Com. v. Guarrasi, J.

J-S64009-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JOSEPH PETER GUARRASI

Appellant No. 3514 EDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order Dated October 20, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

Criminal Division at No: CP-09-CR-0005423-2004

BEFORE: STABILE, J., SOLANO, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 15, 2016

Appellant Joseph Peter Guarrasi appeals from the October 20, 2015

order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County (“PCRA court”), which

denied his request for collateral relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act

(the “Act”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. Upon review, we affirm.

The facts underlying this case are undisputed.1 Briefly, Appellant was

a practicing attorney who maintained an office on York Road in Bucks

County. He devised a scheme to defraud insurance companies by staging

automobile accidents. To this end, Appellant attempted to elicit the aid of

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1

Unless otherwise specified, these facts come from this Court’s July 6, 2006

decision. See Commonwealth v. Guarrasi, No. 1796 EDA 2005,

unpublished memorandum, at 1-2 (Pa. Super. filed July 6, 2006) (citing Trial

Court Opinion, 8/25/05, at 3).

J-S64009-19

others to engage in this fraud and file false claims. He also purchased a

home in Doylestown that he planned to renovate into a “Kama Sutra” sex

club. Because of problems with the real estate transactions, and failed

attempts to evict tenants from the properties, Appellant solicited Michael

Samios to kidnap, assault, and “make disappear” the resident of the house

he intended for the Kama Sutra club. After becoming frightened of the plan

and the nature of Appellant’s instructions, Samios contacted and cooperated

with the authorities. Samios was wired by investigators for the District

Attorney, and several conversations between him and Appellant were

intercepted and recorded.

On March 28, 2005, Appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere to

criminal attempt to commit homicide and pled guilty but mentally ill to

charges of criminal intent to commit aggravated assault, attempt to commit

kidnapping, attempt to commit unlawful restraint, attempt to commit false

imprisonment, attempted burglary and criminal solicitation to promote or

facilitate insurance fraud. On June 8, 2005, Appellant was sentenced to six

and one-half to fifteen years’ imprisonment. On July 6, 2006, we affirmed

Appellant’s judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Guarrasi, 907

A.2d 1133 (Pa. Super. 2006). Appellant did not file a petition for allowance

of appeal. Consequently, his judgment of sentence became final on August

5, 2006. On June 29, 2007, Appellant filed the instant, timely PCRA petition,

which was amended multiple times thereafter. Following sixteen days of

PCRA hearing, spanning over a six-year period, the PCRA court denied

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J-S64009-19

Appellant’s PCRA relief. In support of its denial of Appellant’s PCRA petition,

the PCRA court issued a 112-page opinion. Appellant timely appealed to this

Court. Following Appellant’s filing of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors

complained of on appeal, the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion,

largely incorporating its October 20, 2015 opinion denying Appellant’s PCRA

petition.

On appeal,2 Appellant raises six issues for our review, reproduced here

verbatim:

1. Did the [PCRA c]ourt err or abuse it’s discretion by denying

PRCA relief based on 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 9543(b) prejudice to

the District Attorney’s Office (“DAO”) from the death of Samios

when, after the death of Samios, the [PCRA c]ourt Ordered that

Section 9543(b) prejudice did not insure against the DAO

resulting from Samios’ death, the DAO testified that whole case

rested on the Wiretaps and the Wiretaps are in evidence,

[Appellant] testified to due diligence and that PCRA delays

violated [Appellant]’s rights, and then four (4) years later,

contrary to the plain language of 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 9543(b),

Commonwealth v. Renchenski, 52 A.3d 251 (Pa. 2012) and

stare decisis, the [PCRA c]ourt reversed it’s prior ruling without

conducting the required Section 9543(b) hearing for the DAO to

present prejudice resulting from delays in [Appellant]’s filing of

the PCRA Petition or Amended Petition?

2. Did the [PCRA c]ourt err or abuse it’s discretion by denying

PCRA relief based upon Judge Cepparulo not recusing when, his

failing health caused PCRA hearing delays and his early

retirement, motion left unadjudicated for years,

misapprehending or ignoring facts of record, misquoting Wiretap

Law, misapplying PCRA and Wiretap Law, finding credible former

ADA Gambardella and Detective Carroll contrary to their

demonstrable perjury, including 2/27/2004 Jurat Affiant

presence, Wiretap transcript existence, Wiretap contents,

____________________________________________

2

“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review requires

us to determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by the

record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816,

819 (Pa. Super. 2011).

-3-

J-S64009-19

Wiretap errors and causes, and the alleged $2000 payment and

forfeiture order, accepting lay witness testimony on mental

illness as if accepted as experts, violating Stare Decisis and

conflicts of interests?

3. Did the [PCRA c]ourt err or abuse it’s discretion by denying

PCRA relief based upon [Appellant]’s presented incompetence

when, and involuntary, unknowing and unintelligent plea was

caused by an innocent seriously mentally ill [Appellant]

subjected to an involuntary cessation of all prescribed

medications for several days before the plea, at the plea

exhibited signs of mental illness, contemporaneous psychiatry

progress notes record [Appellant] with probable delusions,

judgment and insight poor, and Dr. Cohen testified and opined

that the [Appellant] would have experienced a sling-shot effect

of serious bipolar with delusions, psychosis and fugue state, and

Judge Biehn found [Appellant] seriously mentally ill, in need of

prescribed medications, and sentenced [Appellant] to serve

some or all of his sentence in a mental facility, but contrary to

expert testimony the court accepted lay persons opinions on

mental illness?

4. Did the [PCRA c]ourt err or abuse it’s discretion by denying

PCRA relief based upon the presented defective guilty plea

colloquy when, the [Appellant] was not present for the general

colloquy as he was meeting in the holding cell with Attorney

Tauber, no facts were contemporaneously read into the record

for the seriously mentally ill unmediated [Appellant], but instead,

Judge Beihn incorporated by reference a document authored by

defense counsel–which refuted the existence of a corpus delecti,

and then gave incorrect instructions of the Law, the [Appellant]

pled unaware of affirmative defenses including a lack of corpus

delecti, Wiretap violations, and the renunciation of any possible

crimes, as Tape 6 only has money paid for a truck title, Tape 9

has no words of “kill” or any other words of violence, and Tape

10 ends mid-sentence with directions for Samios to ignore

everything and to just get work finished at the Bar in Maryland,

all contrary to DAO testimony, and then two (2) months later at

Sentencing, DAO switched the “incorporated” document by

reading into the record an unfiled document authored by former

ADA Gambardella, not read by the [Appellant], the [Appellant]

was never asked if he agreed with those facts, and the ADA

document read at Sentencing lacked corpus delecti for all the

elements of the crimes charged?

5. Did the [PCRA c]ourt err or abuse it’s discretion by denying

PCRA relief based upon the presented Wiretap Act violations, and

Constitutional violations when, the [PCRA c]ourt, by misquoting

and misapplying the Law, found compliant and without violation,

Wiretaps made in Maryland because they were `initiated’ in

Bucks County, Monitor Records created six (6) years after

conviction because it was not “applicable” until then, multiple

undisclosed errors in Wiretap recording, dating, custody and

copying because they were “unintentional”, a 18 Pa.C.S.A.

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J-S64009-19

Section 5704(a)(2)(ii) ADA designation used in the absence of a

18 Pa.C.S.A. Section 5704(2)(a)(iv) designation, the

administrative criminal Judge was accepted as the unwritten

unspoken President Judge’s designee, the Wiretap “order” that

purported to authorize Wiretaps in ‘any home, residence or place

of abode of the [Appellant] or anywhere conversations may take

place’, found not overbroad but specific enough, the DAO’s

press-conferences that disclosed Wiretap Tape contents in

excess of court filings not a violation because court filings are

public, and an Wiretap affidavit Jurat in which the Affiant did not

sign or swear to the underlying facts in front of the issuing Judge

not a violation because the Affiant’s co-worker signed it in front

of the Judge?

6. Did the [PCRA c]ourt err or abuse it’s discretion by denying

PCRA relief based upon [c]ounsel’s deficient performance when,

[c]ounsel failed to undertake a reasonable investigation as he

failed to identify Wiretap Act violations as he failed to listen to

the Wiretap tapes but instead relied upon a non-law-trained

private investigator to inform him of the Wiretap contents,

[c]ounsel failed to follow-up with requested discovery as he

failed to discover that the second (2) copy set of Wiretap Tapes

were more defective that the first (1) copy set, and he failed to

obtain a written transcription of the Wiretap tapes, [c]ounsel

failed to litigate a filed meritorious Wiretap suppression motion

as he failed to know that tape 6 containing the alleged corpus

delecti was orally dated outside the Wiretap order, testifying that

if he knew Tape 6 was orally dated outside the Wiretap order he

definitely would have litigated the suppression motion and won,

[c]ounsel failed to object or correct a defective colloquy,

[c]ounsel was paid $250,000.00, and [c]ounsel outright lied to

[Appellant] to induce a guilty plea?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-7.3

____________________________________________

3

Appellant’s second issue is waived because, as the PCRA court noted, he

raised it for the first time in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.A.P.

302(a); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Commonwealth v. Melendez–

Rodriguez, 856 A.2d 1278, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (holding

issues raised for first time in 1925(b) statement waived); accord

Commonwealth. v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 790 (Pa. Super. 2015); see

also Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa. Super. 2011)

(“It is well-settled that issues not raised in a PCRA petition cannot be

considered on appeal.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),

appeal denied, 30 A.3d 487 (Pa. 2011). Moreover, we note that

Appellant’s third, fourth and fifth issues on appeal are also waived because

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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J-S64009-19

After careful review of the record, and the relevant case law, we

conclude that the PCRA court accurately and thoroughly addressed the

merits of Appellant’s only two issues preserved for appeal, his first and last

issues. See PCRA Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 01/07/16, at 2-4; PCRA

Court Opinion, 10/20/15, at 72-110. Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA

court’s October 20, 2015 order.4 We further direct that a copy of the PCRA

court’s January 7, 2016 Rule 1925(a) Opinion and its October 20, 2015

opinion be attached to any future filings in this case.

Order affirmed. Motion for appellate judicial notice denied.

_______________________

(Footnote Continued)

they could have been raised on direct appeal. Under the PCRA, “an issue is

waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at

trial, during unitary review, on appeal[,] or in a prior state postconviction

proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b); see Commonwealth v. Ford, 809

A.2d 325, 329 (Pa. 2002) (holding that petitioner’s claims of trial court error,

constitutional error, and prosecutorial misconduct, which could have been

raised on direct appeal but were not, were waived under the PCRA). To the

extent any of the issues could have been considered on collateral review, we

dispose of them on the basis of the PCRA court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion and

its October 20, 2015 opinion.

4

We deny Appellant’s July 18, 2016 “Motion for Appellate Judicial Notice.”

-6-

Circulated 11/04/2016 02:21 PM

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF BUCKS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

CRIMINAL DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA CP-09-CR-0005423-2004

V.

JOSEPH GUARRASI

OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant, Joseph Guarrasi (Petitioner), has appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania

from this Court's Order of October 20, 2015 denying and dismissing his Amended Post-Conviction

Relief Act ("PCRA") Petition which was originally filed on June 29, 2007, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9541 et. seq., and amended numerous times thereafter. We file this Opinion pursuant to

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure ("Pa.R.A.P.") l 925(a).

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The relevant factual and procedural history underlying this matter has been extensively set

forth, most recently in our Opinion which accompanied our Order of October 20, 2015. A copy of

our Opinion and Order is attached hereto as "Exhibit A." Petitioner filed a timely Notice of Appeal

from that Order on November 18, 2015. On November 20, 2015, this Court issued an Order

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) directing Petitioner to file a statement of errors complained of on

appeal. On December 3, 2015, Petitioner filed his Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal

Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. l 925(b).1 A copy of that Statement is attached hereto as "Exhibit B."

I

Petitioner sent a copy of his Statement of Errors and accompanying cover letter,_whicb were both dated November

17, 2015, to this Court's Chambers, which were then received sometime after we had issued our 1925(b) Order on

November 20, 2015. Petitioner thereafter reissued his Statement of Errors by correcting the date to reflect December

3, 2015.

Page 1 of 4

.-,.

III. ERRORS COMPLAINED OF ON APPEAL

The six (6) issues identified in Petitioner's Statement of Errors may be summarized as

follows:

(1) It was an abuse of discretion to deny Petitioner PCRA relief, pursuant to 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(b), based upon prejudice to the Commonwealth resulting from

the death of one of the principle witnesses, Michael Samios;

(2) It was an abuse of discretion to deny Petitioner PCRA relief "based upon

Judge Cepparulo not recusing" himself when his failing health caused inter alia

PCRA hearing delays, his early retirement, motions left unadjudicated,

misapplication of the law and faulty credibility findings;

(3) It was an abuse of discretion to deny Petitioner PCRA relief due to alleged

statutory and Constitutional violations involving the Wiretapping and Electronic

Surveillance Act, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5701, et seq. ("the Wiretap Act");

(4) It was an abuse of discretion to deny Petitioner PCRA relief based upon

"Counsel's deficient performance" as a result of inter alia failure to investigate and

attempt to suppress the Wiretap Act communication intercepts;

(5) It was an abuse of discretion to deny Petitioner PCRA relief due to

"defendant's presented incompetence" which resulted in his "involuntary,

unknowing and unintelligent plea caused by an innocent seriously mentally ill

defendant subjected to an involuntary cessation of all prescribed medications for

several days prior to the plea;" and

(6) It was an abuse of discretion to deny Petitioner PCRA relief "based upon

the presented defective guilty plea colloquy when, the defendant was not present

for the general colloquy."

IV. ANALYSIS

Following the sixteen (16) days of PCRA evidentiary bearings, this Court issued an Order

on August 11, 2014, directing Petitioner to serve upon the Commonwealth and this Court a

standard appellate brief "outlining any and all issues cognizable under the PCRA statute." (Order,

8/11/14.) Petitioner complied with our Order and submitted a sixty five (65) page "Brief for

Page 2 of 4

- --

Defendant" on September 4, 2014, in which he identified five (5) questions/issues, which are

summarized as follows:

1) Ineffective assistance of counsel which caused a "severely mentally ill

defendant, unmedicated for several days," to enter an involuntary and unknowing

guilty plea;

2) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to correct "a patently defective

guilty plea colloquy, where defendant wanted to go to trial, unaware of available

affirmative defenses;"

3) Ineffective assistance of counsel which caused defendant to enter an

"involuntary and unknowing plea by failing to litigate an intercept suppression;"

4) Ineffective assistance of counsel which caused defendant to enter an

"involuntary and unknowing plea by failing to undertake a reasonable

investigation, unaware of law fundamental to the case, abandoning requested

discovery, and stipulating to false facts;" and

5) PCRA hearing delays violated defendant's due process rights such that the

District Attorney's Office was precluded from alleging prejudice as a result of Mr.

Samios' death.

All of the five issues identified above from Petitioner's September 4, 2014 Brief have been

extensively discussed and addressed in our Opinion of October 20, 2015, which as noted has been

attached hereto as Exhibit A.

In addition, Petitioner now alleges that he was "not present for the general colloquy" and

that this Court's failure to recuse itself resulted in PCRA hearing delays,. unadjudicated motions,

misapplication of the law and faulty credibility findings.

It is well-established that an issue is waived if the appellant "could have raised it but failed

to do so before trial, at trial, . . . on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding."

Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 470, 481 (Pa. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d

215, 223 (Pa. 2007); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b)). Despite the lack of any evidentiary support for

Petitioner's bald allegations as well as his refusal to acknowledge that he has been responsible for

Page 3 of 4

the delay and continuation of these PCRA evidentiary hearings over the preceding nine years,

Petitioner failed to raise or address these issues in these PCRA proceedings and we therefore

consider them waived.

V. CONCLUSION

As noted in our Opinion and Order of October 20, 2015, we believe after a thorough review

of the complete record that Appellant's PCRA allegations are meritless and Petitioner is not

entitled to relief pursuant to the PCRA.

-=---="·.

Albert J. Cepparulo, Judge

*=

Page 4 of 4

-- --

COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA vs. JOSEPH GUARRASI

NO. CP-09-CR-0005423-2004

Copies sent to:

Joseph Guarrasi

Inmate No. GF64 l O

SCI BENNER TOWNSHIP

301 Institution Drive

Bellefonte, PA 16823

Defendant Pro Se

Karen Diaz

Office of the District Attorney

BUCKS COUNTY JUSTICE CENTER

100 North Main Street

Doylestown, PA 18901

Attorneyfor Commonwealth

EXHIBIT A

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF BUCKS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

CRIMINAL DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA CP-09-CR-0005423-2004

v.

