in Re Hill Minors

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED

In re HILL, Minors. December 27, 2016

No. 332923

Alger Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2013-004455-NA

Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and SAWYER and MARKEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental

rights to the minor children JH and AH pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (ii). For the

reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.

A. BACKGROUND

On May 22, 2013, petitioner filed a petition seeking removal of the children from the

home based on lack of appropriate housing, the parents’ substance abuse and criminality. The

petition indicated that the children were Indian children. At a hearing conducted before a referee

on May 22, 2013, respondent appeared in propria persona, and an attorney for the Sault Ste.

Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians appeared by telephone. The referee read the petition, which

detailed respondent’s histories of substance abuse and criminal conduct. The referee ordered that

the children be removed from the home, but adjourned the proceedings pending appointment of

attorneys for the parents and the children.

The preliminary hearing continued on June 12, 2013. Respondent was incarcerated in the

county jail and appeared at the hearing by video conference. Respondent and the father of the

children waived the remaining hearing proceedings and the referee authorized the filing of the

petition.

The trial court held a plea hearing on August 26, 2013. Respondent was incarcerated in

prison and appeared by telephone. Petitioner’s counsel indicated that respondent would admit

some of the allegations in the petition and plead no contest to the remaining allegations.

Respondent testified that she was incarcerated and that her earliest release date was April 7,

2014. She agreed that due to her multiple incarcerations, she had been unable to maintain

housing for her children. She agreed that she had used controlled substances during her

pregnancies, and that she had been unable to put her children’s needs above her drug use and her

criminal activity. Respondent also stated that she recalled testifying at her probation violation

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hearing. The trial court stated that one or more allegations in the petition were proven by

respondent’s own testimony and the court took jurisdiction over the children.

At a hearing on January 6, 2014, the trial court adopted petitioner’s recommendations

that respondent comply with the treatment plan and ordered that the children remain in foster

care. Thereafter, the trial court held several dispositional review hearings. At a review hearing

on July 8, 2015, respondent’s counsel indicated that respondent was employed, had negative

drug tests, and was doing well in parenting time. However, respondent had been charged with

assault and the charge was still unresolved. The trial court continued the children’s placements

and continued services.

The trial court held a review hearing on February 3, 2016. Petitioner noted that

respondent-father and the children were disenrolled from the Tribe and were no longer

considered Indian children. The trial court maintained the status quo pending the filing of a

petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights.

On February 22, 2016, petitioner filed a supplemental petition seeking to terminate

respondent’s parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). The petition

noted that on May 20, 2013, respondent was sentenced to 20 months to five years in prison for

unlawfully driving away an automobile, MCL 750.413, and was paroled on October 28, 2014.

The petition stated that respondent had violated her parole on four occasions and had been

convicted of assault and had served jail terms for the offenses. The petition alleged that

respondent had participated in substance abuse treatment, but had been unable to stop using

drugs. The petition stated that respondent still had barriers to reunification, including “substance

abuse, criminal behaviors, and incarceration, leaving her unavailable to fully parent and assure

the safety and well-being of the minor children.”

The termination hearing began on April 21, 2016.1 Alyssa Calhoun, respondent’s

caseworker, testified that the goal changed from reunification to termination of parental rights in

February 2016. Calhoun testified that respondent was offered various services, including bus

passes, family continuity, parenting education, drug screens, substance abuse treatment,

supervised parenting time and family team meetings. Calhoun stated that respondent failed to

comply with the services.

William Schieding, respondent’s parole officer, testified that respondent’s parole began

in October 2014. Schieding stated that respondent had been charged with four parole violations.

In March 2015, she had contact with an unauthorized person and possessed narcotics that were

not prescribed to her. Respondent served 14 days in jail for the violation. In June 2015,

respondent violated her parole by being charged with aggravated assault. She served 39 days in

jail for the offense. In October 2015, respondent violated her parole by testing positive for drugs

1

Heidi Cotey, an expert witness from the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, testified at

the termination hearing. However, because the children were no longer considered Indian

children by the time of the termination hearing, the trial court stated that it did not consider

Cotey’s testimony when making its decision to terminate respondent’s parental rights.

