­

ate’s evaluation of his judicial performance and its reaction to his

record of apparent insensitivity to civil rights.

Opposition on ethical grounds was a factor in the defeat of both the

nomination of Justice Fortas to be Chief Justice and the nomination of

Judge Haynsworth to succeed Justice Fortas. The filibuster against

57 S tone's nom ination was controversial chiefly because, having succeeded a H arding appointee,

H arry M. D augherty, as A tto rn ey G eneral, he refused to d ro p a D epartm ent o f Justice case brought

by D augherty, a figure in the T eapot D om e scandal, against S enator W heeler o f M ontana. Frank at

491.

58 T h e Judiciary C om m ittee decided to enci its p ractice o f conducting its nom ination debates

entirely in executive session after the co n tro v ersy engendered by public revelation o f the past K u Klux

K lan m em bership o f Justice H ugo Black, w hose nom ination it had approved by a vote o f 13-4 in 1937.

A braham at 201; A shby at S3.

59 See generally GofT; Sw indler.

60 A shby at 29-31.

474

Fortas may have succeeded chiefly because of opposition to his judicial

philosophy and opposition to President Johnson as a lameduck Presi­

dent in 1968. However, Fortas was also opposed for accepting paid

employment by American University while on the Court and for main­

taining a close advisory relationship with President Johnson, which

seemed to some an inappropriate breach of separation of powers.61

When Fortas later resigned under charges of ethical insensitivity (he

had received and returned, while on the Court, fees from investor

Louis Wolfson and the Wolfson family’s foundation), President Nixon’s

first designated successor, Judge Haynsworth, faced opposition based

on his participation in lower court cases in which he arguably had or

created a financial conflict of interest.62

Considerations of personal or judicial ideology were clearly grounds

for Senate opposition to the nominations of Justice Fortas and Judges

Haynsworth and Carswell. Senators opposed Fortas’ liberal stands on

desegregation, criminal procedure, and free speech. Civil rights and

labor groups attacked the allegedly hostile positions of Judge

Haynsworth. Judge Carswell’s opponents emphasized his statement in

support of “the principles of White Supremacy” during his 1948 cam­

paign for the Georgia legislature.63

Partisan opposition, whether or not “ideological,” may also defeat a

candidate. Of the 14 presidents whose nominees were rejected or other­

wise “killed” by the Senate, six—John Quincy Adams, Tyler, Polk,

Fillmore, Buchanan, and Andrew Johnson—held office in the face of

overwhelming congressional opposition. At the times they lost their

respective nomination fights, it is doubtful that they could have secured

the nomination of almost any individual to the Court.

Interestingly, the most “venerable” ground historically for Senate

opposition to a nominee is the nominee’s prior identification with the

losing side in a national controversy. The first rejected nomination was

that of John Rutledge for Chief Justice in 1795, based largely on his

attack on the Jay Treaty, which the Federalists vigorously supported.

No one-issue debate has loomed as large in the defeat of any Supreme

Court nominee in this century.

The role of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice in

the appointment process has generally been to identify and evaluate

candidates according to the President’s criteria. Department of Justice

witnesses, however, have occasionally played a role in confirmation

hearings either to elaborate on the Administration’s evaluation of a

61 Ashby at 338-41.

62 A braham at 4-5; A shby, at 387-88.

93 Ideological opposition to a candidate may, o f course, backfire. T h e overall c areer record on civil

rights and labor issues o f F o u rth C ircuit Judge John J. Parker, w hose Suprem e C ourt nom ination w as

defeated in 1930, w as undoubtedly m ore progressive o r liberal then the Suprem e C ourt voting record

o f President H oover's subsequent successful nominee, O w en J. R oberts, although P arker’s nom ination

w as defeated prim arily th ro u g h the pressure o f labor and civil rights groups. Schubert at 49-50.

475

nominee’s record or to comment on legal issues raised by a particular

appointment. Not including former Assistant Attorney General

Rehnquist’s testimony at his own confirmation hearing, Department of

Justice Representatives have testified with respect to only two of the

nine persons nominated to the Supreme Court since 1968. Attorney

General Levi testified in support of the 1975 nomination of Judge John

Paul Stevens. Nomination o f John Paul Stevens to be a Justice o f the

Supreme Court: Hearings Before the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 94th

Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975). During the hearings on Justice Fortas’ nomi­

nation to the Chief Justiceship, Attorney General Clark testified regard­

ing whether Chief Justice W arren’s conditional resignation legally cre­

ated a vacancy on the Court, Nominations o f Abe Fortas and Homer

Thornberry: Hearings Before the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 90th

Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1968), and Deputy Attorney General Warren Chris­

topher testified regarding a memorandum he had prepared at the re­

quest of committee member Senator Hart concerning the meaning and

impact of the Supreme Court opinions of Justice Fortas. Id., at 315.64

V. Conclusion: The Appointment Process and Post-Appointment

Performance

Unsurprisingly, the measures of success on the Court vary as widely

as the criteria for selection.65 In considering what process of candidate

selection is most likely to yield a successful Justice, it must first be

borne in mind that, like other virtues, judicial excellence is significantly

in the eye of the beholder, varying with time and place.