JOSEPH GUARRASI

ORDER

'

AND NOW, this v-~ ()-ii lday of October, 2015, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that

the Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") Petition of Petitioner, Joseph Guarrasi, filed on June 29,

2007, and Amended on February 3, 2010, is hereby DENIED and DISMISSED.

Petitioner shall have thirty (30) days from the date of this Order in which to file an

Appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

BY THE COURT:

f ,-. • \ ,_._-.: \..! .

0 .J .•

--

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF BUCKS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

CRIMINAL DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA CP-09-CR-0005423-2004

v.

JOSEPH GUARRASI

OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before this Court is Appellant/Petitioner Joseph Guarrasi's timely Post-Conviction

Relief Act ("PCRA") Petition, filed on June 29, 2007, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et. seq., and

amended nwnerous times thereafter, as set forth at length below. Upon careful consideration of

the facts of the instant case, derived from the evidence submitted throughout the sixteen (16) days

of PCRA evidentiary hearings spanning over a six (6) year period, 1 the plain language of the PCRA

statute, applicable caselaw, and the reasons stated herein, we enter the attached Order denying and

dismissing Appellant's PCRA Petition.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts of the underlying conviction were set forth by our retired colleague, the

Honorable Kenneth G. Biehn ("Judge Biehn"), in his August 25, 2005 Opinion as follows,

verbatim:

Guarrasi was a practicing attorney who maintained an office on York Road in

Bucks County. He devised a scheme to defraud insurance companies by staging

automobile accidents. To this end, Guarrasi attempted to elicit the aid of others to

engage in this fraud and file false claims. He also purchased a home in Doylestown

[Borough] that he planned to renovate into a 'Kama Sutra' sex club. Because of

problems with the real estate transactions, and failed attempts to evict tenants from

I Three (3) additional hearings were held pursuant to motions and other matters relating to this PCRA litigation.

Page 1 of 112

the properties, Guarrasi solicited Michael Samios to kidnap, assault, and 'make

disappear' the resident of the house intended for the Kama Sutra club. After

becoming frightened of the plan and the nature of Guarrasi' s instructions, Samios

contacted and cooperated with the authorities. Samios was wired by investigators

for the District Attorney, and several conversations between him and Guarrasi were

intercepted and recorded.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/25/05.

Based upon the extensive and interwoven fact pattern that underlies Appellant's conviction

in the instant case, this Court carefully reviewed both the defense and the Commonwealth's

exhaustive recitation of the relevant factual background, and we found the District Attorney's

recitation to be more in accord with the facts to which Appellant pied guiltylnolo contendere.

Accordingly, we have referenced only the Commonwealth's recitation of the facts. This recitation

was largely based on the facts read into the record at Appellant's Guilty but Mentally

Ill/Sentencing Hearing, as stipulated to by the parties, memorialized in a "Habeas Corpus"

document, and entered into evidence as the Court's Exhibit 1.

For purposes of this Opinion, it is important to add that, following our independent review

of the recordings following the close of the PCRA proceedings, the intercepted conversations

proved particularly incriminatory and evidenced Appellant's criminal intent to commit insurance

fraud as well as the crimes involving the planned establishment of his "sex club."

On March 2, 2004, Appellant was arrested and charged with fourteen (14) counts of

Criminal Attempt,2 including Criminal Attempt to Commit Murder;' Aggravated Assault,4 and

Kidnapping,5 as well as other related charges. Appellant was also charged with ten (10) counts of

2

18 Pa.C.S. § 90l(a).

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 90l(a) § 250l(a).

4

18 Pa.C.S. § 90J(a) § 2702(a)(l).

5 18 Pa.C.S. § 90l(a) § 290I(a)(2)&{3).

Page 2 of112

---,

Criminal Solicitation? to commit Murder, Aggravated Assault and Kidnapping and related, less

serious crimes.

On March 28, 2005, Appellant entered both an open nolo contendere plea to Criminal

Attempt to Commit Murder and a guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) plea to Criminal Attempt to

Commit Aggravated Assault, Kidnapping, Unlawful Restraint, Burglary, and Criminal Solicitation

to Commit Insurance Fraud before Judge Biehn. At the request of the District Attorney, this Court

nolle prossed Count Ten (I 0) through Count Eighteen (18) of the criminal information. The Court

deferred acceptance of the plea and the subsequent sentencing pending a mental health evaluation

to aid the court in determining whether Appellant was indeed mentally ill when he committed the

offenses for which he was charged. See N.T. 3/28/05, pp. 19, 21-22.

Judge Biehn proceeded with Sentencing on May 25, 2005. Prior to the sentencing portion

of this hearing, the Court heard testimony from mental health professionals in order to determine

whether the Appellant (1) was severely mentally ill at the time of the commission of the instant

offense(s) and (2) is severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment so as to support a plea of

guilty but mentally ill pursuant to the Mental Health Act and 18 Pa.C.S. § 314(b). See N.T. 5/25/05,

pp. 2-3, 32-36. Upon consideration of a number of reports and testimony from mental health

experts opining that Appellant meets the "guilty but mentally ill" threshold, the Court found

Appellant to be guilty but mentally ill and, accordingly, accepted Appellant's plea. See N.T.

5/25/05, pp. 88-89.

Appellant was thereafter sentenced to not less than six-and-a-half (6 Yi) nor more than

fifteen (15) years' incarceration.7 At the time of sentencing, Judge Biehn did not elaborate on

6 18 Pa.C.S. § 902(a).

7

The Sentencing Guidelines called for a sentence of four (4) to five (5) years' incarceration in the mitigated range,

five (5) to six-and-a-half (6 ~) years' incarceration in the standard range and six-and-a-half (6 Yz) to seven-and-a-

Page 3 of 112

exactly which count or counts of the information Appellant was being sentenced, nor was there a

delineation on the court sheet. However, prior to imposing sentence Judge Biehn referred to the

Sentencing Guidelines on Count 1- Criminal Attempt to Commit Murder. N.T. 5/25/05, p. 90.

Therefore, we believe that sentence was imposed on Count 1, and we have recognized that this

would have been in fact a lawfully imposed sentence. See N.T. 1/23/08, pp. 4-5.

Appellant filed a Post-Sentence Motion to Modify Sentence on May 27, 2005, which was

denied without a hearing by Order dated May 27, 2005. This Court, however, entered a subsequent

Order on June 9, 2005, giving Appellant credit for ten (10) months and eight (8) days for time

served at the Bucks County Correctional Facility (BCCF) prior to his sentencing and, additionally,

twenty-four (24) days for time spent at Friend's Hospital.

Appellant was represented by Richard Fink, Esquire (Fink) at his preliminary hearing, in

pre-trial motions, at his guilty plea and sentencing, and throughout the disposition of post-sentence

motions.

On June 24, 2005, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of

Pennsylvania. On July 22, 2005, he filed a Statement of Matters Complained Of on Appeal, raising

solely the issue of the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Appellant was represented by Alan J.

Tauber, Esquire (Tauber) for purposes of his direct appeal.8

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed Appellant's judgment of sentence on July 6,

2006. See Commonwealth v. Guarrasi, 907 A.2d 1133 (Pa.Super. 2006) (table). Appellant did not

seek review with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. As a result, Appellant's judgment of

half {7 ~) years' incarceration in the aggravated range. Appellant did not have a prior record score. N.T. 5/25/05,

p. 90.

8

Appellant filed numerous motions shortly after the filing of his direct appeal including a Motion for Return of

Seized Property, a prose Motion for Return of Property and a "Praecipe Under B.C.R.C.P. 208.3(a)."

Page 4 of 112

conviction and sentence became final on August 5, 2006, and he therefore had until August 5,

2007 to file a timely PCRA Petition. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(l).

Appellant filed the instant timely prose PCRA Petition on June 29, 2007. Thereafter, the

Bucks County Public Defender's Office was appointed to represent Appellant.

Following the appointment of counsel, Appellant filed pro se the following Motions

between July 2007 and October 2007: "Misconduct of D.A. for Willful and Gross Negligence;"

"Motion for Formal Discovery;" "Motion for Return of Property;" "Motion for Judicial Notice;"

"Notice of Typographical Error in PCRA;" "Motion to Compel Discovery and Impose Sanctions;"

a "Motion for Contempt;" "Appeal from the District Attorney's Failure to Charge;" "Motion to

Compel Answer to Petitioner's PCRA;" and "Appeal from DAs Failure to Charge."

On November 27, 2007, the Public Defender's Office filed a Petition for Appointment of

Private Counsel due to a conflict of interest. As a result, Ron Elgart, Esquire, was appointed to

represent Appellant on December 5, 2007. On December 13, 2007, Attorney Elgart filed a Motion

to Vacate Order and Appoint Private Counsel.

Despite the fact that Appellant had two experienced criminal defense attorneys appointed

successively on his behalf, he continued to file pro se motions from December 2007 through

January 2008, including a "Motion for Contempt of Court," a second "Motion to Compel Answer

to Petitioner's PCRA," a "Motion for Continuance and Appointment of New Conflict Counsel,"

and a "Motion for Recusal and Change of Venue."

On January 23, 2008, a hearing was held on the numerous motions at which Appellant was

provided with the opportunity to testify in furtherance of those motions. Based on the voluminous

nature of the issues raised in Appellant's initial pro se Petition, we handled only preliminary

Page 5 of 112

matters at this hearing in order to create an opportunity for Attorney Elgart to meet with Appellant

to further refine the PCRA claims.

Following the presentation of evidence and the conclusion of arguments of counsel, this

Court denied the following: "Motion to for Appointment of New Conflict Counsel"; "Motion to

Recuse Judge Cepparulo and Motion to Disqualify the entire Bucks County Bench"; "Motion for

Discovery"; and "Petition for Return of Property." See N.T. 1/23/08, pp. 9-47, 48-9, 51-59, 61-

77, 89-91. In his "Petition for Return of Property," Appellant had requested the return of all

property seized by the Commonwealth following his arrest. In denying this Motion, this Court

reasoned that "[i]f in fact Mr. Guarrasi is entitled to relief, it may well be that relief would entail

some type of new trial, and if he is entitled to relief and if that relief involves a new trial, obviously

the Commonwealth would need the evidence which it seized ... " N. T. 1/23/08, p. 90.

On February 8, 2008, Appellant filed a "Concise Statement of P.C.R.A. Issues" on his own

volition. These "concise" claims are as follows: (1) Defective Guilty Plea Colloquy; (2) Lack of

Subject Matter Jurisdiction; (3) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel; and (4) Prosecutorial

Misconduct. See "Concise Statement," 2/8/08, ,r,r I-IV.

On February 26, 2008, Attorney Elgart filed a second Motion to Vacate Order of

Appointment, alleging that Appellant had filed a civil complaint against him which created an

inherent conflict of interest and made his continued representation of Appellant impossible. This

Motion was granted on March 12, 2008, and Harry J. Cooper, Esquire, was appointed to represent

Appellant.

On June 26, 2008, November 24, 2008, and December 19, 2008, three (3) counseled PCRA

evidentiary hearings were held, in which testimony was received from Appellant, his guilty plea

Page 6 of 112

..---.

and sentencing counsel, Fink, and one of the investigating officers, Bucks County Detective

Timothy Carroll (Detective Carroll or Carroll).

At the conclusion of the third day of testimony, Mr. Cooper was instructed to submit a brief

within forty-five (45) days from his receipt of the requisite Notes of Testimony. Following the

submission of Appellant's brief, the Commonwealth was instructed to file a reply brief within

thirty (30) days. This Court noted that we would then render a decision unless further testimony

was necessary, in which case another hearing would be scheduled.

Despite Mr. Cooper's representation, Appellant continued to file numerous prose motions,

including a Pro Se Entry of Appearance and Motion for Conference/Experts on June 10, 2008; a

Motion for Removal of Counsel on June 20, 2008; a Motion for Grazier Hearing and Colloquy on

October 27, 2008; a Motion to Develop the Record with Exculpatory Brady Evidence of

Prosecutorial Misconduct on December 17, 20089; and a Motion for Recusal and Change of Venue

on February 12, 2009.

On February 19, 2009, Mr. Cooper filed a Motion for Leave to Withdraw Appearance.

On January 14, 2009, in the midst of the preparation of briefs in support of or opposition

to Appellant's instant PCRA Petition, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of

Pennsylvania, without assistance from his appointed counsel, in which he raised the following

issues: Appellant's request to proceed pro se, this Court's refusal to recuse ourselves, and this

Court's denial of change of venue. On April 16, 2009, we issued an Opinion in which we

9

This Motion was forwarded to Appellant's attorney of record- Mr. Cooper.

Page 7 of 112

determined that Appellant's appeal was not ripe for adjudication, as there had been no final

decision regarding his PCRA Petition.!?

On April 7, 2009, Appellant filed a Petition for Payment of Expert Witness, and on April

29, 2009, this petition was granted.

On April 23, 2009, Michael Goodwin, Esquire, was appointed to represent Appellant.

On May 8, 2009, this Court issued an Order directing Appellant to file a brief within ninety

(90) days in support of his instant PCRA Petition and the evidentiary hearings held thereon. We

also directed the Commonwealth to file a responsive brief within thirty (30) days from the date of

receipt of Appellant's brief. 11

On June 12, 2009, Attorney Goodwin filed a "Petition to Vacate Appointment of Conflict

Counsel." In his Petition, Mr. Goodwin alleged that within two (2) years prior to the offenses

underlying the charges against Appellant, Attorney Goodwin had been appointed to represent

another Appellant in a different criminal matter who had previously consulted Appellant, and

based upon information provided by this criminal Appellant and his wife, Attorney Goodwin had

reported a potential ethical violation by Appellant to the Bucks County District Attorney's Office.

See Petition to Vacate Appointment of Conflict Counsel, 6/12/09, 1~ 2-3.

An in-person PCRA evidentiary hearing was scheduled for August 13, 2009. On August

7, 2009, however, Appellant filed a Motion for Video Hearing. In order to accommodate

Appellant's request, a video hearing was therefore scheduled for October 1, 2009, at which, upon

consideration of Appellant's numerous requests to proceed pro se via written motions, in-court

10

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania issued a non-precedential and unpublished Memorandum Opinion on March

30, 2010, quashing Appellant's appeal. See Commonwealth v. Joseph Guarrasi, 996 A.2d 542 (Pa.Super. 2010)

(table).

II

All relevant Notes of Testimony were filed as of the date of this Order. The briefs were never filed, however, based

upon our granting of Appellant's request to proceed prose, as will be explained in detail below.

Page 8 of 112

-e--.

requests and otherwise, we held a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier.12 At this hearing,

and following a formal colloquy on the matter, this Court determined that Appellant was making

a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel on this first PCRA Petition. We

accordingly granted Appellant's request to proceedprose via written Order dated October 1, 2009,

and simultaneously granted Mr. Goodwin leave to withdraw as counsel. We further ordered

Appellant to file a Petition to Open his PCRA Proceedings within thirty (30) days of the date of

the order, and granted the Commonwealth a thirty (30) day period to file a response following

receipt of Appellant's Petition.

On October 26, 2009, Appellant filed a "Motion for Disclosure of Intercepted

Communications," to which the Commonwealth filed a response on March 9, 2010. On March 18,

2010, Appellant filed a "Reply with New Matter to Commonwealth's Answer to Petitioner's

Motion for Required Disclosure of Intercepted Communications."

On November 4, 2009, Appellant filed a "Petition to Open Further Proceedings and/or New

Proceedings," alleging that he had additional "meritorious causes of action" which he wished to

raise, including "Defective Guilty Plea Colloquy, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Prosecutorial

Misconduct and proceeding in a Tribunal in which venue and jurisdiction is in question." See

Petition to Open, 11/02/09, p. 5.

On February 3, 2010, pursuant to our Order of December 11, 2009 granting Appellant's

"Petition to Open," Appellant filed an Amended PCRA Petition (which was dated January 29,

2010). This Amended Petition consisted of thirteen (13) separate pages and alleged that

Appellant's conviction was the result of the following defects pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §

9543(a)(2)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (viii): an unlawfully induced plea of guilty where "the circumstances

12

713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

Page 9 of 112

make it likely that the inducement caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner is

innocent;" a violation of the United States or Pennsylvania Constitution or laws which "so

undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could

have taken place;" ineffective assistance of plea counsel which "so undermined the truth-

determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place;"

the improper obstruction by government officials of Appellant's right to appeal where meritorious

appealable issues existed and were properly preserved; and finally a "proceeding in a tribunal

without jurisdiction."