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that were not prescribed to her. Schieding stated that respondent was doing well at the time, so

she served five days in jail and attended outpatient drug treatment. In January 2016, respondent

violated her parole by having contact with an unauthorized person and possessing unauthorized

narcotics. Respondent served 45 days in jail and participated in outpatient substance abuse

treatment. Schieding could not say that respondent had fallen back into drug use, but she

continued to put herself into negative social situations. However, Schieding testified that

respondent was attempting to comply with her treatment plan. Schieding believed that

respondent could successfully complete her parole, but he was unsatisfied with respondent’s

ability to maintain employment.

Alyssa Calhoun, respondent’s caseworker, testified that the children had been out of

respondent’s care for nearly three years, since they were 1-1/2 years old and five to six weeks

old, respectively. Calhoun stated that respondent participated in services while she was in

prison, including a domestic violence program that included a segment on how to avoid violence.

Calhoun acknowledged that respondent was charged with aggravated assault in June 2015.

Calhoun also stated that respondent continued to bring the father into the children’s lives in some

ways and opined that respondent’s action was not beneficial to the children because the father’s

parental rights had been terminated. Calhoun stated that respondent failed to appear for several

required random drug screens. Calhoun noted that on two occasions the agency attempted to

increase respondent’s parenting time with the goal of moving toward unsupervised parenting

time, but the efforts were derailed because respondent became incarcerated on both occasions.

In addition, when respondent began dating a felon and a drug user she was not available to

exercise parenting time. Calhoun stated that respondent rejected the assertion that her dating

relationship was a bad influence on her life. Calhoun opined that respondent had not

substantially complied with her treatment plan. Calhoun stated that respondent’s parental rights

should be terminated and that termination was in the best interests of the children.

Cheryl Fields, respondent’s witness and a counselor, testified that respondent was

compliant with her program and had benefitted from counseling. Fields stated that respondent

had realized that her impulsive behavior had negative consequences and had become more

deliberate in her decision making. Fields opined that respondent had the skills necessary to care

for her children.

Respondent testified that she had appropriate housing for the children and was employed

on a full-time basis. Respondent stated that she was more motivated to hold employment since

she was released from prison. Respondent acknowledged that for a short time she used

Tramadol that was not prescribed to her and that she used Neurontin on her parenting time days

to make her more aware. Respondent stated that she no longer associated with persons with

whom she had used drugs, and that she concentrated on undertaking sober activities. Respondent

stated that she participated in counseling and benefitted from it and that she hoped to be able to

afford to participate in more substance abuse counseling. Respondent stated that she had a good

support system that would assist her in caring for the children when she was working.

Respondent acknowledged that her children needed her during the periods when she was

unavailable to them, but stated that her priorities had changed and that the children now came

first in her life. Respondent also acknowledged that since she was released from prison in

October 2014, she had spent 104 days in jail on parole violations.

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Sasha Howard, respondent’s friend, testified that she had daily contact with respondent.

Howard stated that respondent had become more responsible since she was released from prison,

and that she was making a sincere effort to improve her life. Howard stated that respondent had

a strong bond with her children and was ready to have her children returned to her.

Heather MacArthur, respondent’s friend since childhood, testified that since respondent

was released from prison, she was much more responsible and thought about the consequences

of her actions. MacArthur would not hesitate to allow respondent to watch her own children, and

opined that respondent would be a good parent.

After hearing the evidence, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights. The

trial court acknowledged that respondent had made substantial progress, but noted that progress

began after the termination petition was filed. The trial court also noted that respondent had

stable housing and had no positive drug screens since her latest release from jail. However, the

trial court found that respondent’s statements were inconsistent with her actual behavior.

Respondent had four parole violations since she was released from prison, and had not

substantially complied with her case service plan. The trial court emphasized that it viewed the

latter to be much more significant. The trial court acknowledged that from the time jurisdiction

was taken until respondent was released from prison on October 28, 2014, respondent did not

have a reasonable opportunity to address her parenting issue. The trial court noted, however, that

after being released from prison, respondent demonstrated poor judgment in regard to complying

with her treatment plan. She refused to participate in family continuity services and failed to

appear for drug screens. The trial court expressed concern that respondent failed to appear

because she was hiding drug use and noted that respondent returned to using Tramadol in

September and October of 2015 after testing positive for that drug.

