State of Tennessee v. Tedrik Woods

01/25/2017

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs January 5, 2017

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TEDRIK WOODS

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 09-06406 W. Mark Ward, Judge

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No. W2016-01360-CCA-R3-CD

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The Petitioner, Tedrik Woods, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary

denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal

Procedure 36.1. Because the Petitioner’s three-year sentence for employment of a

firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony is illegal, we reverse the judgment

of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with

Rule 36.1 and this opinion.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Reversed

and Remanded

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT

WILLIAMS and ALAN E. GLENN, JJ., joined.

Tedrik Woods, Only, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrew C. Coulam, Assistant

Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and D. Gregory Gilbert,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

On September 9, 2011, the Petitioner entered an Alford or “best interest” guilty

plea in indictment number 09-06406 to two counts of attempted second degree murder

and one count of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony.1

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to concurrent eight-

year sentences at thirty percent release eligibility for the attempted second degree murder

1

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).

convictions and a consecutive three-year sentence at one hundred percent release

eligibility for the firearm conviction.2

On May 23, 2016, the Petitioner filed a pro se “Motion to Correct Judgment”

pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. In the motion, the Petitioner

cited Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(c), which states that a person may

not be charged with possession or employment of a firearm offense pursuant to Code

sections 39-17-1324(a) or (b) “if possessing or employing a firearm is an essential

element of the underlying dangerous felony as charged.” The Petitioner alleged that he

was erroneously charged with employment of a firearm during the commission of a

dangerous felony because the factual allegations supporting his two charges for attempted

second degree murder were that the Petitioner shot the victim one time in the arm. He

claimed that because possessing or employing a firearm was an essential element of his

attempted second degree murder charges based on these factual allegations, his plea

agreement was void, and his three-year sentence for employment of a firearm during the

commission of a dangerous felony should be reversed and dismissed.

On June 1, 2016, the trial court entered an order summarily denying the motion

because it failed to state a colorable claim for relief. The Petitioner, proceeding pro se,

filed a timely appeal from this order.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in summarily denying his

motion on the basis that it failed to state a colorable claim. He also reiterates the

allegation that his three-year sentence for employment of a firearm during a dangerous

felony is illegal because employing a firearm was an essential element of his attempted

second degree murder convictions. The Petitioner asks that his illegal three-year

sentence for the firearm conviction be “corrected, modified, and/or voided” because “it is

2

The transcript from the plea submission hearing shows that the Petitioner

simultaneously entered a guilty plea in indictment number 09-04391 to facilitation of first degree

murder, for which he received a fifteen-year sentence at thirty percent release eligibility;

attempted especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an eight-year sentence at thirty

percent eligibility; and convicted felon in possession of a handgun, for which he received a

sentence of one year at thirty percent release eligibility. The trial court ordered the sentences for

the convictions in indictment number 09-04391 served concurrently with the Petitioner’s two

convictions for attempted second degree murder in indictment number 09-06406 but ordered the

employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction in indictment

number 09-06406 served consecutively to the other sentences, for an effective sentence of

eighteen years. Judgments for the sentences imposed in indictment number 09-04391were not

included in the appellate record.

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impermissible” under Code section 39-17-1324(c)” and because “the trial court lacked

the statutory authority to impose such a sentence.” The State responds that the Petitioner

has failed to present a colorable claim for relief. Specifically, it asserts that Rule 36.1

cannot be used to attack an underlying conviction and that employing a firearm is not an

element of the offense of attempted second degree murder. Because the uniform

judgment document shows that the Petitioner’s three-year sentence for employment of a

firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony is illegal on its face pursuant to the

mandate in Code section 39-17-1324(h)(1) (Supp. 2008), we reverse the order summarily

denying the Rule 36.1 motion and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings

consistent with Rule 36.1 and this opinion.

Pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[e]ither the

defendant or the state may, at any time, seek the correction of an illegal sentence.” Tenn.

R. Crim. P. 36.1(a)(1). “For purposes of this rule, an illegal sentence is one that is not

authorized by the applicable statutes or that directly contravenes an applicable statute.”

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a)(2). A petitioner is only entitled to a hearing and appointment

of counsel “[i]f the motion states a colorable claim that the unexpired sentence is illegal.”

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(b)(3); see State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 211 (Tenn. 2015)

(stating that “a Rule 36.1 motion may be summarily dismissed for failure to state a

colorable claim if the alleged illegal sentence has expired.”). A colorable claim is “a

claim that, if taken as true and viewed in a light most favorable to the moving party,

would entitle the moving party to relief under Rule 36.1.” State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d

585, 593 (Tenn. 2015). Whether a motion states a colorable claim for correction of an

illegal sentence under Rule 36.1 is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo.

Id. at 589 (citing Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 255 (Tenn. 2007)).