More specifically, the following claims were raised in his pro se Amended Petition,

including, but not limited to: his guilty plea was unlawfully induced as he was incompetent "due

to the sudden cessation of all psychotropic medication for several days prior to the plea;" there

was no factual basis to his nolo contendere plea and, therefore, it was unlawfully induced; the

Commonwealth violated the Constitutions of the United States and the Commonwealth,

respectively, by violating the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act (''the Wiretap Act"),

13

18 Pa.C.S. 5701 et seq.; plea counsel was ineffective based on his lack of awareness of the

allegedly constitutionally infirm wiretap evidence; plea counsel "mislead and misinformed"

Appellant as to the "authorship and contents of the 'Habeas Corpus' documents;" appellate counsel

did not withdraw Appellant's plea upon request; there was "improper obstruction" of Appellant's

13

Appellant claims in further detail that Judge Biehn's authorization of the wiretap by Order dated February 23, 2004

was a "legal nullity," as Appellant alleges that Judge Biehn was not the President Judge of Bucks County nor was he

a designated signee by writing, order or statute. See "Amended PCRA to Supplement PCRA Petition Pursuant to

Order Dated 12/10/2009," 2/03/10,, 5(A)(a)(i). Appellant further contends that the Wiretap Act was violated by the

Commonwealth's failure to comply with record keeping and custody requirements, failure to obtain consent from

"informants Fryling or Samios," and failure to seal the recordings to prevent tampering, intercepting oral

communications outside the geographical limits of Bucks County. Id. at ,r 5(A)(b)-(f). Appellant asserts that "Expert

Audio Forensic analysis of the original audio evidence has scientifically proven that there is objective forensic

evidence of intercept tampering in the original recordings." Id. at ,r 5(A)(h).

Page 10 of 112

PCRA collateral appeal by "Bucks County Governmental Officials;"!" and this Court proceeded

without proper venue. See "Amended PCRA to Supplement PCRA Petition Pursuant to Order

Dated 12/10/2009," 2/03/10, pp. 3-10.

On May 6, 20 I 0, the Commonwealth filed a response to the Amended Petition and Request

to Reopen the Record.

Following the Court's grant of prose and in forma pauperis (IFP) status, and throughout

the litigation of his claimed amended issues during the preceding thirteen (13) evidentiary

hearings, Appellant filed numerous motions. These motions included the following15:

1. A "Fifth Motion for Return of Property" filed on February 16, 2010;

2. A "Motion for Judicial Notice that in 20 IO Detective Fabricated Wiretap

Documents" filed on March 29, 2010. (The Court declined to act on this

Motion and it was therefore denied by operation of law);

3. A "Motion to Receive Audio-Visual Expert" filed on the same date. (The

Court also declined to act on this Motion and it was therefore denied by

operation of law);

4. A "Motion for Hearing" and a "Motion for Judicial Notice" filed on April

28, 2010;

5. A "Motion for Rule Absolute" filed on May 12, 2010;

6. A "Motion for Judicial Notice of 201 PA Code 706(e) Requiring the Filing

of an Executed Form" filed on May 13, 2010;

7. A "Motion to Hold the Commonwealth in contempt of Orders dated

12/10/09 and 2/5/10" filed on May 13, 2010;

8. A "Motion to Order Commonwealth to Answer Amended PCRA As

Ordered"!" filed on May 24, 2010;

14

Appellant later elaborated that this was based on either the Bucks County District Attorney's Office or the Bucks

County Detectives tampering with the evidence, presenting false evidence and/or failing to follow the Wiretap Act "in

many different ways." N.T. 8/26/10, p. 15.

15

All of the "Motions" are in Appellant's own words.

16

This Motion was denied on June 2, 2010, as the Commonwealth had previously filed a response to Appellant's

Amended pro se PCRA Petition.

Page 11 of 112

9. A "Memorandum in Support of Amended PCRA" filed on May 28, 2010;

10. A "Motion to Reconsider 'Declining to Act' on Open Motions as it

Prejudices Petitioner" filed on June 16, 2010;

1 I. A "Motion for Handwriting Exemplars of Former Judge Biehn" and a

"Motion for Judicial Notice" filed on June 16, 201 O;

12. A "Motion to Compel Service of Commonwealth's Responses" filed on

June 21, 2010;

13. A "Motion for Standby Counsel" filed on July 8, 2010;

14. A "Motion for Audio-Forensic Expert to Testify by Video at Video-

Teleconference on 8/12/1 O" filed on July 12, 201 O; and

15. A "Motion for the State to Bear Expert Costs" filed on July 28, 2010.

The last three motions filed in July of 2010 were denied or stayed until disposition at trial,

and the PCRA hearing was continued until August 26, 2010.

On August 16, 2010, the Commonwealth filed a "Motion for Mental Health Records." We

issued an Order scheduling a hearing on this Motion for August 26, 2010, to be heard in

17

conjunction with the previously-scheduled evidentiary hearing.

On August 26, 2010, at the first PCRA evidentiary hearing following the foregoing

amendments, Appellant added that in terms of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims he was

raising all of the following:

"[fjailing to litigate a suppression motion, failing to object to a defective guilty plea

colloquy, promising a certain sentence that was not given, failure to investigate the

case and giving incompetent advise based on lack of knowledge of the case;

stipulating to false information and ... not communicating honestly with me, not

offering any defense documents but allowing defense documents to be offered by

the Commonwealth" and "[w]aiving a preliminary hearing without (Appellant's]

presence."

17

At the August 26, 2010 hearing, this Court ordered that the Mental Health Services Unit at the Bucks County

Correctional Facility provide the District Attorney's Office with certified copies of Appellant's records. A written

Order followed.

Page 12 of 112

-- ..

See N.T. 8/26/10, pp. 14-15.

In terms of his claim that this Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over his crimes,

Appellant confirmed that he based this claim on the fact that the interceptions occurred in

Montgomery County and Maryland and Judge Biehn was not designated by the President Judge to

sign the authorization order. N.T. 8/26/10, pp. 16-17.

At the August 26, 2010 hearing, Appellant submitted an offer of proof as to each of his

claims raised in the Amended Petition in addition to the evidence and testimony previously

submitted to this court during the June 26, 2008, November 24, 2008, and December 19, 2008

evidentiary hearings when Appellant had been represented by Attorney Cooper. See N.T. 8/26/10,

pp. 21-36. Appellant explained that he wished to call Attorneys Fink and Tauber as witnesses in

order to introduce certain documentation into evidence to support his defective plea colloquy claim

and prove his claim regarding the voluntariness of his guilty plea. He testified that he sent out

subpoenas to the psychologists involved in his mental health care and to the medical record

custodians at the prison that went unanswered. N.T. 8/26/10, pp. 22-26.

Appellant stated that he intended to call Attorneys Fink and Tauber, in addition to experts

that were unable to attend this hearing, including Herbert Joe, in an effort to prove his claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. N.T. 8/26/10, pp. 28-30. Appellant also indicated that he intended

to call Detective Carroll and Detective McAteer as witnesses. N. T. 8/26/10, p. 31. For the

prosecutorial misconduct claim, Appellant testified that he intended to call [Deputy District

Attorney and now Magisterial District Judge] Gary Gambardella, Judge Diane E. Gibbons, 18 and

18

Judge Gibbons previously held the position of Bucks County District Attorney during the relevant period of

Appellant's investigation, arrest, charging and criminal conviction, and will be referred to hereinafter as District

Attorney Gibbons.

Page 13 of 112

former President Judge David Heckler.19 N.T. 8/26/10, pp. 32-33. Finally, concerning the legality

of the wiretap interception involved in this case, Appellant intended to call Herbert Joe and

Detective Mosiniak. N.T. 8/26/10, p. 35. Appellant would rely on his own testimony from previous

hearings and stated that he would not be testifying further. N.T. 8/26/10, p. 36.

On September 10, 2010, Additional Discovery was filed by the District Attorney's Office.

At the end of the evidentiary hearing on August 26, 2010, we ordered the parties to file

briefs on the issue of the admissibility of the expert testimony of Mr. Herbert Joe regarding audio

forensics. On September 10, 2010, Appellant filed a "Memorandum Regarding the Audio Forensic

Expert [Mr. Joe]". On September 27, 2010, the Commonwealth filed a "Memorandum of Law in

Opposition to Admissibility of PCRA Petitioner's Proposed Expert Testimony," to which the

Appellant filed a "Reply to ADA's Memorandum" on October 6, 2010.

On September 30, 2010, Appellant filed a "Praecipe to Attach to Amended PCRA

Memorandum as Exhibit 24."

On October 25, 2010, the District Attorney forwarded the requisite mental health/medical

records to Appellant. On this same date, Appellant filed Supplemental Exhibits for PCRA Hearing.

On October 27, 2010, Appellant filed a [16] "Motion to Compel Attendance of Hostile and

Commonwealth Witnesses" and a [17] "Motion for Petitioner to Maintain Physical Possession of

Legal Work." On November 3, 2010, Appellant filed a "Notice for Commonwealth to Produce

Originals." On November 10, 2010, Appellant filed a "Praecipe to Attach as Page 13 to Amended

PCRA," and he filed "Petitioner's Supplemental Exhibits for PCRA Hearing" on November 15,

2010.

19

Judge Heckler currently holds the position of Bucks County District Attorney.

Page 14 of 112

On December 15, 20 I 0, Appellant filed a [ 18] Motion for PCRA Discovery which was

denied on December 28, 2010.

On January 31, 2011, Appellant filed a "Supplemental PCRA Hearing Exhibits Set 3."

On May 2, 2011, Appellant filed a "Notice for Commonwealth to Produce Original Record

and Docket Entry Sheets pursuant to Pa.R.E. 1004(3)."

On JtU1e 10, 2011, Appellant filed "Supplemental PCRA Hearing Exhibits J 14 and J 26."

Significantly, on August 5, 2011, the Commonwealth filed a "Motion to Deny and Dismiss

PCRA Action Based on Substantial Prejudice to the Commonwealth," claiming substantial

prejudice due to the death of an essential witness, Michael Samios. On August 18, 2011, Appellant

filed a response to this Motion, and on September 14, 2011, this Court entered an Order denying

the Commonwealth's Motion.

In the interim, Appellant filed a [19] "Motion for Judicial Notice" on September 1, 201120

and "Supplemental PCRA Hearing Exhibits - W Set" on September 8, 2011.

On November 7, 2011, Appellant filed a [20] "Motion for Notice that Detective Carroll did

not take Oath and Termination Date from Bensalem Twp PD."

On January 9, 2012, Appellant filed a "Praecipe to File Petitioner's Subpoenaed

Witnesses." On January 19, 2012, Karen Ann Ulmer filed Certificates of Service of Subpoena

upon the District Attorney's Office, Clerk of Courts, Custodian of Records of Bensalem Township,

and Chief Detective McAteer.21 On this same date, Appellant filed "Supplemental PCRA Hearing

Exhibits Set Y."

20

This Motion was returned to the file without action by this Court.

21

Motions to Quash Subpoena were filed on September 16, 2011, January 19, 2012, and June 17, 2014. On June 26,

2014, this Court granted the Motion to Quash Subpoena and for Protective Order filed by the Honorable Diane

Gibbons, shielding Judge Gibbons from further subpoenas in this PCRA matter.

Page 15 of 112

On February 21, 2012, Appellant filed "Supplemental PCRA Hearing Exhibits Set B."

On February 24, 2012, Appellant filed a [21] "Motion to Order Compliance with Order of

1/20/2012."

On March 27, 2012, the Commonwealth filed a "Memorandum of Law in Opposition to

Request for Introduction of Various Evidence and Testimony," as directed by this Court during

the January 20, 2012 hearing, and a "Motion in Limine to Preclude Introduction of Evidence and

Testimony" on April 25, 2012.22 Appellant filed responses on April 27, 2012 and May 9, 2012.

On June 1, 2012, Appellant filed a (22] "Motion to Compel Commonwealth Production of

Original Intercept Tapes and Recorders Utilized" and a [23] "Petition to Declare Commonwealth's

PCRA Delays Violate Petitioner's Due Process and Equal Protection."

On June 27, 2012, Appellant filed a [24] "Motion for Audio-Forensic Expert," which was

denied on June 28, 2012.

On July 18, 2012, Appellant filed a [25] "Motion for Judicial Notice [that] ADA Diaz Did

Not File 16 P.S. 3403 Oath of Office for her Current Position." On July 30, 2012, Appellant filed

a "Stipulation Pursuant to Order 1120/12," and on August 15, 2012, he filed "Supplemental

Exhibits Set A."

On September 12, 2012, Appellant filed a (26] "Motion for Judicial Notice that

Commonwealth's Exhibits 2A, 2B, 2C Do Not Contain any 16 P.S. 3403 Oaths of Offices for

ADA Gambardella, Nor Detectives Carroll, Mosiniak or Chief'McAteer." On September 27, 2012,

Appellant filed a [27] "Motion in Limine to Order Sprint to Produce Informant Cell Phone Records

from l/15/04-3/15/04," a [28] "Motion to Order Commonwealth PCRA Production of All Parts of

Multiform Property Receipts 4666 & 4667" and a [29] "Motion in Limine to Permit Examination

22The Commonwealth's Motion in Limine was returned for consideration at the time of the next PCRA evidentiary

hearing.

Page 16 of 112

of Corroboration Witness Mosiniak and Affiant Carroll." On October 19, 2012, Appellant filed a

[30] ''Motion to Transcribe Commonwealth's Compilation Tape Admitted as C-PCRA-1." On

October 31, 2012, we issued an Order denying Appellant's Motions in Limine and Motion to Order

Production of Property Receipts.

On November 2, 2012, Appellant filed a [31) "Motion to Order Commonwealth's PCRA

Testimony Warrants Limited to PCRA Discovery." On November 28, 2012, Appellant filed a [32)

"Motion to Permit PCRA Witnesses Confirming CI Samios Provided Drugs to Targets during

Intercepts," a [33] "Motion to Compel PCRA Production of Seized Meth Baggie with CI Samios

Fingerprints" and a "Praceipe to Attach Witness Affidavit Confirming CI Samios Provided Drugs

to Target as Exh. Dl."

On December 5, 2012, Appellant filed a [34] "Motion to Permit Audio Evidence and

Transcript of C-1 Confirming CI Samios Provided Drugs to Target," as well as a "Praecipe to file

Transcript oflntercept Compilation Tape PCRA Admitted as CW Exhibit C-1."

On December 14, 2012, Appellant filed a "Praecipe to Attach to Amended PCRA as

Exhibit Dl, Transcript of20 Min. Compilation Tape."

On December 28, 2012, a [35] Motion for Rule to Show Cause Bill of Sale for Truck

Confirming $2000 Paid to Samios for Truck Title" was filed.

On February 1, 2013, Appellant filed a "Praecipe to file PCRA Hearing Exhibits Set D."

On February 11, 2013, Appellant filed an "Application for Bail Pending Disposition of

PCRA Petition," as well as a Brief in Support thereof. We denied this motion on August 9, 2013.

On February 22, 2013, Appellant filed a [36J "Motion for Judicial Notice of Maryland

Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance," a [37] "Motion for DAO Sanctions," and a

Page 17 of 112

.··-.

"Memorandum of Law." On February 28, 2013, Appellant also filed a [38] "Motion for Sanctions

Per Pa.R.C.P. 1023.2." This was returned to the file without action.

On March 26, 2013, Appellant filed a "Praecipe to Attach Exhibits G" and a "Praecipe to

Attach Exhibits T," and he filed another "Praecipe to Attach Exhibit S" on April 19, 2013.

On March 27, 2013, Appellant filed a [39] "Motion to Compel Production of Seized Office

Billing Records."

On April 19, 2013, Appellant filed a "Praecipe to Move Open Motions as BCLRCP

208.3(a) Uncontested." Despite the fact that Rule 208.3(a) constitutes a local rule of civil

procedure, Appellant invoked this rule in an attempt to "move open motions" that were

"uncontested."

On July 15, 2013, Appellant filed a "Praecipe to Attach as Exhibit T-Tto Amended PCRA

Petition."

On August 26, 2013, Appellant filed a [40] "Motion to Transcribe PCRA Hearings dated

5/3/13, 8/12 & 8/13/13," and on September 3, 2013, he filed a [41] "Motion to Order PennDOT to

Provide Certified Vehicle Title and Lien Histories."

On November 6, 2013, Appellant filed a "Praecipe Notice PCRA Transcripts Not Received

by Appellant for PCRA Hearing of 5/3, 8/12, 8/13, 10/10 Nor 10/11/2013 Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.

No.'s 113, 114 & 115."

On December 6, 2013, Appellant filed a [42] "Motion for Transcripts," which was denied

by this Court on December 11, 2013.

On December 18, 2013, Appellant filed a "Stipulation."

On December 30, 2013, Appellant filed a [43] "Motion Re: DAO Intercept Media

Disclosures of 3/3/2004 for Notice of Testimony" as well as a Brief in support thereof.

Page 18 of 112

On January 29, 2014, Appellant filed another "Praecipe to Attach Exhibit to Amended

PCRA."