In addition, the trial court noted that in October 2015, respondent started dating a known

drug user who had a controlled substance conviction notwithstanding that her parole officer and

her caseworker advised her against doing so. This relationship led to respondent’s fourth parole

violation. The trial court found that respondent exercised extremely poor judgment by allowing

the person to stay at her home even for a short time. The trial court reasoned that the evidence

supported terminated pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (c)(ii).

The trial court also found that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the best

interests of the children. The trial court acknowledged that respondent loved the children and

was bonded with them. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that the bond did not outweigh

the children’s need for permanence and stability and found that respondent could not provide that

permanence and stability within a reasonable time. This appeal ensued.

B. ANALYSIS

I. ADJUDICATION/ACCEPTANCE OF PLEA

Respondent argues that her plea proceeding was defective and violated her due process

rights. “Whether child protective proceedings complied with a parent’s right to procedural due

process presents a question of constitutional law, which we review de novo.” In re Sanders, 495

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Mich 394, 403-404; 852 NW2d 524 (2014). An unpreserved issue is reviewed for plain error

affecting substantial rights. In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 8-9; 761 NW2d 253 (2008).

In challenging the court’s acceptance of her plea, respondent challenges the adjudicative

phase of the proceeding. “In Michigan, child protective proceedings comprise two phases: the

adjudicative phase and the dispositional phase.” In re Sanders, 495 Mich at 404. In general,

during the first phase a trial court determines if there are grounds for it to take jurisdiction over

the children. Id. “Once the court has jurisdiction, it determines during the dispositional phase

what course of action will ensure the child’s safety and well-being.” Id.

“Petitioner may initiate child protective proceedings by filing a petition containing facts

that constitute an offense against the child under the juvenile code.” In re Collier, ___Mich

App___; ___NW2d___(2016) slip op. at 5 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “The

parent may demand an adjudication trial at which he has a right to a jury trial and at which the

rules of evidence generally apply, or he may admit to the allegations contained in the petition.”

Id. (quotation marks omitted). “The petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of

the evidence one or more statutory grounds for jurisdiction alleged in the petition, MCR

3.972(E).” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “‘When the petition contains allegations of abuse or

neglect against a parent . . . and those allegations are proved by a plea or at the trial, the

adjudicated parent is unfit.’” Id., quoting In re Sanders, 495 Mich at 405.

When a trial court finds grounds for jurisdiction based on a parent’s plea, the court must

adhere to MCR 3.971 in accepting the plea. In this case, the trial court failed to adhere to

procedure set forth in MCR 3.971, yet it nevertheless assumed jurisdiction over the children.

The issue, then, is whether respondent can challenge the court’s assumption of jurisdiction or

whether this constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the court’s jurisdiction.

In the context of a child custody case, there are two types of challenges to the court’s

jurisdiction: (1) a challenge for want of jurisdiction, which may be raised at any time; and (2) a

challenge on “matters affecting the court’s exercise of its jurisdiction,” which “may be

challenged only on direct appeal of the jurisdictional decision.” In re Kanija, 308 Mich App

660, 667; 866 NW2d 862 (2014) (citation omitted).

In re Sanders, 495 Mich at 394, illustrates a permissible challenge to a court’s want of

jurisdiction. In Sanders, the trial court adjudicated the respondent mother as unfit, but dismissed

the allegations against the respondent father. Nevertheless, the trial court, relying on the one-

parent doctrine,2 limited the respondent father’s contact with his children and required him to

comply with a service plan. Sanders, 495 Mich at 407. Our Supreme Court held that the one-

parent doctrine was unconstitutional, stating that “due process requires a specific adjudication of

a parent’s unfitness before the state can infringe the constitutionally protected parent-child

relationship.” Id. at 422. Thus, because the trial court never adjudicated the respondent father,

2

The one-parent doctrine allowed a court to enter dispositional orders affecting the parental

rights of both parents even if jurisdiction was established by adjudicating only one parent as

unfit. Sanders, 495 Mich at 407.

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the court did not obtain jurisdiction to enter dispositional orders affecting the respondent father’s

parental rights and, on appeal, the respondent father could challenge the court’s lack of

jurisdiction. In re Kanjia, 308 Mich App at 670-671.

