Mark W. Lovett v. Frank Lynch

12/08/2016

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

November 16, 2016 Session

MARK W. LOVETT v. FRANK LYNCH, ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Franklin County

No. 19990 Larry B. Stanley, Jr., Judge

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No. M2016-00680-COA-R3-CV

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Appellant, the first, but not the highest nor successful bidder on a piece of real property in

a delinquent tax property sale, filed a quo warranto action alleging that the tax sale was

conducted illegally. The trial court dismissed appellant’s suit for lack of standing because

the property at issue had been redeemed by an individual with a mortgage on the

property. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J.,W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL

SWINEY, C.J., and BRANDON O. GIBSON, JJ., joined.

Mark W. Lovett, Sewanee, Tennessee, Pro Se.

David J. Ward and Alix C. Michel, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellee, Frank

Lynch, Randy Kelly, and Ben Lynch.

OPINION

BACKGROUND

On May 20, 2015, Plaintiff/Appellant Mark W. Lovett (“Appellant”) participated

in a delinquent tax property sale (“tax sale”) in Franklin County of the property located at

801 Lynchburg Road in Winchester, Tennessee. Appellant had made the first bid on the

property, but it was later sold to a higher bidder. The next day, after allegedly learning

that the winning bidder was the wife of Frank Lynch, the Franklin County Tax Collection

Attorney, Appellant allegedly sent a letter to Chancellor Jeffrey F. Stewart to protest the

sale. Chancellor Stewart responded to Appellant through the Clerk and Master,

informing Appellant that he did not comment on matters not before the bench. Appellant

subsequently sent letters to several public officials, including the Attorney General for

the State of Tennessee and the Comptroller of the Treasury, seeking an investigation of

the May 20, 2015 tax sale. However, these persons either sent no response or declined

Appellant’s request.

On July 17, 2015, Appellant filed a pleading, which consisted of a petition for a

writ in the nature of quo warranto and a complaint,1 in the Franklin County Chancery

Court against the Defendants/Appellees Frank Lynch, as Franklin County Tax Collection

Attorney; Randy Kelly, as Franklin County Trustee; and Ben Lynch, as Franklin County

Attorney, related to alleged impropriety of the tax sale.2 Therein, Appellant alleged that

the auction was improperly conducted in violation of various statutory provisions because

the winning bidder was the wife of Frank Lynch. Appellant also alleged other

discrepancies that rendered the sale unlawful. Appellant sought, inter alia, the issuance

of a writ in the nature of quo warranto and the appointment of an attorney pro tempore

“to represent the interests of the Public.”3

Appellees filed separate motions to dismiss on August 3, 2015, August 11, 2015,

and August 13, 2015. In the meantime, Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment

on August 26, 2015. Appellees’ motions to dismiss were later amended. The amended

motions to dismiss argued that Appellant’s claim was moot because it was undisputed

that the property at issue had been redeemed. Appellees contended that any claim

regarding the impropriety of the tax sale was moot and that Appellant therefore had no

standing to maintain his cause of action. Appellant thereafter admitted that the property

had indeed been redeemed by a party having an interest in the property.4 The trial court

granted the amended motions to dismiss at the November 13, 2015 hearing, and the order

reflecting that ruling was entered on or about December 8, 2015. Therein, the trial court

1

The pleading also contained a motion to appoint an attorney pro tempore to represent the State

of Tennessee and a motion for a temporary restraining order to stay all non-judicial proceedings flowing

from the May 20, 2015 tax sale.

2

The original trial judge assigned the case, Jeffrey F. Stewart, entered an order of recusal on July

31, 2015. Ultimately, on August 20, 2015, an order was entered recusing Circuit Judges Thomas W.

Graham, J. Curtis Smith, and Justin C. Angel from the matter. On September 2, 2015, the Tennessee

Supreme Court entered an order appointing Larry B. Stanley, Jr. to preside over the case.

3

Appellant also sought the trial court to declare the tax sale “null and void,” award him “Private

Attorney General Fees” to “compensate for [Appellant’s] loss of time in investigating,” award him

“compensatory damages in the amount of $25,000.00 to compensate [him] for lost time[] and lost

opportunity in the development of the [property],” and award him punitive damages in the amount of

$1,250,000.00 for the “impairment” of his constitutional rights.