On April 25, 2014, Appellant filed a [44] "Motion for Sanctions Against DAO

Continuances and Delays." This Motion was denied at the hearing held on June 30, 2014, since it

was Appellant's request that the hearing scheduled for April 22, 2014 be continued because he

was unprepared for the hearing and his slanderous claim that the District Attorney's Office had ex

parte communications with this Court to get the hearing continued was patently false. See N.T.

6/30/14, pp. 17-26.

Appellant filed additional "Praecipes" to attach exhibits to his Amended PCRA Petition on

May 22 and June 20, 2014.

In summary, this Court carefully reviewed each and every motion filed by both Appellant

and the Commonwealth. Many of Appellant's Motions that were not directly disposed of by

written Order or not immediately acted upon were either inappropriately filed pursuant to civil

procedure rules (as opposed to following proper criminal procedure channels) or placed in the file

for disposition at the time of the relevant evidentiary hearings, and/or, in the case of the Exhibits

and Exhibit Sets filed, should have been presented in court subject to cross-examination in order

to determine the exhibits' relevance and admissibility.23

PCRA evidentiary hearings took place on August 26 and November 19, 2010; February 7,

June 13 and September 19, 2011; January 30 and August 17, 2012; May 3, August 12, August 13,

23

As we will set forth in detail below, some of these exhibits were in fact authenticated and later admitted into

evidence, and some were not.

Page 19 of 112

October IO, and October 11, 2013; and finally June 30, 2014.24 These hearings consisted solely

of Appellant's case-in-chief.

Following the last evidentiary hearing, this Court directed the parties to submit briefs.

Appellant and the Commonwealth submitted briefs on September 4, 2014 and October 6, 2014,

respectively.

A complete set of the sixteen (16) analog cassette tapes which are referred to by all

witnesses during the course of the PCRA evidentiary hearings was entered into evidence as C-

PCRA-7.

a. Appellant's PCRA Testimony

Preliminarily, we noted that upon consideration of Appellant's contention that he was

unable to make a knowing and intelligent decision to enter a guilty plea as a result of being off his

medications, Dr. Strochak, who testified at Appellant's Guilty but Mentally Ill/Sentencing

Hearing, "did not wish to give a full opinion with regard to the coming off of medications because

he does not dispense medications." Dr. Strochak did, however, recommend Dr. David Nover, who

later indicated that it was necessary to review a list of medications that Appellant was off of and

his guilty plea colloquy transcript before giving his professional opinion. N.T. 6/26/08, pp. 13-15.

On December 15, 2008, Dr. Nover submitted a report to Appellant and his attorney. At the hearing

on December 19, 2008, defense counsel indicated that he would not be offering the report into

evidence, as it was his opinion that "it doesn't help this petition and this relief that is requested."

Defense counsel also indicated that he reviewed and explained this to Appellant. N.T. 12/19/08,

p. 6.

24

Some additional evidentiary hearings were originally scheduled but had to be continued due to unavailability of

Appellant, the District Attorney or other witnesses.

Page 20 of 112

Appellant testified to the facts he believed to be in existence supporting the allegations

made in his February 8, 2008 "Concise Statement" as set forth above.

Appellant first addressed his contention that this Court (the Bucks County Court of

Common Pleas] lacked subject matter jurisdiction in accepting Appellant's guilty plea and

sentencing him thereafter. Appellant averred that "[d]uring periods of time that these alleged

offending conversations were allegedly made, I, myself, was in Maryland, and some of the time I

was in Montgomeryville ... " He testified that he did not know where the individual who placed the

telephone calls which led to the recordings was geographically at the time they were made and

simultaneously recorded. He claimed that the Commonwealth did not offer any logs to indicate

where the confidential informant (C.I.) who placed the calls was at the relevant time the calls were

placed and the incriminating statements were made. Furthermore, Appellant testified that it was

his belief and opinion that if the incriminating conversations did not happen in Bucks County, this

Court did not have jurisdiction to authorize the wiretaps underlying the recorded telephone calls,

and this jurisdiction did not "follow them to other states and to other countries." N.T. 6/26/08, pp.

19-28.

During the relevant period of February and March, 2004, when the crimes underlying

Appellant's conviction occurred, Appellant's parents lived in Plumstead Township, Bucks County,

and Appellant's office and residence were located in Furlong, Bucks County. Appellant also

agreed that, pursuant to the Notes of Testimony from Appellant's Sentencing Hearings, a recitation

of the facts indicated as follows:

... on February 27 the detectives conducted a taped conversation at Guarrasi's

parents' house, Guarrasi tells Samios that he cannot write out a sketch for him

because it would have his handwriting on it, but he would have a schematic back at

the office that he can provide him with. He then pays Samios two thousand dollars

as a downpayment and he even counts out the money on tape.

Page 21 of 112

-.

Appellant admitted that if this were a "true statement," the Court would have had jurisdiction. He

also admitted that during the relevant time period, he gave Mr. Samios (Samios)25 money and

blueprints of the Lower State Road residence and had conversations with him. N.T. N.T. 6/26/08,

pp. 39-46, 63-64; N.T. 11/25/08, pp. 53-54.

Nevertheless, Appellant now claims these facts are completely erroneous and that he never

solicited Samios to kill Thomas Witthauer or his family.26 N.T. 6/26/08, pp. 41, 64-65; N.T.

11/25/08, pp. 56-61. Instead, Appellant claimed that despite Mr. Witthauer's continued residence,

he had hired Samios to perform landscaping/construction work on the Lower State Road property

because the corporation of which he was an owner had purchased this property.27 N.T. 11/25/08,

pp. 49-51. Appellant also indicated that he wanted to review his personal telephone bill or the

telephone records of Detective Carroll and Samios. On cross-examination, Appellant explained

that, in his opinion, the locus of the crime was located in Montgomery County. N.T. 6/26/08, pp.

27, 35-36.

In terms of his mental state at the time of Appellant's Guilty Plea hearing on March 28,

2005, Appellant claims he was off medication and was "out of [his] mind." N.T. 6/26/08; p. 70.

In response to the District Attorney's question as to what he did not understand in relation to the

guilty plea, Appellant claimed that he was not paying attention to the proceeding and he was ''just

there to agree" and agreed to "whatever was going to be said." N.T. 11/25/08, p. 65. However,

although Appellant had claimed he was on medication at his Guilty but Mentally Ill/Sentencing

25

Throughout his testimony, Appellant referred to Mr. Samios as the "C.I." We do not agree with his designation of

Samios, as Samios was a named informant.

26

The Notes of Testimony from Appellant's Guilty Plea hearing indicate that Appellant informed the trial court that

he understood the charges against him and that there were numerous victims with regard to his attempted crimes. See

N.T. 3/28/05, pp. 7-14, 16·17.

27

Appellant later testified that Sarnios conducted construction work on numerous properties Appellant owned in

Pennsylvania and Baltimore, Maryland. N.T. 11/25/08, pp. 95-97.

Page 22 of 112

Hearing on May 25, 2005, and was therefore "more in [his] right mind then," he claimed he still

"wasn't as clear" as he was on the date of the June 26, 2008 hearing. N.T. 6/26/08, pp. 70, 75.

Appellant also claimed he was not as clear mentally when Attorney Tauber represented Appellant

on his direct appeal, and he claimed that Attorney Tauber refused to attempt to withdraw

Appellant's guilty plea upon request. N.T. 6/26/08, p. 71.

Appellant admitted, however, that as a former attorney representing a number of criminal

Appellants, he understood how guilty pleas are performed, was familiar with the elements of

colloquies and the constitutional rights a Appellant gives up following entrance of a guilty plea,

as well as the limited right to appeal and the dictates of the Wiretap Act. Appellant indicated that

he understood the rights that an individual possesses that are waived in order to enter a guilty plea.

Furthermore, he indicated that at the time he entered the guilty plea, he understood that he entered

a nolo contendere or guilty but mentally ill plea to crimes that occurred in Bucks County. N.T.

6/26/08, pp. 30-31, 69, 97; N.T. 11/25/08, pp. 46-48.

Appellant additionally indicated that he understood that by entering an open guilty plea,

his sentence was dependent upon the trial judge, and he understood that no recommendation was

made as to sentence. Finally, he recalled that Judge Biehn instructed him regarding the Sentencing

Guidelines and that his sentence was in fact within the standard range of the Guidelines. N.T.

11/25/08, pp. 67-68, 70, 89-90. Appellant did not raise a claim that he was wrongfully induced to

enter into a guilty plea until the filing of the instant PCRA Petition. N.T. 6/26/08, p. 78.

Appellant claimed he entered into a nolo contendere plea because Attorney Fink informed

him he would never go to jail and would be housed in a mental hospital, and had assured him that

"he got this all worked out." N. T. 6/26/08, p. 80-81. Appellant testified that he remained steadfast

in the proposition that he wanted to go to trial and that Fink never explained to him the reasoning

Page 23 of 112

. ...-...

behind his recommendation to enter into a guilty plea besides that it was in his best interest. N.T.

11/24/08, 36, 39. Appellant testified that according to Fink, "he was supposed to spend one year

[at a mental health hospital] and go home" following his sentencing. N.T. 6/26/08, 84-86.

Appellant later testified at the November 24, 2008 hearing that Fink suggested he enter a

guilty plea to solicitation to commit aggravated assault and that he would be looking at "two to

four [years] maybe spent in a mental hospital."28 N.T. 11124/08, pp. 36, 73. Appellant testified

that ifhe would have received a two (2) to four (4) year sentence in the Bucks County Correctional

Facility he "probably" would not have filed an appeal to the Superior Court. N.T. 11125/08, p. 87.

Appellant also indicated that Fink said that by pleading guilty he could "keep [his] stuff," meaning

his law license, properties and contact with his family. N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 73-74. Receiving a

sentence of time served in a mental health institution as opposed to incarceration in a correctional

facility was an important consideration when Appellant entered his plea. N. T. 6/26/08, pp. 81-82.

However, following his sentencing Appellant was "unexpectedly" transported to SCI Graterford

for classification purposes, then he went to SCI Camp Hill for a "couple months," followed by SCI

Cresson, where he continues to serve his sentence. N.T. 6/26/08, p. 83.

Thereafter, Appellant referred to the Notes of Testimony from his Guilty Plea, during

which Judge Biehn informed Appellant that if, at the time of sentencing, he is still in need [ of

treatment] or severely mentally disabled, he may serve part of his sentence in a mental institution.

N.T. 6/26/08, pp. 88-89; N.T. 11/25/08, pp. 77-79; see N.T. 3/28/05, pp. 15-16.29 Furthermore, at

the Guilty but Mentally Ill/Sentencing Hearing, Judge Biehn indicated that Appellant would be

28 Appellant testified that he would have done whatever Fink suggested, as he was his "expert" and he trusted him.

N.T. 11/25/08, pp. 71-72.

29The Court explained further that Appellant would serve some or all of his sentence in a mental health institution

until Appellant is found "to be no longer severely mentally disabled and in need of that kind of treatment under the

Mental Health and Procedures Act." Appellant indicated that he understood. N.T. 3/28/05, pp. 15-16.

Page 24 of 112

evaluated and serve the initial part of his sentence in a mental health and psychological facility

and/or a drug and alcohol facility. N.T. 6/26/08, pp. 89-90; N.T. 11/25/08, pp. 92-93; see N.T.

5/25/05, 99-100.

Prior to the entry of his Guilty Plea, Appellant admitted that he reviewed the Affidavit of

Probable Cause attached to the criminal complaint. N.T. 11/25/08, p. 64. In addition, Appellant

listened to relevant portions of the tapes at the District Attorney's Office prior to the plea, Fink

provided him with copies of the tapes prior to the plea as well, and he advised Judge Biehn at his

sentencing hearing that he listened to the tapes. N.T. l I/24/08, p. 19; N.T. I 1/25/08, p. 64; N.T.

5/25/05, pp. 90-91.

Judge Biehn informed Appellant of his right to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea

within ten (10) days, indicated that Appellant appeared to understand the proceeding, and ensured

that Appellant did not have any questions of the Court. N.T. 11/25/08, pp. 79-80. See N.T. 3/28/05,

p. 20. Appellant also testified at his guilty plea that he was satisfied with Fink's representation and

did not have any questions of the court. N.T. 11/25/08, pp. 79-80.

It was uncontradicted that Appellant did not possess written proof that he would receive a

two (2) to four (4) year sentence or that he would serve his sentence in a mental hospital. N.T.

11/25/08, pp. 70- 71, 91.

Appellant claims that there existed no factual basis for his plea contained on the record

because the District Attorney did not read the affidavit of probable cause or other documents into

Page 25 of 112

.-.......

the record.3 ° Furthermore, the tapes/interceptions31 of Appellant's recorded conversations were

not played for the Court. N.T. 6/26/08, p. 100. However, the Notes of Testimony indicate that both

the District Attorney and defense counsel agreed that the notes presented to the court from the

litigation concerning Appellant'sMotion for Habeas Corpus were sufficient to establish the factual

basis for the plea. See N.T. 3/28/05, pp. 17-18.

Appellant testified at the Guilty Plea hearing that he reviewed the stipulation and

acknowledged that the facts set forth therein formed the basis for his conduct underlying the instant

charges. See N.T. 3/28/05, pp. 18-19. However, this stipulation was not located within the

transcript from Appellant's guilty plea hearing. Appellant claimed that there were different

versions of the habeas corpus petition and supporting documents and he had not reviewed some of

these documents, including the factual stipulation. As such, Appellant claimed he did not read this

document prior to his Guilty Plea or Guilty but Mentally Ill/Sentencing Hearings. N.T. 6/26/08,

pp. 103-105.32 Appellant was later referred to Page 10 of the Guilty Plea hearing transcript. At this

point in the hearing, Judge Biehn explained that the nolo contendere plea followed disposition of

Appellant's Petition for Habeas Corpus and that Appellant was acknowledging that there was

30 The defective plea colloquy claim also encompasses an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as Appellant alleges

that Fink failed to adequately go over the stipulated document that was later read into evidence; said document was

not signed by Fink or dated, and there were lines drawn through it. N.T. I l/24/08, pp. 39-40. He also claims that some

of the factual averments contained therein were false and "not supported by anything [the Commonwealth has] in

evidence." N.T. 11121/08, p. 40. The District Attorney explained that following the Sentencing hearing, the Court

Reporter requested a copy of the Habeas Corpus document and the District Attorney accordingly provided it. N.T.

11/24/08, p. 44. He indicated that the paragraphs which were crossed out were not recited for the Court or, in the

alternative, were summarized for the Court in the District Attorney's own words. N.T. 11124/08, pp. 44-45.

31 Because both Appellant and the Commonwealth characterize the recorded conversations relevant to the instant case

that were later memorialized on cassette tapes as either tapes or interceptions, we use these terms interchangeably

throughout the remainder of our Memorandum Opinion.

32 Inlater testimony, Appellant claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform Appellant of the contents

of said document prior to his Guilty Plea and Guilty but Mentally Ill/Sentencing Hearings. N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 28-30,

31.

Page 26 of 112

r..........

sufficient evidence to establish the relevant charge despite Appellant's lack of admission thereto.

N.T. 11125/08, pp. 94-95. See N.T. 3/28/05, pp. 9-10.

At Appellant's Guilty but Mentally Ill/Sentencing Hearing, the Habeas Corpus document

was read into the record and entered into evidence as the Court's Exhibit 1 (Exh. CE-1). See N.T.

5/25/05, pp. 6-30, Exh. CE-1. Appellant claimed he brought his disagreement with some of the

facts to Fink's attention but to no avail. N.T. 6/26/08, pp. 135-37.

Specifically, Appellant underwent an analysis of each and every page of the recitation of

Exhibit CE-I at the November 24, 2008 hearing. He claimed that the vehicles that he used to

further his insurance fraud scheme were "on blocks" and therefore not in working order to facilitate

a car crash. He also claimed that Samios and Ms. Fryling (Fryling) had no automobile insurance

at this time, intimating that the statements and proposed testimony of these witnesses were false.

Additionally, he claimed he only had one (1) single limousine whereas the District Attorney

claimed he had several. N.T. 11124/08, pp. 50-51, 55. Furthermore, he claimed that (I) there was

no intended victim in the instant case and (2) he owned the Lower State Road property and Mr.

Witthauer "was a crack addict that broke into one of my houses, barricaded himself, and had crack

parties." N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 53, 54; N.T. 11/25/08, p. 110. Appellant called the police numerous

times in an attempt to remove Mr. Witthauer from the property. N.T. 11125/08, pp. 110-11. He

also denied that he planned to purchase the Lower State Road property to renovate it into a "kama

sutra" club, and in fact blamed Mr. Witthauer for the sex club scheme.33 N.T. 11/24/08, p. 53.

Ultimately, Appellant refused to take responsibility for the crimes to which he pied guilty,

as he claimed that no crimes were committed and ''there's no responsibility to take." N.T.

11/25/08, pp. 112-13.

