Preemptive Effect of the Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food Donation Act

Preemptive Effect of the Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food

Donation Act

T he Bill Em erson G ood Sam aritan Food D onation Act preem pts state “ good Sam aritan” statutes that

provide less protection from civil and crim inal liability arising from food donated in good faith

for distribution to the needy than the Act provides.

March 10, 1997

M em orandum O p in io n fo r t h e G eneral C o u n sel

D epartm ent of A g r ic u l t u r e

You have requested our views on the question whether the Bill Emerson Good

Samaritan Food Donation Act (the “ Act” ), Pub. L. No. 104-210, 110 Stat. 3011

(1996) codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1791 (Supp. II 1996), preempts state

statutes that provide less protection from civil and criminal liability arising from

food donated in good faith for distribution to the needy. We believe that Congress

intended to establish a minimum level of immunity for those engaged in food

donation and distribution. Accordingly, we believe that Congress intended to pre­

empt state “ good Samaritan” statutes that provide less liability protection than

the Act.

I.

In order to “ encourage the donation of food and grocery products to nonprofit

organizations for distribution to needy individuals,” the Bill Emerson Good

Samaritan Food Donation Act precludes civil and criminal liability arising from

food donated in good faith, except in cases of gross negligence or intentional

misconduct. 42 U.S.C. §1791. It amended and converted to affirmative law the

Model Good Samaritan Food Donation Act (the “ Model Act” ), 42 U.S.C.

§§12671-12673 (1994), which had been enacted in 1990 to provide states with

model language for revising their existing good Samaritan laws.1 The current Act

provides:

(1) LIABILITY OF PERSON OR GLEANER. — A person or

gleaner shall not be subject to civil or criminal liability arising from

1 Every state and the District of Columbia prior lo 1990 had enacted some form of statutory protection from

liability for food donation and distribution. See H R Rep. No. 104—661, at 2-3 (1996) (citing “ Summary of Good

Samaritan Food Donation Statutes” prepared by Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam and Roberts in 1992 for “ Share Our

Strength,” a non-profit hunger relief organization). These statutes are exceptions to the common law or statutory

rule of strict liability for distributing food or any other defective product, the defective aspect of which causes

injury. Id The statutes vary considerably, however Some provide liability only for gross negligence or intentional

acts, while others impose liability for negligence. Still others limit liability if the donor reasonably inspects the

food at the time of donation and has no actual or constructive knowledge of any defective condition Only one

state has adopted the language m the Model Act. Id.

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Opinions o f the Office o f Legal Counsel in Volume 21

the nature, age, packaging, or condition of apparently wholesome

food or an apparently fit grocery product that the person or gleaner

donates in good faith to a nonprofit organization for ultimate dis­

tribution to needy individuals.

(2) LIABILITY OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION. — A non­

profit organization shall not be subject to civil or criminal liability

arising from the nature, age, packaging, or condition of apparently

wholesome food or an apparently fit grocery product that the non­

profit organization received as a donation in good faith from a per­

son or gleaner for ultimate distribution to needy individuals.

(3) EXCEPTION.— Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply to an

injury to or death of an ultimate user or recipient of the food or

grocery product that results from an act or omission of the person,

gleaner, or nonprofit organization, as applicable, constituting gross

negligence or intentional misconduct.

42 U.S.C. § 1791(c).2

II.

As the Supreme Court has observed, preemption is fundamentally a question

of congressional intent. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)

( “ [t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption

case” ) (quoting Retail Clerks Int’l A ss’n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103

(1963)). In assessing congressional intent, the Court has “ long presumed that Con­

gress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.” Id. In cases where

“ Congress has ‘legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occu­

pied’ ” the Court “ ‘start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers

of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the

clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ” Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator

Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). It is with this admonition in mind that we

examine the preemptive effect of the Act.

The Supreme Court has identified three ways in which a federal law may pre­

empt state law.3 First, Congress may preempt state law explicitly in the text of

its statute. See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990).4 Second,

2The Act defines a “ gleaner” as ‘‘a person who harvests for free distribution to the needy, or for donation

to a nonprofit organization for ultimate distribution to the needy, an agricultural crop that has been donated by

the owner " 42 U.S.C § 1791(b)(5)

3See generally Freighthner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U S 280, 287 (1995), Cipollone v. Liggett Group, In c, 505

U S 504,516-17 (1992)

4 For example, to expressly preempt state regulation on a particular subject. Congress may provide that ” [n]o

State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect any requirement — (1) which is

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Preemptive Effect o f the Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food Donation Act

Congress may preempt state laws implicitly by demonstrating an intent to occupy

the field exclusively with federal regulation. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. Finally,

even where Congress permits concurrent state regulation in a field, such regulation

is preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law. The Supreme

Court has found an actual conflict where “ compliance with both federal and state

regulations is a physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce,”

Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1962),

or where state law “ stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution

of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.

52, 67 (1941).