If a President’s measure of success is the predictability of his ap­

pointee’s decisions, no selection process can guarantee a happy result.

Even a President’s intimate familiarity with the opinions of a nominee

cannot assure that their views will coincide as the appointed Justice

grows in his position and faces novel questions unforeseen at the time

of his appointment. There are notable examples of presidential dissatis­

faction with the performance of an appointee, e.g., Madison, with the

Federalist Story; Teddy Roosevelt, with Holmes’ vote in the Northern

6* A D epartm ent o f Justice A tto rn ey , N orm an K nopf, testified under subpoena in a private capacity

during the hearings on Ju d g e C arsw ell concerning his experiences w ith Judge C arsw ell w hile a

mem ber o f the Law Students Civil R ights R esearch Council, prior to his em ploym ent w ith the

D epartm ent o f Justice. George Harrold Carswell: Hearings Before the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary,

91st C ong., 2d Sess. 174 (1970).

65 T w o com m entators have w ritten that success on the C ourt is:

the result o f several qualities in com bination: scholarship; legal learning and analytical

pow ers; craftsm anship and technique; w ide general know ledge and learning; character,

moral integrity and impartiality; diligence and industry; the ability to express oneself

w ith clarity, logic and com pelling force; openness to change; courage to take unpopu­

lar positions; dedication to the C o u rt as an institution and to the office o f Supreme

C ourt Justice; ability to carry a pro p o rtio n ate share o f the C ourt's responsibility in

opinion w riting; and finally, th e quality o f statesm anship.

Dennis, Overcoming Occupational Heredity at the Suprem e Court. 66 A.B.A. J. 41, 43 (1980) (quoting A.

Blaustein and R. M ersky, The First O ne H undred Justices: Statistical Studies o f the Suprem e Court o f the

United States (\91%)).

476

Securities case; Wilson, with the conservative McReynolds; and Eisen­

hower, with W arren.66

It is likely that those Presidents who measured success more by the

craftsmanship of their appointees were better pleased than those count­

ing on predictable votes. The average Justice has been one who has

reliably made substantial contributions to acceptable adjudications of

difficult issues over a significant period of time. Not every Justice, of

course, possesses the creativity, intellect, political acumen, and perhaps

longevity, to achieve not only excellence, but “greatness.” However,

those candidates with the potential to be truly exceptional and extraor­

dinary rarely stand out clearly from the pool of excellent candidates,

and a process seeking to identify the “potentially great” might prove

more whimsical than practical. While the eminence of John Marshall or

Brandeis was perhaps predictable, no prognosticator could confidently

have predicted the careers of Harlan Fiske Stone, Hugo Black, or Earl

Warren. Whether a process aimed at finding “great” future jurists

would have focused on them originally cannot be known.

History gives much reason for optimism that, whatever the Presi­

dent’s criteria, a potentially successful member of the Court meeting

those criteria can be found with proper care. A clear set of standards,

input from numerous sources, a broad-based search for candidates, and

time enough for a thorough evaluation are the elements necessary and

sufficient to find the appropriate nominee.

APPENDIX

DATA ON SUPREM E COURT APPOINTM ENTS

1. Succession of the Justices of the Supreme Court

of the United States

2. Supreme Court Nominations Rejected or Refused

3. Prior Judicial Experience of U.S. Supreme Court

Justices and Their Subsequent Service

4. Occupations of Supreme Court Designees at Time

of Appointment

5. Acknowledged Religion of the 100 Individual

Justices of the Supreme Court (at time of appoint­

ment)

