“Simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- “Simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)
- “A violation is not established merely by evidence showing sporadic use of abusive language, [race]-related jokes, and occasional teasing.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DEC 20 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAVID GLENN BROWN, No. 15-15093
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-01923-VC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY; MARK
PETERSON; KAREN ZELIS; DOUGLAS
MACMASTER,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Vince G. Chhabria, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 16, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
David Brown appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment
against his claim of workplace racial harassment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.1
Because the facts are known to the parties, we repeat them only as necessary to
explain our decision.
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment. Nearly all of
the alleged workplace incidents are race neutral, and the record provides no reason
to infer that they had anything to do with Brown’s race. The few alleged incidents
that were arguably related to Brown’s race were not sufficiently severe or
pervasive to create an objectively hostile work environment. See, e.g., EEOC v.
Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A violation is
not established merely by evidence showing sporadic use of abusive language,
[race]-related jokes, and occasional teasing.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Manatt v. Bank of Am., 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Simple teasing,
offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not
amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.”
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, regardless whether
1
By failing to present any argument regarding his other claims, Brown has
waived any challenge to the district court’s earlier dismissal of such claims or to
the court’s denial of Brown’s request to file a sixth amended complaint. See, e.g.,
Torres v. Goddard, 793 F.3d 1046, 1059 (9th Cir. 2015).
2
Brown subjectively perceived his environment to be racially abusive, he cannot
prevail. See Manatt, 339 F.3d at 799 & n.6.
AFFIRMED.
3