State of Tennessee v. Leo H. Odom

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. LEO H. ODOM

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 96-B-946 Steve R. Dozier, Judge

No. M2016-00523-CCA-R3-CD – Filed December 9, 2016

_____________________________

Defendant, Leo H. Odom, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an

illegal sentence filed pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 The State has

filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.

Said motion is hereby granted.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Order of the Criminal Court Affirmed

Pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20

TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS T.

WOODALL, P.J., and ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., joined.

Leo H. Odom, Whiteville, Tennessee, pro se.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Renee W. Turner, Senior Counsel,

for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The record on appeal before us reflects that in July 1997 Defendant pled guilty to

second degree murder and was sentenced as a violent offender to thirty years

imprisonment to be served at 100%. On December 21, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to

correct an alleged illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure

36.1. The trial court summarily denied the motion on February 2, 2016. The Appellant

timely filed notice of appeal. Following the filing of the record on appeal and

Defendant’s brief, the State filed a motion to affirm the ruling of the trial court pursuant

to Rule 20. For the reasons stated below, the motion is hereby granted.

In the motion he filed in the trial court, Defendant argued that his sentence is

illegal because he was sentenced outside the applicable range. The trial court disagreed

because Defendant specifically waived his right to a range one sentence in his guilty plea.

Rule 36.1 permits a defendant to seek correction of an unexpired illegal sentence

at any time. See State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 211 (Tenn. 2015). “[A]n illegal

sentence is one that is not authorized by the applicable statutes or that directly

contravenes an applicable statute.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a). Our supreme court

recently interpreted the meaning of “illegal sentence” as defined in Rule 36.1 and

concluded that the definition “is coextensive, and not broader than, the definition of the

term in the habeas corpus context.” State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585, 594-95 (Tenn.

2015). The court then reviewed the three categories of sentencing errors: clerical errors

(those arising from a clerical mistake in the judgment sheet), appealable errors (those for

which the Sentencing Act specifically provides a right of direct appeal) and fatal errors

(those so profound as to render a sentence illegal and void). Id. Commenting on

appealable errors, the court stated that those “generally involve attacks on the correctness

of the methodology by which a trial court imposed sentence.” Id. In contrast, fatal errors

include “sentences imposed pursuant to an inapplicable statutory scheme, sentences

designating release eligibility dates where early release is statutorily prohibited, sentences

that are ordered to be served concurrently where statutorily required to be served

consecutively, and sentences not authorized by any statute for the offenses.” Id. The

court held that only fatal errors render sentences illegal. Id.

Defendant previously challenged the length of his sentence in a habeas corpus

petition. He repeats that argument now in his Rule 36.1 challenge. In affirming the

denial of habeas corpus relief, this Court stated as follows:

In support of his argument, [Defendant] asserts that at the time of his

indictment for first degree murder, he had no prior felony convictions as an

adult; thus, he argues his classification as a Range II offender, which

requires a minimum of two prior felony convictions, was error. See T.C.A.

§ 40-35-106 (2003). [As noted by this Court in a footnote, Defendant was

sentenced pursuant to the plea agreement as a violent offender, not as a

Range II offender]. Indeed, [Defendant] contends that because he was a

juvenile when the murder was committed and he had no prior felony

convictions, he was entitled to be sentenced as an especially mitigated

offender. See T.C.A. § 40-35-109 (2003). [Defendant] does not contest the

requirement that he serve 100% of his sentence as a violent offender.

In ordering dismissal of the petition, the trial court entered the following

findings:

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[It] appears . . . that the thirty (30) year sentence contested by

[Defendant] was a compromise judgment on a plea to a

charge of second degree murder reduced from a first degree

murder indictment. The trial court could have the authority

and jurisdiction to sentence petitioner to thirty (30) years on

an agreed plea. At best this sentence would only be voidable,

but not void. Nor has the sentence expired. For the reasons

stated this petition is denied.

At the time [Defendant] was indicted, the law provided that premeditated

murder “shall be punishable by . . . (2)[i]mprisonment for life without

possibility of parole; or (3)[i]mprisonment for life.” T.C.A. § 39-13-

202(c)(2)-(3) (Supp. 1996). It is apparent from the record that [Defendant]

was successful in negotiating a plea agreement which eliminated his

possible exposure to a life sentence and allowed him to receive a sentence

of thirty years for a Class A felony. [Defendant] and the State may

negotiate offender classifications, and even release eligibility, because they

“are non-jurisdictional and legitimate bargaining tools in plea negotiations

under the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989.” Bland v. Dukes, 97

S.W.3d 133, 134 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002) (citing McConnell v. State, 12

S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tenn. 2002) (habeas corpus relief denied where guilty

plea provided for “hybrid sentence” in which the length of one of

petitioner’s sentences was in Range II, but his release eligibility date was in

Range I); Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tenn. 1997) (post-

conviction relief denied; our supreme court held that sentence was valid

where Petitioner’s plea bargain provided for “hybrid sentence” involving

Range II length of incarceration and Range I release eligibility

percentage)); see also State v. Mahler, 735 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tenn. 1987).

As found by the trial court, because “offender classifications” are non-

jurisdictional and subject to waiver within the context of a guilty plea, there

is nothing which appears on the face of the judgment or the record of the

proceedings before us which indicates that [Defendant’s] thirty-year

sentence is illegal or void. See William L. Smith v. Virginia Lewis, Warden,

et al., No. E2004-01800-SC-R11-HC (Tenn., Sept. 14, 2006).

Leo H. Odom v. Tony Parker, Warden, No. W2006-00217-CCA-R3-HC, 2006 WL

3327822, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 13, 2006) (footnotes omitted), no perm. app.

filed.

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As noted above, the supreme court recently interpreted the meaning of “illegal

sentence” as defined in Rule 36.1 and concluded that the definition “is coextensive, and

not broader than, the definition of the term in the habeas corpus context.” Wooden, 478

S.W.3d at 594-95. Indeed, the court observed that the language of Rule 36.1 “mirrors”

the definition of an illegal sentence for habeas corpus purposes. Id. Accordingly, this

Court’s analysis in [Defendant’s] habeas corpus action controls the outcome herein. The

trial court correctly ruled that [Defendant] did not state a colorable claim for relief

pursuant to Rule 36.1. Clearly, the thirty-year sentence he received for second degree

murder, a Class A felony, is within the applicable range of fifteen to sixty years

authorized by statute. See T.C.A. § 40-35-11(b)(1). Our supreme court has specifically

held that “a plea-bargained sentence may legally exceed the maximum available in the

offender Range so long as the sentence does not exceed the maximum punishment

authorized for the plea offense.” Hoover v. State, 215 S.W.3d 776, 780 (Tenn. 2007).

Accordingly, the ruling of the trial court is hereby affirmed pursuant to Court of

Criminal Appeals Rule 20.

_________________________________

TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JUDGE

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