Stand up for California v. State of Cal.

Filed 12/12/16

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STAND UP FOR CALIFORNIA! et al.,

F069302

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

(Super. Ct. No. MCV062850)

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., OPINION

Defendants and Respondents;

NORTH FORK RANCHERIA OF MONO

INDIANS,

Intervener and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Michael J.

Jurkovich, Judge.

Snell & Wilmer, Sean M. Sherlock, Todd E. Lundell, and Brian A. Daluiso for

Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Sara J. Drake, Assistant Attorney General,

William P. Torngren and Timothy M. Muscat, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants

and Respondents.

Maier, Pfeffer, Kim, Geary & Cohen, John A. Maier; Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering,

Hale & Dorr, Danielle Spinelli and Christopher E. Babbitt for Intervener and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

SEE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS

Plaintiffs Stand Up for California! and Barbara Leach (plaintiffs) initiated this

litigation by filing a complaint challenging the Governor’s authority to concur in the

decision of the Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior to take land in

Madera County into trust for defendant North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians (North

Fork) for the purpose of operating a casino for class III gaming. The Governor’s

concurrence was a necessary element under federal law for the granting of permission to

North Fork to operate the casino on the land. While the case was pending, the

Legislature passed a statute ratifying a compact previously negotiated and executed with

North Fork by the Governor. This compact is a device authorized by federal law to allow

a state to agree with an Indian tribe on the terms and conditions under which gambling

can take place on Indian land within the state. Plaintiffs then initiated Proposition 48, a

referendum by which, at the 2014 general election, the voters disapproved the ratification

statute. North Fork, having intervened, filed a cross-complaint alleging that the

ratification statute was not subject to the referendum process.

North Fork and the state defendants—the Governor, the Attorney General, the

California Gambling Control Commission, the Bureau of Gambling Control, and the

State of California—demurred to plaintiffs’ complaint challenging the Governor’s

concurrence authority. Plaintiffs and the state defendants demurred to North Fork’s

cross-complaint challenging the referendum.

The trial court sustained all the demurrers without leave to amend. The complaint

and cross-complaint were dismissed. The result was that the land remained in trust for

North Fork, but the compact was not ratified, so class III gaming on the land was not

approved. Subsequently, however, as a product of federal litigation between North Fork

and the state, a set of procedures designed to function as an alternative to a state-

approved compact was approved by the Secretary of the Interior.

Appeals were filed from both judgments of dismissal, but the parties agreed to

dismiss North Fork’s appeal in the case challenging the referendum, leaving only the

2.

concurrence issue. In my view, for reasons related to the lack of a state-approved

compact or any future prospect of a state-approved compact for gambling on the land,

any authority the Governor might have had to concur in a decision of the Secretary of the

Interior to take the land into trust for purposes of gaming was inapplicable in this case, so

the demurrers to plaintiffs’ claims on that issue should have been overruled.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

North Fork is a federally recognized Indian tribe with about 1,900 tribal citizens.

It possesses a small rancheria in the Sierra Nevada foothills near the unincorporated

community of North Fork. In March 2005, North Fork applied to the United States

Department of the Interior (DOI) pursuant to the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act

(18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1167; 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.) (IGRA) to have the federal

government take into trust for North Fork’s benefit a 305-acre parcel in Madera County

about 40 miles from the rancheria. The parcel, owned by North Fork’s development

partner, is located on State Route 99 adjacent to the City of Madera. North Fork

proposed building a hotel and casino on the site. Federal action taking the land into trust

was a precondition to legal class III gaming under federal law. (25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1).)

Class III gaming is the type of gambling practiced in casinos in Nevada. (25 U.S.C.

§ 2703(6)-(8).)

In September 2011, DOI made a finding that, within the meaning of IGRA, taking

the land into trust for the purpose of gaming would be in the best interest of North Fork

and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community. (25 U.S.C.

§ 2719(b)(1)(A).) The Governor, fulfilling a role delineated in IGRA, concurred in this

determination in August 2012. (25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).) The Secretary of the

1North Fork’s appeal, case No. F070327, has been dismissed, but I take judicial

notice of the record in that case for purposes of this statement of the facts and procedural

history.

3.

Interior decided to take the land into trust in November 2012, and the conveyance was

completed on February 5, 2013.

Concurrently with this process, the Governor pursued a tribal-state compact under

Government Code section 12012.25 and article IV, section 19, subdivision (f), of the

California Constitution. Under IGRA, a tribal-state compact is one of the methods of

legalizing class III gaming on Indian land. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C).) In August 2012,

the Governor announced that he had negotiated and signed a compact with North Fork for

gaming on the 305-acre parcel and was forwarding the compact to the Legislature for

ratification.

Plaintiffs filed their complaint on March 27, 2013. As amended, the complaint

named as defendants the State of California, the Governor, the Attorney General, the

Gambling Control Commission, and the Bureau of Gambling Control. It alleged that the

Governor’s concurrence in the Secretary of the Interior’s determination violated the

California Constitution because such a concurrence was not within the Governor’s power.

The complaint prayed for a writ of mandate setting aside the concurrence.

A statute ratifying the compact, designated Assembly Bill No. 277, was passed by

both houses of the Legislature. The Governor signed it on July 3, 2013, and it became

chapter 51 of the Statutes of 2013. In addition to ratifying the compact, the statute

exempted the casino project from compliance with the California Environmental Quality

Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) (CEQA). (Stats. 2013, ch. 51, § 1(b).) The

compact contained provisions, however, that required North Fork to produce a tribal

environmental impact report similar to a CEQA environmental impact report. The

compact was forwarded to the Secretary of the Interior, who published a notice in the

Federal Register on October 22, 2013, stating that the compact was approved and was

taking effect to the extent it was consistent with IGRA. (78 Fed.Reg. 62649 (Oct. 22,

2013).)

4.

In the compact, the state authorized North Fork to conduct class III gaming on the

305-acre parcel, and North Fork agreed not to conduct gaming on its environmentally

sensitive rancheria or elsewhere in California. North Fork agreed to make payments to

the Chukchansi Tribe to mitigate the economic impact of the new casino on the existing

Chukchansi casino. North Fork also agreed to share revenue with the Wiyot Tribe in

order to enable that tribe to forgo gaming on its environmentally sensitive land near

Humboldt Bay National Wildlife Refuge. North Fork further agreed to participate in a

revenue-sharing scheme to benefit other tribes without casinos. The compact included

many additional terms, including North Fork’s submission to detailed regulations for the

operation of its casino.

On July 8, 2013, Cheryl Schmit, using the letterhead of Stand Up for California!,

asked the Attorney General for a title and summary for a proposed statewide referendum

rejecting the compact ratification statute, chapter 51 of the Statutes of 2013. The

Attorney General issued the title and summary, and signatures were gathered. The

referendum qualified for the November 2014 general election ballot.

North Fork, which was not originally a party to the litigation initiated by plaintiffs’

complaint, was granted leave to intervene on August 23, 2013. North Fork filed its cross-

complaint on February 27, 2014, naming the state defendants as cross-defendants.

Schmit, the official proponent of the referendum petition, was named as a real party in

interest. The cross-complaint sought a declaratory judgment stating that the referendum

petition was invalid.

North Fork and the state defendants demurred to plaintiffs’ complaint (alleging

that the Governor’s concurrence was unauthorized), and the trial court ruled on the

demurrers on March 3, 2014. In its written ruling, the court stated that the Governor’s

power to concur arose by implication from his authority to negotiate and execute tribal-

state compacts, as set forth in article IV, section 19, subdivision (f), of the California

Constitution. Because the Governor was authorized to negotiate compacts for gaming on

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Indian land, and some such compacts, including the one at issue in this case, cannot come

into effect unless the land in question is taken into trust by the federal government with

the Governor’s concurrence, the Governor must have the power to concur. The court

rejected plaintiffs’ argument that when the voters added article IV, section 19,

subdivision (f), to the California Constitution via Proposition 1A in 2000, they intended

to deny to the state the authority to approve Indian casinos on land that was not yet Indian

land at the time, so that there could be no casinos on newly added trust land. Plaintiffs

conceded they could not cure their complaint by amendment, so the demurrers were

sustained without leave to amend. A defense judgment was entered on March 12, 2014.

Plaintiffs, Schmit, and the state defendants demurred to North Fork’s cross-

complaint (challenging the validity of the referendum), and the trial court ruled on the

demurrers on June 26, 2014. The court wrote that the plain language of article II,

section 9, subdivision (a), of the California Constitution was controlling. That provision

states that the referendum power allows the voters to reject “statutes or parts of statutes

except urgency statutes, statutes calling elections, and statutes providing for tax levies or

appropriations for usual current expenses of the State.” It was undisputed that chapter 51

of the Statutes of 2013 was a statute and not within one of those three exceptions. The

court rejected North Fork’s argument that the ratification of the compact was in substance

administrative, not legislative, so it was not subject to referendum despite its statutory

form. The court also rejected North Fork’s argument that, in order to avoid a conflict

between state law and IGRA, state law must be interpreted to deny the voters power to

invalidate a tribal-state compact. North Fork declared it would not attempt to cure its

cross-complaint by amendment, so the demurrers were sustained without leave to amend.

Judgment dismissing the cross-complaint was entered on July 9, 2014.

The referendum was designated Proposition 48. A majority of voters voted “no”

on Proposition 48 on November 4, 2014, thereby rejecting the Legislature’s ratification of

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the compact. (Historical and Statutory Notes, 32E pt. 1 West’s Ann. Gov. Code (2016

supp.) foll. § 12012.59, p. 13.)

Plaintiffs appealed from the dismissal of their complaint. North Fork appealed

from the dismissal of its cross-complaint. On May 25, 2016, however, the parties filed a

stipulation to dismiss North Fork’s appeal, thus removing the referendum issue from the

case. Only the question of the Governor’s concurrence power remains.

On August 3, 2016, plaintiffs filed an unopposed request for judicial notice of

action by DOI to approve a document called Secretarial Procedures for the North Fork

Rancheria of Mono Indians (the secretarial procedures). According to a letter from DOI

included in the request for judicial notice, the secretarial procedures were issued as a

remedy for North Fork in litigation in federal court. In this litigation, as a consequence of

the voters’ rejection of the compact via Proposition 48, the court found the state failed to

negotiate with North Fork in good faith. This led to court-ordered mediation, which,

producing no settlement, led in turn to the district court’s approval a set of procedures

proposed by North Fork to regulate gambling on the 305-acre site in the absence of a

state-approved compact. These procedures were submitted to DOI and, upon approval by

the Secretary of the Interior, became the secretarial procedures. The letter, dated July 29,

2016, states that the secretarial procedures are in effect. This request for judicial notice is

granted.2

2On August 25, 2016, this court directed the parties to submit supplemental

briefing. All parties filed supplemental briefs. On October 4, 2016, plaintiffs filed a

motion to strike portions of North Fork’s supplemental brief on the ground that it cited

various court opinions and other materials in which certain facts were recited. Plaintiffs

contended the facts in question were not subject to judicial notice. No facts influencing

the result in this appeal have been introduced into the record through materials cited in

North Fork’s supplemental brief. Plaintiffs’ motion to strike therefore is moot.

7.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of review

The standard of review is well-established:

“In an appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after a general

demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, our Supreme Court has

imposed the following standard of review. ‘The reviewing court gives the

complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting

all material facts properly pleaded. [Citations.] The court does not,

however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.

[Citation.] The judgment must be affirmed “if any one of the several

grounds of demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]” [Citation.] However, it is

error for a trial court to sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a

cause of action under any possible legal theory. [Citation.] And it is an

abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the

plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect identified by the

defendant can be cured by amendment. [Citation.]’ [Citations.].” (Genesis

Environmental Services v. San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution

Control Dist. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 597, 603.)

II. Legal framework for Indian gaming

IGRA was enacted in 1988. (Pub.L. No. 100-497 (Oct. 17, 1998) 102 Stat. 2467.)

Its primary purpose is “to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian

tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong

tribal governments.” (25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).)

Under IGRA, gambling is divided into three classes. Class I is “social games

solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming” connected with

“tribal ceremonies or celebrations.” (25 U.S.C. § 2703(6).) On Indian lands, class I

gaming is not subject to IGRA and is within the exclusive jurisdiction of Indian tribes.

(25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1).) Class II is bingo, games similar to bingo, and certain card

games. (25 U.S.C. § 2703(7).) IGRA places class II gaming on Indian lands under tribal

jurisdiction in any state in which class II gaming is ever permitted by state law, subject to

regulations in IGRA itself. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(b).)

8.

Class III is all other gaming. (25 U.S.C. § 2703(8).) It includes “‘high-stakes

casino-style’ gaming” and encompasses slot machines, casino games, banking card

games, dog racing and lotteries, among other things. (Keweenaw Bay Indian Community

v. United States (6th Cir. 1998) 136 F.3d 469, 473.) IGRA permits class III gaming on

Indian lands in any state in which class III gaming is ever permitted by state law,

provided that the state and tribe enter into a tribal-state compact setting forth terms under

which the gaming is to be conducted. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d).)

Upon request by a tribe, a state is required to negotiate in good faith to enter into a

tribal-state compact.3 (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).) After a state and a tribe enter into a

compact, the compact is submitted to the Secretary of the Interior for review. The

secretary has 45 days to approve or disapprove the compact; if he or she does not act

within 45 days, the compact is deemed approved. The Secretary is authorized to

disapprove a compact only if it fails to conform to federal law. (25 U.S.C.

§ 2710(d)(3)(B), (d)(8).)

IGRA provides that, in general, gaming is not authorized on land acquired by the

DOI in trust for an Indian tribe after the effective date of the statute, October 17, 1988.

(25 U.S.C. § 2719(a).) One exception is when “the Secretary, after consultation with the

Indian tribe and appropriate State and local officials, including officials of other nearby

Indian tribes, determines that a gaming establishment on newly acquired lands would be

in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to

the surrounding community, but only if the Governor of the State in which the gaming

3IGRA provides that if a state fails to negotiate in good faith, a tribe has a cause of

action, and the federal courts have jurisdiction over that action. A federal court then can

order the state and tribe to engage in a mediation process, which, if unsuccessful, leads to

the approval of gaming under terms imposed by the Secretary of the Interior. (25 U.S.C.

§ 2710(d)(7).) In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida (1996) 517 U.S. 44, 47, however,

the United States Supreme Court held that a state can obtain dismissal of such a lawsuit

by invoking sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.

9.

activity is to be conducted concurs in the Secretary’s determination .…” (25 U.S.C.

§ 2719(b)(1)(A).) This is the provision, involving what is often referred to as the two-

part determination, under which the Governor concurred in the conversion of the 305-

acre parcel to trust status in this case.

When IGRA was enacted, the California Constitution prohibited all casino-type

gambling statewide. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (e); California Commerce Casino,

Inc. v. Schwarzenegger (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1411.) An initiative statute passed

in 1998, Proposition 5, purported to authorize the state to enter into tribal-state compacts

as contemplated by IGRA, but because the measure was only statutory, it was held to be

invalid in light of the constitutional gambling prohibition. (Hotel Employees &

Restaurant Employees Internat. Union v. Davis (1999) 21 Cal.4th 585, 589-590 (Hotel

Employees).) In 2000, the voters approved Proposition 1A, which amended the

California Constitution to authorize the state to enter into tribal-state compacts. (Cal.

Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f); Historical Notes, 1E West’s Ann. Cal. Const. (2012 ed.)

foll. art. IV, § 19, p. 604.) The Legislature enacted Government Code section 12012.25,

authorizing the Governor to negotiate and execute tribal-state compacts and requiring the

Governor to submit executed compacts to the Legislature for ratification. (Gov. Code,

§ 12012.25, subds. (d)-(e).)4

III. Governor’s concurrence power

Plaintiffs maintain that no authority can be found in state law empowering the

Governor to concur in a finding by the Secretary of the Interior that taking land into trust

for an Indian tribe for gaming purposes is in the best interest of the tribe and not

4In light of the holding in Hotel Employees, supra, 21 Cal.4th 585, it is really the

constitutional provision, not the statute, that is doing the work of authorizing tribal-state

compacts in California. For this reason, in the remainder of this opinion, I will refer to

Proposition 1A as the law that gives the Governor the power to negotiate and execute

compacts.

10.

detrimental to the surrounding community, within the meaning of IGRA. North Fork and

the state defendants argued in the trial court, and argue again now, that the Governor

should be found to have this authority according to three different analyses: (1) the

Governor’s authority to concur arises by implication from his express authority to

negotiate and execute compacts; (2) the Governor has authority to concur as part of his

inherent authority as head of the executive branch of government; and (3) the Legislature

impliedly ratified the concurrence when it ratified the compact, effectively supplying the

Governor with authority after the fact. The trial court agreed with the first argument and

did not address the others.

The parties agree that no statutory, constitutional, or other authority under state

law explicitly authorizes the Governor to exercise the concurrence power contemplated

by IGRA. Further, as plaintiffs point out, it has been held that any authority with which

the Governor acts in granting his concurrence under IGRA must be based on state law;

IGRA itself does not supply that authority:

“When the Governor exercises authority under IGRA, the Governor

is exercising state authority. If the Governor concurs, or refuses to concur,

it is as a State executive, under the authority of state law. The concurrence

(or lack thereof) is given effect under federal law, but the authority to act is

provided by state law.… In the present case, the consequences of the

Governor’s exercise of discretion under state law will affect how the

Secretary of the Interior will proceed to execute IGRA. No doubt, federal

law provides the Governor with an opportunity to participate in the

determination of whether gaming will be allowed on newly acquired trust

land. But when the Governor responds to the Secretary’s request for a

concurrence, the Governor acts under state law, as a state executive,

pursuant to state interests.” (Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of

Oregon v. United States (9th Cir. 1997) 110 F.3d 688, 697-698

(Confederated Tribes).)

The Ninth Circuit made this point to show that, when a governor concurs or

refuses to concur, he or she does not exercise significant authority under federal law, and

does not possess primary responsibility for protecting a federal interest, and therefore

11.

IGRA’s employment of a state official to carry out a part of the statutory scheme does not

violate the appointments clause of the federal Constitution. (Confederated Tribes, supra,

110 F.3d at pp. 696-698.) Under this reasoning, it follows that if no state law authorized

the Governor to concur, then he lacked authority to do it.

In my view, the argument adopted by the trial court is indeed the most plausible of

the arguments made by plaintiffs: The needed authority, if it exists, is found by

implication in state law authorizing the Governor to negotiate and execute tribal-state

compacts. Article IV, section 19, subdivision (f), of the California Constitution, which

was added by Proposition 1A in 2000, states: “[T]he Governor is authorized to negotiate

and conclude compacts, subject to ratification by the Legislature, for the operation of slot

machines and for the conduct of lottery games and banking and percentage card games by

federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands in California in accordance with

federal law.” The Legislature provided substantially the same authority in Government

Code section 12012.25, subdivision (d): “The Governor is the designated state officer

responsible for negotiating and executing, on behalf of the state, tribal-state gaming

compacts with federally recognized Indian tribes located within the State of California

pursuant to the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1166 to

1168, incl., and 25 U.S.C. Sec. 2701 et seq.) for the purpose of authorizing class III

gaming, as defined in that act, on Indian lands within this state.” In the opinion of the

tribe, the state defendants and the trial court, this constitutional provision and this statute

are rightly construed as empowering the Governor to concur in the Secretary of the

Interior’s determination under title 25 of United States Code section 2719(b)(1)(A)

because of the unrestricted reference in both to “Indian lands.” As I will explain,

however, I need neither endorse nor reject that reasoning in this case. Even if it is

correct, the Governor’s implied concurrence power would not extend to lands as to which

there is no state-approved compact, nor any prospect of one, since the point of the

implied concurrence power would be to give effect to the state’s compacting power.

12.

In interpreting a statute, our objective is “to ascertain and effectuate legislative

intent.” (People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1007.) To the extent the language

in the statute may be unclear, we look to legislative history and the statutory scheme of

which the statute is a part. (People v. Bartlett (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 244, 250.) We

look to the entire statutory scheme in interpreting particular provisions “so that the whole

may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.” (Clean Air Constituency v. California

State Air Resources Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 801, 814.) “In the end, we ‘“must select the

construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a

view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an

interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.” [Citation.]’” (Torres v.

Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003.) The same principles apply to

the interpretation of a voter initiative. Analyses and arguments contained in the official

ballot pamphlet are relevant when the language of the enactment is unclear. (Robert L. v.

Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 900-901.)

As the tribe and the state defendants point out, the term “Indian lands” includes

both land on Indian reservations and land taken into trust by the federal government for

the benefit of Indian tribes. (25 U.S.C. § 2703(4).) Trust lands include those taken into

trust for gaming purposes after 1988 under title 25 of United States Code

section 2719(b)(1)(A), the provision requiring the Secretary of the Interior’s findings and

the Governor’s concurrence. Thus, the argument goes, the Governor cannot

meaningfully negotiate and execute tribal-state compacts for some Indian lands—those

taken into trust after 1988 under title 25 of United States Code section 2719(b)(1)(A)—

unless he can also exercise the concurrence power contemplated by that provision. It is

well established that governmental officials in California have implied power to take

action necessary for the administration of powers expressly granted by law. (Dickey v.

Raisin Proration Zone No. 1 (1944) 24 Cal.2d 796, 810; Crawford v. Imperial Irrig. Dist.

(1927) 200 Cal. 318, 334; Watt v. Smith (1891) 89 Cal. 602, 604.) It follows, the tribe

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and the state defendants aver, that the Governor must have the power to concur in a

determination to take land into trust for gaming when the state’s power to make a

compact for gaming on that land is exercised.

The trouble for this argument in this case is that we now know the state’s power to

make a compact is not being exercised for gaming on the 305-acre parcel. The voters

decided to reject the compact that was negotiated and ratified; the tribe has dismissed its

appeal in the litigation that was designed to revive that compact; and no new compact has

been proposed by any party. Instead, the casino project is poised to proceed, but for the

issue in this appeal, based on the secretarial procedures, which have been imposed

against the state’s will.

I do not believe an implied concurrence power can be held to exist under these

circumstances. Laws are deemed to have implied provisions and confer implied powers

only when necessary for the carrying out of express provisions and powers. An implied

power should have no greater scope than this necessity requires. “‘“[F]or a consequence

to be implied from a statute there must be greater justification for its inclusion than a

consistency or compatibility with the act from which it is implied. ‘A necessary

implication within the meaning of the law is one that is so strong in its probability that

the contrary thereof cannot reasonably be supposed.’”’” (Lubner v. City of Los Angeles

(1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 525, 529.) It may be appropriate (there is no need to decide) to

say that the Governor’s concurrence power is necessary under this standard to carry out

the provisions of Proposition 1A because those provisions contemplate the possibility of

state-approved tribal-state compacts for class III gaming on any Indian lands as defined

by law, and some such compacts (those for post-1988 trust lands) cannot be made

effective without a gubernatorial concurrence in a DOI finding regarding the land in

question. But it would make no sense to say the gubernatorial concurrence power arises

by necessary implication from the compacting power in Proposition 1A because

secretarial procedures that have been issued cannot meaningfully become effective

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unless the Governor’s concurrence makes the land available. The concept of necessity

limits the scope of any implied concurrence power to situations in which gambling on the

land in question will be conducted pursuant to a state-approved compact, and the

concurrence power is necessary to make such a compact effective. The concurrence

power is not necessary to the carrying out of the compacting power in cases in which the

compacting power is not being exercised.

In summary, it would be perverse to find the Governor has an implied authority

based on an express power that the state has finally decided not to exercise, after

protracted consideration by the Governor, the Legislature, and the voters. It is no

denigration of the Governor’s authority to say he cannot exercise an implied power in a

case where the voters have vetoed an exercise of the express power on which the implied

power is purportedly based.

The effect of this conclusion is that the Governor’s concurrence for the 305-acre

parcel is invalid without a state-approved compact for gaming on that parcel. Would that

concurrence become valid if a new state-approved compact should come into being? It is

not necessary to answer that question in this opinion.

IV. Inherent authority and implied ratification

North Fork and the state defendants argue that, even if there is no implied

gubernatorial concurrence authority in the Proposition 1A compacting power, the

Governor had inherent authority to give his concurrence, and the Legislature provided

any missing authority by impliedly ratifying the concurrence when it ratified the

compact. I turn to these arguments now.

A. Inherent executive authority

The notion that the Governor has inherent power to grant his concurrence is

approached from several angles in the briefs for North Fork and the state defendants. The

state defendants and North Fork both undertake to rebut the idea that there would be a

separation-of-powers violation if the Governor had the concurrence power because, in

15.

exercising the concurrence power, the Governor infringes on or usurps a legislative

function. The Governor’s action is invalid because there is a lack of authority for it in the

first place, not because the action infringes on the Legislature’s domain, so there is no

need to address this contention.5 North Fork also argues, however, that the concurrence

power is “[i]nherently [e]xecutive” and that the power “is a natural consequence of [the

Governor’s] role as the head of the administrative state.” North Fork cites article V of

the California Constitution, which states that “[t]he supreme executive power of this State

is vested in the Governor,” and “[t]he Governor shall see that the law is faithfully

executed.” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 1.) I understand these contentions to mean that the

Governor is entitled to exercise the concurrence power contemplated by IGRA simply

because he is the Governor; no specific express or implied grant of power is necessary

under this view.

Among the cases cited by North Fork in connection with this argument, two seem

most relevant: United States v. 1,216.83 Acres of Land (Wash. 1978) 574 P.2d 375

(1,216.83 Acres) and Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of

Wisconsin v. United States (7th Cir. 2004) 367 F.3d 650 (Lac Courte Oreilles). But

neither of these shows that the Governor has inherent executive authority, independent of

any specific express or implied grant of power, to issue concurrences as contemplated by

IGRA.

In 1,216.83 Acres, the question was whether the governor of the State of

Washington had authority to designate the state’s game commission as the agency

responsible for approving federal land acquisitions for purposes of establishing migratory

bird refuges pursuant to a federal statute, the Migratory Bird Conservation Act.

5Forthis reason, it is unnecessary to analyze United Auburn Indian Community of

the Auburn Rancheria v. Brown (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 36), which holds only that the

Governor’s exercise of the concurrence power does not violate separation-of-powers

principles.

16.

(1,216.83 Acres, supra, 574 P.2d at pp. 376-377.) The federal law provided that such

acquisitions had to be approved by the governor or appropriate state agency in each state.

(Id. at p. 376.) The Washington Supreme Court held that the game commission had the

necessary authority to grant the approvals because a state statute expressly conferred on

the commission authority to enter into agreements with the United States on all matters

regarding wildlife conservation. (Ibid.) Then the court held that, although there was no

state statute or state constitutional provision specifically authorizing the governor to

designate the commission, there was implied authority in “the Governor’s position as

head of the executive branch of government.” (Id. at p. 379.) Further, the Governor’s

authority to designate the agency was apparent “[i]n view of the extensive authority the

Governor has already been given by statute over the game department and its

personnel .…” (Ibid.)

The situation in 1,216.83 Acres is not similar to the situation here. The Migratory

Bird Conservation Act called for certain action by an appropriate state agency, and a

Washington statute named the agency responsible for such action. In designating that

agency, the Governor of Washington merely pointed out what the state statute had

already made clear. It was obvious that the governor had inherent authority to follow a

state statute and direct a state agency to follow it. The Supreme Court of Washington

rightly devoted only a single paragraph of analysis to this easy question. In our case,

there is no state statute or other state law explicitly giving anyone responsibility for

participating in the two-part determination necessary to take land into trust for gambling

under IGRA. Further, even if I thought Proposition 1A impliedly gave the Governor the

necessary authority in general, I would conclude that the authority is limited to land on

which gambling will be conducted under a state-approved compact.

In Lac Courte Oreilles, the Governor of Wisconsin refused to concur in the

Secretary of the Interior’s two-part determination for land on which three tribes proposed

to operate a casino. (Lac Courte Oreilles, supra, 367 F.3d at p. 653.) The tribes sued for

17.

a declaration that the concurrence requirement in IGRA was unconstitutional. (Lac

Courte Oreilles, supra, at p. 652.) One argument the tribes made was that the

concurrence provision violated principles of federalism because it required governors to

create state public policy, a function state constitutions commit to state legislatures. (Id.

at p. 664.) Rejecting this contention, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that Wisconsin already

had a policy on gambling expressed in its laws authorizing a state lottery and allowing

bingo and raffles by certain nonprofit organizations. (Ibid.) Applying California v.

Cabazon Band of Mission Indians (1987) 480 U.S. 202 (Cabazon), the Seventh Circuit

then concluded that, because the state did not prohibit all gambling, its policy was to

tolerate gaming on Indian lands (since Cabazon held that a state cannot prohibit gaming

on Indian lands if it chooses to permit any gambling elsewhere). The Governor, in

deciding whether to grant or withhold a requested concurrence, thus made no new policy

but was guided by the old policy and acted in a manner “typical of the executive’s

responsibility to render decisions based on existing policy.” (Lac Courte Oreilles, supra,

at p. 664.)

North Fork argues that, from the rationale of Lac Courte Oreilles, it follows that

the Governor is merely acting within existing California gambling policy when he

concurs in a two-part determination by the Secretary of the Interior, and therefore he

needs no specific authority to do it.

I do not believe Lac Courte Oreilles supports this conclusion. The question in that

case was whether the concurrence provision violated federalism principles because it

involved the federal government compelling a governor to create state public policy, an

act reserved by the state constitution to the state legislature. The answer given by the

Seventh Circuit was that there was no such violation of federalism principles because,

under the reasoning of Cabazon, the state already had a policy regarding Indian casinos,

so the governor did not create a new policy by concurring or declining to concur. Under

Cabazon and Lac Courte Oreilles, California would also properly be said to have a policy

18.

regarding Indian casinos and the Governor’s exercise of the concurrence power would

not create that policy. This does not show, however, that the power to concur is inherent

in the Governor’s office. There is no rule that the Governor has inherent authority to take

any action he pleases in areas in which the state has an existing public policy.

In sum, Lac Courte Oreilles held only that the concurrence provision does not

violate the federal Constitution because it does not force governors to usurp state

legislative authority by making state public policy. It did not consider the question of

whether any governor has inherent executive authority to exercise the concurrence power

under any state’s law. “Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the

light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a

proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2.)

North Fork next says there are many federal statutes that call on the Governor to

take actions without specific authority under state law, and “chaos would ensue” if such

specific authority were held to be required. For instance, one section of a federal law on

the establishment of airports in national parks provides that the Secretary of the Interior

can acquire the necessary land, but only with “the consent of the Governor of the State,

and the consent of chief executive official of the State political subdivision, in which the

land is located.” (54 U.S.C. § 101501(c)(2).) Similarly, under the Uranium Mill Tailings

Radiation Control Act, the Secretary of Energy is allowed to acquire land for radioactive

materials disposal but in certain states must obtain “the consent of the Governor of such

State.” (42 U.S.C. § 7916.) North Fork claims there is no specific authority in California

law that would allow the Governor to give consent under these statutes.