In contrast, where a court adjudicates a parent, assumes jurisdiction, yet nevertheless

makes errors during the process, the respondent must directly appeal the court’s jurisdictional

order as opposed to waiting to raise the issue until after the termination. In re SLH, 277 Mich

App 662, 668; 747 NW2d 547 (2008); In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426, 444; 505 NW2d 834

(1993). That is, “[m]atters affecting the court’s exercise of its jurisdiction may be challenged

only on direct appeal of the jurisdictional decision.” In re Kanija, 308 Mich App at 667. Thus,

“when a termination occurs following the filing of a supplemental petition for termination after

the issuance of the initial dispositional order . . . an adjudication cannot be collaterally attacked

following an order terminating parental rights.” In re SLH, 277 Mich App at 668.

In this case, respondent contends that the trial court erred in accepting her plea because it

did not adhere to the procedural steps set forth in MCR 3.971. However, this argument

constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on matters affecting the court’s jurisdiction. In re

Kanija, 308 Mich App at 667. Here, respondent received an adjudication; she was present

during the adjudication and she was represented by counsel. Respondent and her counsel were

aware of the adjudication and could have filed a direct appeal. However, respondent failed to

directly appeal the court’s exercise of jurisdiction following the adjudication and termination of

her parental rights occurred following the issuance of an initial dispositional order and pursuant

to a supplemental petition. Because respondent was present and represented by counsel at the

adjudication, the trial court did not violate her due process rights when it assumed jurisdiction

and respondent cannot collaterally attack the errors in the assumption of jurisdiction. Id.; see

also In re Hudson, 294 Mich.App 261, 264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011) (noting that a “[r]espondent

may not assign as error on appeal something that [ ]he deemed proper in the lower court because

allowing [him] to do so would permit respondent to harbor error as an appellate parachute.”)

Respondent contends that her argument should not be considered a collateral attack on

jurisdiction and she cites In re Wangler/Paschke, 498 Mich at 911 in support of that argument.

However, respondent’s argument is misplaced. In Wangler/Paschke, our Supreme Court

explained that the respondent’s argument was not a collateral attack on jurisdiction where the

trial court “purported to issue dispositional orders without first adjudicating the respondent-

mother.” Id. (emphasis added). In contrast, in this case, the trial court adjudicated respondent

before entering dispositional orders and before it terminated respondent’s parental rights

pursuant to a subsequent petition. Accordingly, unlike the challenge in Wangler/Paschke, here,

respondent’s argument constitutes a collateral attack on the court’s jurisdiction that we decline to

consider on appeal. See In re SLH, 277 Mich App at 668; In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426, 444;

505 NW2d 834 (1993).

In addition, this case is dissimilar to In re Collier, ___ Mich App at ___ wherein this

Court refused to hold that the collateral-attack rule precluded the respondent’s challenge to a

termination order. In Collier, the trial court entered a default against the respondent after the

respondent failed to appear at the adjudication hearing and subsequently terminated the

respondent’s parental rights. The Collier Court vacated the termination order, in part, on their

finding that the respondent was deprived of an adjudication hearing. Collier, slip op at 5-6.

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Unlike in Collier, as discussed above, in this case respondent was adjudicated. Respondent was

present at the adjudication and was represented by counsel. Thus, the factors which were present

in Collier are not present in this case. As such, Collier does not govern the outcome of this case.

In sum, the trial court adjudicated respondent and then terminated respondent’s rights

pursuant to a subsequent petition and after it entered the initial dispositional order. Respondent

failed to raise a direct appeal following the adjudication and her argument on appeal constitutes

an impermissible collateral attack on the court’s assumption of jurisdiction. In re SLH, 277 Mich

App at 668.

II. INDIAN FAMILY PRESERVATION ACT

Next, respondent argues that the trial court erred during the proceeding when it declined

to make a finding as to whether the children were Indian children. We review de novo a trial

court’s interpretation of statutes, but review a trial court’s findings of fact for clear error. In re

Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson, 311 Mich App 49, 56; 874 NW2d 205 (2015).

The issue whether the children are Indian children implicates the Indian Child Welfare

Act (ICWA), 25 USC 1901 et seq., and the Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA),

MCL 712B.1 et seq. Section 1903 of the ICWA defines “Indian child” as follows:

(4) “Indian child” means any unmarried person who is under age eighteen

and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in

an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe[.] [25

USC 1903(4).]