33 While questioning Detective Carroll on direct-examination, Appellant again attempted to inculpate Mr. Witthauer

in the scheme. N.T. 8/13/13, pp. 24-26.

Page 27 of 112

Moreover, Appellant claimed that any incriminating statements made were not "insidious

commands" but, based on the fact that "laughter" and "words of comedy" were cut out of the

transcriptions, in reality these statements were the result of "people that are drinking, doing meth

and in a different frivolity." He contends that many of the statements that either he or Samios made

regarding the solicitation scheme were mischaracterized and presented to the Court in a "false

light" and that they were "represented improperly." N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 60, 65; N.T. 11125/08, p.

I 03. Appellant complained that certain dates of the transcriptions were wrong. Finally, Appellant

claimed that any "ruses" to get Samios into the property were based on legitimate legal

documentation demonstrating that Appellant was the actual owner of the property. N.T. 11/24/08,

pp. 61, 63.

Later, Appellant testified that he purchased the Lower State Road residence from Ms.

Fryling, and, thereafter, there was a dispute about Fryling and Samios moving back into the

residence. Appellant agreed to "take over" that property and give Fryling and Samios a trailer in

Valley View Trailer Park. Appellant testified that a lot of work had to be done to this particular

property as a result of "deferred maintenance." He claimed Samios had a crew of approximately

six (6) to twelve (12) construction workers and that this was his purpose for him being at the Lower

State Road property. He admitted on cross-examination that he had purchased the property from

the Witthauers and that Patricia Witthauer's name was still on the deed to the property prior to

Lower State Road Associates purchase thereof N.T. 11/25/08, pp. 98-106; see N.T. 2/07/11, pp.

191-93; Exh. P-104, P-105, P-106.

On November 24-25, 2008, Appellant testified regarding his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim against Fink. Appellant testified that Fink met with him only a "few" times regarding

this case. He claimed that following his preliminary hearing, his bail was increased and he was

Page 28 of 112

subsequently sent to the Bucks County Correctional Facility (BCCF) and then a mental hospital

for approximately one (1) month. During his time at the mental hospital, Appellant averred that

Fink did not meet with him. Following his stay at the mental hospital, Appellant was returned to

BCCF, and was thereafter released on house arrest in January of 2005 until March of 2005. He

was later re-committed back to BCCF as a result of cocaine use. Appellant testified that Fink did

not meet with him during either his time in BCCF or on house arrest at his residence in Furlong,

Bucks County. However, he did visit with Fink approximately three (3) times while on house arrest

to discuss the case. On one occasion, Marty Lyons (Lyons), the investigator Appellant had hired

through Fink, was present and allegedly indicated that there were problems with the interceptions.

N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 32-35.

More specifically, Appellant testified that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim

includes Fink's alleged failure to do the following: challenge the prosecution's case by waiving

the preliminary hearing in his absence; obtain discovery from the District Attorney's Office;

provide Appellant with a full copy of discovery; include a complete copy of the tapes of his

recorded conversations with Samios or a transcription of the tapes and the chain of custody of said

tapes; listen to the tapes/transcriptions;34 litigate a suppression motion and add allegations of a

constitutional violation of the Wiretapping Act to said motion as well as adding a notice of intent

to impeach both Samios and Fryling by evidence of past criminal convictions;35 challenge the

34

Significantly, Appellant later admitted that both he and Fink listened to a portion of the tapes in the District

Attorney's Office. N.T. I I/24/08, pp. 19-21.

35 Appellant further testified these violations were the result of conversations being recorded of him in his home

without a valid search warrant, as well as conversations being recorded that took place out of state or outside the

country. He also alleged that investigating officers utilized false statements and omissions to obtain the warrant to

conduct electronic surveillance. Furthermore, Appellant testified that although the prosecution claimed there were

between ten (10) to eighteen (18) hours of transcription, when he received copies there were only approximately six

(6) hours that contained "all kinds of edit marks and all kinds of breaks in the tapes ... and gaps." N.T. 11/24/08, pp.

16-18.

Page 29 of 112

chain of custody for the alleged $2,000.00 paid to Samios to order the hit of Mr. Witthauer; and

retrieve both Appellant and Detective Carroll's cell phone records36 and his "Palm Pilot" showing

his schedule. In terms of the habeas corpus document that provided the factual basis for Appellant's

nolo contendere and guilty but mentally ill plea, he testified that he was unsure as to who authored

the document and it was not dated or signed by either Fink or the District Attorney. N.T. 11/24/08,

pp. 13-28, 37, 69, 75.

Later, Appellant claimed that Fink informed him that the prosecution "had no case" and he

would have the case thrown out at the preliminary hearing. Specifically, Appellant testified that

Fink said the case will be "taken care of' or "gone" following the preliminary hearing. He also

stated that, prior to the preliminary hearing, Fink's office confirmed that Appellant should go to

the hospital and Appellant was under the impression that the hearing would be continued.37 N.T.

11/25/08, pp. 13-14, 104-05.

Later in his testimony, Appellant added a claim that Fink failed to file and litigate a Motion

to Withdraw Guilty Plea that he requested "soon after" he entered into the plea. However, despite

this, Appellant permitted Fink to continue his representation through the Guilty but Mentally

Ill/Sentencing Hearing. N.T. 11/25/08, pp. 24, 25.

Finally, Appellant made the blanket assertion that Fink was ineffective for failing to

communicate with him honestly, as Fink informed him that investigating officers did not violate

the Wiretapping Act and that he reviewed all the evidence against him very thoroughly. N.T.

11/24/08, pp. 71-72.

ss Appellant has since obtained his personal cell phone records, which were attached to his PCRA Petition as Exhibit

132. N.T. 11/24/08,pp. 76-77.

31 Fink later testified that he could not verify that his secretary at the time spoke to Appellant regarding his failure to

appear at the preliminary hearing. However, he indicated that he recalls speaking to Dr. Strochak afterward who said

that if Appellant was experiencing "such severe reactions that [he] should go to the hospital." N.T. 8/26/10, pp. 78-

79, See Exh. P-1 (e-mail from Dr. Strochak to Mr. Fink relating to Appellant's hospitalization).

Page 30 of 112

----·.

Appellant testified that Tauber was part of Appellant's counsel team prior to his guilty plea

in order to assist and consult with Fink. He also retained Tauber and his firm, Levant, Martin &

Tauber, to litigate his direct appeal. Appellant contracted with Tauber for $100,000. Appellant

claimed he is raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in relation to their representation.

Appellant filed a civil suit claiming breach of contract and legal malpractice against Tauber and

his firm, on the basis that Appellant asked them to withdraw his guilty plea,38 file motions, enter

their appearance, and raise certain issues on appeal and they failed to do so. Appellant enumerated

the issues on appeal he requested be raised, including the fact that he believe his sentence was too

long, the sentencing judge improperly used mental illness39 as an aggravating factor, as well as an

issue relating to the withdrawal of his guilty plea. Appellant also added that he wanted Tauber to

take over the case from Fink. N.T. 11/25/08, pp. 8-11, 17, 25-26, 34-35.

Appointed defense counsel, Harry Cooper, Esquire, explained that the basis for Appellant's

prosecutorial misconduct claim encompasses the District Attorney's failure to turn over

exculpatory evidence in discovery, the exaggerated language contained on the interceptions, as

well as the tampered, destroyed and fabricated physical evidence and violations of the

Pennsylvania Wiretapping Act. N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 79-80.

Appellant also raised an issue, presumably in the context of prosecutorial misconduct, that

Samios was permitted to provide Appellant drugs and alcohol at the time the conversations were

intercepted by law enforcement. Appellant testified that Samios admitted this to Lyons, the private

38 Appellant testified that he specifically requested Mr. Tauber or other members of his firm to withdraw his guilty

plea; however, they failed to do so either before or after sentencing. During this time, however, Fink was Appellant's

attorney of record. N.T. 11/25/15, pp. 22~23.

39

Following Fink's entry of appearance, Appellant was treated by Dr. Strochak and Dr. Cohen. Prior to this, he was

diagnosed at Friends Hospital with bipolar, mania, dissociative identity disorder and psychosis and was placed on

medication. He testified that he agreed with both doctor's reports as well as Dr. Strochak's testimony before Judge

Biehn. N.T. 11/25/08, pp. 36-39.

Page 31 of 112

investigator, and this admission was brought to Fink's attention via e-mail. Appellant also

indicated that it was his belief that Fink should have litigated this issue via a suppression motion.

N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 80-85.

b. Richard Fink's PCRA Testimony"

Fink indicated that he had been practicing law for about thirty (30) years, and his practice

is and has been primarily in criminal law. Appellant privately retained Fink to represent him in the

instant case. Fink went to the Lehigh County prison to meet with Appellant following an indication

from a Philadelphia defense attorney that Appellant was interested in meeting with him. Upon

consideration of the fact that Fink viewed this case as complex and the added notoriety based on

Appellant's position as an attorney, his fee was substantial. N.T. 11/24/08, 89-91, 145-46.

Fink met with Appellant prior to the preliminary hearing. Fink testified that "the potential

adverse consequences of having the preliminary hearing as opposed to obtaining all of the

discovery very early in the case" were discussed. It follows that the District Attorney agreed to

such an arrangement. Fink testified that the case itself was largely based on the recorded

interceptions of conversations between Appellant and Samios and, as a result, full discovery early

on in the case would enable him to start preparing the case for trial. He explained that the only

disadvantage to waiving the preliminary hearing would be foregoing the testimony of Samios, who

was the Commonwealth's main source of information in the case. Appellant's biggest contention

was that Samios had been supplying him with drugs at the time their conversations took place.

Fink determined that this could potentially constitute an entrapment defense in this case and,

40

Mr. Fink testified at Appellant's counseled hearing on November 24, 2008. Mr. Fink was recalled by Appellant

after he was permitted to represent himself at the August 26, 20 IO and November I 9, 201O hearings. In the interest

of judicial economy, we have summarized Mr. Fink's collective testimony and categorized it by relevant claim to

avoid duplication.

Page 32 of 112

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therefore, he wanted to look for confirmation of Appellant's contention. N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 91-

94, 155-56; N.T. 9/19/11, p. 60.

In his testimony, Fink identified the potential danger of having the preliminary hearing as

follows:

There had been some publicity in this case, some really bad adverse publicity. The

fact he was [a] lawyer, first of all, created a lot of publicity. The allegations of the

sexual operation created a lot of publicity. There was a lawyer who got involved

in the case and stated to the newspaper that Mr. Guarrasi was creating a sorority

house out of... this building and not a bordello. And then the publicity from the

newspaper writer that the college this lawyer alluded to had no sororities, so people

were starting... to prejudge the case. It would have been well attended by the

newspaper because of a lot of substantial interest.

N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 92-93; see N.T. 2/07/11, p. 8.

Fink recommended to Appellant that he waive the preliminary hearing in order to obtain

the benefit of early discovery and to avoid the publicity that he felt would have generated a "worse

sentence." N.T. 11/24/08, p. 97. Fink testified that he discussed this at length with Appellant well

before the date of the preliminary hearing and Appellant agreed to waive it. N.T. 2/07/11, pp. 5,

7-8. Fink testified that he never informed Appellant that the case would be dismissed prior to the

preliminary hearing. N.T. 9/19/11, p. 75.

On August 11, 2004, Fink sent a letter to the District Attorney advising him that he was

authorized by Appellant to waive the preliminary hearing on three (3) conditions, including

"[r]eceipt of all the documentation regarding the wiretaps, a copy of the tapes, together with... any

transcripts made, as well as any discovery which will be expedited."41 N.T. 11/19/10, p. 175;N.T.

41Fink later testified that the Commonwealth eventually complied with all conditions. In a letter dated November 2,

2004, Fink wrote to the District Attorney inquiring as to when the documents authorizing the wiretap would be

forwarded. Fink filed a Motion for Discovery thereafter. N.T. 11/19/IO,pp. 176-179; see Exh. P-38. A November 19,

2014 letter from the District Attorney to Fink contained the requisite wire documents, although these documents were

not filed with the Clerk of Courts as of this date because (I) they were provided in the form of informal discovery and

Page 33 of 112

-

2/07/11, pp. 5-8; see Exh. P-34. After the District Attorney permitted Fink to interview Samios

prior to the preliminary hearing on August 16, 2014, Fink again advised Appellant to waive the

preliminary hearing.42 N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 94-95, 150. Fink recalled that the District Attorney gave

him "free reign" to ask questions at this point, many of which would not have been admissible at

the preliminary hearing. N.T. 11/24/08, 150; N.T. 2/07/11, 209. Samios denied any drug usage

and anything that Fink determined "might have been helpful and [he] could have corroborated."

Fink also acquired Samios' background and did not recall any specific prior convictions but did

testify that his criminal background was "relatively insignificant." He found Samios to be credible

and felt he would be believed by a jury. N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 95-97, 156. Furthermore, he testified

that Samios was a hostile witness and, although he adamantly denied providing Appellant with

drugs at the time the interceptions were recorded, in terms of Fink's investigator "he had an interest

in telling Marty Lyons the things we wanted to be told so that he could get in turn something that

he wanted." N.T. 6/13/11, pp. 115-18. Ultimately, Fink uncovered no evidence to support an

entrapment defense, nor did he find any indication that any of the information found towards the

end of the investigation would lend credence to Appellant's contention that the information

constituted "jokes." N.T. 9/19/11, p. 60.

Fink also recognized that mental health experts opined that Appellant had a "serious mental

health problem." N.T. 8/26/10, pp. 72-73. Accordingly, Appellant was evaluated by Dr. Strochak

and Dr. Cohen for purposes of determining whether to proceed with a mental illness defense. N.T.

(2) because it was Fink's request that the District Attorney share as much information as early as possible with him to

avoid further publicity. N.T. 6/13/11, pp. 69-71; see Exh. J-2.

42 Appellant did not appear at the preliminary hearing, however, because he checked himself into Warminster Hospital

[Mental Health Unit] the night before it was scheduled. N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 148-49. A police officer witnessed

Appellant in the waiting room in the hospital, saw a television show with his picture on it announcing that he failed

to appear at his preliminary hearing, and thereafter arrested him. N.T. l l/24/08, p. 149. Appellant was later granted

bail and was placed on house arrest. N.T. 8/26/10, p. 90.

Page 34 of 112

11/24/08, p. 162; N.T. 8/26/10, pp. 74-75. Fink discussed the insanity affirmative defense with

Appellant. N.T. 9/19111, p. 27. However, both doctors found Appellant to be competent to stand

trial. N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 162-63. Dr. Strochak was of the opinion that Appellant was not legally

insane at the time the instant crimes were committed, despite his March 20, 2005 e-mail to Fink

indicating that the "Minnesota Multi-Phasic Index" (personality test) suggests "severe mental

disturbance" on the part of Appellant. N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 164-65; N.T. 8/26/10, pp. 82-85, 86-87;

N.T. 9119/11, p. 58. See Exh. P-8.

Fink testified that Appellant's house arrest was revoked and Appellant was remanded back

to the BCCF following his cocaine use and bail was set thereafter in March of 2005. Fink recalled

receiving a letter from Dr. Cohen on March 22, 2005 which indicated that it is important that

Appellant continue to take prescribed medications while incarcerated. N.T. 8/26110, pp. 88-90; See

Exh. P-9. Fink instructed his secretary to send correspondence to BCCF on March 23, 2005

attaching a copy of Dr. Cohen's letter (Exh. P-9). Furthermore, Fink identified a letter sent on

March 29, 2005 to the BCCF Mental Health Department requesting that Appellant continue to

receive his medications as prescribed. N.T. 8/26/10, pp. 91-92, 101-102; See Exh. P-10, Exh. P-

l 1.

Fink requested a CD ROM of the intercepted conversations, however, he did not recall

exactly how many hours or how much time the tapes encompassed. He testified that he recalled

the detectives having difficulty transposing the tapes to a CD ROM and, therefore, they provided

him with copies of the actual cassette tapes. N.T. 11124/08, pp. 98-99. Fink admitted that he

listened to the tapes, however, he did not listen to all of them and could not estimate exactly how

much he listened to. N.T. 11/24/08, p. 99; N.T. 11/19/11, p. 30. He specifically recalled the end

part of the tapes where Appellant instructs Mr. Samios on "what he wants him to do" and that this

Page 35 of 112

portion did not constitute "a short time." However, Fink relied on his investigator, Marty Lyons,

to listen to the tapes in their entirety. N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 99, 101; N.T. 11/19/11, p. 30. He instructed

Lyons to review the tapes and pay attention to not only the words that were said but also the tone

of voice used by the parties being intercepted, whether they sounded like they are joking, whether

they sounded high or like they are puffing cigarettes or doing drugs, etc. Once Lyons finished

listening to the tapes, he detailed everything that would be of interest to Fink's theory of

entrapment and informed him of such via e-mail and subsequent in-person conversations. N.T.