My analysis implies nothing regarding the Governor’s authority to act in

connection with these other federal laws. I do not go beyond the proposition that there is

no concurrence power when, on the land at issue, the proposed gambling establishment

would be operated under authority other than a state-approved compact. In other words,

if the concurrence power exists, it is limited by the purposes of the state law in

19.

connection with which it would be exercised, that is, the purposes of Proposition 1A.

Those purposes involve the legalization of gambling in casinos regulated by state-

approved compacts, not those regulated by secretarial procedures imposed over the

state’s resistance. I think this limit would exist even if the Governor’s power were

supported by inherent executive authority. If a statute limits the power of the Governor,

the Governor would not be entitled to exceed that limit based on the theory that the power

is part of his inherent authority. So it would be, at least, if the statutory limit did not

amount to an unconstitutional legislative infringement on executive authority.

In short, I draw no conclusion about whether the Governor has inherent authority

to grant concurrences under IGRA in general, let alone whether he has authority to give

consent to federal actions under other federal laws. I aver only that any authority he has

to grant concurrences under IGRA is limited to land on which gambling will be subject to

a state-approved compact.

Finally, North Fork claims the concurrence power is authorized by the Governor’s

statutory role as the “sole official organ of communication” between California and the

United States (Gov. Code, § 12012) and his statutory authority to “require executive

officers and agencies and their employees to furnish information relating to their duties”

(Cal. Const., art. V, § 4). This is not persuasive. The concurrence power involves more

than communication or furnishing information.

B. Implied ratification

North Fork’s final argument is that when the Legislature ratified the compact, it

impliedly also ratified the Governor’s concurrence, thereby supplying any authority that

might have been lacking. This argument might have been persuasive had the compact

been upheld in the 2014 election. As I have explained, however, any concurrence power

the Governor possesses can operate only with respect to land on which gambling will be

regulated by a state-approved compact. The voters have defeated the ratification of the

compact, North Fork has withdrawn its legal challenge to the validity of the referendum,

20.

the state has declined to agree to a new compact via court-ordered mediation, secretarial

procedures have been issued, and no party claims there is now any prospect of a state-

approved compact for gambling on the 305-acre parcel. Even if the Governor’s

concurrence would have been valid otherwise, it is not valid under these circumstances.

V. Dismissal of state defendants other than the Governor

The state defendants argue that the claims against all of them except the

Governor—that is, the Attorney General, the California Gambling Control Commission,

the Bureau of Gambling Control and the State of California—should be dismissed as

moot because plaintiffs sought only a judgment prohibiting them from enforcing or

implementing provisions of the compact. Section 8.2 of the secretarial procedures,

however, gives the state the option of participating in the regulation of gambling on the

305-acre site under those procedures. In light of this, plaintiffs might still wish to pursue

relief against all the state defendants and might be able to amend their complaint

accordingly. Consequently, I conclude that plaintiffs’ claims against these defendants are

not moot.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. The Governor’s concurrence is invalid under the facts

alleged in this case. Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action for a writ of mandate to set

the concurrence aside on the ground that it is unsupported by legal authority. The matter

is remanded for further proceedings, and the trial court is directed to vacate its order

sustaining the demurrers and enter a new order overruling them.

The request for judicial notice filed by plaintiffs on August 3, 2016, is granted.

The motion filed by plaintiffs on October 4, 2016, to strike portions of North

Fork’s supplemental brief is denied.

21.

Appellants are awarded costs on appeal.

_____________________

Smith, J.

22.

DETJEN, J., Concurring and Dissenting.

I join in the disposition as stated in the lead opinion. The trial court erred in

sustaining the demurrers. I do not, however, think the analysis reaches the question of

whether the Governor has “concurring” authority because, on the facts of this case, he

could not exercise the limited authority to compact granted to him by article IV,

section 19, subdivision (f) of the California Constitution (added by Prop. 1A, eff. Mar. 7,

2000).

This case arises from a complicated interplay between the federal law governing

the acquisition and use of lands held in trust for Indian tribes, and the federal and state

interests in regulating such land when used for gambling and related gaming activities.

The parties1 initially briefed and argued a difficult question in this arena—whether, in

order to execute the express constitutional authority to negotiate and conclude gaming

compacts granted under Proposition 1A, the Governor has been implicitly granted the

power to concur in the United States Secretary of the Interior’s (Secretary) determination

that it would be in the best interest of the tribe and its citizens, and not detrimental to the

surrounding community, to permit gaming on Indian lands. Upon our request, the parties

submitted supplemental briefing on five questions, including whether “the failure of the

305-acre parcel to be ‘Indian lands’ prior to the time the Governor negotiated and

executed the compact deprive[d] him of the authority to negotiate and execute the

compact when he did” (italics omitted) and whether the voters’ defeat of the compact

ratification or the recent approval of substitute procedures for gaming by the United

States Department of the Interior affected this case.

1 The parties are: plaintiffs and appellants, Stand Up for California! and Barbara

Leach (collectively, appellants); defendants and respondents, State of California, the

Governor of California, the Attorney General of California, California Gambling Control

Commission, and Bureau of Gambling Control (collectively, respondents); and intervener

and respondent, North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians (intervener).

Justice Smith opines state authority authorizing the Governor to concur most

likely exists by implication in the language of Proposition 1A that authorizes the

Governor to negotiate and execute tribal-state compacts. He concludes however that,

since California voters vetoed the tribal-state compact through Proposition 48 in the

November 4, 2014, General Election, the express power from which the power of

concurrence could be implied no longer exists. An implied concurrence power, the

analysis goes, cannot be exercised when the compact no longer exists.

Justice Franson concludes no state authority authorizes the Governor to concur; it

is neither stated in nor implied from Proposition 1A.2 He opines an implied grant of that

power is not necessary under the principles of California law. He does not believe the

authority can be found in general executive power.

2 Justice Franson’s concurrence and dissent attempts to completely resolve the

scope of the Governor’s concurring power by claiming the average voter would not have

understood Proposition 1A to resolve the controversial issue of off-reservation casinos.

(Conc. & dis. opn. of Franson, J., post, at pp. 2-3.) The issue before us is not so broad,

being limited to whether the Governor has concurring power in the context of land not

yet taken into trust. To the extent Justice Franson’s position is premised on the notion no

power to concur could be intoned from Proposition 1A because the proposition did not

affect off-reservation casinos, I disagree. The Indian Gaming Regulation Act (IGRA)

wholly bans class III gaming on Indian lands in states which do not permit such gaming

“by any person, organization, or entity.” (25 U.S.C.S. § 2710(d)(1)(B).) As discussed,

post, by passing Proposition 1A the voters opened California to gaming under the IGRA.

Justice Franson’s recitation of the full scope of the IGRA’s gaming provisions shows this

authorization resolved whether off-reservation casinos would be permitted on lands not

subject to the concurrence provisions at issue here by allowing the Governor to compact

for, and thus approve, casinos on lands taken into trust at any time that are contiguous to

the boundaries of Indian reservations; on lands taken as part of a settlement of a land

claim; on lands obtained through restoration; and on lands held by an Indian tribe or

individual subject to restriction by the United States against alienation. (25 U.S.C.S.

§§ 2703(4); 2719(a), (b).) In light of the limited scope of the alleged facts in this case, it

is unnecessary to conclude Proposition 1A cannot support any form of concurring power,

particularly in the context of lands held in trust for non-gaming purposes which would

require a concurrence to permit future gaming. I take no position on that issue and

therefore cannot agree with Justice Franson’s broader conclusions.

2

In arguing the issues, the parties initially assumed the Governor was appropriately

exercising the authority granted under Proposition 1A to negotiate gaming compacts in

the first instance. In the supplemental briefing, appellants asserted the Governor lacked

authority to compact in the first instance. Due to the unique structure of California’s

constitutional provisions regarding casino-style gaming, I believe this later position is

correct.

OVERVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LAW

“The Indian Reorganization Act . . . authorizes the Secretary . . . to acquire land

and hold it in trust ‘for the purpose of providing land for Indians.’ ” (Carcieri v. Salazar

(2009) 555 U.S. 379, 381-382.) The operative statute for this authority is 25 United

States Code Service section 5108 (formerly, 25 U.S.C. § 465), which provides that the

“Secretary . . . is . . . authorized, in his [or her] discretion, to acquire through purchase,

relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands, water rights, or

surface rights to lands, within or without existing reservations, including trust or

otherwise restricted allotments[,] whether the allottee be living or deceased, for the

purpose of providing land for Indians.”

As with many federal laws, there are additional federal regulations delineating

how this authority will be exercised. In the case of accepting land into trust, these

regulations are detailed at 25 Code of Federal Regulations parts 151.1 through 151.15.

Under part 151.3, “land may be acquired for a tribe in trust status” in three

circumstances: (1) when the property is “located within the exterior boundaries of the

tribe’s reservation or adjacent thereto, or within a tribal consolidation area”; (2) when

“the tribe already owns an interest in the land”; or (3) when the Secretary . . . “determines

that the acquisition of the land is necessary to facilitate tribal self-determination,

economic development, or Indian housing.” With respect to accepting off-reservation

land offered into trust under the third basis, the Secretary is guided by part 151.11, which

lists several factors to consider, including the need of the tribe for the land, the purposes

3

for which the land will be used, the impact on the state from removing the land from the

tax rolls, potential conflicts of land use which may arise, the location of the land relative

to state boundaries and the boundaries of the tribe’s reservation, and, in the case where

land is being acquired for business purposes, the tribe’s plan specifying the anticipated

economic benefits associated with the proposed use. (25 C.F.R. § 151.11(a)-(c)

[incorporating 25 C.F.R. § 151.10(a)-(c) & (e)-(f)].)

Comparatively, the primary purpose of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)

is “to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of

promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.”

(25 U.S.C.S. § 2702(1).) Generally, class III gaming activities “shall be lawful on Indian

lands” only when they are authorized by the tribe and approved by the Chairman of the

Indian Gaming Commission, “located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose

by any person, organization, or entity,” and “conducted in conformance with a Tribal-

State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State.” (Id., § 2710(d)(1).) Under

the IGRA, any tribe “having jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon which a class III

gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted, shall request the State in which

such lands are located to enter into negotiations for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-

State compact.” (25 U.S.C.S. § 2710(d)(3).) The IGRA specifically defines “ ‘Indian

lands’ ” as all land within the limits of any Indian reservation and “any lands title to

which is . . . held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe . . . and

over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power.” (25 U.S.C.S. § 2703(4).)

However, the IGRA excludes any land taken into trust after October 17, 1988,

from being used for gaming purposes unless certain exceptions apply. (25 U.S.C.S.

§ 2719(a).) Relevant here, land taken into trust after October 17, 1988, which is not

otherwise permitted to be used for gaming by the IGRA, may be converted to such use if

“the Secretary, after consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local

officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines that a gaming

4

establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe

and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, but only if

the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be conducted concurs in the

Secretary’s determination.” (25 U.S.C.S. § 2719(b)(1)(A).)

Like the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), the IGRA is also the subject of multiple

federal regulations. (25 C.F.R. §§ 292.1-292.26.) Relevant to this appeal, the regulations

define the phrase “[n]ewly acquired lands” as “land that has been taken, or will be taken,

in trust for the benefit of an Indian tribe by the United States after October 17, 1988.”

(25 C.F.R. § 292.2.) The regulations allow the Secretary to streamline the process for

taking lands into trust for the purpose of allowing gaming to occur. The regulations

demonstrate, however, that taking land into trust and allowing gaming to occur remain

two separate processes. (See id., §§ 292.3(b) [“If the tribe seeks to game on newly

acquired lands that require a land-into-trust application . . . the tribe must submit a

request for an opinion to the Office of Indian Gaming.”]; 292.15 [“A tribe can apply for a

Secretarial Determination under § 292.13 for land not yet held in trust at the same time

that it applies under part 151 of this chapter to have the land taken into trust.”].) Indeed,

if in these dual processes, the Secretary notices an intent to take the land into trust for

gaming purposes, but the Governor of the affected state issues a written non-concurrence,

“the Secretary will withdraw that notice pending a revised application for a non-gaming

purpose” and the land will not be taken into trust. (Id., § 292.23(a)(2).) If the land is

already in trust or otherwise under control of the tribe, the tribe “may use the newly

acquired lands only for non-gaming purposes.” (Id., § 292.23(a)(1).)

California’s Constitution generally bans what is categorized as class III gaming

under the IGRA. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (e) [“The Legislature has no power to

authorize, and shall prohibit, casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New

Jersey.”].) As our Supreme Court explained: “In 1984, the people of California amended

our Constitution to state a fundamental public policy against the legalization in California

5

of casino gambling of the sort then associated with Las Vegas and Atlantic City.” (Hotel

Employees & Restaurant Employees Internat. Union v. Davis (1999) 21 Cal.4th 585, 589

(Hotel Employees).) This prohibition led to the downfall of the first attempt to permit

class III gaming on Indian land in California: Proposition 5. That proposition, which

attempted to grant a statutory procedure for authorizing gaming on Indian lands, was held

invalid3 in the face of California’s constitutional ban on casinos. (Hotel Employees,

supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 615.) In response, the California Constitution was amended

through Proposition 1A.

Proposition 1A added article IV, section 19, subdivision (f), to the California

Constitution: “Notwithstanding subdivisions (a) and (e), and any other provision of state

law, the Governor is authorized to negotiate and conclude compacts, subject to

ratification by the Legislature, for the operation of slot machines and for the conduct of

lottery games and banking and percentage card games by federally recognized Indian

tribes on Indian lands in California in accordance with federal law. Accordingly, slot

machines, lottery games, and banking and percentage card games are hereby permitted to

be conducted and operated on tribal lands subject to those compacts.”

DISCUSSION

The core issue in this case is the effect of Proposition 1A. The parties and my

colleagues appear to agree that, if no state authority grants the Governor power to concur

in the Secretary’s determination, then the Governor has no authority to concur. (See

Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1997) 110 F.3d 688, 697-698

(Confederated Tribes) [noting the Governor acts under the authority of state law].)

My colleagues then split on whether the authority to concur in the Secretary’s

determination that newly acquired land is suitable for gaming is implied from the

3 With the exception of the final sentence of Government Code section 98005, not

relevant here.

6

Governor’s compacting authority under Proposition 1A, with the lead opinion avoiding

the impact of that split by relying on a later revocation of the compact by voters. This

analysis is one step too far down the road. Under the facts alleged in the complaint,

appellants could state a legitimate claim that the Governor exceeded any constitutionally

granted authority when concurring because, even if the power to concur was necessary to

or implied within the authority to compact, the Governor was not properly executing the

authority to compact.

Given that the Governor may only compact or concur if authorized under State

law, a point discussed more fully, post, and that without authorization to act the

California Constitution bars any conduct which would create Nevada- or New Jersey-

style casinos, the meaning of the law defining the Governor’s authority is of paramount

importance. (Hotel Employees, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 589; Confederated Tribes, supra,

110 F.3d at pp. 697-698.) The basic principles of statutory interpretation must therefore,

in the first instance, be applied to the scope of the Governor’s authority under Proposition

1A.