The Petitioner, in his Rule 36.1 motion, alleged that his three-year sentence for

employment of a firearm during a dangerous felony is illegal because employing a

firearm was an essential element of his attempted second degree murder convictions. The

Petitioner attached to his motion the plea agreement as well as the judgment showing the

three-year sentence for the employment of a firearm during the commission of a

dangerous felony. This court has consistently held that while Rule 36.1 provides a

method for correcting allegedly illegal sentences, it does not provide a method for

seeking the reversal of convictions. State v. John Armstrong, No. W2016-00082-CCA-

R3-CD, 2016 WL 5210869, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 2016); State v. Jimmy

Wayne Wilson, No. E2013-02354-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 1285622, at *2 (Tenn. Crim.

App. Mar. 31, 2014) (citing Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 455-56 (Tenn.

2011)). Moreover, it is well established that employing a firearm is not an essential

element of attempted second degree murder. State v. Roy Demond Duncan, No. W2012-

00834-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 2490551, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 7, 2013); State v.

Frederick Edward Braxton, No. M2009-01735-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 3809773, at *17

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(Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2011); State v. Henry Cooper, No. W2006-02482-CCA-R3-

CD, 2008 WL 169648, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2008); State v. Joe Mitchell, No.

W1999-06610-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 633340, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2000).

Therefore, at first glance, the Petitioner’s pro se motion did not appear to state a colorable

claim for Rule 36.1 relief.

However, we simply cannot ignore the fact that the Petitioner received an illegal

sentence of three years for his guilty plea to employment of a firearm during the

commission of a dangerous felony. The transcript from the plea submission hearing,

which was included in the appellate record, clearly shows that the Petitioner entered a

guilty plea to employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and

that the trial court sentenced him to three years pursuant to the plea agreement. The

Petitioner committed the employment of a firearm offense on February 6, 2009. At the

time of this offense, Code section 39-17-1324(h)(1) provided, as it does now, that “[a]

violation of [Code section 39-17-1324(b)] is a Class C felony, punishable by a mandatory

minimum six-year sentence to the department of correction.” T.C.A. § 39-17-1324(h)(1)

(Supp. 2008) (emphasis added). Therefore, while the trial court properly determined that

the sentence for the firearm offense was required to be served at one hundred percent and

consecutively to any other sentence pursuant to Code sections 39-17-1324(e)(1), (2), it

erroneously sentenced the Petitioner to three years rather than six years for this offense,

which results in an illegal sentence. Having found that the Petitioner’s judgment form,

which reflected a three-year sentence for this offense, is illegal on its face, we are obliged

to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

The record shows that the Petitioner’s illegal three-year sentence in indictment

number 09-06406 has not expired. Therefore, on remand, the trial court must follow the

procedure established in the recently amended Rule 36.1(c)(3):

With or without a hearing, if the court determines that the illegal sentence

was entered pursuant to a plea agreement, the court shall determine whether

the illegal aspect of the sentence was a material component of the plea

agreement.

(A) If the illegal aspect was not a material component of the plea

agreement, the court shall file an order granting the motion and also shall

enter an amended uniform judgment document, see Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 17,

setting forth the correct sentence.

(B) If the illegal aspect was a material component of the plea agreement but

the illegal aspect was to the defendant’s benefit, the court shall enter an

order denying the motion.

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(C) If the illegal aspect was a material component of the plea agreement

and the illegal aspect was not to the defendant’s benefit, the court shall give

the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his or her plea. If the defendant

chooses to withdraw his or her plea, the court shall file an order stating its

findings that the illegal aspect was a material component of the plea

agreement and was not to the defendant's benefit, stating that the defendant

withdraws his or her plea, and reinstating the original charge against the

defendant. If the defendant does not withdraw his or her plea, the court

shall file an order granting the motion and also shall enter an amended

uniform judgment document, see Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 17, setting forth the

correct sentence.

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(c)(3) (amendment effective July 1, 2016). To reiterate, if the trial

court determines that the illegal three-year sentence was a material component of the plea

agreement but the illegal sentence was to the Petitioner’s benefit, the court shall enter an

order denying the motion rather than entering an amended judgment document setting

forth a sentence of six years. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(c)(3)(A), (B). The trial court, in its

order granting or denying the motion, must set forth its findings of fact and conclusions

or law regarding the Petitioner’s illegal three-year sentence. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(e).

Upon the filing of the trial court’s amended uniform judgment document or upon the

filing of an order denying the motion, the Petitioner or the State may initiate an appeal as

of right pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(f).

CONCLUSION

Based on the aforementioned authorities and reasoning, we reverse the judgment

of the trial court and remand the case for proceedings consistent with Rule 36.1 and this

opinion.

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CAMILLE R. McMULLEN, JUDGE

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