11/24/08, pp. 101-102, 179-80. The e-mails were introduced into evidence as Exhibit D-1.

The first e-mail, which was in response to Fink's request that Lyons conduct a complete

review of the tapes, indicated that Lyons found certain tapes which exhibited mistakes in the

copying process, including parts of Tape Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 9. N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 110-111.

He recalled that Lyons indicated that there were areas in the tape that sounded like "he had

been cut off'43 and that there were gaps in the tape. Fink brought this directly to the attention of

the investigating officer, Detective Carroll, who explained that while making the recordings, he

accidently inserted a previously used tape as opposed to a new blank tape at a part of the

interceptions that Fink did not find significant. Fink received an excised version of a transcript of

the interceptions from the District Attorney's Office. N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 104-111. Additionally,

Fink described an e-mail from Lyons indicating that there was a mistake made in the copying of

one of the tapes. N.T. 2/07/11, 94-95; See Exh. P-78. Later in his testimony, Fink stated that there

was one (1) problem that he identified with the taping regarding the malfunction in the recorder

43 Fink elaborated that this meant that the voice that was being intercepted had gone down in volume or the tape

sounded clear and no one was talking. N.T. 11124/08, p. 103. Exhibit P-79 constitutes an e-mail from Lyons to Fink

describing the dates of the tapes which contained supposed errors in the copying process. Lyons met with Detective

Carroll to review his perceived errors. Fink received more accurate copies of the tapes thereafter. N.T. 2/07/1 I, pp.

96-101.

Page 36 of 112

wherein a tape that had two sides was flipped onto auto reverse and, therefore, seconds of the other

side were taped over." N.T. 6/13/11, p. 152; N.T. 9!19/11, pp. 33-34. Furthermore, one of the

intercept tapes (Tape 10) ended in mid-sentence. N.T. 6/13/11, p. 158. He described these as

"minor" technical problems involving the recording of the tape. N.T. 911911 I, p. 59. Fink contacted

Detective Carroll who remedied the problem and sent a complete and corrected copy. N.T. 2/07/11,

p. 95.

Fink testified that both he and Appellant listened to the interceptions in the District

Attorney's Office prior to the preliminary hearing.45 N.T. 11/24/08, p. 142; N.T. 9119/11, p. 84.

The portion of the tapes which they both listened to at this time totaled approximately twenty (20)

to thirty (30) minutes.46 N.T. 11/24/08, p. 142; N.T. 2/07/11, p. 131. Although he had instructed

Appellant not to react to the interceptions that were played at this time, Fink did not follow his

own instructions, and he reacted to what he perceived as "very dangerous" words spoken by

Appellant. He stated that these words made Appellant seem like an "evil" person and they

"dehumanized" him. N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 151-153. He explained that the statements made by

Appellant during the intercepts were "devastating" in the sense that "it was worse than instructing

someone to engage in these actions. It was more like personal guru instruction to someone as to

how to live their life and how to be a hit man." Fink agreed that following his review of the

intercepted conversations, it became "less a matter of cross-examination and more a matter of

trying to limit the damage." N.T. 9/19/11, p. 83.

44

Fink testified this would constitute a violation of the Wiretap Act, however, it would be a technical violation which

would not result in suppression. N.T.9/19/11, p. 88.

45

Furthermore, when Appellant was on house arrest, Fink made a copy of the tapes for Appellant to review. N.T.

11/24/08, pp. 157-58; N.T. 9/19/11, pp. 85-86.

46

This included much of the content played for Judge Biehn during Appellant's sentencing proceeding. N.T. 9/l9/l l,

p. 84.

Page 37 of 112

.-- ..

Following his review of what he perceived to be more incriminatory statements made to

Samios in furtherance of the solicitation, Fink noted as follows:

The beginning of the tapes, from earlier days and much earlier times was not of as

much interest to me because, unless in the beginning of the tapes he was saying,

'I'm going to make a big joke at [the] end of these tapes,' I don't see how it could

have affected my determination.

N.T.11/24/08,pp. IOO-OI;seeN.T. 9/19/11,pp. 59-60.

Fink indicated that the Commonwealth transcribed portions of the recorded conversations,

but they were summaries and not word-for-word verbatim transcripts. N.T. 9/19/11, pp. 31-32.

Fink was aware that the currency collected from Samios was confiscated; however, he

never examined it and did not recall whether or not it was dusted for Appellant's fingerprints. N.T.

11/24/08, pp. 138-39; N.T. 2/07/11, p. 177; N.T. 9/19/11, p. 35.

According to his independent review of the tapes prior to the guilty plea, Fink testified that

the intended victim was Mr. Witthauer as well as his wife and child.47 N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 168-69.

Fink characterized Mr. Witthauer as a holdover tenant. However, it was Fink's "vague

recollection" that when Mrs. Witthauer sold Appellant the property, there was an agreement that

the family was allowed to stay in the house. N.T. 2/07/11, pp. 189, 194-95.

Fink filed a suppression motion with regard to the wiretaps; however, after a thorough

review of the wiretap statute and related caselaw, and after consultation with co-counsel Tauber,

he determined with his staff attorneys, as well as Appellant, that this motion would be meritless.

(emphasis supplied)48 N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 122-23, 173; N.T. 2/07/11, pp. 12-13, 148-53; N.T.

2/07/11, pp. 112-13; N.T. 9/19/11, p. 61. In arriving at this conclusion, Fink reviewed the Wiretap

47 At his guilty plea, Appellant agreed that he was entering a guilty plea to two (2) separate counts of criminal attempt

to commit aggravated assault to different individuals. See N.T. 3/28/05, p. 13.

48

This included review of whether Detective Carrol! established probable cause for the issuance of an in-home

interception authorization order. N.T. 2/07/11, pp. 145-46.

Page 38 of 112

Act.49 N.T. 2/07/11, pp. 13-17; N.T. 9/19/11, pp. 60-61. His outline of all the potential "attacks

which could be launched on the wire" were contained in his file, of which Appellant then had

possession" N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 124-25; N.T. 9/19/11, p. 74. Fink testified that he had not had

the opportunity to review his file since 2005. N.T. 9/19/11, p. 74. Furthermore, Fink, Tauber, and

other attorney's from Tauber's firm examined the Affidavit of Probable Cause for the issuance of

the wiretap order and determined that "there was probable cause if you deleted the items which

[Appellant] [was] contending were false." N.T. 9/19/11, p. 44. Fink could not specifically recall

if he checked whether the tapes were sealed or the chain of custody; however, he assured Appellant

that he had investigated every avenue upon which the wiretaps could be challenged. N.T.

11/24/08, pp. 123-24, 137. He later testified that it was his belief that Detective Carroll had the

tapes in his possession throughout the entirety ofthis case. N.T. 2/07/11, pp. 108, 125, 129; N.T.

11/24/08, p. 137. Further, he explained to Guarrasi that by entering a guilty plea he was waiving

his right for the motion to be heard. N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 125-26. Fink did not recall receiving any

monitor records/master logs pursuant to the interceptions in this case. N.T. 2/07/11, pp. 116, 166.

Fink believed that Appellant's words contained in the interceptions and his directions to

Samios were damning and sufficient to potentially constitute Solicitation to Commit Murder. N. T.

11/24/08, pp. 119-20. Regardless, he filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus, challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence to establish each element of each charge. N.T. 11/19/10, p. 117. A

49 Fink explained that the District Attorney designated an Assistant District Attorney to make interceptions of Mr.

Samios and Appellant's conversations, as required by the Wiretap Act. Appellant went through the painstaking

analysis of attempting to establish that because the District Attorney in the instant case was a Chief Deputy/Deputy

District Attorney at the time the interceptions were authorized, this was a violation of the Wiretap Act. Fink succinctly

responded as follows: "I think it's not relevant for this reason: I think that a Deputy District Attorney as well as a

Chief Deputy District Attorney or any of the inclusive provisions you can use to denominate District Attorneys

includes an Assistant District Attorney." N.T. 2/07/11, pp. 23-57.

soFink stated that Appellant never denied it was both his and Mr. Samios' voices on the intercepted tapes, nor did

Appellant indicate that he was not physically present in Bucks County at the time they were recorded. N.T. 9/19/11,

61·62

Page 39 of 112

conference on the Habeas Corpus Petition was held in Judge Biehn's chambers, with both defense

counsel and the District Attorney present. Fink testified that it occurred before the guilty plea.

N.T. 11/19110, p. 113; N.T. 9/19/11, p. 95. In discussing the Petition for Habeas Corpus further,

Fink recalled that it was submitted to Judge Biehn on the stipulated facts (i.e., the Habeas Corpus

document that established the factual basis for Appellant's plea) and, therefore, there was no in-

court evidentiary hearing. N.T. 2/07/11, p. 11.

He described the Habeas Corpus document, which was used to establish the factual basis

of Appellant's plea, as follows:

To the best of my recollection, this is the document which was prepared for

the purpose of a determination at my request by Judge Biehn at a writ of habeas

corpus, the facts being submitted to him as the facts in light best seen pro

prosecution.

In other words, I was asking Judge Biehn to give us an opinion as to whether

or not the evidence seen in the best light as favor- most favorable to the prosecution

would support a verdict of guilty of attempted murder. We briefed it, we presented

the facts to him, and conferenced it with him, and presented a writ of habeas to him.

N.T. 11/24/08, p. 135. The District Attorney prepared this document. Nevertheless, Fink testified

that he had the opportunity to review it and it was his opinion that the District Attorney "was

casting [the facts] a little towards the side of fairness to Mr. Guarrasi instead of overstepping him."

N.T. 11/24/08, p. 136.

With regard to the statements made by Appellant pursuant to the transcriptions as they

appear in the Habeas Corpus document, Fink testified as follows:

... I believe that the extract that was basically what I have said is the very worst

things that [Appellant] said, and that's what was admitted into evidence. The part

where the crime was planned and the part where [Appellant] [was] offering money

to Samios and those portions, I did listen to. And I told [Appellant] that I thought

that they were ...just some of the worst things I've ever heard. And that was in this

extract.

Page 40 of 112

N.T. 2/07/11, p. 162.

In terms of the nolo contendere and guilty but mentally ill plea, he met with Appellant a

number of times between the preliminary hearing and the guilty plea. N.T. 11/24/08, p. 126. He

could not recall meeting Appellant in his holding cell prior to the plea; however, it was something

that he normally would do. N. T. 11/19/10, pp. 159-60. Because Appellant requested another law

firm to "check everything" Fink had done on the case, all of the attorneys met with Appellant and

discussed the evidence against him, the possibility of a guilty plea and any trial tactics. Appellant

was " ... very interested in our opinions and the reasons for them and analyzing them." Fink

indicated that Appellant understood that, ultimately, it was the consensus of the attorneys that his

best course of action was to pursue a guilty plea. Fink stated, however, that he was quite certain

that he informed Appellant it was his ultimate and personal decision as to how he wanted to

proceed and the lawyers could only express their opinion on the matter. Fink testified that " ... I

took great pains to make sure that [Appellant] understood ... " and that it was his belief Appellant

did in fact understand the decision to enter a guilty plea, the reasons supporting this decision and

that " ... [Appellant] made a very intelligent decision by decided to plead guilty." N.T. 11/24/08,

pp. 126-128, 159-160, 173-174, 178; N.T. 9/19/11, pp. 67, 72. Fink later reiterated that he was

satisfied in the number of his meetings with Appellant and additional communications with him,

and that he understood what the facts of the case were. N.T. 9/19/11, pp. 57, 72.

Fink explained that his strategy in advising Appellant to plead guilty plea was a result of

his legal research into the elements of the crimes charged and what evidence was required for the

Commonwealth to prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, his determination that there

were no defenses applicable, and the fact that the probable cause affidavits pursuant to the court

order and arrest warrant substantially set forth the facts and established probable cause, even with

Page 41 of 112

.. .-......

the excising of statements made by the informants that Appellant alleged were misstatements of

fact. Furthermore, he also considered his meeting with Samios, as set forth above. He described

Samios as being ''eager to assist the Commonwealth and eager to help prosecute Mr. Guarrasi,"

and he did not have any information that Samios did not voluntarily consent to the interceptions.

N.T. 9/19/11, pp. 63-66, 77.

Fink testified and we accepted that he did not threaten Appellant in any way to force him

to enter a guilty plea, nor did he make a recommendation as to his ultimate sentence. Furthermore,

Fink did not promise Appellant a specific amount of time he would serve, nor did he promise him

the place of incarceration. N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 161, 170; N.T. 9/19/11, pp. 67-68.51 In fact, he

testified that an individual who enters a nolo contendere and guilty but mentally ill plea will be

classified first by the state, after which a determination is made as to where an individual will serve

their sentence. Appellant understood that it would be an open guilty plea. Fink also stated that he

did not witness the other attorneys with whom he was working threaten Appellant in any way.

N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 161, 171.

Fink testified that he anticipated Appellant would be sentenced to a four (4) to eight (8)

year sentence of incarceration. However, he informed Appellant that he expected the best a judge

could possibly do for him was a two (2) to four (4) year sentence; however, he cautioned Appellant

that "two years is an awfully small number for a crime of this seriousness." He informed Appellant

of this prediction and he testified that he "believe[d] that [Appellant] understood everything that I

was telling him." N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 117, 129.

Fink further testified that prior to the guilty plea, Appellant informed him that he had not

been taking his medication, which was brought to Judge Biehn' s attention. However, Fink did not

51

Fink assumed that Appellant would lose his attorney's license, but another attorney was representing Appellant on

that issue. N.T. 9/19/11, p. 68.

Page 42 of 112

have any reason to believe that Appellant was incompetent up to the date of the guilty plea and

during the entire plea proceedings. It was his opinion that Appellant understood the proceedings

in their entirety. Furthermore, if there had been any question of Appellant's competence to

proceed, Fink would have brought that to the Court's attention and asked for a competency

evaluation by a psychiatrist. N.T. l 1/19/10, p. 154; N.T. 9/19/11, p. 68-72; see N.T. 3/28/05, pp.

16, 22.

Fink also had no recollection of Appellant discussing the withdrawal of his guilty plea prior

to sentencing, and he did not see any grounds upon which the plea could be withdrawn. He recalled,

however, that he received "some correspondence with Tauber's firm about withdrawing the plea

for him and their declining to do so." N.T. 11/24/08, pp. 133-134; N.T. 9/19/11, p. 81.

At his Guilty but Mentally Ill/Sentencing Hearing, the Commonwealth played a

"compilation" of the recorded intercepts, which comprised a total of twenty-one (21) minutes. See

N.T. 5/25/05, p. 31. Fink testified that he assumed this compilation was put together by the District

Attorney. He was of the opinion that

" ... the compilation ... which is an extraction and a summary of the tapes, was not

including a number of things that were detrimental to you ... when I got it and

reviewed it that it was fairly done, in that it could have ... been extracted to have

worse things that you had said during these conversations."

Fink reviewed the compilation prior to it being played in court. N.T. 9/19/11, pp. 38, 82.

When asked about Appellant's prosecutorial misconduct claim, Fink opined that the case

was handled by the District Attorney's Office professionally and both he and Appellant were

treated fairly and without any malice. N.T. 11/24/08, p. 172. Fink further testified that he did not

witness or suspect any intentional misconduct. He stated that he did not have any evidence that

any documents or interceptions were falsified. N.T. 9/19/11, p. 80.

Page 43 of 112

~--.

c. Detective Timothy Carroll's PCRA Testimony52

Detective Carroll testified that he has been a law enforcement officer since I 977, and his

current position is Detective with the Bucks County District Attorney's Office. He began his law

enforcement career with the Bensalem Township Police Department (BTPD), first as a police

officer and then as a detective, until he left on September 14, 1998 to become a county detective.

N.T. 11/24/08, p. 182; N.T. 9/19/11, p. 180; N.T. 10/11/13, p. 47.

While holding the rank of detective with the BTPD, Carroll received an "A,, Certification

in March of 1994 through the Pennsylvania State Police to perform consensual and nonconsensual

telephone interceptions or "consensual wires." He has maintained the "A" Certification throughout

his employment with the BTPD, and he has been a Detective with the Bucks County District

Attorney's Office since September 14, 1998. In order to ensure that his "A" Certification remained

current, there was no lapse of service between his employment with BTPD and his employment

with the District Attorney's Office and, as a result, on September 14, 1998 he was on record for

employment by both agencies. As of the last day of his testimony in this litigation, Carroll

maintained his "A" Certification. N.T. 9/19/11, p. 47; N.T. 10/11/13, pp. 48-51, 54-55; see Exh.

C-PCRA-6.

As a result of his "A" Certification, Carroll had experience in wiretaps and electronic

surveillance, and had recorded hundreds of phone calls and supervised many in-person meetings.