I. Grammatical Structure of the Governor’s Compacting Authority.

Proposition 1A grants a narrow and specific constitutional authority, providing the

Governor “is authorized to negotiate and conclude compacts, subject to ratification by the

Legislature, for the operation of slot machines and for the conduct of lottery games and

banking and percentage card games by federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands

in California in accordance with federal law.” (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f).) By

applying some non-substantive simplifications,4 the following sentence diagram can be

generated:

4 These simplifications generally reduce the sentence to its non-redundant parts.

In this process, the ratification clause is irrelevant to the issue at hand and can be

completely eliminated. The “operation” and “conduct” phrases can be combined to

simply authorize the operation of slot machines, as the remaining games are redundant

with respect to the analysis. Likewise, “negotiate and conclude” can be expressed simply

7

This shows the Governor’s authority to negotiate compacts was substantially

limited. The Governor’s compacting authority was limited in both the scope of gaming

the compacts could grant, and the groups that could conduct that gaming, to “the

operation of slot machines and for the conduct of lottery games and banking and

percentage card games by federally recognized Indian tribes” (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19,

subd. (f)), which corresponds roughly to the class III gaming permitted by the IGRA. It

was also limited as to where the Governor could compact for that gaming to occur,

namely “on Indian lands in California.” (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f).) And it was

limited such that the compacts and restrictions must be considered “in accordance with

federal law.” (Ibid.) In this case, it is the restriction to compacting for operations on

Indian lands which precludes the Governor’s actions under the alleged facts of this case.

II. The Meaning of “Indian lands” as Used in Proposition 1A.

There is no direct definition of “Indian lands” in Proposition 1A. However, as is

apparent from the general legal framework governing this issue, the proposition is readily

as “negotiate.” And the copular phrase “is authorized to” can be succinctly stated as the

modal verb “may” without causing any harm to the section’s meaning. (Garner, Garner’s

Modern English Usage (4th ed. 2016) pp. 113 [“Verb phrases containing be-verbs are

often merely roundabout ways of saying something better said with a simple verb. . . . [¶]

. . . [¶] Many such wordy constructions are more naturally phrased in the present-tense

singular: . . . is authorized to (may) . . . .”], 221 [defining copula as “(1) a linking verb,

such as be, feel, or seem, that expresses a state of being rather than action; or (2) a link or

connection in general”].)

8

understood to reference the IGRA through its specific provisions, its reference to

allowing gaming operations “in accordance with federal law,” and its enactment

following the failure of Proposition 5. (See Flynt v. California Gambling Control Com.

(2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1132-1137 [outlining the history of Indian gaming in

California].) Indeed, the analysis by the Legislative Analyst for Proposition 1A preceded

its explanation of how the changes proposed by Proposition 1A would affect gaming in

California with a detailed explanation of how gaming regulations under the IGRA

worked. Partially in light of this history, respondents concede that, in this appeal,

“article IV, section 19, subdivision (f)’s plain meaning is to authorize the Governor to

negotiate compacts for certain forms of otherwise illegal class III gaming to be conducted

on Indian lands in California pursuant to IGRA.” As intervener puts it, the “history of

Proposition 1A indicates that (1) the Governor may act ‘in accordance with federal law’

and (2) Indian tribes may conduct gaming on ‘Indian lands’ as that term is defined in

IGRA . . . .”

I agree with respondents that, given the history of Proposition 1A, the term

“Indian lands” should be understood to have the same meaning as used in the IGRA.

And, turning to the IGRA, there is, in fact, a definition of “Indian lands” to apply. As

noted above, this definition covers all land within the limits of any Indian reservation and

“any lands title to which is . . . held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any

Indian tribe . . . and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power.” (25

U.S.C.S. § 2703(4).) Under this definition, the Governor’s authority under

Proposition 1A is limited to compacting for gaming on lands held in trust by the United

States and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power.

III. Proposition 1A is a Conditional Authorization of Authority.

Given that the Legislature faces a blanket constitutional prohibition on authorizing

Nevada- and New Jersey-style casinos under article IV, section 19, subdivision (e), of the

state Constitution subject only to a limited compacting authority delegated to the

9

Governor for such gaming on trust lands pursuant to subdivision (f), the notion that the

Governor is vested with a broad authority to negotiate any compact which could

ultimately result in gaming on later-created Indian lands (and has the concurring authority

to enact those compacts) is difficult to defend. In support of this claim, respondents and

intervener argue that a restriction on the Governor’s authority requiring the existence of

“Indian lands” operates as an improper temporal limitation. As intervener further argues,

the disputed provision “is a limitation on the content of compacts, not the time during

which the Governor may negotiate and conclude the compacts.”

Although this argument generally contradicts the grammatical structure of the

sentence which naturally reads such that the prepositional phrase “on Indian lands”

modifies “for the operation” as opposed to “compacts,” in the abstract one could argue, as

respondents and intervener do, that the language is simply a limitation on where the

operation of slot machines must ultimately occur and not a limitation on the Governor’s

authority to act in the first instance. However, such an argument ignores a key

component of statutory construction – the contested terms must be understood both in the

context of the section as a whole and in its contemporary legal context. (Graham County

v. United States ex rel. Wilson (2005) 545 U.S. 409, 415 [explaining that “[s]tatutory

language has meaning only in context”]; Stevens, Essay: The Shakespeare Canon of

Statutory Construction (1992) 140 U.Pa. L.Rev. 1373, 1374-1381 [describing the first

three cannons of statutory interpretation as “ ‘Read the statute,’ ” “ ‘Read the entire

statute,’ ” and ensure “that the text be read in its contemporary context,”] italics omitted.)

In the broader context of article IV, section 19, subdivision (f) of the state

Constitution is a limited authorization of authority carved out of a blanket prohibition.

And in the broader social context, subdivision (f) was only enacted through Proposition

1A because other attempts to grant Indian tribes the authority to engage in gaming on

Indian lands had been overturned by the California Supreme Court. Thus, the suggestion

the Governor’s compacting authority is ever-present, provided that what is negotiated

10

satisfies the authorizing statute at the time of implementation, runs contrary to the

broader section’s text and the contemporary purpose for enacting Proposition 1A. The

disputed limitation on the Governor’s authority to act is not temporal but conditional.

In other words, the fact the Governor’s authority can only be exercised when the

conditions triggering that authority are met is not a temporal restriction on an existing

authority. Like other conditional powers, the Governor’s authority only exists upon

satisfying the condition needed to bring the right to act into existence. (Cf. Board of

Trustees v. Garrett (2001) 531 U.S. 356, 374 [“Congress is the final authority as to

desirable public policy, but in order to authorize private individuals to recover money

damages against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which

violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be

congruent and proportional to the targeted violation.”]; City of Boerne v. Flores (1997)

521 U.S. 507, 517-520 [positive grant of legislative power to enforce 14th Amend.

cannot be exercised unless record shows Congress is acting within that power by passing

appropriate legislation]; see Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa

Indians v. U.S. (7th Cir. 2004) 367 F.3d 650, 656-657 (Lac Courte Oreilles) [explaining

how the IGRA is a conditional statute, where the authority to act requires certain factual

predicates to exist before the Secretary may proceed (i.e. – the Secretary could not agree

to take land into trust on the assumption that, by the time the act was complete, the

Governor would concur)].) As an example, picture a pet-sitting business. Assume a

client says to the business, “You may take my dog for a walk on the sidewalk.” The most

natural reading of this command is that the business is not permitted to take the dog for a

walk unless that walk occurs on a sidewalk. If there is no sidewalk on which to walk,

the business lacks authority to take the dog. If the business prepares for a walk, believing

there is a sidewalk outside, it risks the possibility of being wrong and thus lacking

authority to take the dog on a walk. And if the business nonetheless proceeds to take the

dog on a walk, expecting a sidewalk to appear around the corner, the business has begun

11

the walk without authority. Here too, while the Governor may wish to proceed with a

compact, expecting Indian lands to appear prior to any gaming occurring, the Governor

will be acting without authority at all times there are no Indian lands because the

condition necessary to trigger the Governor’s authority to compact has not arisen.

IV. On the Facts Pled, the Governor Could Not Exercise His Compacting

Authority.

Having determined the initial limits of the Governor’s compacting authority under

Proposition 1A, the question becomes whether the complaint “has stated a cause of action

under any legal theory.” (Genesis Environmental Services v. San Joaquin Valley Unified

Air Pollution Control Dist. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 597, 603.) The relevant facts, as set

forth throughout the first amended complaint, are as follows:

On March 1, 2005, intervener applied to have “the Madera [s]ite taken into trust

for the purposes of conducting class III gaming.” By letter dated September 1, 2011, the

Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs noted a favorable determination under the two-part

analysis required by 25 United States Code Service section 2719 had been reached and

requested the Governor concur. On August 31, 2012, the Governor responded by letter,

concurring. When the Governor issued this concurrence letter, “he also announced that

he had already negotiated a Compact with the Tribe.” The complaint then alleges the

Governor’s concurrence “exceeded his authority under state law.”

Although the focus of the complaint is clearly on the Governor’s power to concur,

the facts detailed above are sufficient to demonstrate the Governor exceeded the authority

granted under state law as alleged. This is so because the Governor was alleged to have

negotiated a compact for gaming on lands that were not “Indian lands.”5 At the time the

5 Further facts developed in the record show that the Secretary only took the Madera

property into trust after receiving the Governor’s letter. As expected, it did so “pursuant

to the [IRA], 25 [United States Code Service section 5108, formerly United States Code

section] 465, and its implementing regulations at 25 [Code of Federal Regulations p]art

151[.1 et seq.]” However, this fact did not necessarily need to be pled to state a cause of

12

Governor negotiated the compact and gave the disputed concurrence, the Secretary had

not accepted the Madera property into trust under the only authority permitting such

conduct, 25 United States Code Service section 5108. Without this acceptance, the land

cannot be considered as held in trust by the United States. (25 C.F.R. § 151.3 [“No

acquisition of land in trust status, including a transfer of land already held in trust or

restricted status, shall be valid unless the acquisition is approved by the Secretary.”].)

Because the land was not held in trust at the time the Governor negotiated the announced

compact, the Governor was not negotiating a compact for gaming on Indian lands and,

thus, exceeded any authority granted by Proposition 1A.

V. The Parties’ Framing of this Issue.

The parties have framed this issue in the context of the Governor’s power to

concur in light of the constitutional power to compact, disputing whether such power

would grant the Governor the ability to take lands from California for Indian use, thereby

usurping the Legislature’s role in setting public policy and resolving land use issues. As

appellants argued, the “primary issue in this appeal is whether the Governor has authority

to authorize the Secretary to create new Indian land in California for the purposes of

gaming by concurring in the Secretary’s two-part determination.” While respondents

generally worked to rebut appellants’ claims, they too suggested authorization in the

Governor to concur in the taking of lands into trust under the IGRA, writing: “When a

tribe seeks a compact for gaming on Indian lands that are not taken into trust through the

Secretary’s powers under 25 [United States Code Service section] 2719(b)(1)(A), a

gubernatorial concurrence is not required.” It further directed the issue to this point by

action, as the complaint directly alleged the Madera property was not in trust when the

application was made and did not indicate it had gone into trust at any point prior to the

Governor’s concurrence.

13

arguing that “[a]s long as Indian lands are established ‘in accordance with federal law,’

meaning IGRA, those lands become eligible for gaming.”6

I agree with the general idea that the historical exclusion of casino gaming in

California coupled with the history of Proposition 1A would not inform a voter that

Proposition 1A was granting to the Governor the concurring authority to convert non-

Indian land to Indian land in a manner which would authorize Nevada- or New Jersey-

style casinos.

As the summary of the various laws and regulations show, however, this framing

misses the mark. There is no provision of law in the IGRA which permits the Secretary

to take lands into trust. The trust determination is wholly driven by the provisions of the

IRA. And, while regulations may allow both proceedings to progress in tandem, the

authority to concur in a determination that “newly acquired lands” are suitable for

gaming purposes in no way grants the Secretary a right to take the land into trust under

the IRA. At most, such a concurrence would support the Secretary’s determination that

taking the land into trust would benefit the tribe because gaming would not be blocked at

a later date and, thus, the economic impacts of the decision would be clearer.

All parties appear to recognize this fact, at least implicitly, at some point in their

briefing. For example, respondents explain in their summary of the law, that while “the

IRA governs federal action to take land into trust for Indian tribes, IGRA governs a

federal decision to allow such trust land’s use” for gaming purposes. Likewise,

6 To intervener’s credit, it generally kept the issues separate (despite wrongly

claiming that 25 U.S.C.S. § 2703(4) defines “ ‘Indian lands’ ” to include “lands acquired

through two-part determination”) contending “the Governor does not unilaterally make

new policy or exercise plenary power to create new Indian land when concurring in the

Secretary’s determination” while arguing the trial court correctly concluded “the

California Constitution grants the Governor authority to concur in the Secretary of the

Interior’s two-part determination to permit gaming on Indian lands acquired by the

Secretary after 1988 . . . .” Intervener does not, however, explain how the Madera

property qualified as “Indian lands” under the facts of this case.

14

intervener clearly explains that the IRA “governs the federal government’s acquisition of

land for the benefit of Indian tribes” while the IGRA aims only to “facilitate ‘the

operation of gaming by Indian tribes.’ ” This split in framing and understanding appears

to arise from a conflict that may be unique to California and derives from California’s

start and stop history in regulating Indian gaming.

In the federal regulatory scheme, the Secretary is permitted to conduct analyses

with respect to the suitability of gaming on “newly acquired lands.” (25 U.S.C.S.

§ 2719(b)(1)(A); 25 C.F.R. § 292.13.) By regulatory definition, such lands include not

only those already held in trust, but also those that “will be taken” into trust. (25 C.F.R.

§ 292.2.) In contrast, California’s Proposition 1A arose in part as a mechanism to ratify

several previously negotiated compacts. (California Commerce Casino, Inc. v.

Schwarzenegger (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1412.) In doing so, it approved the

Governor’s prior unauthorized compacting, weakened the constitutional restriction on the

Legislature’s authority to permit Nevada- and New Jersey-style casinos, and delegated

compact power to the Governor, subject to ratification by the Legislature. As part of this

change, Proposition 1A tightly limited the Governor’s future authority to compact such

that he could only negotiate for gaming “on Indian lands.” (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19,

subd. (f).) In this way, California’s Constitution was amended to grant the Governor a

right to compact which covers only half of the potential proceedings occurring under the

federal regulatory scheme.7, 8

7 It appears appellants may have belatedly recognized this fact in their reply brief.

There appellants complained respondents’ argument that the “concurrence was

authorized because the concurrence is the mechanism under federal law by which the

land in question here would become Indian land on which gaming could occur” was

“circular,” explaining the “existence of Indian land on which gaming can occur is the

precondition to the Governor’s authority to negotiate a compact pursuant to which such

gaming on that land would be regulated.” Appellants, however, fully embraced this

limitation in their supplemental briefing.

15

It must be noted that the Seventh Circuit, in Lac Courte Oreilles, supra, 367 F.3d

at page 656, wrote, “Unless and until the appropriate governor issues a concurrence, the

Secretary of the Interior has no authority under [25 United States Code Service section]

2719(b)(1)(A) to take land into trust for the benefit of an Indian tribe for the purpose of

the operation of a gaming establishment.” While this statement would appear to

contradict the prior analysis, I find it distinguishable on at least three grounds.

First, the issue under consideration in Lac Courte Oreilles was whether the

IGRA’s concurrence provision was an unconstitutional violation of the separation of

powers doctrine. (Lac Courte Oreilles, supra, 367 F.3d at p. 655.) The court’s

understanding of the basis for invoking the request for concurrence, as authority to take

the land into trust or authority to permit gaming on newly acquired land, was therefore

immaterial to the resolution, rendering this analysis dicta. Indeed, the court used the

above statement in order to analogize the legislation to other examples of “contingent

legislation” which had been held constitutional. (Id. at p. 656.)