6. The 31 States From Which the 103 Supreme

Court Appointments Were Made

7. Occupational Backgrounds of Supreme Court

Nominees Since 1937

66 A braham at 62-63.

477

Table 1

T A B L E O F SUCCESSION O F TH E JU STICES O F TH E SUPREME C O U R T O F TH E U N ITE D S TA TES

Showing Yean « f A d n t Srrvict on the Court

Judiciary A il of I W provided Im a Chief imtrar and 5 AtmciaU Ju ttim

John Ruttedpr William Cuihina Jam n Irrdell Jamet Vihon John blaa

John Jay P R O -1795 17*9-17*1 1719-IRIO 1790- 17<M 17R9.1 **a |7 * 9|7 %

Thofflu JofcfKon

I79|.|7<*J

Jithn R u I M p 179$

William Patmon Samuel Oiaw

Olr**r ElliworlH |79t.|ROh Buthrad Wathtnfton

|79t».»799 |79*-|RII

Alfred Moorr I79R.1RJ9

John M in liill

1K0|.»R»5 Hrnry B. 1 mngMnn William Johnwn

IftfM IR U

IROhlR.'.l

J w p h Story

IR I I 1 M 5 C.jhnrl Duvil

INI M « » *

Smith Thnmpvw

l* M IK4I

IWnry Baldwin

IK10-IH44

Rnfrr | Taney lam n M Waynr fillip P Rirhftii

IN 1ft |N*4 IN.UIRftT i m Wiina i

Peter V Dan»1

Samuel Nchon Levi Wpndhurv IH4I IMM)

Rnhert ( (.riei

iM M r; |R4*n |RH IR 4 t.lR ’ i)

Beniamin R Curti*

IK M IR 5 ’

Nathan Clifford

1

Z. 5

3 S

s * Samuel F Millet

Salmon P Chav i s

|Bfi ’ Ht'Ht

iH M in a ?

\\

8 « Wilham Stroma

M m non R V m «

Ward Hunt

i r ?m r m :

; s 1*70 IRRU

IR74-IRRR 3 ;

I» se William B Wood*

Horave C n y iNRtyiRR?'

Samuel Blatchford

IH R JIR UI 1RRM90.' M i

MelmllrW Fuller L w i i m O C Lamar

IRRR-1910 •- s IRRN IR41

" c Hrnry B Brown

IR90l90n

Howell E J k I w i

Edward 0 White IR9.1 |R«H

J IR94 < Rufus W Peikham

<1 1 9 | 0 -l»:i |R<*S 191)9

Oti»tr Wendrll H o in n

i « * o :i9 i : William H Moody

|9Qf> 1910

M o n o H Lurtm

Edward D Vhiic Wtdti V n Dt*afilrr |909.|g<4 lo v p h R Lamar

JIR94 1910-19.17 |9|(v I9ir*

( J 1910-19:1

Ja m n C McRrynnMt Loun D Brandrn

I9 I4 I9 4 I lvtn-1919

William H Taft

I9.M-I9.M) Benjamin N Cardoro

I 9 IM 9 J H

F rln Frankfurt"

I 9 i9 i« r ,j

1910-1941

Hugo L BIk I

|917. |'IT ( William O Doufta*

1919

J I9JS * Jamn F Byfnei

( J 1941 |94A 1941.1942

Wiley R u tlrd^

F n d M V im m |V4.M*49

I94A -I9JJ Sherman Hinton

" |<*4U.|«<*

Karl V a r m W illim J Brennan

|9<M <*9 I9*h

Arthur J ( « l d M f

!% M % <

Ahr Fortas

Warrrn E Burfrr I9 M -I9 A 9

|9fi9

1r a n E Powell. Jt

|U70

l« 7 :

'S ucceeded by Justice Jo h n Paul Stevens. December 19, 1975.

From A braham at 292-93.

Fe b n w y. 1973

TABLE O F SUCCESSION O F THF JUSTICES O F THE S UP tE M E COURT O F TH E UNITED S TA TE S

1789

IT9 0

j c l >11 1800

i ii'-J 1

u! | ' t

T t w m a To d d

1807-1826

g . i i i i tlto

=11 i l l

“ o E

1

| 21

21| 1820

Robert Tum ble x

oJ « !o X 5ii

John M k U t i) <w Si

8

e

0

ar 1 8 )0

6

o

John Catron John M c K u ilty

«-

IR t T -l f t M 1 8 V 1852

< o !

5* 1840

5S

'S*

1 8 )0

John A Campbell i i

IN V tlA M

“1 &

18*0

Noah H S va y n r O a n d Dana Stephen J Field

1*62 1*81 I8 6 M 8 7 7

1863-1897

h |

!

i l l - Joaepto P. Bradley — 1870

I- 1870-1892

ni *

John M Hartan

?«5 l«-r? .| Q i i 5

1880

Stanley Matthew*

1M I I 889

- ^ O

*e <

D and J B i t x i

1889-19)0

1890

C r a r p S h in e . Jr

1892 1903

ioaeph McKenna

1898-192)