Section 3 of the MIFPA defines “Indian child” as follows”

(k) “Indian child” means an unmarried person who is under the age of 18

and is either of the following:

(i) A member of an Indian tribe.

(ii) Eligible for membership in an Indian tribe as determined by that Indian

tribe. [MCL 712B.3(k).]

A higher burden of proof is required in a termination case involving an Indian child or

children.3 However, in this case, the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians determined that

Ryan Hill, the children’s father and the person through whom the children’s eligibility for

membership was determined, was improperly enrolled as a member of the Tribe, and so

3

In a termination case involving an Indian child or children, a trial court must find that at least

one state statutory ground for termination of parental rights was proven by clear and convincing

evidence, and must also make findings that active efforts were made to avoid the breakup of the

Indian family, and that those efforts were unsuccessful. 25 USC 1912(e); MCL 712B.15(3).

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disenrolled him and the children. After being notified of the Tribe’s action, the trial court noted

that it did not determine who was or was not a member of the Tribe and that the decision rested

within the exclusive discretion of the Tribe. Respondent asserts that the trial court should have

determined whether the children were eligible for membership in the Tribe, notwithstanding the

Tribe’s decision that Ryan Hill was not eligible for membership.

Respondent’s argument is without merit. It is undisputed that the Tribe determined that

Ryan Hill was not eligible for membership, and that the children’s eligibility depended on Hill’s

eligibility. Respondent points to no authority that would allow the trial court, as opposed to the

Tribe, to determine if a person is eligible for membership in the Tribe. Further, respondent’s

argument would have the effect of allowing a Michigan family court to overrule the Tribe’s

decision regarding the children’s eligibility for membership. It should be noted that that in

addition, the Tribe made its decision as to membership based on the statutory definitions of

“Indian child.” Our review of the statute clearly indicates that the Tribe correctly concluded that

the children were not eligible for membership. The children were not the biological children of a

member of a Tribe, and so did not qualify under the ICWA. The Sault Ste. Marie Band of

Chippewa Indians determined that the children were not members and did not qualify for

membership; therefore, the children did not qualify under the MIFPA.

In sum, the trial court did not err in declining to question the Tribe’s determination that

the children were not members of the Tribe.

III. TERMINATION AND SERVICES

Next, respondent argues that DHHS failed to provide adequate services for reunification

and that the trial court erred in finding statutory grounds for termination and in finding that

termination was in the children’s best interests.

The petitioner bears the burden of proving a statutory ground for termination by clear and

convincing evidence. MCL 712A.19b(3); In re Trejo, 462 Mich. 341, 350; 612 NW2d 407

(2000). We review for clear error a circuit court’s decision to terminate parental rights. MCR

3.977(K); In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). Similarly, we review the trial

court’s findings of fact, including a finding that the DHHS made reasonable efforts toward

reunification, for clear error. In re Fried, 266 Mich.App 535, 541-543; 702 NW2d 192 (2005).

A decision qualifies as clearly erroneous when, “although there is evidence to support it, the

reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been made.” In re JK, 468 Mich at 209-210.

i. SERVICES

Respondent contends that DHHS failed to offer her adequate services that would

facilitate reunification.

Before a court may contemplate termination of a parent’s right to her child, the petitioner

generally “must exert ‘reasonable efforts’ to maintain the child in [the parent’s] . . . care, MCL

712A.18f(1), (4),” and “make ‘reasonable efforts to reunite the child and family.’ MCL

712A.19a(2).” In re Hicks/Brown, ___Mich App___; ___NW2d___ (2016) (Docket No.

328870); slip op at 6. A failure by petitioner to offer a respondent a reasonable opportunity to

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participate in services creates a gap in the record that requires reversal of an order terminating

parental rights. In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 158-160; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). However, a

respondent also has a responsibility to participate in services offered by petitioner. In re Frey,

297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012).