Second, the factual scenario considered in Lac Courte Oreilles was different in a

material way. In Lac Courte Oreilles, the Governor had declined to concur in the

Secretary’s findings, precluding the requested authorization for gaming and triggering a

dispute concerning the Governor’s authority to affect federal law. (Lac Courte Oreilles,

8 I recognize that the interplay of the various regulatory schemes creates the

potential for significant gubernatorial power over the placement of class III gaming

facilities within California should the Governor have authority to concur once lands are

Indian lands. While the Governor has no direct role in determining which lands are taken

into trust, there appears to be no legal reason why the Secretary could not take lands into

trust for the purpose of providing future revenue as a gaming location or other similar

reason. Once the lands are in trust, the Governor would appear to have both the power to

negotiate compacts under state law and the power to preclude gaming by withholding his

necessary concurrence under federal law, thereby precluding gaming under a federal

compact. Whether this was the desired outcome of the electorate when passing

Proposition 1A is not before us. Regardless, it is the province of the Legislature to

resolve any unintended consequences.

16

supra, 367 F.3d at p. 653.) As such there was no detailed discussion of Wisconsin’s laws

or policies with respect to the Governor’s authority to act. In contrast, here the Governor

concurred with the Secretary, triggering a different dispute concerning whether, under

California law, the Governor had the authority to issue that concurrence.

Finally, and most importantly, the court’s statement in Lac Courte Oreilles is not

accurate. There is no technical reason under the law, provided the proper Administrative

Procedure Act (APA) requirements are met, that the Secretary could not take land into

trust for the purpose of gaming without the Governor’s concurrence.9 This is so because

the authority to act arises under 25 United States Code Service section 5108 and not

section 2719. Should the Secretary so act and survive the likely challenge under the

APA, however, 25 United States Code Service section 2719 would still bar class II or III

gaming on the property unless and until an exception applied – such as the Governor’s

concurrence provision. Thus, in the context of a dispute arising when a request for a trust

determination was made under 25 United States Code Service section 5108 at the same

time as a request for a determination that the newly acquired property is suitable for

gaming under 25 United States Code Service section 2719, it would be understandable,

though not wholly correct, to claim the property could not be taken into trust for the

purpose of gaming unless the Governor concurred. To the extent Lac Courte Oreilles

suggests the Governor’s concurrence is required to take land into trust, I do not find it

persuasive authority.

VI. The Governor’s Executive Authority.

9 This is particularly true if the land is taken into trust for class I gaming, which is

not regulated by the IGRA and thus not subject to the post-1988 Indian land gaming

prohibition. (See 25 U.S.C.S. §§ 2710(a)(1) [“Class I gaming on Indian lands is within

the exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes and shall not be subject to the provisions of

this act.”]; 2719(a) [“Except as provided in subsection (b), gaming regulated by this act

shall not be conducted on lands acquired by the Secretary . . . .”].)

17

The Governor’s concurrence could still be accepted as valid in this case if the

Governor held the authority to concur as a power inherent to the chief executive of the

state. I concur with and join Justice Franson’s conclusion that no such authority exists. I

find persuasive his analysis showing that the California Constitution expressly bans the

creation of Nevada- or New Jersey-style casinos. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (e).)

This general prohibition demonstrates forcefully that the Governor does not

possess the power to act in a manner which would result in the authorization to operate

Nevada- or New Jersey-style casinos within California absent some express grant of that

right. While it is true the Governor’s concurrence does not, by itself, create permission to

operate such casinos in California, that authority being expressly found only in the

Secretary, there can be no doubt the practical effect is the same. (See Lac Courte

Oreilles, supra, 367 F.3d at p. 663 [rejecting argument that impact of gubernatorial

inaction violated federalism principles because federal government could grant states

input into execution of federal law]; Confederated Tribes, supra, 110 F.3d at p. 698

[noting that Secretary must comply with guidelines expressed by Congress and that

Governor plays limited role by concurring once the Secretary has determined gaming

would be appropriate].) At the time the Secretary requests concurrence, a preliminary

determination that operation of class III gaming on the identified lands is appropriate has

already been reached. (See 25 C.F.R. § 292.13; Lac Courte Oreilles, supra, 367 F.3d at

p. 663 [explaining that due to the transparent nature of the IGRA, “if the Secretary of the

Interior issues a favorable finding, but ultimately denies the application, the constituents

will gather that the governor likely declined to issue a concurrence”].) Given that the

California Constitution expressly forbids the authorization of such gaming, and that the

exception created by Proposition 1A only applies to “Indian lands,” there can be no

18

inherent authority in the Governor to concur in the conclusion that gaming may occur on

“newly acquired lands” which are not already in trust.10

I also find this constitutional prohibition is confirmation that the underlying

authority to concur in the Secretary’s determination to authorize Nevada- or New Jersey-

style casinos on newly acquired lands is inherently and wholly legislative. By expressly

removing the authority to authorize Nevada- and New-Jersey style casinos from within

the broad plenary powers of the Legislature, then placing partial authority to compact for

such casinos with the Governor, subject to express ratification from the Legislature, the

California Constitution leaves no doubt that the authority to authorize such casinos

cannot exist within the Governor’s inherent executive authority. During our

consideration of this case, another court of appeal reached a contradictory result in United

Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Brown (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 36

(United Auburn). United Auburn reviewed three general legislative spheres and found

the Governor’s concurring power did not fall exclusively within any of those three. (Id.

at pp. 47-51.) Then, relying on Lac Courte Oreilles, the court determined the concurring

power had some “[e]xecutive [c]haracteristics,” while failing to expressly call it an

executive power, because it allegedly involves the implementation of existing Indian

gaming policy in California. (United Auburn, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 51-52.) I am

not persuaded by this analysis.

10 Due to the expressly stated policy against such gaming, this is not a case, as

intervener suggests, where the Governor is acting in the face of silence. The People of

California amended the state Constitution in a manner that excludes any assertion of

inherent authority and, indeed, respondents do not rely on this justification in their own

briefing. For similar reasons, I find intervener’s reliance on United States v. 1216.83

Acres of Land (Wash. 1978) 574 P.2d 375, 379 misplaced. Unlike 1216.83 Acres of

Land, where broad powers were granted to the Governor to control the consenting agency

and its policies, the policy outlined in California’s Constitution is directly opposed to the

Governor’s conduct in this case, limiting his ability to act.

19

As the court in United Auburn noted, case law in California stands “for the

unremarkable proposition that the Governor may not exercise a legislative power without

express authority from the Legislature.” (United Auburn, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 47.)

California’s constitutional ban on the legislative authority to authorize gaming and the

later amendment granting limited powers to the Governor in that context demonstrates

forcefully that this proposition is the controlling law. Yet, United Auburn makes no

reference to this history or its implication.

Similarly, United Auburn’s reliance on Lac Courte Oreilles to conclude

concurring has an executive characteristic under California law is misplaced. As United

Auburn noted, Lac Courte Oreilles found extensive gaming regulations in Wisconsin

meant there was a general policy, consistent with the Wisconsin Constitution, which the

Governor was simply enforcing. (United Auburn, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 51-52.)

Lac Courte Oreilles conducted its analysis by following an earlier United States Supreme

Court case considering California’s authorization of bingo. In that case, California v.

Cabazon Band of Mission Indians (1987) 480 U.S. 202 (Cabazon), the Supreme Court

noted that California allowed several forms of gambling to occur, including bingo and the

card games being operated by the tribe, but had sought to criminalize high stakes,

unregulated bingo. (Id. at p. 211.) In the context of these facts, the Supreme Court found

“California regulates rather than prohibits gambling in general and bingo in particular”

and, thus, could not enforce its stricter bingo regulations on reservations. (Id. at pp. 211-

212.)

In contrast to both Lac Courte Oreilles and Cabazon, there is no regulation of

Nevada- and New Jersey-style gaming under California law generally. Rather, the

general rule is a constitutional prohibition on such actions. As such, if not for

Proposition 1A there would be no doubt that California prohibited rather than regulated

such gaming and, thus, the Governor could exercise no executive authority in this area.

(See Artichoke Joe’s California Grand Casino v. Norton (2003) 353 F.3d 712, 721

20

[noting that post-Cabazon “the general criminal jurisdiction that California exercises

under Public Law No. 280 allowed California to prohibit gaming for Indian tribes, if the

scheme was prohibitory rather than regulatory”].) Yet, in the face of federal regulations

permitting gambling on Indian lands, California has granted a limited exception to this

general prohibition which permits Nevada- and New Jersey-style gaming operations on

land already taken from the State to benefit Indian tribes. Such a limited exception to the

general prohibition cannot be understood as a switch from prohibition to regulation given

the broader constitutional ban. Indeed, on the federal side of the analysis, California’s

grant of limited gaming rights is generally not considered to invoke a broader grant of all

gaming rights under federal law. (Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson

(1994) 64 F.3d 1250, 1258 [“IGRA does not require a state to negotiate over one form of

Class III gaming activity simply because it has legalized another, albeit similar form of

gaming . . . . In other words, a state need only allow Indian tribes to operate games that

others can operate, but need not give tribes what others cannot have.”] fn. omitted.)

California has determined not only that the ability to authorize Nevada- and New Jersey-

style casinos is a legislative function, but has constitutionalized a general prohibition to

such gaming activities subject to a single regulatory exception available where the land in

question is “Indian land” and thus not subject to the general California constitutional

prohibition. This is not a basis for broad gubernatorial authority.

VII. Remaining Issues.

I concur and join in Justice Smith’s determination the claims against certain

respondents, the Attorney General, the California Gambling Control Commission, the

Bureau of Gambling Control and the State of California are not moot for the reasons he

states.

I do not join in the guidance asserted in section VII of Justice Franson’s opinion. I

take no position on how the differing views in our opinions should affect further

21

proceedings upon remand. The issues are complex and intertwined with federal law.11

The parties and the trial court are in the best position to work through the import of our

disposition.

VIII. Conclusion.

In summary, I conclude the demurrers should have been overruled. Constitutional

authority to negotiate a tribal-state compact authorizing class III gaming requires that the

land at issue be Indian land. At the time of this tribal-state compact, the 305-acre parcel

in Madera was not Indian land. On the facts pled by appellants, the Governor exceeded

his constitutional authority.

_____________________

Detjen, J.

11 I do not share Justice Franson’s concerns that an inability to negotiate prior to land

becoming Indian lands “might be considered a violation of IGRA’s requirement for good

faith negotiations.” (Conc. & dis. opn. of Franson, J., post, at p. 67, fn. 29.) Proposition

1A grants the Governor compacting authority over Indian lands. And the federal scheme

does not mandate any negotiations until the land at issue is under tribal control (i.e., is

Indian lands). (See 25 U.S.C.S. § 2710(d)(1)(A)(i) [making class III gaming lawful only

upon passage of ordinance by Indian tribe “having jurisdiction over such lands”]; id.,

(d)(3)(A) [requiring state to negotiate in good faith upon receipt of request from any

“Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon which a class III gaming

activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted”]; see also Citizens Against Casino

Gambling v. Chauduri (2d Cir. 2015) 802 F.3d 267, 279 [“IGRA requires that any tribe

seeking to conduct gaming on land must have jurisdiction over that land.”].)

22

FRANSON, J., Concurring and Dissenting.

I concur in all parts of the disposition in the lead opinion and agree with its

resolution of some of the legal questions presented. I write separately to identify the

legal issues that I have resolved differently and the points on which I agree.

This appeal addresses the controversial issue of off-reservation casinos1 and

whether the Governor of California has the authority to approve off-reservation gambling

on previously nontribal lands. The specific question of California law is whether the

Governor has the constitutional authority to concur in the Secretary s determination under

IGRA that a proposed off-reservation casino “would be in the best interest of the Indian

tribe and its members” and “would not be detrimental to the surrounding community,”

thereby allowing off-reservation gambling. (25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).) The answer to

1 For purposes of this opinion, I use the phrase “off-reservation casinos” to mean

casinos located on “after-acquired trust land” for which the Secretary of the Interior’s

(Secretary) two-part determination and the Governor’s concurrence is required before

casino-type gambling may proceed at that location.

I use the phrase “after-acquired trust land” to refer to land acquired by the United

States in trust for the benefit of an Indian tribe after October 17, 1988. That date is the

effective date of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988. (IGRA; 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et

seq.; cf. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) [statute uses term “newly acquired lands”].) The

phrase “after-acquired trust land” is broad and covers both “off-reservation land” and

“nonconcurrence trust land.”

I use the phrase “off-reservation land” to mean after-acquired trust land for which

the Secretary’s two-part determination and the Governor’s concurrence is required before

casino-type gambling may proceed at that location. Accordingly, the phrase “off-

reservation casino” refers to a casino proposed or operating on off-reservation land. The

terms “off-reservation land” and “off-reservation casino” are significant in this appeal

because the site in question is off-reservation land and, thus, the North Fork Rancheria of

Mono Indians’s (North Fork) proposed casino is an off-reservation casino.

I use the phrase “nonconcurrence trust land” to refer to after-acquired trust land

that is not “off-reservation land” but might become the site for a casino under provisions

of federal law that do not require a Governor’s concurrence. This type of land is not

involved in this appeal and the term is defined for use in providing background about

IGRA. (See pt. I.D.6., post.)

this question requires us to interpret Proposition 1A, which the voters passed in

November 2000 to modify the California Constitution’s prohibition of casinos.

My approach to interpreting voter initiatives that amend the California

Constitution is simple. The initiative process functions best when voters are (1) informed

that the initiative addresses a controversial issue with a wide range of impacts for

Californians and (2) told how the initiative resolves that controversial issue. When voters

are so informed, courts can “give effect to the voters’ formally expressed intent, without

speculating about how they might have felt concerning subjects on which they were not

asked to vote.” (Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 920,

930 (RagingWire).) Furthermore, when the voter initiative creates a specific exception to

a general constitutional prohibition, the exception should not be expanded and the

prohibition reduced to allow an activity on which the electorate was not asked to vote.

Using this approach to interpret Proposition 1A leads to the conclusion that it does

not authorize the Governor to concur. First, the text of Proposition 1A plainly omits any

power to concur in the Secretary’s two-part determination and, thus, does not include a

formally expressed intent to grant such a power. Second, an implied grant of that power

is not “necessary” under the principles of California law that define when an implication

is necessary. Third, the wording of Proposition 1A and the materials in the ballot

pamphlet did not inform the average voter that approving the constitutional amendment

would grant the Governor the power to concur or, more generally, would grant the

Governor authority to veto or approve a proposed off-reservation casino.

In sum, expanding Indian gaming to off-reservation locations was and is a

controversial issue of public policy with a wide range of consequences for Californians.

It is implausible that the average voter would have understood the controversy was being

resolved by an undisclosed, implied grant of the authority to concur. Simply put, there is

absolutely nothing of substance in the historical record, the language or history of

2.

Proposition 1A, or the ballot materials to show that the electors were asked to vote on a

grant of the authority to concur.

Therefore, plaintiffs stated a cause of action on the ground the Governor has no

authority to concur in a federal two-part determination relating to an off-reservation

casino. I concur in the reversal of the judgment of dismissal and the conclusion that

plaintiffs have stated a cause of action for a writ of mandate to set the concurrence aside

on the ground that it is unsupported by legal authority. My interpretation of

Proposition 1A also results in the conclusion that plaintiffs have stated a cause of action

for declaratory relief stating the concurrence was void ab initio.