1900

W ilK «n R. O n

>903-1922

Chartei E Hughes

1910

1910-1916

Mahkm Pitney

19121922

Jofin H Clarkr

19(^-1 9 2 2

1920

GfOfft Swlhrrland - Pierce Bvftet

F d v i f d T Sanford H ir lt * F . Slone 1922-1939

1922-19,18

I9 2 .V I9 J0

J 192)

C J 1941-1946

1930

I9 .W 1 9 4 5

Stanley F Heed

I9 JR I9 S 7 Frank M urphy

1940

Robert H . Ja ct ton

1 9 41-19)4

H ir n M H . Burton

I9 4 J -I9 M I

Tom C. C M

1949-1967

1950

John M Htrtan

C h a rtn E Whittaker

1955-1971

19)7-1062 Poller Stewart

1959

l«6 0

Byron ItWhile

|9f>2

Th vrfo o d Manhall

1967

1970

W m H . R rhn qim t

197’

1980

478

T a b l e 2.— S u p r e m e C o u r t N o m i n a t i o n s R e j e c t e d o r R e f u s e d

(In the following tabulation, details on the nominations to the Suprem e C ourt o f the United States

w hich w ere declined by the nominees or acted on adversely by the Senate have been summarized.

T he political com position o f the Senate at ihc time o f such action is show n by m ajor parlies only:

F .— Federalist; A .-F.—A nti-Federalist; D.R. — D em ocratic Republican: N.R. — National Republican;

W .—W hig; D .— D em ocratic; R. —Republican.]

President and A ction on

Senate D ate o f

Supreme Court N ature o f action

com position nomination nomination

nominee

G eorge W ashington

Robert H. Harrison F. 17; A .-F. 9... Sept. 24. 1789.... Sept. 26, 1789.... C onfirm ed; declined.

William P aterson1 F. 17; A .-F. 13. Feb. 27. 1793..... Feb. 23, 1793..... W ithdraw n.

John Rutledge, F. 1^; A .-F. 13. July I. 1795 ! D ec. 15. 1795 Rejected. 10-14.

C J .2 Nov. 5. 1795

William Cushing, F. 19; A.-F. 13. Jan. 26. 1796...... Jan. 27, 1796.. Confirm ed; declined.

C.J.

John Adams

John Jay, C .J........... F. 19; D .R. 13. Dec. 18. 1800... Dec. 19. 1800.... C onfirm ed; declined.

James Madison

Levi L in co ln ........... D .R. 28; F 6... Jan. 2, 1811... Jan. 13, 1811.. C onfirm ed; declined.

A lexander W olcott. D .R . 28; F. 6... Feb. 4, 1811... Feb. 13, 1811. R ejected. 9-24.

John Q. A d am s....... D .R . 28; F. 6... Feb. 21. 1811. Feb. 22, 1811. Confirm ed; declined.

John Q. Adams

John J. C ritte n d e n .. D .R. 28; N.R. 20..! D ec. 17, 1828... Feb. 12, 1829.. “ Postponed. “

A ndrew Jack'son

R oger B. T an ey n .... D. 20; W. 20 . Jan. 15. 1835.. Mar. 3, 1835. “ Postponed.” 24-21.

W illiam S m ith ......... D. 30; W. 18 . Mar. 3, 1837.. Mar. 8, 1837. C onfirm ed; declined.

John Tyler

John C. Spencer W. 28; D. 25 . Jan. 9, 1844...... Jan. 31, 1844.. Rejected, 21-26.

Reuben H. W. 28; D. 25 . Mar. 13, 1844.. Jan. 15. 1845.. "P ostponed.“

W alw orth Jan. 27, 1845.. W ithdraw n.

Edw ard K in g .......... W. 28; D. 25 . June 5. 1844.. Jan. 15, 1845.. “ Postponed.**

Dec. 4. 1844. Feb. 7, 1845... W ithdraw n.

John M. R e a d ......... W. 28; D. 25 . Feb. 7, 1845.. N u action.

James K. Polk

G eorge W. D. 31; W. 2 5 ......... Dec. 23. 1845 . Jan. 22, 1846.. Rejected, 20-29.

W oodw ard

M illard Fillm ore

Edw ard A. D. 35; W. 2 4 ......... Aug. 16. 1852. No action.

Bradford

G eorge E. B a d g e r.. D. 35; W. 2 4 ......... | Jan. 10. 1853.... Feb. 1 1. 1853. “ Postponed."

William C. M icou... D. 35; W. 2 4 .........1 Feb. 24. 1853.. N o action.

James Buchanan

Jerem iah S. B lack... D. 36; R. 26. Feb. 5, 1861.... Feb. 21. 1861. R ejected, 25-26.

A ndrew Johnson

H enry S ta n b e ry ...... R. 36; D. 26 . A pr. 16, 1866.. N o action.