4

According to Appellant’s response to Frank Lynch’s motion to dismiss, filed on August 17,

2015: “The Official record will show that Mr. Bob Cortner redeemed a financial interest in 801

Lynchburg Rd. Winchester property that was sold May 20, 2015 at PUBLIC AUCTION that had a Deed

of Trust properly executed and recorded id[en]tif[y]ng the rightful owner of the Property.”

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ruled that Appellant lacked standing to pursue his claim because he was not the

successful bidder on the property at issue and the property had later been redeemed. As

such, the trial court ruled that Appellant lacked “a special interest or injury that is not

shared with other citizens” because he never had a valid legal interest in the property, and

the redemption left “nothing capable of being redressed by a favorable decision of the

court.” Consequently, the trial court dismissed Appellant’s petition/complaint with

prejudice. On November 30, 2015, Appellant filed a motion for relief from the trial

court’s order.5 At the February 12, 2016 hearing on the motion, Appellant submitted

testimony from the individual who owned a mortgage on the property prior to the tax

seizure and who ultimately redeemed the property. Specifically, Bob Cortner testified

that at the time of the delinquent tax property sale, he was the holder of the mortgage on

the subject property. Although he testified that he had notice by publication of the

delinquent tax sale, he did not attend the auction because he was “busy.” Following the

auction, he testified that he redeemed the property by paying the delinquent taxes.

Thereafter, the mortgagor agreed to surrender the property to Mr. Cortner, and he

testified that he now owns the property “free and clear.” The trial court denied the motion

for relief by order of March 7, 2016, and upheld its previous ruling, concluding that

Appellant was “not entitled to a trial” because of his failure to establish standing.

Appellant timely appealed.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Appellant presents sixteen issues before this Court, which are taken largely

verbatim from his appellate brief:

1. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred in holding that it

has Constitutional authority [1][11] to determine who is, or who is not,

entitled to a trial, as evidenced in it[s] Order of March 3, 2016: “It was

found the Relator/Plaintiff did not have [‘]standing[‘] therefore he is not

entitled to a trial[.”]

2. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred in making a

judicial conclusion regarding Plaintiffs “standing” without any evidence the

5

Under Rule 59.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] motion to alter or amend a

judgment shall be filed and served within thirty (30) days after the entry of the judgment.”

However, we have previously interpreted this rule to mean that a motion under Rule 59.04 may be filed

prior to the entry of a final judgment. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 883 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)

(quoting Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 62 (6th Cir. 1979)) (comparing Rule 59.04 to the analogous Rule

59(e) under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and noting that the trial court may “entertain a motion to

alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) even though it was filed prior to the actual entry of

judgment”); cf. Grundy Cnty. v. Dyer, 546 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tenn. 1977) (“It would be manifestly

unjust, absent prejudice to the complaining party, to . . . penalize a lawyer and his client for

promptness.”).

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Law was [2] upheld or applied to the material facts, or circumstances cited

in THE COMPLAINT.

3. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred in failing to

address the attenuation between the alleged illegal conduct of the

defendants, and the claims of violations of the Plaintiffs U.S. And

Tennessee Constitutional rights [3].

4. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred in concluding a

lack of “standing” of the Plaintiff, in spite of the record that showed

Defendant Frank Lynch, Franklin County Tax Collection Attorney did

allow his wife to bid against the Plaintiff to win the rights in a property

while he was being paid by the Court for “Official Duties” [4] officiating at

the Court Ordered Public Delinquent Tax Auction of May 20, 2015.

5. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred in failing to try

the trier of facts evidenced in the record, (that substantiated violations of

Law), that were not denied by any of the Defendants under Rule 8.04 [5].

6. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred in failing to

address the effect of Involuntary Dismissal of the case (pre trial) [6] had on

the Plaintiffs responsibility to meet his burden of proof, [7][[30] State ex

rel[. ]De Selm v. Owings, 310 S. W 3D 353[ ](Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) by “a

preponderance of the evidence” to prove “injury in fact”[8], (without any

question of record from the bench; have you concluded your case-in-

chief[6]), and before [all] the witnesses could be called to testify upon duly

executed Subpoenas issued by the Clerk of the Chancery Court [14].

7. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred by failing to

address at it[s] earliest opportunity what was the undefined and undeclared

[ “]Conflict of Interest” found by Jeffery F. Stewart [12][141, Chancellor of

the Franklin County Chancery Court in “the file[,”] (with only THE

COMPLAINT and record of the Auction contained therein at that time of

his recusal), prior to the Honorable Larry Bart Stanley Jr. assuming his

appointment to preside that could have assured all, what ever the “conflict

of interest” was, did not persist after the recusals of other Justices.

8. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred by proceeding

under Honorable Larry Bart Stanley Jr. by allowing the Franklin County

Chancery Court’s Clerk and Master, Ms. Brenda Clark, (a Subpoenaed

material witness) to appear on the bench in Court at the 2nd. MOTION

HEARING in this case.

9. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred by failing to try

the facts raised that are evidenced in the exhibits, and pleadings that

delineate in detail the possible violation of Law as cited in , “Private Acts

of 1980, Chapter 268” of Franklin County[9] that does not permit a County

Official to be represented by anyone save the County Attorney except at

their own expense, and the appearance by Attorney Alix C. Mich[]el who

under direct questioning from the bench responded “ I represent them as

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Employee’s[,”] leaving the question open: Were the Defendants Legal

Pleadings Fraudulently placed before the bench in violation of the Law[2]?

10. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred by failing to

examine the facts contained in the exhibits filed with the Court; wherein the

letter from Franklin County Clerk, Philip Custer custodian of the Franklin

County Board of Commissioners shows no appointment by the Franklin

County Board of Commissioners, (current day Quarterly Court), after May

20, 2015 of Attorney Mr[.] Alix C. Mich[]el to represent Frank Lynch, or

Ben Lynch, (both Private Practice Attorneys), or any appointment by the

board for Attorney Alix C. Mich[]el to represent interest of the citizens of

Franklin County in their “officials offices” as Franklin County Attorney, or

Franklin County Tax Collection Attorney, or Franklin County Trustee.

11. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred in failing to

examine the difference between the Plaintiff admitting Mr. Cortner has a

lawful interest in the property, (transcript 2nd. MOTION HEARING), as a

mortgage holder, and [not] admitting to the lawfulness of the redemption of

801 Lynchburg Rd. Winchester in light of Mr. Courtner’s testimony that

revealed he did not pay all of the back taxes costs, penalties, and interest

owed on the property, but did pay a little more than what was owed for

2007–2008.

12. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred by failing to

give any written acknowledgment in it[s] judicial conclusion of the

Plaintiff’s “standing” to the fact the Defendants specifically admitted the

following by their failure to deny with specificity the following:[12]

Taken from the text of THE COMPLAINT]on Page 8.

“That the Auction for Delinquent Tax Properties was held in violation of

Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 67-5-2507(b). in that the properties

offered for sale were auctioned off for the amount of the delinquent taxes

for years 2007 and 2008 and not offered for sale for the, [total un-disclosed

cost] of tax indebtedness, penalties and interest owed to date as of May 20,

2015.”

Taken from text of THE COMPLAINT]on Page 9.

“That Mark W. Lovett’s rights described in: The 5th and 14th Amendment

of the United States Constitution guaranteeing a citizen [‘]Equal Protection

of[,’] and the ‘Due Process of the Law[.’”] [17]

Taken from text of THE COMPLAINT]on Page 9. Continued:

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[“]The Tennessee State Constitution Article 1, Section 8, part 10, and of

provisions within U.S. Code > Title 42 > Chapter 21> Sub chapter I > §

1981, (“to make and enforce contracts, amongst others”), were violated.”

d.) That Official Misconduct by Defendants acts, made a lawful contract to

purchase property from the Chancery Court of Franklin County by the

Plaintiff, Mark W. Lovett at a Public Auction impossible [17]. e.) That

Official Misconduct by Defendants acts, under the color of Law,

fraudulently represented that “all legal requirements have been meet” for

the sale [17].

13. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred in applying

“ACLU v. Darnell” and “Watson v. Waters” both cases tired at Trial, and

then became “ appellate cases “ to this case pre Trial by entering an

involuntary dismissal of the case [11][6][31].

14. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred by failing to ask

the Plaintiff is he had closed his proof-in-chief [6] ?

15. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred in not allowing

duly subpoenaed witnesses to be called whose testimony was material to

discovery and conformation of the “injury in fact” to the Plaintiffs

Constitutionally protected Rights [14][12].

16. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred in failing to

examine the allegation that,” the May 20, 2015 Public Auction was

conducted by someone other than a Tennessee State Licensed Auctioneer,

and the effect that has on the legality of the proceedings or on the

enforceability of any purchases made that day [31][17].

In the posture of appellee, Appellees assert that this appeal involves only a single

dispositive issue: Whether trial court correctly invoked the standing doctrine and applied

it to bar Appellant’s claims in this case.

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, we note that Appellant appears before this Court pro se, as he

did in the trial court. It is well-settled that pro se litigants must comply with the same

standards to which lawyers must adhere. Watson v. City of Jackson, 448 S.W.3d 919,

926 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). As explained by this Court:

Parties who decide to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal

treatment by the courts. The courts should take into account that many pro

se litigants have no legal training and little familiarity with the judicial

system. However, the courts must also be mindful of the boundary between

fairness to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant’s adversary.

Thus, the courts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the

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same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected

to observe.

Jackson v. Lanphere, No. M2010-01401-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 3566978, at *3 (Tenn.

Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2011) (quoting Hessmer v. Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2003)). We will, therefore, keep Appellant’s pro se status in mind as we proceed to

discuss the merits of his appeal.

The trial court dismissed Appellant’s suit on a motion to dismiss on the basis of

standing. “Lack of standing may be raised as a defense in a Tennessee Rule of Civil

Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss.” Dubis v. Loyd, No. W2015-02192-COA-R3-CV,

2016 WL 4371786, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2016) (quoting In re Ava B., No.

M2014-02408-COA-R10-PT, 2016 WL 1730661, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2016),

perm. app. denied (July 1, 2016)). “The purpose of a . . . motion to dismiss is to test the

legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the strength of the complainant’s proof.” Webb v.

Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Tenn. 2011). The

pleadings alone determine whether a 12.02(6) motion to dismiss should be granted. Id.

“We must liberally construe the pleadings, presuming all factual allegations are true and

drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the complainant.” Id. at 426. A complaint

“need not contain detailed allegations of all the facts giving rise to the claim,” but it

“must contain sufficient factual allegations to articulate a claim for relief.” Id. at 427

(citation omitted).

Here, Appellant filed his complaint in the nature of a quo warranto action.

Tennessee law is well-settled on this issue: “The rule is essentially that a private citizen,

as such, cannot maintain an action complaining of wrongful acts of public officials unless

such private citizen avers [a] special interest or a special injury not common to the public

generally.” State ex rel. Inman v. Brock, 622 S.W.2d 36, 44 (Tenn. 1981) (citing

Bennett v. Stutts, 521 S.W.2d 575 (Tenn.1975); Walldorf v. City of Chattanooga, 192

Tenn. 86, 237 S.W.2d 939 (1951): Patton v. Mayor, Etc., City of Chattanooga, 108

Tenn. 197, 65 S.W. 414 (1901)). In this regard, “[i]t is fundamental that plaintiff as a

private citizen must show that he is a[d]versely affected in some manner that is not

common to all citizens to invoke the jurisdiction of this court.” Wooten v. Macon Cty.,

No. 87-287-II, 1988 WL 9821, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1988) (citing Ray v.

Weaver, 586 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tenn. 1979)). “In the absence of standing, [Appellant]

cannot proceed with this action.” State ex rel. DeSelm v. Owings, 310 S.W.3d 353, 359

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (discussing the role of the Attorney General in quo warranto

actions, an issue not raised in this case).