PROCEEDINGS

The procedural history that led to the judgment of dismissal challenged in this

appeal is described in the lead opinion. The main issue raised in this appeal relates to the

Governor’s concurrence power. The trial court decided an implied concurrence power

existed and the initial briefing in this appeal addressed whether an implied concurrence

power was granted by Proposition 1A. Accordingly, this opinion addresses whether an

implied concurrence power exists.2

DISCUSSION

I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR PROPOSITION 1A

Ascertaining the meaning of a voter initiative such as Proposition 1A requires an

examination of the words and grammar of the initiative, along with the history of the

initiative placed in the wider historical circumstances of its enactment. (B.H. v. County of

2 Under the ripeness branch of California’s doctrine of justiciability, I conclude the

first amended complaint and matters judicially noticed present a set of facts sufficient to

frame the issue of whether the Governor was granted an implied concurrence power.

(See Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170

[ripeness and justiciability].) Therefore, I conclude the legal question of whether

Proposition 1A granted the Governor an implied power to concur is ripe and,

accordingly, it is not premature to resolve that issue of constitutional interpretation.

3.

San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168, 190 [wider historical circumstances]; People v.

Manzo (2012) 53 Cal.4th 880, 886 [history and background of provision]; see pt. III.B.3.,

post.) The wider historical circumstances for the adoption of Proposition 1A in 2000

include events that defined the United States’s approach to the sovereignty of tribal lands

and, more recently, the regulation of Indian gaming by federal, state and tribal

governments.

A. Federal Constitution and Sovereignty

1. Federal Constitution

Policies, legislation and litigation involving the possession of Indian land and the

regulation of activity on that land predates the American Revolution. (See generally

Worthen & Fransworth, Who Will Control the Future of Indian Gaming? “A Few Pages

of History Are Worth a Volume of Logic” (1996) 1996 B.Y.U. L.Rev. 407, 412–417

(Worthen).) I pick up the historical trail at the Constitutional Convention, which

considered the question of whether states should have the authority to enter into treaties

and wars with Indians. (Id. at p. 419.) The convention did not produce a clear definition

of the roles held by the federal government and the state governments in matters

involving Indian tribes. Instead, the United States Constitution provides that Congress

shall have the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the

several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” (U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.) This provision

is referred to as the Indian commerce clause. (Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v.

Superior Court (2006) 40 Cal.4th 239, 249 (Agua Caliente).)

The ambiguous power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes could be

interpreted to grant the federal government exclusive control of relations with Indians

residing on Indian lands, but some objected to that interpretation based on concerns about

state sovereignty and the creation of enclaves of exclusive federal control within the

states. (Worthen, supra, 1996 B.Y.U. L.Rev. at p. 419.) Two pragmatic considerations

4.

underlying the state sovereignty issue were (1) the denial of access to natural resources

found on tribal lands within a state and (2) the creation of a haven for fugitives from state

law. (Id. at pp. 419–420.) The latter concern is echoed in present day measures designed

to prevent organized crime from infiltrating gambling on Indian reservations.

2. State Sovereignty Over Indian Lands

In 1832, the ambiguity in the Indian commerce clause relating to the sovereignty

of states in their dealings with Indian tribes was addressed by Chief Justice Marshall in

Worcester v. Georgia (1832) 31 U.S. 515 (Worcester). The court struck down Georgia

laws that asserted jurisdiction over Cherokee lands within Georgia’s borders. (See

Worthen, supra, 1996 B.Y.U. L.Rev. at p. 421.) The court concluded the powers

conferred on Congress by the United States Constitution “comprehend all that is required

for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indians. They are not limited by any

restrictions on their free actions.” (Worcester, supra, at p. 559.) In short, the court

determined that “the federal government and not the States had authority over the Indian

Tribes.” (Worthen, supra, at pp. 420–421.)

3. Indian Sovereignty

The nature of Indian sovereignty had been address by the United States Supreme

Court the previous year in a case related to Worcester. (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia

(1831) 30 U.S. 1.) The high court described Indian tribes as “domestic dependent

nations,” which provided Indian tribes with some sovereignty, but distinguished them

from foreign states or independent nations. (Id. at pp. 17, 19–20.) The court stated, “they

are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to

his guardian.”3 (Id. at p. 17.)

3 This language, which makes one cringe today, suggests a policy of assimilation.

Assimilation of Indians into the United States’s European-based society was the federal

policy pursued until the Great Depression.

5.

Indian sovereignty also was discussed in Worcester, supra, 31 U.S. 515, and that

discussion, which had traced the foundation of tribal sovereignty from colonial times,

was summarized recently by the California Supreme Court:

“The court explained that since the arrival of the colonists on American

soil, the tribes were treated as dependant sovereign nations, with distinct

political communities under the protection and dominion of the United

States. (Worcester, supra, 31 U.S. at pp. 549–561.) The tribes possessed

territorial and governance rights with which no state could interfere. (Id. at

p. 561.)” (Agua Caliente, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 247.)

As to the source of tribal sovereignty, the United States Supreme Court has

addressed whether it was delegated to the tribes by Congress or is inherent in the tribe.

(United States v. Wheeler (1978) 435 U.S. 313, 322.) The court stated that Indian tribes

are “subject to ultimate federal control,” but “remain ‘a separate people, with the power

of regulating their internal and social relations.’” (Ibid.) Thus, Indian tribes retained

some inherent powers of sovereignty, while some aspects of sovereignty were divested

by incorporation within the territory of the United States, other aspects were yielded by

treaty, and still others were removed by Congress. (Id. at p. 323.) “The sovereignty that

the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the

sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.” (Ibid.)

4. Summary of Principles of Sovereignty

Three main points about sovereignty are relevant to this appeal. First, the federal

government is placed above Indian tribes in the legal hierarchy—that is, tribal

sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, the federal government. (California v.

Cabazon Band of Mission Indians (1987) 480 U.S. 202, 207 (Cabazon).) Second, Indian

tribes retain some, but not all, attributes of sovereignty over their members and their

territory, but that sovereignty is subject to Congress’s plenary control. (Ibid.; United

States v. Wheeler, supra, 435 U.S. at p. 323.) Third, state laws apply to tribal Indians on

their reservations if and only if Congress has expressly so provided. (Cabazon, supra, at

6.

p. 207.) Thus, states have no authority to regulate Indian activities on reservation land,

except where Congress has granted that authority.

These points demonstrate the dominant role Congress plays (1) in Indian affairs

and (2) in defining what attempts by state governments to control activities of Indian

tribes are valid. With this background, I turn to the statutes Congress has adopted to

govern (1) the acquisition of new land for the benefit of Indian tribes for gaming and

nongambling purposes and (2) Indian gambling in general.

B. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA)

1. General Provisions

The passage of IRA marked a dramatic shift in the federal government’s Indian

policy, as the failure to assimilate tribal members into American society was recognized.

(Worthen, supra, 1996 B.Y.U. L.Rev. at pp. 429–430.) The IRA terminated allotments

of land to individual Indians (which had reduced reservation land), authorized the

incorporation of Indian tribes, and granted Indian tribes the right to organize by adopting

constitutions and bylaws. (25 U.S.C. §§ 5101, 5123, 5124; see County of Yakima v.

Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation (1992) 502 U.S. 251, 255

[IRA brought an abrupt end to federal policy of allotment]; Washburn, Agency Conflict

and Culture: Federal Implementation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act by the

National Indian Gaming Commission, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Department

of Justice (2010) 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 303, 329 (Washburn) [IRA’s purpose was to reject

allotment policies and halt erosion of tribal land base].) Although federal policy

oscillated back towards assimilation in the 1950’s, it returned to Indian autonomy and

self-determination under President Nixon. (See Clarkson & Murphy, Tribal Leakage:

How the Curse of Trust Land Impedes Tribal Economic Self-Sustainability (Spring 2016)

12 J.L. Econ. & Policy 177, 187.) Throughout that time, the IRA’s provisions relating to

land acquisition remained in effect.

7.

2. Acquisition of Land: The Fee-to-trust Process

Under section 5 of the IRA, the Secretary is authorized to acquire land, “within or

without existing reservations, … for the purpose of providing land for Indians.” (25

U.S.C. § 5108.) One commentator described this provision of the IRA as giving the

Secretary broad authority “to acquire lands for Indian tribes by virtually any voluntary

means.” (Washburn, supra, 42 Ariz. St. L.J. at p. 329, fn. omitted.)

Section 5 of IRA also provides: “Title to any lands or rights acquired … shall be

taken in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe … for which the land is

acquired, and such lands or rights shall be exempt from state and local taxation.” (25

U.S.C. § 5108.) Land held in trust (1) may not be sold or otherwise alienated without an

act of Congress and (2) is exempt from state and local taxation. (Sheppard, Taking

Indian Land Into Trust (1999) 44 S.D. L.Rev. 681, 682–683.) The acquisition of land

and the holding of title in trust for the benefit of an Indian tribe is sometimes referred to

as the fee-to-trust process. (See generally Comment, Extreme Rubber-Stamping: The

Fee-To-Trust Process of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (2012) 40 Pepperdine

L.Rev. 251.)

Tribes may directly acquire real estate and hold it in fee simple. (Cass County v.

Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians (1998) 524 U.S. 103, 111, 115.) However, land

acquired in that manner, even if former reservation land, is subject to state and local

taxation. (Id. at p. 115)

The federal regulations governing the acquisition of land by the United States in

trust for Indian tribes are contained in part 151 of title 25 of the Code of Federal

Regulations. Under these regulations, “land may be acquired for a tribe in trust status” in

three circumstances, including when the Secretary “determines that the acquisition of the

land is necessary to facilitate tribal self-determination, economic development, or Indian

housing.” (25 C.F.R. § 151.3.) Land to be used for Indian gaming falls under this

provision because gaming promotes self-determination and economic development. The

8.

Secretary’s decision whether to take land into trust to facilitate tribal self-determination

and economic development involves the consideration of several factors, including the

need of the tribe for the land, the purposes for which the land will be used, the impact on

the state from removing the land from the tax rolls, potential conflicts of land use that

may arise, the location of the land relative to state boundaries and the boundaries of the

tribe’s reservation, and, in the case where land is being acquired for business purposes,

the tribe’s plan specifying the anticipated economic benefits associated with the proposed

use. (25 C.F.R. § 151.11, subds. (a)–(c); see 25 C.F.R. § 151.10, subds. (a)–(c) & (e)–

(f)].)

IGRA, discussed below, addresses the process the Secretary undertakes to

authorize class III gaming on trust lands, but contains no provision authorizing the

Secretary to take land into trust. Consequently, the Secretary’s statutory authority for

taking land into trust derives from IRA. (Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dept. of the

Interior (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2016 ___ F.Supp.3d ___, ___ [2016 U.S. Dist. Lexis 119649,

p. 151].)

To summarize, IRA is the source of the federal authority for taking land into trust

for Indian tribes. This authority is subject to further restrictions when a tribe’s fee-to-

trust application under IRA proposes to use the land for gaming purposes. Those

additional restrictions can be found in IGRA, the federal gaming legislation discussed

below. (See pt. I.D., post.) IGRA and IRA define some of the requirements that must be

met before an Indian tribe can build a casino on after-acquired trust lands. These federal

requirements delineate Congress’s approach to the controversial issue of casinos on after-

acquired trust lands.

9.

C. Developments in the 1980’s

1. Budget Cuts

Shortly after taking office in January 1981, President Reagan moved to abolish or

reduce the funding of a variety of social programs. (Ducheneaux, The Indian Gaming

Regulatory Act: Background and Legislative History (2010) 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 99, 110–

111 (Ducheneaux).) The cuts in federal funding of programs administered by the Bureau

of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Indian Health Service affected tribal members living on

reservations. (Id. at p. 111.) Indian tribes, lacking a sound tax base or thriving economy,

searched for economic development activities and, partially as the result of federal court

decisions, identified gaming (particularly bingo) as a potential source of revenue. (Ibid.)

2. Lower Court Decisions Relating to Indian Gaming

Part of the historical context for IGRA was established by court decisions

involving attempts by state or county governments to regulate bingo on Indian

reservations. The most important of these cases, Cabazon, supra, 480 U.S. 202, was

decided by the United States Supreme Court in February 1987, shortly after Senator

Daniel K. Inouye introduced the Indian gaming legislation that eventually became IGRA.

(Boylan, Reflections on IGRA 20 Years After Enactment (2010) 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 4

(Boylan); see Pub.L. No 100-497 (Oct. 17, 1988) 102 Stat. 2467.) The legal environment

at the time of the Cabazon decision included the following three cases upholding the

legality of on-reservation bingo. (See Clinton, Enactment of the Indian Gaming

Regulatory Act of 1988: The Return of the Buffalo to Indian Country or Another Federal

Usurpation of Tribal Sovereignty? (2010) 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 17, 42 (Clinton) [Cabazon

“constituted the culmination of the long train of federal judicial analysis of Indian

commercial gaming”].)

In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth (S.D.Fla. 1980) 491 F.Supp. 1015

(Seminole), an Indian tribe successfully sought to permanently enjoin a county sheriff

from enforcing Florida’s bingo statute on the tribe’s land. (Id. at p. 1016.) In Oneida

10.

Tribe of Indians v. Wisconsin (W.D.Wisc. 1981) 518 F.Supp. 712 (Oneida), an Indian

tribe filed a civil action and obtained declaratory relief stating that a Wisconsin statute

relating to bingo operations could not be lawfully enforced on its reservation. (Id. at p.

713.) In Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy (9th Cir.

1982) 694 F.2d 1185 (Barona), the Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals

held that county and state laws could not be applied to bingo conducted by the tribe on its

reservation in San Diego County, California. (Id. at p. 1190.)

These decisions employed the same method of analysis. The courts recognized

that state law would apply to activities on the reservations only if federal law granted that

authority to the states and, accordingly, addressed whether Public Law No. 83-280

(Aug. 15, 1953) (67 Stat. 588–590) did so.4 That legislation conferred broad criminal

jurisdiction and very limited civil jurisdiction. Consequently, the courts considered

whether the state laws in question should be classified as criminal/prohibitory or

civil/regulatory. (Seminole, supra, 491 F.Supp. at p. 1019; Oneida, supra, 518 F.Supp. at

pp. 719–720; Barona, supra, 694 F.2d at p. 1188.) If the state laws were

criminal/prohibitory, they would fall within Public Law No. 83-280’s grant of criminal

jurisdiction to the states. In contrast, if the state laws were civil/regulatory, the federal

statute did not authorize their enforcement on the reservations. In all three cases, the

courts determined the laws in question were regulatory because they allowed bingo to be

conducted in these states under certain circumstances rather than prohibiting it outright.5

4 This federal statute “conferred criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian country

to certain states and authorized other states to take the necessary action to assume such

jurisdiction. Six states, including California, were initially granted jurisdiction under

Public Law 83-280. A few others, including Florida, assumed jurisdiction under this Act

….” (Ducheneaux, supra, 42 Ariz. St. L.J. at p. 105, fns. omitted; see 18 U.S.C. § 1162

[criminal jurisdiction]; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 [civil jurisdiction].)

5 For example, the district court in Seminole concluded: “It seems plain that

Florida, in permitting bingo to be run by certain groups in a restricted manner, has

acknowledged certain benefits of bingo and has chosen to regulate rather than prohibit.”

11.

Consequently, the courts held those state laws could not be enforced on the reservations

under the criminal jurisdiction granted to states by Public Law No. 83-280. In sum, if a

state allowed bingo within its borders, it could not dictate how bingo was conducted on

tribal lands.