He was also responsible for copying the intercepted tapes and proof-reading transcriptions of said

tapes. N.T. 11/24/08, p. 182.

52

Detective Carroll testified at Appellant's counseled hearing on November 24, 2008. Detective Carroll was recalled

by Appellant, after Appellant was permitted to represent himself, and testified at the September 19, 20 l l, August 17,

2012, May 3, August 12, 'August 13, October IO, October l l, 2013 and June 30, 2014 hearings. In the interest of

judicial economy, we have summarized Detective Carroll's collective testimony and categorized it by relevant subject

matter so as to avoid duplication.

Page 44 of 112

Carroll was the lead investigator, although he worked "hand in hand" with Detective

Mosiniak. N.T. 8/17/12, p. 6. Carroll was responsible for the recording, monitoring and copying

of tapes relating to the one-party consent intercepts within Appellant's residence. N.T. 9/19/11,

pp. 180-18 I. None of the phone calls were intercepted before authorization was issued by Judge

Gambardella, who was then Deputy District Attorney (DDA) at the time, nor were any in-home

intercepts done without court approval by Judge Biehn. N.T. 10/10/13, pp. 19-20.

Carroll identified the Memorandum of Consent on Case Number 253-2004, which was

prepared by him and then signed by both him and Samios on February 27, 2004.53 He also

identified the Application for Intercept Order authored by DDA Gambardella, the Memorandum

of Request, and the Affidavit of Probable Cause attached thereto and authored by him and sworn

to and subscribed by both him and Detective Mosiniak. N.T. 8/17/12, pp. 66, 71, 76; N.T. 6/30/14,

pp. 51-53. He testified that the Affidavit of Probable Cause was true and accurate to the best of

his knowledge, information and belief. N.T. 6/30/14, p. 53.

Carroll was not physically present at the time DDA Gambardella and Detective Mosiniak

presented these documents to President Judge Heckler because he was with Sarnios outside the

courthouse in order to record a telephone conversation with Appellant made in response to

voicemail messages left by Appellant for Sarnios. N.T. 8/17/12, pp. 75, 86-88; N.T. 5/03/13, pp.

57-58; N.T. 10/11/13, pp. 78-79. Carroll explained that he left the newly amended Probable Cause

Affidavit in the courthouse and he "left with a consent form and met Mr. Sarnios, and Mr. Samios

was re-consented by phone by Mr. Garnbardella... (a]nd Detective Mosiniak brought that consent

53Although the last in-person intercept occurred on the evening of February 26, 2004, which led investigatingofficers

to consult with DDA Gambardella and obtain a second intercept order covering suspicions of more serious criminal

offenses based on the content of the intercepts, the process of preparing the documents and "reconsenting" Mr. Samios

a second time, as well as presenting the information to an available Common Pleas Judge, took until the end of the

business day of February 27, 2004. N.T. 5/03/13, pp. 57~60;N.T. 8/12/13, p. 46.

Page 45 of 112

form back and took all of the required forms to Judge Heckler, and I was with Mr. Samios at

Doylestown." N.T. 10/11/13, p. 79.

Carroll also identified all documents on Case No. 254-2004, including the February 23,

2004 Application for Intercept Order as well as the attached Affidavit of Probable Cause authored,

sworn to and subscribed by him (and co-sworn to and subscribed by Detective Mosiniak). The

information contained within the Affidavit of Probable Cause was true and accurate to the best of

Detective Carroll's knowledge, information and belief. N.T. 10/11/13, pp. 78-79; N.T. 6/30/14,

pp. 55-56.

Carroll testified that DDA Gambardella was responsible for determining Samios' knowing

and willful consent. N.T. 8/17/12, 121. Carroll had no knowledge of any promises or offers made

to Samios to secure his cooperation and/or consent. N.T. 10/10/13, 130; N.T. 10/11/13, 58, 59,

93. Furthermore, Samios did not hesitate to be consensualized and have those conversations

recorded. N.T. 10/11/13, pp. 59, 93.

Detective Carroll authored the Memorandum of Interception54 as well as the Affidavits of

Probable Cause. N.T. 8/17/12, p. 49. He explained that in preparing the Memorandum of

Interception, he "listened to the tapes in their context and with the understanding of the

investigation and decided in my [his] summary what was pertinent, [and] tried to summarize it in

that way." He did not believe that anything in the Memorandum of Interception mischaracterized

any portion of the intercepted conversations. Any parentheses present in these documents were

utilized to show the context of the words. N.T. 5/03/12, pp. 112-113, 115; N.T. 10/11/13, p. 103.

The Affidavit of Probable Cause attached to the Criminal Complaint was dated March 2,

2004. N.T. 8/12/13, p. 152. In terms of this Affidavit, Carroll confirmed that, as stated directly in

54

The Memorandum of Interception was entered into evidence as C-PCRA-5. It was not made until 2010 after

Detective Carroll reviewed the intercept tapes. N.T. 9/19/11, pp. 207-08; N.T. 5/03/I3, p. 113.

Page 46 of 112

the Affidavit, on March 2, 2004, Ms. Fryling and Mr. Samios were no longer living at the 703

North Street, Doylestown, Bucks County property, because they had reported to Detective Carroll

that they believed they were the victims of Appellant who may have been involved in a theft by

deception of that property.55 N.T. 8/17/12, pp. 96-98; N.T. 10/10/13, pp. 130-31. Following a

meeting with Fryling and Samios, it was further revealed to Carroll that they had known Appellant

for some time, that he was involved in an insurance fraud scheme and, additionally, it was his plan

to turn the 703 North Street property into a brothel.56 N.T. 8/17/12, p. 98; N.T. 10/10/13, pp. 163-

64; N.T. 10/11/13, p. 58; N.T. 6/30/14, pp. 64, 67. Carroll testified that the Affidavits of Probable

Cause supporting the wire application did not contain known incorrect statements of fact. N.T.

8/17/12, p. 116. In relation to this alleged fraud, the Affidavit stated that Appellant continued to

pay for lodging for Fryling and Samios at two (2) motels in Bucks County at this same time. N.T.

8/12/13, pp. 150-51. This was also indicated on the Affidavit of Probable Cause relating to the

February 27, 2004 Application for the interceptions. N.T. 8/12/13, pp. 151-53, 163. It is

uncontroverted that at the beginning of 2004, Fryling and Samios were in danger of losing their

real property and that Samios was in need of money for his family. N.T. 8/12/13, p. 167; N.T.

10/10/13, p. 142.

ss Detective Carroll testified that pursuant to a February I 8, 2004 interview with Ms. Fryling and Mr. Samios, and as

memorialized in the February 23, 2004 Probable Cause Affidavit pursuant to 224-2004, they averred that they were

living at the 703 North Street property at this time. N.T. 8/17/12, p. l 02; N.T. 10/10/13, pp. 156-57, 162. However,

because Appellant was never charged or convicted of any crimes related to this property or the mobile home that Ms.

Fryling and Mr. Samios subsequently obtained from Appellant, we found all testimony regarding this property to be

irrelevant. SeeN.T. 8/17/12, pp. 108-11; N.T. 10/10/13, pp. 133-34, 135, 156-57, 162.

56

Although he does not recall specifically taking notes from the interviews of Fryling and/or Samios, he no longer

has them. N.T. 9/19/11, pp. 185-86; N.T. 8/17/12, pp. 45-48. He testified that "[tjhe written record of that interaction

· between myself, Fryling, Samios, and also Detective Mosiniak was incorporated in the officer's memo of request"

relative to his request that DDA Gambardella approve electronic intercept surveillance. N.T. 9/19/11, p. 186; N.T.

8/17/12, pp. 47-48. Further, that information is also reflected in the Probable Cause Affidavits relating to the Criminal

Complaint as well as the interception requests. N.T. 9/19/11, 186.

Page 47 of112

Carroll testified that all one-party consensual interceptions were conducted and intercepted

in Bucks County, and he was present with Mr. Samios for all of the recorded telephone calls. N.T.

8/12/13, pp. 55-56; N.T. 10/10/13, pp. 119, 152; N.T. 10/11/13, p. 64. In terms of Appellant's

location during intercepted telephone calls, Carroll testified that "there may have been times when"

Appellant was in Baltimore. N.T. 5/03/13, pp. 96-97, 98; N.T. 8/12/13, p. 57. There were no

wiretap applications or orders of approval to intercept conversations in Maryland regarding this

case, nor did Detective Carroll or any other investigating officer travel to Baltimore on case. N.T.

5/03/13, pp. 98-99; N.T. 8/12/13, p. 147.

Six (6) of the tapes were in analog, ninety (90) minute, two-sided standard cassette tape

form representing recordings from telephone conversations, whereas the remaining tapes

represented in-person intercepts and were two (2) hour long digital tapes (or "NT" tapes), as this

is easier to conceal on the person and they are tapes oflonger duration. N.T. 9/19/11, p. 184; N.T.

8/12/13, pp. 95, 163. Carroll stated that a total of 9.12 hours of actual conversation had been

intercepted, and the remaining seventy-one (71) minutes include "drive time" and Detective

Carroll's preamble. In regards to related civil litigation, pursuant to a request for admissions,

Carroll approximated that there were seventeen ( 17) hours' worth of tapes relating to the instant

case. He later explained that the 17 hours encompasses the total available hours of both the analog

and digital tapes themselves, not considering the actual amount of content placed on the tapes.

N.T. 10/10113, pp. 98-107.

When Carroll copied the digital tapes to analog, he created more than one (1) cassette tape

per digital tape. N.T. 9/19/11, p. 184. He testified that, as a result, there are sixteen (16) "working

copies" created from ten (I 0) original tapes representing the recorded interceptions conducted in

this case, which occurred from February 23 through March 2, 2004. N.T. 9/19/11, p. 184; N.T.

Page 48 of112

8/12/13, p. 125; N.T. 1 Oil 0/13, pp. 93-94. The working copies were made in order to maintain the

integrity of the original recordings and represent the intercepted conversations in their entirety.

N.T. 10/11/13, pp. 61-62, 95-96. In terms of the actual recording of the in-person meetings between

Samios and Appellant, Detective Carroll used what he referred to as an "extended ear

microphone," which is placed in the ear of the consenting party, who in this case was Samios, He

explained that" ... there is a wire that runs from that microphone, like a one-eighth inch plug that

plugs directly into the input of the cassette recorder, that extending mic picks up both sides of the

conversations through the ear mic." Carroll testified that he could listen in real time to the

conversations by placing a set of earphones in the earphone jack of the recorder which he had on

his person, but he did not always choose to do so. He was not sure if the ear mic ever fell out of

Samios' ear during any of these in-person interceptions, but he did not believe this ever happened,

as it would have resulted in an ambient sound and/or Samios' voice on the tape sounding more

distant. N.T. 8/12/13, pp. 97-99, 117-18.

The original tapes were contained in envelopes, with each envelope containing the case

number, the Bucks County Detectives' case number, the number of the tape, the master log

number, whether the tape is original or copy, the detective assigned, the date of the interception,

the location of the interception, the consenting individual and the target or the person intercepted.

N.T. 6/30/14, pp. 27-28, 37-38; see Exh. C-PCRA-8 (copies of the original envelopes). Mr. Herbert

Joe previously inspected these envelopes on Appellant's behalf. Carroll identified the contents

contained on each envelope as related to each individual tape. N.T. 6/30/14, pp. 36-51.

In terms of the content of the tapes, Carroll testified that prior to any intercept there is a

discussion between him and the confidential informant regarding whether it is "likely [the C.I.]

could even talk to this person about these crimes?" In the instant case, there was an agreement

Page 49 of 112

with Samios at the time he consented to the interceptions that he could discuss the scheme further

with Appellant. N.T. 10/11/13, p. 65.

Carroll explained that there were two (2) different types of recording devices utilized in

the instant case. The first was a cassette recorder/player and the second was a Sony NT digital

cassette recorder. N.T. 8/17/12, p. 140; 10/11/13, p. 73. The NT digital cassette recorder was

placed on Samios' body and Samios was not aware of how to tum the machine off. After all four

(4) in-person meetings Detective Carroll had to tum the recorder off himself. Furthermore, when

the machine is turned on or off the tape captures the sound of the mechanism of the tape. N.T.

10/11/13, pp. 73-75; N.T. 6/30/14, p. 87. However, when the tape runs out, it turns itself off. N.T.

10/11/13, p. 75.

Carroll testified that on some tapes it generally appears that a different pen was used to

mark the date on the tape itself, and this was the result of instances in which the tape was not yet

full and was therefore kept in his possession and used on a subsequent day to record additional

interceptions. He testified he never went back and changed the date on any of the tapes after the

fact. N.T. 8/17/12, pp. 133-35.

Each tape contains a preamble, which identifies Detective Carroll, the location, the date

and the time. Further, each tape includes times when a second or subsequent telephone call is

made, as well as any corresponding telephone numbers. N.T. 9/19/11, p. 187; N.T. 8/12/13, p. 72;

N.T. 10/11/13, p. 103; N.T. 6/30/14, p. 83. In each interception, Appellant was the target and

Samios was the consenting individual. N.T. 6/30/14, pp. 37-51.

Tapes 1 and 2 represent recorded telephone conversations between Appellant and Samios

from February 23, 2004.57 N.T. 5/03/13, pp. 68-69. Specifically, Tape 1 contained three (3)

57For the foregoing explanations regarding what is contained on Tapes 1-10, Detective Carroll relied on his

Memorandum of Interception, entered into evidence as C~PCRA-5.

Page 50 of 112

..-....

separate phone conversations between Samios and Appellant of varying lengths which occurred

from approximately 7:00 p.m. to 7:50 p.m., and the place of interception was the Doylestown

Township Police Department Headquarters (DTPDHQ).58 N.T. 8/12/13, p. 126; 6/30/14, p. 38; see

Exh. C-PCRA-5.

The telephone conversation between Samios and Appellant contained on Tape 2 occurred

from 9:30 p.m. to 10: 12 p.m., and the calls were also intercepted at the DTPDHQ. 59 This tape also

contains content of a call that went to Appellant's voicemail. N.T. 8/12/13, pp. 127-28; N.T.

6/30114, p. 40; see Exh. C-PCRA-5.

It was uncontroverted that no interceptions were made of any conversations on February

24, 2004. N.T. 8/12/13, p. 128.

Tape 3 contains phone conversations from February 25 and February 26, 2004. N.T.

5/03/13, p. 69. The phone calls occurring on February 25, 2004 took place between 6:44 p.m. to

9:59 p.m., respectively.t" N.T. 8/12/13, p. 130; see C-PCRA-5. Furthermore, Tape 3 also reflects

a ten (10) minute phone conversation at 12:27 p.m., a one (1) minute conversation at 2:25 p.m.,

and voicemails left by Samios for Appellant which occurred as early as 9:28 a.m. N.T. 8/12/13,

pp. 130-31; see C-PCRA-5. The interceptions on Tape 3 were made at the Pineville Tavern,

Pineville, Wrightstown Township, Bucks County and Doylestown Township, Bucks County. N.T.

6/30/14, pp. 40-41; see Exh. C-PCRA-5.

58

The DTPDHQ is located in Doylestown Township, Bucks County. N.T. 6/30/14, pp. 44-45.

59

This tape first contains a recorded telephone call made from Samios to Appellant, in which he left a voicemail and

Appellant returned his call shortly thereafter. N.T. 8/12/13, pp. 127-28.

60

These conversations were scattered throughout this time period and encompassed six (6) calls of varying lengths.

See C-PCRA-5.

Page 51 of 112

Tape 4 consists of an in-person body wire intercept that occurred on February 26, 2004 at

Appellant's home office located at 2995 York Road, Furlong, Warwick Township, Bucks County.

N.T. 5/03/13, p. 71; N.T. 10/11/13, p. 75; N.T. 6/30/14, pp. 41-42; see Exh. C-PCRA-5. This

occurred from approximately 2:45 p.m. to 4:35 p.rn. N.T. 8/12/13, p. 131. During this in-person

meeting, Appellant made a $500 payment to Samios that he was owed as a result of his completion

of work unrelated to the instant investigation. N.T. 8/13/13, p. 35. In order to get this currency,

Samios and Appellant travelled to a nearby bank, and detectives kept the two under surveillance.

N.T. 10/11/13, pp. 75-76. Detective Carroll permitted Sarnios to keep the currency because the

payment was unrelated to the crimes underlying Appellant's conviction in the instant case. N.T.

8/13/13, pp. 35-36; N.T. 10/10/13, p. 144; N.T. 10/11/13, p. 77. After this meeting, the focus of

the investigation shifted away from fraud (insurance or otherwise) to the solicitation by Appellant

to harm Mr. Witthauer. N.T. 10/11/13, pp. 77-78.