The issue of a party’s standing to maintain an action is a question of law.

Whalum v. Shelby Cnty. Election Comm’n, No. W2013-02076-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL

4919601, at *6–7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2014) (citing Massengale v. City of E. Ridge,

399 S.W.3d 118, 123 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012)). As such, “our review is de novo upon the

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record with no presumption of correctness accompanying the trial court’s conclusions of

law.” Id. at 123–24. According to the Tennessee Supreme Court:

Courts employ the doctrine of standing to determine whether a particular

litigant is entitled to have a court decide the merits of a dispute or of

particular issues. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L.

Ed. 2d 343 (1975); Knierim v. Leatherwood, 542 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tenn.

1976) (holding that courts use the standing doctrine to decide whether a

particular plaintiff is “properly situated to prosecute the action[]”); City of

I

Brentwood v. Metro[.] Bd. of Zoning Appeals, et al., 149 S.W.3d 49, 55

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2004). Grounded

upon “concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts

in a democratic society,” Warth, 422 U.S. at 498, the doctrine of standing

precludes courts from adjudicating “an action at the instance of one whose

rights have not been invaded or infringed.” Mayhew v. Wilder, 46 S.W.3d

760, 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr[.] 30, 2001).

M

Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Tenn. v. Darnell, 195 S.W.3d 612, 619–20 (Tenn. 2006).

To establish the requisite standing, a plaintiff must therefore show: (1) “a distinct and

palpable injury,” (2) “a causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged

conduct,” and (3) “that the alleged injury is capable of being redressed by a favorable

decision of the court.” Id. at 620.

As this Court explained:

The primary focus of a standing inquiry is on the party, not on the merits of

the party’s claim. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for

Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484, 102 S. Ct. 752,

765, 70 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1982); Petty v. Daimler/Chrysler Corp., 91 S.W.3d

765, 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). Thus, a party’s standing does not depend

on the likelihood of success of its claim on the merits. Mayhew v. Wilder,

46 S.W.3d 760, 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); Metro[.] Air Research Testing

Auth., Inc. v. Metro[.] Gov’t, 842 S.W.2d at 615. However, because a

party’s standing may hinge on the nature of its claims, a standing inquiry

requires a “careful judicial examination of a complaint’s allegations to

ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the

particular claims asserted.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752, 104 S. Ct.

3315, 3325, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1984).

The sort of distinct and palpable injury that will create standing must be an

injury to a recognized legal right or interest. In many cases, this right or

interest may be created or defined by statute. Thus, in cases where a party is

seeking to vindicate a statutory right of interest, the doctrine of standing

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requires the party to demonstrate that its claim falls within the zone of

interests protected or regulated by the statute in question. Federal Election

Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1783–84, 141 L. Ed.

2d 10 (1998); Chattanooga Ry. & Light Co. v. Bettis, 139 Tenn. 332, 337,

202 S.W. 70, 71 (1918); Jefferson C[nty.] v. City of Morristown, No.

03A01-9810-CH-00331, 1999 WL 817519, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct.13,

1999) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

Wood v. Metro. Nashville & Davidson Cnty. Gov’t, 196 S.W.3d 152, 158 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2005). The standing issue in this case also implicates the related doctrine of

mootness:

The issues of standing and mootness are related concepts to be used in

analyzing the basic question of whether an adversary contest before the

court is such that the court, in rendering a decision, will not be giving a

merely advisory opinion. “Standing” focuses on parties and requires that

each party possess an interest in the outcome of litigation, while

“mootness” applies more to issues involved and, as a general rule, requires

that opinions not be given concerning issues which are no longer in

existence because of changes in factual circumstances.

“Standing” to sue means that an individual has a sufficient personal stake in

the controversy to obtain judicial resolution, while “mootness” is the

doctrine of standing set in a time frame: the requisite personal interest, or

standing, that existed at the commencement of the litigation must continue

throughout its existence in order for the litigation not to become moot. A

case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the

parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. Consequently, a

party must have continued standing throughout the pendency of an action to

avoid invocation of the mootness doctrine.