3. 1987 United States Supreme Court Decision

In Cabazon, supra, 480 U.S. 202, two Indian tribes filed an action seeking a

declaratory judgment that Riverside County had no authority to apply its ordinances or

California’s statutes to bingo, draw poker and other card games conducted on their

reservations. (Id. at pp. 205–206.) The district court granted the Indian tribes’ motion

for summary judgment and, in 1986, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. (Id. at p. 206.) The

United States Supreme Court also affirmed. (Id. at p. 222.) Some have characterized the

Supreme Court’s decision as opening “the floodgates for tribal gaming.” (Johnson,

Fencing the Buffalo: Off-Reservation Gaming and Possible Amendments to Section 20 of

the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (2014) 5 UNLV Gaming L.J. 101, 106.)

In part I of Cabazon, the Supreme Court accepted the prohibitory/regulatory

distinction as the appropriate test for determining whether Public Law No. 83-280

authorized the state to enforce its laws on an Indian reservation. (Cabazon, supra, 480

U.S. at p. 210.) The Supreme Court noted that bingo was legally sponsored by many

different organizations and was widely played in California. (Id. at p. 211.) Based on

“the fact that California permits a substantial amount of gambling activity, including

bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its state lottery,” the court concluded

“that California regulates rather than prohibits gambling in general and bingo in

particular.” (Ibid.) Consequently, the court concluded that Public Law No. 83-280 did

not authorize the enforcement of California law within the reservations. (Id. at p. 212.)

(Seminole, supra, 491 F.Supp. at p. 1020.) This decision was affirmed in Seminole Tribe

of Florida v. Butterworth (5th Cir. 1981) 658 F.2d 310.

12.

In part II of the Cabazon opinion, the Supreme Court considered the state’s

authority to regulate the activities of non-Indians on the reservations. (Cabazon, supra,

480 U.S. at pp. 215–216.) The court broadly framed the question as “whether the state

may prevent the Tribes from making available high stakes bingo games to non-Indians

coming from outside the reservations.” (Id. at p. 216.) The court then stated the specific

legal issue as “whether state authority is pre-empted by the operation of federal law”—an

inquiry that required the balancing of the federal and tribal interests against the state

interests at stake. (Ibid.)

The court identified the relevant federal and tribal interests by referring to the

congressional goals of Indian self-government, tribal self-sufficiency and economic

development. (Cabazon, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 216.) The court described these as

“important federal interests.” (Id. at p. 217.) The court supported its description by

referring to (1) the President’s policy statement that self-government would be furthered

by reducing tribal reliance on federal funding and (2) the actions of the Department of the

Interior in promoting tribal bingo enterprises, including making grants and guaranteeing

for loans for the construction of bingo facilities. (Id. at pp. 217–218.) As to tribal

interests, the court stated the reservations contained no natural resources that could be

exploited. (Id. at p. 218.) Furthermore, tribal games were the sole source of revenues for

the operation of the tribal governments and the provision of tribal services, and were the

major sources of employment on the reservations. (Id. at pp. 218–219.) Accordingly,

tribal self-determination and economic development were closely connected to the tribal

games. Against these federal and tribal interests, the sole interest asserted by California

for imposing its laws on the tribes was to prevent the infiltration of organized crime into

the tribal games. (Id. at p. 220.) The court regarded this as a legitimate concern, but it

did not outweigh the federal and tribal interests supporting the tribal bingo and card club

enterprises. (Id. at pp. 221–222.) As a result, the court concluded that the California

13.

laws were preempted by federal law and could not be applied to the tribal bingo and card

games. (Id. at p. 222.)

Cabazon (1) clarified how the existing federal statutes applied to tribal gaming and

(2) described the limited authority of states to regulate gaming on Indian reservations.

The court concluded that because Congress had not provided for the regulation of tribal

gaming, a state could prohibit gaming on tribal lands only if the state completely

prohibited all gaming within its borders.6 (Cabazon, supra, 480 U.S. at pp. 210–211.)

Cabazon provided further impetus for Congress to enact tribal gaming legislation.

D. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988

1. Overview

Congress passed IGRA in 1988 and it became effective on October 17, 1988.

IGRA is the legal foundation for California’s adoption of Proposition 1A. IGRA’s

primary purpose is “to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian

tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self–sufficiency, and strong

tribal governments.” (25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).) Additional purposes of IGRA are shielding

the tribe from organized crime and other corrupting influences; ensuring the tribe is the

primary beneficiary of the gaming operation; and assuring the gaming is conducted fairly

and honestly by both the operator and players. (25 U.S.C. § 2702(2).)

Once Congress decided to allow Indian gaming, it had to address what types of

games to allow, who would regulate those games, and where the games could be offered.

This last issue included the controversial topic of allowing casinos outside existing Indian

6 Few States have sacrificed the tax revenues and fees they receive from lottery and

other gaming activities within their States in order to obtain authority under Cabazon and

title 25 United States Code section 2710(d)(1)(B) to prohibit gambling on Indian lands.

(See Note, Casting A New Light on Tribal Casino Gaming: Why Congress Should

Curtail the Scope of High Stakes Indian Gaming (1999) 84 Cornell L.Rev. 798, 802-803

[asserting 46 states allow gaming in a form that, under IGRA, allows high stakes Indian

gaming].)

14.

lands. Congress exercised its plenary powers by (1) adopting classifications for the

various types of games, (2) allocating regulatory responsibility for particular class of

games among the tribes, states and federal governments, (3) generally prohibiting the

expansion of casinos on lands taken into trust after the enactment of IGRA, and

(4) providing specific exceptions to that general prohibition, including a procedure under

which states could allow a proposed off-reservation casino by the Governor’s issuance of

a concurrence—the very act that is challenged in this litigation.

As to the allocation of regulatory responsibility for high stakes casino-type

gambling conducted on Indian land, Congress employed the concept of tribal-state

gaming compacts under which the tribes and states would share responsibility. As to the

expansion of Indian gaming to off-reservation locations, Congress created a separate and

distinct mechanism that required the approval of the Indian tribe, the federal government

and the state. Specifically, the mechanism allowed Indian gaming on an off-reservation

site only if the Secretary decided to take the new land into trust for gaming purposes and

the state’s governor concurred in the Secretary’s decision. As shown below, the

mechanism for authorizing off-reservation Indian gaming is separate and distinct from

tribal-state compacts. Compacts allow Indian tribes to negotiate with states to determine

the scope and regulations of gambling on Indian lands, if gaming is allowed in the state.

Concurrences, on the other hand, are necessary for the proposed off-reservation casino to

qualify for a specific exception to the general rule prohibiting casinos on after-acquired

trust lands. Under this particular exception, a state’s Governor can give a thumbs-up to

an off-reservation casino by issuing a concurrence or, alternatively, can veto the proposed

casino by withholding his or her concurrence.

2. Development and Enactment of IGRA

IGRA “is the outgrowth of several years of discussions and negotiations between

gaming tribes, states, the gaming industry, the administration, and the Congress, in an

15.

attempt to formulate a system for regulating gaming on Indian lands.” (Sen.Rep.

No. 100-446, 2d Sess., p. 1 (1988) (Sen.Rep. 100-446).) Professor Santoni provides an

overview of the bills introduced from 1983 to 1988 that formed the legislative journey

leading to the emergence of IGRA. (Santoni, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: How

Did We Get Here? Where Are We Going? (1993) 26 Creighton L.Rev. 387, 395

(Santoni).) That overview and the many issues and compromises reached will not be

repeated here.

Instead, this appeal is concerned with the issues and compromises that were

addressed through the tribal-state compacts and the concurrence authority. Those matters

include (1) the types of gaming allowed, (2) who regulates, or shares regulatory control

over, the various types of gaming, and (3) where the gaming may be conducted. The

concept of tribal-state compacts was used by IGRA to deal with the first two issues.

IGRA adopted the state Governor’s concurrence solely as a condition to the final

approval of casino-style gaming on off-reservation lands.

3. IGRA’s Three Classes of Gaming

IGRA divided games into three classes and identified who was responsible for

regulating each class. Class I games are “social games solely for prizes of minimal value

or traditional forms of Indian gaming” connected with “tribal ceremonies or

celebrations.” (25 U.S.C. § 2703(6).) “Class I gaming on Indian land is within the

exclusive jurisdiction of Indian tribes and shall not be subject to the provisions of

[IGRA].” (25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1).) Thus, Indian tribes have complete control over class

I gaming and the federal and state government have no role in regulating those games.

Class II gaming consists of bingo, games similar to bingo, and certain card games.

(25 U.S.C. § 2703(7).) IGRA created “a system for joint regulation by tribes and the

Federal Government of class II gaming on Indian lands .…” (Sen.Rep. 100-446, supra,

p. 1.) IGRA established the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) as an

16.

independent agency within the Department of the Interior and assigned it a regulatory

role for class II gaming. (Sen.Rep. 100-446, supra, p. 1.) Generally, a tribe may engage

in, or license and regulate, class II gaming on Indian land if (1) the state where the

gaming is located permits such gaming for any purpose by any person or entity, (2) the

tribe has adopted an ordinance or resolution regulating the class II gaming, and (3) the

NIGC has approved the ordinance or regulation. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1).)

Class III gaming—the type involved in this litigation—covers all other forms of

gaming, such as “slot machines, casino games including banking card games, horse and

dog racing, pari-mutuel, jai-alai, and so forth.” (Sen.Rep. 100-446, supra, p. 3;

§ § 2703(8); Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. United States (6th Cir. 1998) 136 F.3d

469, 473 (Keweenaw Bay) [class III includes “‘high-stakes casino-style’ gaming”].) The

Select Committee on Indian Affairs, balancing the federal interest of preserving tribal

sovereignty and the need for sound enforcement of gaming laws and regulations,

developed a framework for the regulation of class III gaming on Indians lands that did

not unilaterally impose state jurisdiction on Indian lands for the regulation of class III

gaming activities, but instead allowed tribes to elect to have state laws and state

jurisdiction extend to tribal lands. (Sen.Rep. 100-446, supra, pp. 5–6.)7 Without this

election by the tribe, class III gaming activities could not be conducted on its lands.

4. Tribal-state Compacts

The tribal election is exercised by requesting a tribal-state compact—“[t]he

mechanism for facilitating the unusual relationship in which a tribe might affirmatively

seek the extension of state jurisdiction and the application of state laws to [class III

gaming] conducted on Indian land .…” (Sen.Rep. 100-446, supra, p. 6.) IGRA “does

7 Some tribes opposed any federal or state regulation of gaming on tribal lands,

preferring exclusive tribal regulation. (Clinton, supra, 42 Ariz. St. L.J. at pp. 58–59.)

Others were willing to accept some outside regulation, provided it was done by the

federal government. (Id. at p. 59.)

17.

not contemplate and does not provide for the conduct of class III gaming activities on

Indian lands in the absen[c]e of a tribal-State compact.” (Sen.Rep. 100-446, p. 6.) Thus,

in the view of the Select Committee on Indian Affairs, “the compact process is a viable

mechanism for setting various matters between two equal sovereigns” that both have

significant governmental interests in the conduct of class III gaming. (Id. at p. 13.)

The idea of the compact mechanism appears to have been derived from a

recommendation by the National Indian Gaming Task Force to Congress that suggested

“off-reservation gaming regulated by recognized Indian governments should be dealt

with on the local and State level by means of agreements between the parties. Such

agreements would provide protection as well as define their respective obligations.”

(Indian Gambling Control Act, Part I: Hearing on H.R. No. 1920 and H.R. No. 2404

before the House Com. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 173

(1985); see Clinton, supra, 42 Ariz. St. L.J. at pp. 58–60.) The proposed agreement,

“although expressly limited to ‘off-reservation gaming,’ may have been the first

suggestion of the compact mechanism that ultimately became the compromise measure

Congress adopted late in its legislative discussions to break the stalemate between

opposing views on the question of class III gaming” and its regulation. (Clinton, supra,

at pp. 59–60.) Accordingly, the revised version of Senate Bill 555 that became IGRA

“introduced the Tribal-State compact concept” as a compromise to resolve the disputes

concerning appropriate jurisdiction over class III. (Santoni, supra, 26 Creighton L.Rev.

at p. 403.)

IGRA provides that in states allowing class III “gaming for any purpose by any

person, organization, or entity,” an Indian tribe and the state may enter a compact for the

conduct of class III gaming on the Indian lands under the tribe’s jurisdiction. (25 U.S.C.

§ 2710(d)(1) & (d)(3).) To complete such a compact, tribes and states must negotiate a

range of issues that relate to the scope of the games, standards for operating the games,

regulatory responsibility, allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction, liquor sales, and

18.

taxes on retail and restaurant outlets. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C); Boylan, supra, 42

Ariz. St. L.J. at p. 8.) From the perspective of sovereignty, the tribal-state compact grants

the state control over activities on Indian land that it would not have without the compact.

In that sense, tribal-state compacts expand the state’s jurisdiction.

One reason Congress chose a mechanism that involved the states (as opposed to a

federal agency) in regulating class III gaming was “that the expertise to regulate gaming

activities and to enforce laws related to gaming could be found in state agencies, and thus

that there was no need to duplicate those mechanisms on a Federal level.” (Sen.Rep.

100-446, supra, p. 5.) The tribal-state compact mechanism would tap into this expertise

and “assure that the interests of both sovereign entities are met with respect to the

regulation of complex gaming enterprises .…” (Id. at p. 13.)

An issue not resolved by IGRA was which state official has the responsibility of

negotiating the tribal-state compact. (Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska v. State of

Nebraska (8th Cir. 1997) 121 F.3d 427, 431; see 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3).) As a result of

IGRA’s silence on this point, each state must decide that question for itself.8

The fact that tribes cannot conduct class III gaming on their lands without a

gaming compact appears to give the states a great deal of power in negotiating the terms

of the compact. This imbalance in power created the concern that the compact

requirement for class III gaming might “be used as a justification by a State for excluding

Indian tribes from such gaming or for the protection of other State-licensed gaming

enterprises from free market competition with Indian tribes.” (Sen.Rep. 100-446, supra,

p. 13.) Consequently, IGRA restricted the authority of states by requiring them to

8 For example, in State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney (1992) 251 Kan. 559, the Kansas

Supreme Court determined the Kansas Governor could negotiate tribal-state compacts,

but had no power to bind the state to the compact because that power was held

exclusively by the Legislature. (Id. at p. 583; State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson (1995) 120

N.M. 562, 578 [Governor of New Mexico lacked constitutional or statutory authority to

enter into tribal-state gaming compacts].)

19.

“negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith.” (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A); see Tsosie,

Negotiating Economic Survival: The Consent Principle and Tribal-State Compacts

Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (1997) 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 25, 54–55 [statutory

process for tribal-state compacts under IGRA].) To enforce this duty to negotiate, IGRA

granted federal district courts jurisdiction over causes of action brought by tribes alleging

the state failed to negotiate in good faith. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A).) If the district

court finds a lack of good faith, it may direct the parties to conclude a compact and, if

that attempt is unsuccessful, select a mediator who will choose the proposed compact that

best comports with IGRA. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv); see Seminole Tribe of Florida

v. Florida (1996) 517 U.S. 44, 73–74 [state’s duty to negotiate enforceable through by

“the carefully crafted and intricate remedial scheme set forth in § 2710(d)(7)”].)

IGRA’s requirement that a state negotiate a tribal-state compact in good faith, and

the remedies provided for the failure to negotiate in good faith, means that state control

over the tribal-state compact is limited. 9 A state that allows class III gaming within its

borders cannot prevent an Indian tribe from conducting class III gaming on its lands by

refusing to enter into a compact. In short, states are not given veto power over compacts,

like they are with concurrences.