Respondent contests the trial court’s finding that petitioner made reasonable efforts to

reunify the family by providing services. Respondent notes that during the termination hearing,

petitioner’s witnesses testified that respondent was offered various services both while she was

incarcerated and after she was released from prison. During respondent’s incarceration, she

participated in services such as Healing Trauma; a domestic violence program; Alcoholics

Anonymous meetings; parenting skills; and writing to the children and speaking to them by

telephone. Following respondent’s release from prison, petitioner provided services including

wraparound (a family continuity program); bus tickets and other transportation assistance;

assistance with employment; drug screens; Alcoholics/Narcotics Anonymous meetings and

substance abuse counseling; parenting education; supervised parenting time; and individual

counseling. Respondent asserts that she did not need the family continuity and parenting classes,

and that substance abuse treatment was provided through her parole program. Respondent

contends that in effect, petitioner provided only bus tickets, supervised parenting time, and

family meetings, and that this level of services was inadequate.

Respondent’s argument is without merit. The evidence directly contradicts respondent’s

assertion that she was not offered services while she was incarcerated. Respondent

acknowledges that petitioner offered her various services after she was released from prison, but

asserts that she did not need some of these services. For example, respondent alleges that she

spoke with her caseworker and decided that she did not require family continuity services;

however, her caseworker testified that respondent missed six of nine appointments with the

family continuity worker and decided on her own that she did not need the services because she

had a residence and a job. Respondent alleges that her participation in the SPAN drug testing

program was terminated due to her work schedule and the fact that the program was phased out

in Alger County; however, her caseworker testified that not all of respondent’s missed

appointments were due to a work conflict, and that her participation was terminated before the

program was phased out of the county.

Respondent appears to argue that only the services she thought she needed should count

as services actually offered. However, no statute or caselaw allows a respondent to decide which

services are to be offered in the case. Petitioner has a statutory duty to formulate a case service

plan detailing efforts to be made both by petitioner and the parent to return the child to the home.

MCL 712A.18f(2)-(3). Petitioner offered services to respondent as required. The fact that

respondent did not fully engage in the services does not mandate a conclusion that the services

were inadequate. In short, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that petitioner offered

services and made reasonable efforts at reunification. In re Fried, 266 Mich App at 541-543.

ii. STATUTORY GROUND FOR TERMINATION

Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred in finding statutory grounds for

termination.

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The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights in part pursuant to MCL

712A.19b(3)(c)(i), which provides that termination is proper where clear and convincing

evidence shows that:

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this

chapter, 182 or more days elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional

order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the

following:

(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is

no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable

time considering the child’s age.

Here, the conditions that led to adjudication included lack of appropriate housing,

substance abuse and criminality. Respondent states that at the termination hearing the evidence

showed that she had appropriate housing, had completed substance abuse treatment and had

substantially complied with her treatment plan, and had not committed any substantial criminal

offenses. Respondent argues that no evidence demonstrated that she could not effectively parent

her children within a reasonable time.

Respondent’s argument is without merit. The trial court acknowledged that respondent

loved her children and had made some progress in addressing the issues that led to the children

being removed from her care. However, the trial court concluded that it could not overlook the

facts that respondent, in the 18 months since she was released from prison in October 2014, had

been found in possession of narcotics not prescribed to her, had amassed four parole violations,

including one for assaultive behavior, had been incarcerated for those violations, and had

associated with a known felon and drug user. In addition, the trial court noted that respondent

seemed to cooperate with services offered to her only if she believed that she needed the

services. On this record, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court

erred in finding clear and convincing evidence to support termination of respondent’s parental

rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Because there was one ground for termination, we need

not address the additional grounds upon which the trial court based its decision. In re Ellis, 294

Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011).

iii. BEST INTERESTS

Respondent argues that the trial court erred in finding that termination was in the

children’s best interests.

“If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that

termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of

parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not

be made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). In determining a child’s best interests, the trial court may

consider the child’s need for stability and permanency and whether the child is progressing in its

current placement. In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 141; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). In

addition, the trial court may consider the children’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting

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ability, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich

App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012).

At the time of the termination hearing, the children had been out of respondent’s care for

nearly three years, i.e., nearly their entire lives. The trial court acknowledged that respondent

and the children shared a bond, and did not find that respondent was a bad parent. However, the

trial court noted that respondent continued to engage in behaviors that caused the children to be

removed from her custody, and that respondent’s actions had resulted in her being incarcerated

on several occasions, albeit for short periods. Essentially, the trial court found that the children

deserved more than respondent had demonstrated she could or would offer. The trial court did

not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests

of the children.

Affirmed.

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello

/s/ David H. Sawyer

/s/ Jane E. Markey

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