Ulysses S. G rant

Ebenezer R. H oar... R. 56; D. 11 . Dec. 15. 1869... Feb. 3. 1870....... Rejected, 46-11.

Edw in M. S ta n to n .. R. 56; D. II . Dec. 20. 1869... D ec. 20, 1869... C onfirm ed (d. D ec.

24, 1869).

G eorge H. R. 49; D. 19. Dec. I. 1873 ...... Jan. 8. 1874.... W ithdraw n.

Williams, C.J.

C aleb Cushing, C.J. R. 49; D. 19. Jan. 10. 1874...... Jan. 13, 1874.. W ithdraw n.

R utherford B. Hayes

Stanley M atthew s4 . D. 42; R. 33. Jan. 26, 1881...... N o action.

C hester A. A rth u r

Roscoe C o n k lin g .... R. 37; D. 37 . Feb. 24, 1882.... Mar. 2, 1882... C onfirm ed; declined.

G ro v e r Cleveland

William B. D. 44; R. 38 . Sept. 17. 1893.... Jan. 15, 1894... Rejected, 24-30.

H om blow er

W heeler H. D . 44; R. 38 . Jan. 22, 1893...... Feb. 16, 1894.. R ejected, 32-41.

Peckham

H erbert H oover

John J. P ark er......... R. 56: D. 3 9 .......... Mar. 21, 1930.... M ay 5, 1930....... R ejected. 39-41

479

T a b l e 2.— S u p r e m e C o u r t N o m i n a t i o n s R e j e c t e d o r R e f u s e d — Continued

[In the follow ing tabulation, details on the nom inations to the Suprem e C ourt of the U nited States

w hich w ere declined by the nominees o r acted on adversely by the Senate have been summarized.

T he political com position o f the Senate at the time o f such action is show n by m ajor parties only:

F .— Federalist: A .-F .— A nti-Federalist: D .R .— D em ocratic Republican; N .R .—National Republican:

W .— W hig; D .— D em ocratic; R .— Republican.]

President and

Senate D ate o f A ction on

Suprem e C ourt N ature o f action

com position nom ination nom ination

nominee

Lyndon B. Johnson

A be Fortas. C .J......... D. 64; R. 36 June 27. 1968 O ct. 7. 1968 W ithdraw n,

H om er D. 64; R. 36 June 27, 1968 O ct. 7. 1968 W ithdraw n.

T h o rn b erry r>

R ichard M. Nixon

C lem ent F. D. 58; R. 42 Sept. 4, 1969...... Nov. 21, 1969... Rejected, 45-55.

H aynsw orth, Jr.

G . H arrold D. 58; R. 42 Jan. 19. 1970 A pril 7, 1970 R ejected, 45-51.

Carsw ell

1 Paterson's name w as inadvertently subm itted before his term as Senator had expired, he having

been a mem ber o f the Senate w hich created the C ourt positions under the Judiciary A ct o f 1789, I

Stat. 73.

2 Rutledge w as com m issioned, sw orn in and presided o v er the August, 1795. Term o f the C ourt.

3 T he Senate rejected the nom ination as an attem pt to co n trol the C ourt through T aney's Cabinet

affiliation. In the 1836 election, w ith six additional states voting, the D em ocrats won control o f the

Senate. Taney was renom inated, this time for C h ief Justice, and w as confirm ed. 29-15.

4 T h e nom ination, caught betw een D em ocratic co n tro l o f the Senate and Senator C onkling’s fight

w ith Hayes, was pigeonholed. In the new Senate. D em ocrats and R epublicans w ere evenly divided.

G arfield prom ptly resubm itted M atthew s' name, and he was confirm ed. 24-23.

5 T he Senate never reached this nom ination, as it was tied to the effort to advance Fortas to C hief

Justice.

From Sw indler at 536.

T a b l e 3.— P r i o r J u d i c i a l E x p e r i e n c e o f U .S . S u p r e m e C o u r t