Tape 5 contains two (2) telephone conversations which took place on February 27, 2004,

from approximately 4:17 p.m. and 5:32 p.m., which were intercepted by Detective Carroll at the

DTPDHQ. N.T. 5/03/13, p. 71; N.T. 8/12/13, p. 132; N.T. 6/30/14, p. 42; see Exh. C-PCRA-5.

The first call is a response to several voicemails left by Appellant to Samios whereas the second

call is only two (2) seconds long before the tape stops. N.T. 8/12/13, p. 132. This call occurred

one (1) hour prior to an in-person meeting which was recorded on Tape 6. N.T. 10/11/13, p. 100;

see Exh. C-PCRA-5.

Tape 6 contains a two (2) hour digital body recorder type tape. N.T. 5/03/13, p. 74. The

recording of the face-to-face conversations between Appellant and Sarnios which comprise Tape

6 were intercepted at Appellant's parents' property in Gardenville, Plumstead Township, Bucks

Page 52 of 112

County.61 N.T. 5/03/13, p. 77; N.T. 10/11/13, p. 80; N.T. 6/30/14, p. 43; see Exh. C-PCRA 5.

This in-person meeting occurred from about 6:32 p.m. to 7:52 p.m. on February 27, 2004. N.T.

8/12/13, pp. 132-33; see C-PCRA-5. Tape 6 contains the $2,000.00 payment made by Appellant

to Samios, N.T. 5/03/13, p. 77; N.T. 8/13/13, pp. 48-49; N.T. 10/11/13, p. 83; N.T. 6/30/14, pp.

43-44. Detective Carroll and other investigators conducted surveillance during this intercept;

however, it was more difficult to watch the Gardenville property because it was situated along a

two-lane highway and, therefore, the officers conducted drive-bys and waited at a nearby

intersection. N.T. 10/11/13, p. 81.

Tape 7 contains two (2) telephone calls placed by Samios to Appellant that went to

Appellant's voicemail on February 28, 2004 at 5:11 p.m., and another placed at 5:19 p.m., which

Appellant answered, with that conversation lasing approximately 1.5 minutes. N.T. 5/03/13, p.

79; N.T. 8/12/13, pp. 133-34; see Exh. C-PCRA-5. The calls were intercepted at the DTPDHQ.

N.T. 6/30/14, p. 44; see Exh. C-PCRA-5. The call made at 5:11 p.m. was an outgoing call to

Appellant, as prior to this, Appellant called Mr. Samios and left a voicemail message. N.T.

8/12/13, pp. 133-34.

Tape 8 contained an in-person meeting which occurred at Appellant's home office at 2995

York Road, Furlong, Bucks County, on February 28, 2004. N.T. 8/12/13, pp. 134-35; N.T.

6/30/14, pp. 45-46; see Exh. C-PCRA-5. This meeting took place from 5:45 p.m. to 7:31 p.m. N.T.

8/12/13, pp. 134-35; see Exh. C-PCRA-5. During this meeting, Samios received paperwork from

Appellant meant "to purport [sic] some legitimacy to be at the Lower State Road property," which

he turned over to Detective Carroll following the meeting. N.T. 10/11/13, pp. 87-88; N.T. 6/30/14,

61 Detective Carroll testified that he did not physically view this meeting nor did any video surveillance record said

meeting. N.T. 5/03/13, 89.

Page 53 of 112

pp. 46, 68. Included in the paperwork was a blue print of the Lower State Road property as well

as a letter typed by Appellant. N.T. 6/30/14, pp. 47-48.

Tape 9 represents a series of telephone calls, including a five (5) minute conversation

lasting from 7:39 p.m. to 7:44 p.m, N.T. 5/03/13, p. 80; N.T. 8/12/13, pp. 135-36; see Exh. C-

PCRA-5. Furthermore, one conversation from March 1, 2004, occurring at approximately 9:43

a.rn. and lasting only forty-one (41) seconds, is also reflected on Tape 9. The second call on Tape

9 was placed at 10:20 a.m. to Appellant but went to Appellant's voicemail. The third and fourth

calls took place at 6:06 p.m. and 6:17 p.m., and again both went to Appellant's voicemail. The

next call intercepted was placed at 7:00 p.m. and constituted a three-minute-twenty-second

conversation. Another call lasting ten (10) seconds was intercepted at 9:51 p.m., which was

followed by a thirty (30) second incoming call. Finally, a call from March 2, 2004 from 5:52 p.m.

to 5:54 p.m. is contained therein.62 N.T. 8/12/13, pp. 136-139; see Exh. C-PCRA-5. All of these

telephone communications were intercepted by Detective Carroll in Doylestown and Plumstead

Township, Bucks County. N.T. 6/30/14, pp. 49-50; see C-PCRA-5.

Tape 10 consists of an in-person interception, which occurred from 10:42 p.m. on March

1, 2004 to 12:52 a.m. on March 2, 2004 at Appellant's parents' property in Gardenville, Plumstead

Township, Bucks County. N.T. 8/12/13, p. 138; 10/11/13, p. 94; see Exh. C-PCRA-5.

We accepted Detective Carroll's qualifications as an expert witness in the field of narcotics

investigation in this case. N.T. 8/13/13/, pp. 96-98. Carroll testified that he did not have any

knowledge of Appellant being provided cocaine at the time the conversations between him and

Samios were intercepted and recorded. N.T. 8/17/12, p. 117; N.T. 5/03/13, pp. 103, 109; N.T.

I 0/11/13, p. 12. Carroll further testified that in his conversations with Samios, Samios did not

62This call is contained on Tape 9 despite the fact that it actually occurred one (1) day after the previous calls, as

Detective Carroll testified that he still had room on Tape 9. N.T. 8/12/13, p. 139.

Page 54 of 112

,-.. ,

appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs at any point during the course of the

investigation. Carroll testified that ifSamios appeared to be under the influence, he would not have

continued. N.T. 10/11/13, pp. 58, 60-61, 76-77, 80, 85.

Carroll recalled that he made numerous copies of the tapes, which were provided to

Attorney Fink and his investigator Lyons, and he was later advised by Lyons that there were issues

with some of the tapes that were first copied in December of 2004. N.T. 8/12/13, pp. 101-02, 110;

N.T. 10/11/13, p. 96. These issues were later addressed by Detective Carroll's explanations, as set

forth below, and another set of corrected copies was provided to Fink sometime prior to

Appellant's guilty plea hearing, although Detective Carroll could not specifically recall exactly

when those tapes were provided. N.T. 8/12/13, pp. 122-23.

In terms of the "gaps" present in some of the transcriptions, Detective Carroll testified as

follows:

During the investigation ... which lasted ... a couple weeks, there were

numerous phone calls to Mr. Guarrasi that resulted in voice mail where Samios in

my presence over his cell phone, with me recording, it would connect with

Guarrasi's cell phone or office and would ... [result in] voicemail.

So I just kept a tape-instead of using a new tape for every phone call, I

kept the tape in my possession and we continued to make calls ... (W]hat I used to

record the call is an ear microphone and standard cassette recorder with a cassette

tape. During one of the conversations with the tape, as it should in the machine,

flipped to the second side, it automatically does that. One of my habits is, before

the next call I always check the tape to make sure I'm ready to go.

On one of these occasions after the tape had flipped to the second side and

before making another call, I opened the cassette recorder to make sure my tape

was good, closed it, made my call, didn't realize that when I opened the recorder,

it flipped back to the first side of the tape, so my next call was taping over something

that had been on side one. I realized it. And that's what happened on that particular

tape occasion.

Page 55 of 112

N.T. 11124/08, pp. 183-84. Carroll further explained that although he did not agree with defense

counsel's characterization of the spaces between the phone calls/voice mails as "gaps," he testified

that if a telephone call is made and/or Samios received a voicemail, he would tum the tape off.

Therefore, this would constitute the space in the tapes between the phone calls. N.T. 11/24/08, pp.

184-185.

Carroll indicated that Tape 3 had oral communications made out of chronological order.

N.T. 9/19/11, pp. 182-83; N.T. 8/12/13, p. 116. He explained that once a recording has filled one

side of a cassette tape, it automatically flips to the other side and continues recording. N.T.

8/17112, p. 143. He explained this constituted an unintentional tape-over of part of the previously

recorded conversations on his part. N.T. 8/12/13, p. 115. He further explained: "When I listened

to [Tape 3] I realized there were some of the calls that should have been on B had actually overrode

some conversations on A ... and that was my error." N.T. 8/12/13, pp. 116-17; N.T. 10/11/13, pp.

70-71. He later specified that on Tape 3, two (2) calls from February 26, 2004 inadvertently taped

over call 7 from February 25, 2004 for approximately 172 seconds. N.T. 10/11/13, pp. 67, 71.

Carroll recalled that there was not a lot of material conversation that was taped over other than

where Appellant and Samios should meet next in person. N.T. 10/11/13, pp. 69-70.

Tape 5 stopped recording during a telephone call. N.T. 9/19/11, pp. 182-83; N.T. 10/11/13,

p. 89. Carroll testified that he was unsure exactly why the tape had stopped recording but explained

it was his opinion it was a mechanical issue with the recorder. N.T. 8/12/13, pp. 97-99, 115, 117-

18; N.T. 10/11/13, p. 89. He recalled that the remaining conversation which did not record

regarded where Samios and Appellant should meet the next day, and that meeting was intercepted

and recorded in Tape 6. N.T. 8/12/13, pp. 98-99.

Page 56 of 112

Tape 6 is orally dated April 27, 2004 in Detective Carroll's preamble,63 which was an

admitted mistake on Carroll's part, and the actual date of this interception was February 27, 2004.

N.T. 9/19/11, pp. 182-83; N.T. 8/12/13, p. 72; N.T. 10/11/13, p. 84. Additionally, the last call on

the tape was cut off, although Carroll could not recall why the recorder stopped. N.T. 8/17/12, pp.

37-38.

Appellant attempted to establish that Tape 6 was not protected from alteration or edit

because "the red tab was not punched out." N.T. 8/17/12, p. 129. Carroll explained as follows:

.. .I believe that's the digital, small digital tapes that were the in-person tapes. They

have a very small red clip or a little mechanism that you punch through to keep the

tape from being taped over. I think they can be pushed back. I'm not sure. So that

could have been pushed through and pushed back. I'm not sure. But I don't know

that they necessarily protect tape-over as well as an analog tape, because an analog

tape, you actually break the tab on top. There's - on either side of the top of the

tape you break down a tab, and it prevents the wheels to be operated by the tape

recorder. I'm not so sure that's exactly the technology with the digital tapes.

There's a tab to punch through, but I think that tab can be returned for a tape-over.

N.T. 8/17/12, pp. 130-31; see also pp. 137-138 (identifying a photograph of one of the tapes in

which the red tab is not pushed through). It is Detective Carroll's general practice to push the red

tabs all the way through following the recording of said tapes. N.T. 8/17/12, p. 138.

Tape 10 stopped mid-sentence as the tape ran out of time. N.T. 9/19/11, pp. 182-183; N.T.

8/12/13, pp. 113, 115; N.T. 8/13/13, pp. 83, 84-85; N.T. 10/11/13, pp. 91-92. Carroll testified that

he did not recall how long of a period of time the conversation continued; however, he called

Samios to instruct him to leave twice, and Samios followed Detective Carroll's directions just a

few minutes later. N.T. 5/03/13, pp. 94-95; N.T. 8/13/13, pp. 84-85. Thus, the conversation only

continued for a few minutes. N.T. 8/13/13, p. 85.

63 This tape contains the payment of$2,000 from Appellant to Samios. N.T. 8/17/12, p. 37.

Page 57 of 112

Carroll testified that during the in-person interceptions, he and other law enforcement

officers conducted surveillance in the form of driving by the target location and waiting at nearby

locations. He testified that sometimes they would momentarily lose visual contact of Samios. N.T.

8/I 7/12, pp. 124-25. There was no video surveillance with regard to any of the in-person

interceptions. N.T. 8/12/13, p. 132; N.T. 6/30/14, pp. 67-69. Furthermore, Carroll did not recall

any summaries he made regarding the voicemails left by Appellant to Samios. N.T. 8/12/13, pp.

141-42.

Carroll did not intentionally delete or make any edits to the tapes; nor did he do anything

in an attempt to purposefully prejudice Appellant. N.T. 11124/08, pp. 185-86; N.T. 8/12/13, p. 92;

N.T. 10/11/13, pp. 62, 95-96. Furthermore, he did not splice together different conversations. N.T.

10/11/13, pp. 62-63.

Carroll had possession of the original analog and digital tapes until they were turned over

to storage. N.T. 11/24/08, p. 186; N.T. 9/19/11, p. 181; N.T. 8/17/12, pp. 50-51, 55; N.T. 10/11/13,

p. 65. Thereafter, Chief McAteer maintained custody of the tapes in the evidence locker located in

the detective's section of the District Attorney's Office. N.T. 9119/11, p. 193; N.T. 10/11/13, pp.

65-66. Carroll identified a portion of the Master Tape Log which reflected these tapes being

logged into evidence, and in which certain entries were crossed out in black ink, as they related to

other cases. The Master Tape Log represented an excerpt from a larger log kept by all county

detectives who conduct recordings for any of their respective cases. N.T. 8/12/13, pp. 83, 84-85,

Exh. P-75.

Carroll testified that Chief McAteer kept these original tapes in his custody until he gave

them back to Detective Carroll, who met with Herbert Joe in May of 2009. At this time, a bar code

Page 58 of 112

was noted on the tapes, as the county had purchased a bar code evidence system in 2004.64

Following this meeting, the tapes were transported to the Bucks County storage facility at the

Thiokol warehouse where they were placed into a temporary evidence locker. N.T. 9/19/11, pp.

193-194, 196.

Chief Deputy County Detective McAteer had assigned an evidence number for Appellant's

case on or before March 12, 2004. N.T. 8/17/12, p. 49. However, prior to this, Detective Carroll

provided Detective McDonough with $2,000,65 a file and other items seized pursuant to a search

warrant on Appellant's residence.66 N.T. 9/19/11, p. 192.

Carroll recalled that the murder-for-hire scheme was developed mostly throughout in-

person intercepted meetings between Samios and Appellant, which occurred from February 26 to

March 2, 2004. N.T. 8/13/13, pp. 61-62. He stated that "I think in the context of these ten tapes

and the seven days or eight days of the interaction between [Appellant] and Samios, it's very clear

there what's being said." Samios did not use explicitly specific language regarding this scheme

because Appellant had previously chided him for doing so while talking to him via cell phone.

N.T. 8/13/13, pp. 91-92. Furthermore, Carroll indicated that throughout the time in which the

interceptions were made, Samios and Appellant had discussions about other matters that were

unrelated and/or irrelevant to the instant case, including the alleged sale of a truck from Samios to

Appellant which occurred during the general time period of the investigation. N.T. 10/10/13, pp.

110-16; N.T. 10/11/13, pp. 43-45. Based on his knowledge of the facts underlying the case and

,,.

64

See N.T. 6/30/14, pp. 30-31 (Detective Carroll's corroborating testimony).

65

Detective Carroll received this directly from Samios on February 27, 2004. N.T. 10/10/13, p. 136.

66

Detective McDonough then submitted the currency and other items seized pursuant to the search warrant to Chief

McAteer. N.T. 8/17/12, pp. 52-53.

Page 59 of 112

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his careful review of all intercepted conversations, and with regard to the $500 payment made to

Samios in the course of the investigation, Detective Carroll found that

"[t]he 2,000 in my mind and in the context of the tapes was clearly for the crime,

for committing the crimes. It was a down payment. And then [Appellant] talks later

about paying the balance, so Ithink it's separate payments. I think there's payment

for work, and I think there's payment clearly for the solicitation."

N.T. 10/10/13, pp. 114-15. Specifically, in terms of discussions regarding the sale of the truck,

Detective Carroll determined that this was separate from the solicitation concerning the murder of

Mr. Witthauer. N.T. 10/10/13, p. 115; N.T. 10/11/13, p. 20.

During the course of the foregoing PCRA proceedings, Mr. Samios died and Detective

Carroll testified that he attended his viewing. N.T. 6/30/14, pp. 60-61; see Exh. C-PCRA-9.

d. Chief Christopher F. McAteer, Jr.'s PCRA Testimony

Chief McAteer began his career in law enforcement as a police officer and then a detective

with the Bristol Township Police Department in Bucks County, being employed there from April

1974 to October 1990. Thereafter, he became a Special Agent with the Pennsylvania Attorney

General's Office until 1997, when he began work at the Bucks County District Attorney's Office

as a detective. He was promoted to Deputy Chief of Detectives in 2000. N.T. 5/03/13, pp. 43-44.

In 2004, at the time the investigation underlying Appellant's instant conviction was under way,

ChiefMcAteer held the position of Deputy Chief. N.T. 5/03/13, p. 9.

Chief McAteer was the evid

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