Although the Act contains no express preemption clause, its purpose is to super­

sede, at least to a certain extent, state good Samaritan statutes. Thus, the question

is to what extent it supersedes those statutes. We believe the Act clearly preempts

state good Samaritan statutes to the extent they provide less liability protection

than federal law — for example, to the extent they permit liability based on evi­

dence of negligence — because such laws literally would “ stand[] as an obstacle

to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con­

gress.” Hines, 312 U.S. at 67. As stated above, the express purpose of the Act

is to “ encourage the donation of food and grocery products to nonprofit organiza­

tions for distribution to needy individuals’’ by limiting liability for such activities.

Unless potential donors and distributors are assured that the Act sets an absolute

liability ceiling, they will continue to be deterred by the threat of liability under

state law and will not be encouraged by the Act to donate food. Thus, to have

any effect at all, the Act must preempt state statutes that provide less liability

protection.

The legislative history of the Act confirms this interpretation. As Representative

Danner explained when introducing the bill in the House,

the current patchwork of State laws has been cited by many poten­

tial donors as the principal reason so much food is thrown away

rather than given to food banks and food pantries for distribution

to the hungiy. . . .

Simply put, we need a reasonable nationwide law that eliminates

confusion and forges a stronger alliance between the public and

private sectors in this Nation. That is exactly what this bill delivers.

different from or in addition to, any requirement applicable under (federal law] . . . and (2) which relates . .

to any other matter included in a requirement applicable . under [federal law].” 21 US.C. §360k(a) (1994)

(Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as amended by the Medical Device Amendments), see also 29 US C.

§ 1144(a) (1994) (provision m ERISA preempting “ any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter

relate to any employee benefit plan” ). Congress instead may limit the extent to which states may regulate, by pro­

viding for example that “ [aj State may adopt or continue in force any law, rule, regulation, order, or standard

relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary has adopted a rule, regulation, order, or standard covering

the subject matter of such State requirement ” Federal Railroad Safety Act, 45 U.SC §434, repealed by Act of

July 5, 1994, Pub. L No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379

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The [Act] will establish a uniform national law to protect organiza­

tions and individuals when they donate food in good faith.

A business should not have to hire a legal team to interpret

numerous State laws so that it feels comfortable in contributing

food to the hungry.

142 Cong. Rec. 17,066 (1996).

The remarks of other members o f Congress also demonstrated an intent to pre­

empt those state good Samaritan statutes that conflict with the federal standard.

See e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 104-661, at 7 (1996) (“ The bill would preempt civil

and criminal liability laws of state and local governments that deal with the dona­

tion of food and grocery products to nonprofit organizations.” ); 142 Cong. Rec.

21,516 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (acknowledging that the Act would

“ diminish the protections afforded by the tort laws” ). Indeed, Representative

Conyers expressed concern about the intended preemptive effect of the Act:

Although I am supportive o f the impetus behind the legislation —

encouraging private entities to donate food to nonprofit organiza­

tions who distribute food to the needy — I question whether pre­

empting traditional State law prerogatives in this area is desirable

. . . . [A]ll 50 States have enacted special statutory rights con­

cerning food donations. Not surprisingly, the States have crafted

a variety of liability rules — ranging from those who subject all

negligent parties to liability, to those who limit liability only to

grossly negligent or intentional acts.

Unfortunately, with the adoption of this bill, the House will be

seeking to impose a one-size-fits-all [sic] legal standard for food

donors . . . .

142 Cong. Rec. 17,067 (1996).

President Clinton also apparently believed that the Act would preempt con­

flicting state laws. In his signing statement the President observed:

In working with various private sector donors and food banks . . .

it has come to light that liability concerns are often an impediment

to food recovery and donation efforts. Although many States have

enacted their own “ Good Samaritan” laws to support food

recovery and donation efforts, many businesses have advised that

these varying State statutes hinder food donations. This legislation

will end the confusion regarding liability for food recovery and

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Preemptive Effect o f the Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food Donation Act

donation operations through uniform definitions in one national

law.

2 Pub. Papers of William J. Clinton 1737, 1737-38 (1996).

We believe that the legislative history of the Act, together with its express pur­

pose and the context in which it was enacted, indicate that Congress intended

to establish a “ uniform national law” that displaces conflicting state good Samari­

tan statutes — i.e., those that provide less liability protection than federal law.

There is an argument that Congress intended to go even farther, preempting not

only less protective state statutes but all state good Samaritan laws. Although we

acknowledge that some parts of the legislative history could be read to support

this argument, we find insufficient evidence that Congress intended to preempt

the field. “ Field preemption” does not seem necessary to achieve the congres­

sional goals underlying the Act. The Act should have the desired effect of encour­

aging food donation as long as it assures potential donors that they will not incur

liability for conduct above a certain national level of culpability. The existence

of state standards that provide even greater protection from liability should not

deter food donation; indeed, they may further promote it. Furthermore, as noted

above, the Supreme Court is reluctant to construe preemption broadly in areas

traditionally regulated by the states.5 For these reasons, we decline to interpret

the Act to preempt all state good Samaritan statutes. Rather, we construe the Act

to preempt only those state good Samaritan statutes that furnish less liability

protection than federal law.

DAWN E. JOHNSEN

Acting Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

5See Medtronic, Inc , 518 U S at 485; Rice 331 U S. at 230

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