J u s t ic e s a n d T h e ir S u b s e q u e n t S e r v ic e

N u m b e r o f Y ears o f P rio r Ju d icial Y ears o f

E x p erien ce S e rv ice on

Ju stice Y ear N o m in ated S u p re m e

F e d e ra l S tate T o ta l C o u rt

J a y ‘ ......................... 1789 ......................... 0 2 2 6

J. R u tled g e* * ....... '1789 an d 1795..... 0 6 6 “2

C u s h in g ................. 1 7 8 9 ......................... 0 29 29 21

1789 .................... 0 0 0 9

1 7 8 9 ................... .*... 0 11 11 7

1 7 9 0 ......................... 0 Vz Vz 9

1 7 9 1 ......................... 0 l>/2 1 >/2 2

1793 ......................... 0 0 0 13

1 7 9 6 ......................... 0 8 8 15

1 7 9 6 ......................... 0 5 5 4

W a s h in g to n .......... 1 7 9 8 ......................... 0 0 0 31

1 7 9 9 ......................... 0 1 1 5

1 8 0 1 ......................... 0 0 0 34 Vi

1 8 0 4 ......................... 0 6 6 30

L iv in g s to n ............ 1 8 0 6 ......................... 0 0 0 17

T o d d ....................... 1 8 0 7 ......................... 0 6 6 20

S to r y ....................... 1 8 1 1 ......................... 0 0 0 34

1 8 1 1 ......................... 0 6 6 24

T h o m p s o n ............ 1823 ......................... 0 16 16 20

T rim b le .................. 1 8 2 6 ......................... 9 2 11 2

480

T able 3.—P rior J udicial E x per ien ce of U.S. S uprem e C ourt

J ustices an d T heir S ubsequent S erv ice —Continued

N u m b er o f Y ears o f P rio r Judicial Y ears o f

E x p erien ce S e rv ic e on

Ju stice Y ear N o m inated

S u p rem e

F ed eral S tate T o ta l C o u rt

1 8 2 9 ......................... 0 6 6 32

1 8 3 0......................... 0 0 0 14

1835 ......................... 0 5 5 32

1 8 3 6 ......................... 0 0 0 28

1836 ......................... 6 2 8 5

1837 ......................... 0 10 10 28

1837 ......................... 0 0 0 15

1 8 4 1 ......................... 4 0 0 19

1845 ......................... 0 22 22 27

1845 ......................... 0 6 6 6

18 4 6......................... 0 13 13 24

1 8 5 1......................... 0 0 0 6

1853 ......................... 0 0 0 8

C liffo rd .................. 1858 ......................... 0 0 0 23

1862 ......................... 0 0 0 19

1 8 6 2......................... 0 0 0 28

1 8 6 2......................... 0 14 14 15

F i e l d ..................... 1 8 6 3......................... 0 6 6 34'/2

1 8 6 4 ......................... 0 0 0 9

1 8 7 0 ......................... 0 11 11 10

1 8 7 0......................... 0 0 0 22

1872 ......................... 0 8 8 10

1 8 7 4......................... 0 0 0 14

1877 ......................... 0 1 1 34

1 8 8 0......................... 12 0 12 7

1 8 8 1......................... 0 4 4 8

1 8 8 1......................... 0 18 18 21

1882 ......................... 15 0 15 II

L. Q. C. L am ar... 1888 ......................... 0 0 0 5

1 8 8 8.......................... 0 0 0 22

1 8 8 9......................... 6 22 28 21

18 9 0......................... 16 0 16 16

1892 ......................... 0 0 0 11

1 8 9 3......................... 7 0 7 '2

W hite*................... ‘ 1894 and 1910..... 0 l'/2 P/2 27

1 8 9 5......................... 0 9 9 14

1898 ......................... 5 0 5 27

19 0 2......................... 0 20 20 1 30

1 9 0 3......................... 4 3 7 19

1 9 0 6......................... 0 0 0 4

1 9 0 9........ ................ 16 10 26 5

'1 9 1 0 an d 1930..... 0 - 0 0 17

1 9 1 0......................... 7 1 8 27

1 9 1 0......................... 0 2 2 6

1 9 1 2......................... 0 11 11 10

1 9 1 4......................... 0 0 0 27

1 9 1 6 ......................... 0 0 0 23

1 9 1 6 ......................... 2 0 2 6

T a ft’........................ 1 9 2 1 ......................... 8 5 13 9

1 9 2 2......................... 0 0 0 16

B u tle r..................... 1 9 2 2......................... 0 0 0 17

481

T able 3.— P rior J ud icial E x per ien ce of U.S. S uprem e C ou rt

J ustices a n d T heir S ubsequent S erv ice —Continued

N u m b e r o f Y ears o f P rio r Judicial Y ears o f

E x p e rie n c e S e rv ic e on

Ju stic e Y ear N o m in ated S uprem e

F ed eral S tate T o ta l C o u rt

1923 ......................... 14 0 14 7

'1923 and 1941..... 0 0 0 23

1 9 3 0......................... 0 0 0 15

1932 ......................... 0 18 18 6

1937 ........................ 0 l ‘/2 l ‘/2 34

1937 ......................... 0 0 0 19

1 9 3 9......................... 0 0 0 23

1939 ......................... 0 0 0 36

1940 ...................... 0 7 7 9

1 9 4 1 ......................... 0 0 0 1

1941 .......................... 0 0 0 13

1943 ......................... 4 0 4 6

1 9 4 5 ......................... 0 0 0 13

1946 ......................... 5 0 5 7

1949 ........................ 0 0 0 18

1 9 4 9 ......................... 8 0 8 7

1953 ......................... 0 0 0 16

1955 ......................... 1 0 1 16

1956 0 7 7

1957 ......................... 3 0 3 5

1958 4 0 4

W h ite ...................... 1 9 6 2 ......................... 0 0 0

1 9 6 2 ......................... 0 0 0 3

1 9 6 5 ......................... 0 0 0 4