Whalum v. Shelby Cnty. Election Comm’n, No. W2013-02076-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL

4919601, at *6–7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2014) (quoting 1A C.J.S. Actions § 76

(2014)).

First, Appellant has failed to show that he sustained “a distinct and palpable

injury” as required to show standing. Darnell, 195 S.W.3d at 620; see also State ex rel.

Inman v. Brock, 622 S.W.2d 36, 44 (Tenn. 1981) (citing Patton v. Mayor, Etc., City of

Chattanooga, 65 S.W. 414 (Tenn. 1901); Walldorf v. City of Chattanooga, 237 S.W.2d

939 (Tenn. 1951); Bennett v. Stutts, 521 S.W.2d 575 (Tenn. 1975)) (“[A] private citizen .

. . cannot maintain an action complaining of wrongful acts of public officials unless such

private citizen avers special interest or a special injury not common to the public

generally.”). It is undisputed that Appellant never acquired any legal right or interest in

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the property. Indeed, Appellant at all times admits that that he “did not prevail in

winning the rights to [the] property . . . that he was seeking to acquire.” Furthermore,

there is no dispute that the property in question was later redeemed by another individual

holding an interest in the property. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2701(a)(1) (“Upon entry

of an order confirming a sale of a parcel, a right to redeem shall vest in all interested

persons.”). Accordingly, even if Appellant had been the high bidder at the tax sale, he

would nevertheless not be entitled to the property. Despite Appellant’s contention

otherwise, he may not sue just to vindicate “the interests of the Public” absent a specific

personal injury. Appellant’s failure to win a property at auction, where even the winning

bidder is no longer entitled to the property by operation of Tennessee redemption laws,

does not constitute the type of injury which would confer him standing in this case.

Moreover, the third element of standing is also lacking: that a favorable verdict

would remedy the specific injury. See Darnell, 195 S.W.3d at 620. As previously

discussed, there is no dispute that a person with an interest in the property redeemed the

property. Accordingly, even if the quo warranto action resulted in a finding that the tax

sale was conducted improperly and, therefore, void, a declaration that the tax sale is void,

alone, would still not entitle Appellant to the property at issue.

Consequently, the undisputed facts, taken from the pleadings and admissions of

the parties, establish that: (1) Appellant had no interest in the subject property prior to the

delinquent tax sale; (2) Appellant acquired no interest in the subject property by virtue of

the delinquent tax sale because he was not the high bidder on the property; and (3) even if

Appellant had been entitled to the property by virtue of the delinquent tax sale, he can no

longer have any interest in the property because it has been redeemed by an interested

party. Clearly, these facts show that Appellant does not now nor did he ever have an

interest in the subject property or suffer any injury as a result of the deprivation of his

alleged right to the property that would confer him standing in this case. Accordingly, we

hold that the trial court did not err in dismissing Appellant’s suit based on his lack of

standing.

On appeal, although Appellant further challenges the constitutionality of the

standing doctrine, this issue was not raised in the trial court. Tennessee law is clear that

“arguments not first raised in the trial court are waived on appeal.” State v. Willis, 496

S.W.3d 653, 707 (Tenn. 2016) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a); State v. Hayes, 337

S.W.3d 235, 256 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010)); see also Lawrence v. Stanford, 655 S.W.2d

927, 929 (Tenn.1983) (“It has long been the general rule that questions not raised in the

trial court will not be entertained on appeal and this rule applies to an attempt to make a

constitutional attack upon the validity of a statute for the first time on appeal unless the

statute involved is so obviously unconstitutional on its face as to obviate the necessity for

any discussion.”). Consequently, we will not entertain this issue on appeal and will not

now “conclude that the requirement of standing that has been in place for decades if not

centuries and has been repeatedly reaffirmed by our Supreme Court is obviously

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unconstitutional.” Watson v. Waters, 375 S.W.3d 282, 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).

Based on our holding that Appellant has no standing to pursue the underlying claims in

this cause, all other issues are pretermitted.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Franklin County Chancery Court is affirmed. Costs of this

appeal are taxed to Appellant, Mark W. Lovett, for all of which execution may issue if

necessary.

_________________________________

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE

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