5. General Prohibition of Gaming on After-acquired Trust Land

IGRA authorizes gaming only on “Indian lands.” (25 U.S.C. § 2702(3); see

Washburn, supra, 42 Ariz. St. L.J. at p. 330.) IGRA defines “‘Indian lands’” as (1) “all

lands within the limits of any Indian reservation”; (2) any lands “held in trust by the

9 Potentially, when a federal court finds the state has not negotiated in good faith,

the state essentially loses its power to participate in the compact process, which is what

eventually occurred with this proposed project. (See North Fork Rancheria of Mono

Indians v. California (E.D.Cal., Nov. 13, 2015, No. 1:15-CV-00419) 2015 U.S. Dist.

Lexis 154729.) The foregoing lawsuit involved the Madera site and generated two

decisions cited in this opinion. I refer to the lawsuit as Good Faith Compact Case, the

November 2015 decision as Good Faith Compact Case I and the August 2016 decision as

Good Faith Compact Case II.

20.

United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual”; and (3) any lands held in

fee by any tribe or individual subject to a federal restriction on alienation. (25 U.S.C.

§ 2703(4).)

The inclusion of trust lands in this definition created a concern that, after

enactment, tribal governments might acquire trust land in or near metropolitan areas and

open bingo or casino facilities on that land. (Boylan, supra, 42 Ariz. St. L.J. at pp. 9–10.)

IGRA addressed this concern by adding a separate provision, section 20, to address

gaming on lands acquired in trust after October 17, 1988, the date of IGRA’s enactment.

(25 U.S.C. § 2719; Boylan, supra, at p 10.) Section 20 of IGRA prohibits gaming on

after-acquired trust lands, unless a statutory exception applies. (25 U.S.C. § 2719(a).)

Section 20 of IGRA has been referred to as an anti-proliferation provision. (Clinton,

supra, 42 Ariz. St. L.J. at p. 58.)

6. Exceptions to Prohibition of Gaming on After-acquired Trust Land

The general prohibition of class III gaming on after-acquired trust land created

concerns about unfair or dissimilar treatment of tribes without a land base and tribes not

yet recognized by the federal government. (Boylan, supra, 42 Ariz. St. L.J. at p 10.) To

address these concerns, Congress created exceptions for (1) new and restored reservations

and (2) acquisitions of land within an existing reservation and land outside an existing

reservation. (Ibid.; see 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b).)

The various exceptions are addressed in part 292 of title 25 of the Code of Federal

Regulations (Part 292), which is labeled “Gaming on Trust Lands Acquired After

October 17, 1988.” (73 Fed.Reg. 29354, 29375 (May 20, 2008).) Part 292 contains the

procedures used by the Department of the Interior to determine whether an exception

applies. (See 25 C.F.R. § 292.1.)

The exception relevant to this appeal requires the Governor’s concurrence and is

described in the next subpart. The other statutory exceptions for after-acquired trust land

21.

that potentially could be applied in California involve (1) lands located within or

contiguous to the boundaries of the tribe’s reservation on October 17, 1988 (25 U.S.C.

§ 2719(a)(1)); (2) lands acquired for a tribe whose last recognized reservation was within

California and, as of October 17, 1988, the tribe had no reservation (25 U.S.C. §

2719(a)(2)(B); and (3) land “taken into trust as part of—[¶] (i) a settlement of a land

claim, [¶] (ii) the initial reservation of an Indian tribe acknowledged by the Secretary

under the Federal acknowledgement process, or [¶] (iii) the restoration of lands for an

Indian tribe that is restored to Federal recognition” (25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(B)). As

previously noted, I refer to these types of after-acquired trust lands as “nonconcurrence

trust lands.”

None of these exceptions involve the concurrence by the Governor in any federal

decision allowing an Indian tribe to conduct class III gaming on lands so taken into trust.

Consequently, once a state has decided to allow class III gaming “for any purpose by any

person, organization, or entity” (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B)), the state cannot block or

otherwise prohibit class III gaming on nonconcurrence trust lands. The requirement for a

tribal-state compact allows the state some input as to the gaming operations, but states do

not have the ability to prevent class III gaming by refusing to enter into a tribal-state

compact because IGRA specifically requires the state to negotiate a compact with the

Indian tribe in good faith. (See pt. I.D.4., ante.) If the state fails to do so, secretarial

procedures that take the place of a compact can be forced on the state under IGRA’s

provisions that allow a federally appointed mediator to choose between the proposed

compacts, if any, and then notify the Secretary of the choice. (See 25 U.S.C.

§ 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv)–(vii).) The Secretary shall prescribe, in consultation with the Indian

tribe, procedures for the conduct the class III gaming that are consistent with the

proposed compact selected by the mediator. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii).)

To summarize, there are narrowly drafted exceptions in section 20 of IGRA that

have the potential to result in casinos being operated by Indian tribes on after-acquired

22.

trust lands in California that do not involve or require the Governor’s concurrence. (25

U.S.C. § 2719(b).) In contrast, only one of the exceptions requires a state’s Governor’s

concurrence as a necessary condition to conduct class III gaming on after-acquired trust

land. That issue is the focus of this appeal.

7. Exception Involving Governor’s Concurrence

The exception relevant to this appeal has four main elements: (1) a tribal

application submitted to the Secretary, (2) a consultation requirement imposed on the

Secretary, (3) a two-part determination by the Secretary, and (4) the Governor’s

concurrence in the Secretary’s determination. (25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).)10 The

exception “has become known as the ‘two-part determination’ exception to the

prohibition on gaming on after-acquired lands.” (Boylan, supra, 42 Ariz. St. L.J. at p. 10,

fn. omitted; see Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. Brown (2014) 229

Cal.App.4th 1416, 1421.) To reiterate, it is the only exception that involves any kind of a

concurrence from a state’s Governor.

When after-acquired trust lands do not qualify for any of the other exceptions

under section 20 of IGRA, a tribe may submit a written application to the Secretary

requesting the Secretary to make the two-part determination. (25 C.F.R. § 292.13; see 73

Fed.Reg. 29354 (May 20, 2008) as corrected in 73 Fed.Reg. 35579 (June 24, 2008).) The

Secretary’s two-part determination is made “after consultation with the Indian tribe and

appropriate State and local officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes.”

(25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).) The procedures for conducting the consultation process

require a letter be sent to the appropriate officials soliciting comments and an opportunity

for the applicant tribe to respond to those comments. (25 C.F.R. §§ 292.19 [letter and

comment period], 292.20 [contents of consultation letter].)

10 The federal regulations addressing the exception and its four elements are set forth

in subpart C of Part 292. (See 25 C.F.R. §§ 292.13–292.25.)

23.

After reviewing the tribe’s written application and completing the consultation

process, the Secretary is in a position to decide both elements of the two-part

determination—specifically, whether gaming on the land (1) “would be in the best

interest of the Indian tribe and its members” and (2) “would not be detrimental to the

surrounding community.” (25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).) If the Secretary determines an

element is not met, the tribe must be informed of both the disapproval of application and

the reasons. (25 C.F.R. § 292.21(b).) Alternatively, if the Secretary makes a favorable

two-part determination, the Secretary will send the Governor of the state written

notification of its determination and findings of fact, a copy of the entire record, and a

request for the Governor’s concurrence in the determination. (25 C.F.R. §§ 292.21(c),

292.22.)

The two-part determination exception was tailored to take into consideration

federal, tribal, state and local interests affected by a proposed off-reservation casino. The

evaluation of these interests requires the Secretary and the Governor to make political

judgments. The concurrence requirement gives the Governor, for practical purposes, veto

or approval authority over off-reservation gaming.11 (Boylan, supra, 42 Ariz. St. L.J. at

p. 11.) The concurrence requirement, in contrast to the compacting mechanism, is not

subject to a good faith requirement and, thus, gives the state the absolute power to

prohibit the expansion of class III gaming to off-reservation sites. A rationale for

11 The concurrence condition can be traced to a House of Representative’s bill

proposed in the 99th Congress (1985-1986) that would have required the Secretary

consult with a state’s Governor to ascertain the state’s public policy on gaming. (Clinton,

supra, 42 Ariz. St. L.J. at p. 57.) This gubernatorial consultation requirement related to

gaming on existing Indian land and was not adopted. However, a similar device—the

governor’s concurrence—subsequently became part of the anti-proliferation provisions in

section 20 of IGRA addressing gaming on after-acquired trust land. (Clinton, supra, at

pp. 57-58; 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).) The legislative history of the provisions requiring

input from a governor (including the provision requiring concurrence) shows that the

concurrence condition developed apart from the compacting mechanism and, thus, is not

an integral or essential piece of the compacting authority.

24.

granting a state this veto authority is that the state loses jurisdiction over the land taken

into trust and such a loss should not occur without the state’s approval.

The two-part determination exception had been used only a few times to authorize

off-reservation casinos when Proposition 1A was presented to the voters in 2000. For

nearly 18 years after IGRA was enacted, there had been only three instances, all outside

of California, where a governor had concurred in a two-part determination. (Off-

Reservation Gaming: Land into Trust and the Two-Part Determination, Hearing before

the Sen. Com. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4 (2006), testimony of George

Skibine, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Policy and Economic Development for

Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior.) As a result of these concurrences, off-

reservation land in Wisconsin, Washington and Michigan was acquired in trust for

purposes of Indian gaming.12 Thus, in 2000 when California’s voters approved

Proposition 1A, the exception involving a governor’s concurrence authority for off-

reservation gaming had been rarely used.

8. Intertwined Approvals Under IRA and IGRA

The construction and operation of a casino on land, like the site in this case, that

was not held in trust for the tribe when the casino was proposed, cannot occur until (1)

the land is taken into trust for the benefit of the tribe pursuant to IRA and (2) the requisite

approvals of Indian gaming are obtained under IGRA. The fact that two federal statutes

are involved raises questions about how the sequence in which the various approvals are

12 The three tribes were the Forest County Pottawatomi Tribe in Wisconsin (1990);

the Kalispel Tribe in Washington (1997); and the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community in

Michigan (2000). (Boylan, supra, 42 Ariz. St. L.J. at p. 11, fn. 50.) Boylan also referred

to the 2008 tribal-state compact that Governor Schwarzenegger negotiated with the Fort

Mojave Indian Tribe, but that compact was not ratified by the Legislature and the

Secretary did not publish a notice of approval in the Federal Register. (Cf. Gov. Code, §

12012.45, subd. (a)(2) [Aug. 23, 2004, compact between California and the Fort Mojave

Indian Tribe ratified]; 69 Fed.Reg. 76004 (Dec. 20, 2004) [notice of approval of compact

between California and Fort Mojave Indian Tribe].)

25.

obtained. A federal district court described the sequence in a federal lawsuit involving

North Fork’s applications relating to its casino proposal:

“[T]he Secretary’s [two-part] decision under the IGRA must logically be

finalized before the Secretary’s [land-to-trust] decision under the IRA can

be made. Permitting gaming on trust land would be essential to the

Secretary’s conclusion under the IRA that the acquisition meets the criteria

listed in 25 C.F.R. Part 151, such as ‘[t]he need of the individual Indian or

the tribe for additional land,’ and ‘[t]he purposes for which the land will be

used.’ See 25 C.F.R. § 151.10. Similarly, the governor’s concurrence is

plainly required before gaming on trust land can be permitted. See 25

U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A). Therefore, in this case, approving a trust

acquisition under the IRA prior to the governor’s concurrence would have

been putting the proverbial cart before the horse: The Secretary would not

yet have known whether gaming would be permitted and thus would have

had no basis to ascertain whether the basic criteria for approving a trust

acquisition had been met.” (Stand Up for California v. U.S. Dept. of the

Interior (D.D.C. 2013) 919 F.Supp.2d 51, 71.)

As to the relative timing of a fee-to-trust application under IRA and an application

for a two-part determination for a proposed casino under IGRA, a tribe may submit its

applications at the same time. (25 C.F.R. § 292.15.) The history of the applications

relating to the casino site proposed by North Fork is set forth in part II, post.

E. California’s Proposition 5

Prior to the adoption of IGRA, the California Constitution set forth a fundamental

public policy against the legalization in California of casino gambling. “The Legislature

has no power to authorize, and shall prohibit, casinos of the type currently operating in

Nevada and New Jersey.” (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (e).)

After IGRA was enacted, several conflicts developed between the State of

California and Indian tribes over class III gaming, particularly stand-alone gaming

devices and live banking and percentage card games. (Hotel Employees & Restaurant

Employees Internat. Union v. Davis (1999) 21 Cal.4th 585, 596–597 (Davis).) To resolve

these conflicts relating to class III gaming on Indian lands, Proposition 5 was drafted and

26.

presented to California’s voters as an initiative statute, not a constitutional amendment.

(Davis, supra, at pp. 597–598.)

In 1998, California’s voters approved Proposition 5. (Davis, supra, 21 Cal.4th at

p. 589.) Proposition 5 purported to authorize the state to enter into tribal-state compacts

as contemplated by IGRA, but because the measure was only statutory, it was held to be

invalid in light of the constitutional gambling prohibition. (Davis, supra, at pp. 589–

590.)

F. 1999 Compacts and Assembly Bill No. 1385

Less than a month after the California Supreme Court invalidated Proposition 5,

the State of California executed 57 tribal-state gaming compacts entered into pursuant to

IGRA.13 The compacts allowed, on reservation land that was not subject to the two-part

determination and the Governor’s concurrence, the tribes to present a wider range of

games than previously offered, including full Las Vegas-style slot machines, and

provided tribes with the exclusive right to conduct class III gaming within California.

(Koenig, Gambling on Proposition 1A: The California Indian Self-Reliance Amendment

(2002) 36 U.S.F. L.Rev. 1033, 1043–1044.) In exchange, the tribes agreed to

(1) contribute to a special distribution fund to offset expenses incurred by the state in

connection with tribal gaming and (2) revenue sharing that allocates funds to nongaming

tribes. (Id. at pp. 1047–1049 [revenue sharing] & 1051 [special distribution fund]; see

Gov. Code, §§ 12012.75 [revenue sharing trust fund], 12012.85 [special distribution

fund].)

13 The tribal-state compacts are identified in paragraphs (1) through (57) of

subdivision (a) of section 12012.25 of the Government Code. None of these compacts

required a Governor’s concurrence. (See generally Note, Chapter 51: Approval of

Tribal-State Gaming Agreements Governing California’s First Off-Reservation Casino

(2014) 45 McGeorge L.Rev. 521 (California’s First Off-Reservation Casino).)

27.

On September 10, 1999—the same day the compacts were executed—both the

Assembly and the Senate ratified the compacts by unanimously approving Assembly Bill

No. 1385 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) (AB 1385). This legislation is codified in sections

12012.25, 12012.75 and 12012.85 of the Government Code.14 (See Stats. 1999, ch. 874,

§§ 1–3.) For purposes of this appeal, I note that AB 1385 does not mention (1) off-

reservation casinos or (2) the Governor concurring in the Secretary’s two-part

determination related to taking off-reservation land into trust for gaming purposes.

Furthermore, none of the 57 compacts ratified by AB 1385 involved the two-part

determination exception to IGRA’s general prohibition against gaming on after-acquired

trust land and, therefore, did not require a Governor’s concurrence. (See generally

California’s First Off-Reservation Casino, supra, 45 McGeorge L.Rev. 521.)

The 1999 compacts were conditioned upon the subsequent passage of Proposition

1A. (California Commerce Casino, Inc. v. Schwarzenegger (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th

1406, 1412.) That proposition was drafted to amend the California Constitution and

remove the grounds used to invalidate Proposition 5. (Ibid.)

G. Proposition 1A

1. Ballot Materials

In 2000, the initiative designated as Proposition 1A—“Gambling on Tribal Lands.

Legislative Constitutional Amendment”—was presented to California’s voters. The

14 The legislative history for Government Code section 12012.25 provides no

guidan

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