1 9 6 7 ......................... 3 '/2 0 3'/2

1 9 6 9 ......................... 13 0 13

1 9 7 0 ......................... 11 0 11

1971 ....................... 0 0 0

1 9 7 1 ......................... 0 0 0

1975 ....................... 5 0 5

‘ In d ic a te s C h ie f Ju s tic e and d a te o f his a p p o in tm e n t o r p ro m o tio n .

* R u tle d g e 's n o m in atio n w as re je c te d by th e S en ate in D e c e m b e r 1795, b ut h e had

se rv e d as C h ie f Ju s tic e u n d e r a recess a p p o in tm e n t fo r fo u r m onths.

“ A c tu a lly R u tle d g e n e v e r se rv e d as A sso ciate Ju stic e , a lth o u g h he d id p e rfo rm c irc u it

d u ty b efo re his resig n atio n in 1791.

n In d icates n o ju d ic ia l ex p e rie n c e w h e n a p p o in ted as Associate Ju stice.

From A b ra h a m at 45-47.

482

T a b l e 4 .— O c c u p a t i o n s * o f S u p r e m e C o u r t D e s i g n e e s a t T i m e o f

A pp o in t m e n t +

F ed eral O ffice h o ld e r in E x ecu tiv e B r a n c h ...................................................................... 22

Ju d g e o f In ferio r F ed eral C o u r t ........................................................................................... 21

Ju d g e o f S tate C o u r t................................................................................................................. 21

P riv a te P ra c tic e o f L a w .............................................................................................:............ 18

U.S. S e n a to r.................................................................................................................................. 8

U.S. R e p re se n ta tiv e ............................................................... .................................................... 4

S tate G o v e r n o r ............................................................................................................................ 3

P ro fesso r o f L a w ........................................................................................................................ 3

A ssociate Ju stice o f U.S. S u p re m e C o u rt " ..................................................................... 2

Ju stice o f the P erm an en t C o u rt o f In tern atio n al J u s tic e ............................................ 1

' M any o f the ap p o in tees had held a v ariety o f federal o r sta te offices, o r ev en b o th ,

p rio r to th eir selection.

* In g en eral the ap p o in tm en ts from sta te office are c lu ste re d at th e beg in n in g o f the

C o u rt’s existence; th o se from federal office are m o re recen t.

“ Ju stices W hite and Stone, w h o w e re promoted to the C h ie f Ju sticesh ip in 1910 and

1930, resp ectiv ely .

D o es not in clu d e Ju stic e Jo h n Paul Stevens, a p p o in te d 1975, fo rm erly a ju d g e o f the

U.S. C o u rt o f A p p eals for th e S ev en th C ircu it.

From A b rah am at 53.

T a b l e 5.— A c k n o w l e d g e d R e l i g i o n o f t h e 100 I n d i v i d u a l

J u s t i c e s o f t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t ( a t t i m e o f a p p o i n t m e n t )*

E p is c o p a lia n ............................................................................................................................................. 26

U nspecified P ro te sta n t.......................................................................................................................... 24

P re sb y te ria n .............................................................................................................................................. 17

R om an C a th o lic ...................................................................................................................................... 6

U n ita ria n .................................................................................................................................................... 6

B a p tis t........................................................................................................................................................ 5

J e w is h ......................................................................................................................................................... 5

M e th o d ist................................................................................................................................................... 4

C o n g re g a tio n a list................................................................................................................................... 3

D isciples o f C h r i s t ................................................................................................................................. 2

L u th e ra n .................................................................................................................................................... 1

Q u a k e r........................................................................................................................................................ ............ 1

100

•D o e s not in clu d e Ju stice Jo h n P aul S tevens, ap p o in ted 1975.

From A b rah am at 57.

483

T a b l e 6 .— T h e 31 S t a t e s f r o m W h i c h t h e 103 S u p r e m e C o u r t

A pp o in t m e n t s W e r e M a d e

N e w Y o r k ................................................ 15 M in n e so ta ................................................. 2

O h io ............................................................ 9 N o rth C a ro lin a ...................................... 2

M a s s a c h u s e tts ......................................... 8 Io w a ................................................................2

V ir g in ia ..................:................................. 7 M ic h ig a n .................................................. ....2

T e n n e s s e e ................................................. 6 N e w H a m p sh ire ..................................... ....1

P e n n sy lv a n ia ........................................... 6 M a in e ......................................................... ....1

K e n tu c k y .......... M ississip p i....................................................1

M a ry la n d .......... K a n s a s ....................................................... ....1

N e w J e r s e y ...... W y o m in g .................................................. ....1

S o u th C a ro lin a U ta h ................................................................1

C o n n e c tic u t...... T e x a s ......................................................... ....1

G e o r g i a ............. In d ia n a ...........................................................I

A la b a m a ............ M isso u ri.........................................................1

C a lif o r n ia ......... C o l o r a d o .................................................. ....1

Illin o is................. A riz o n a ..........................................................1

L o u is ia n a ..........

• J o h n Paul S tev ens, w h o receiv ed the 104th successful p resid en tial ap p o in tm en t to the

C o u rt, w as from Illinois, th u s raising th at S ta te ’s total to four.

From A b rah am at 56.

484

T able 7.— O c c u p a t i o n a l Backgrounds of S u prem e C o urt

N o m in e e s S in c e 1937

L ast o ccu p a tio n befo re

N o m in ee M a jo r o ccu p a tio n

ap p o in tm en t

D o u g la s .......................... S ecurities and E x ch an g e L aw and teaching.

C om m ission

R e e d ................................. S o licito r G e n e ra l................. E x e c u tiv e b ra n c h and p riv a te p ractice.

J a c k s o n ........................... A tto rn e y G e n e r a l................ E x e c u tiv e b ra n c h and p riv a te p ractice.

S to n e ................................ S u p rem e C o u rt J u s t ic e ..... E x e c u tiv e b ra n c h and p riv a te p ractice.

B y rn es.............................. U .S. S e n a to r ......................... Politics.

M u rp h y ........................... A tto rn e y G e n e ra l................ Politics.

R u tle d g e ......................... A p p e lla te c o u r t ................... L aw sc h o o l d ean an d in stru cto r.

B u rto n .............................. U.S. S e n a to r ......................... P o litic s an d p riv a te practice.

V in s o n ............................ S e c re ta ry o f T re a s u r y ....... Politics.

M in to n ............................ A p p ellate c o u r t ................... P olitics.

C la r k ................................ A tto rn e y G e n e ra )................ E x e c u tiv e b ra n c h an d p riv a te p ractice.

H a rla n .............................. A p p ellate c o u r t ................... P riv a te practice.

B re n n a n .......................... S tate c o u r t ............................. P riv a te p ra c tic e an d S tate ju d g e .

S te w a r t........................... A p p e lla te c o u r t ................... P riv a te practice.

W h itta k e r ....................... A p p e lla te c o u r t ................... P riv a te practice.

W h ite ............................... A ssistant A tto rn e y P riv a te practice.

G en eral

G o ld b e r g ........................ S e c re ta ry o f L a b o r ............ P riv a te practice.

F o r t a s .............................. P riv a te p ra c tic e ................... P riv a te p ra c tic e w ith som e ex p erien ce

in ex ecu tiv e b ran ch .

M a rsh all.......................... S o licito r G e n e r a l................. N A A C P a tto rn e y and F e d eral bench.

T h o rn b e rry .................... A p p e lla te c o u r t ................... Politics.

B u rg e r.............................. A p p ellate c o u r t ................... P riv a te p ractice.

H a y n s w o rth .................. A p p ellate c o u r t ................... P riv a te practice.

C a rs w e ll......................... A p p ellate c o u r t ................... P riv a te practice.

B la c k m u n ...................... A p p e lla te c o u r t ................... P riv a te practice.

P o w e l l ............................ P riv a te p r a c tic e ................... P riv a te practice.

R e h n q u is t....................... A ssistant A tto rn e y P riv a te practice.

G en eral

S te v e n s ........................... A p p e lla te c o u r t ................... P riv a te practice.

Adapted from A sh b y at 453.

485

BIBLIOGRAPHY

H. Abraham, Justices and Presidents: A Political History of Appoint­

ments to the Supreme Court (1974).

H. Abraham and E. Goldberg, A N ote on the Appointment o f Justices o f

the Supreme Court o f the United States, 46 A.B.A. J. 147 (1960).

American Bar Association, The Standing Committee on Federal Judici­

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