Richard Hamilton v. Randy Holderman

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

September 20, 2016 Session

RICHARD HAMILTON, ET AL. v. RANDY HOLDERMAN, ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Fentress County

No. 25CC12014CV11 John D. McAfee, Judge

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No. M2015-02302-COA-R3-CV – Filed October 27, 2016

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This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict for conversion of property. The

property owners, Appellees, received a judgment of $24,999.99 in general sessions court, and

Appellants filed an appeal to the circuit court. At the jury trial, jurors awarded Appellees a

verdict of $40,000.00. Appellants appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court

Affirmed and Remanded

KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDY D. BENNETT and

ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, JJ., joined.

R. Jack Adkins, Crossville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Randy Holderman and Jennifer

Holderman.

Melanie Stepp Lane, Jamestown, Tennessee, and Daniel Hurley Rader, IV, Cookeville,

Tennessee, for the appellees, Richard Hamilton and Nell Hamilton.

OPINION

I. Background

Richard Hamilton and his wife Nell Hamilton (together, “Appellees”) own property in

Fentress County, Tennessee. The property includes a house and a barn. After several years

of using the property as a vacation home, in November 2010, Appellees began renting the

furnished property to Randy Holderman and his wife Jennifer Holderman (together,

“Appellants”). The parties entered into an agreement, the terms of which are disputed.

Appellants claim that the Appellees agreed to sell the furnished property for $100,000.00, to

be paid in monthly payments of $150.00 without interest. Appellees claim that Appellants

agreed to rent the property for $150.00 per month, with additional payments for utilities.

On August 27, 2013, Appellees sent a letter to Appellants, requesting that they vacate

the property within one month. Appellants would not willingly leave the property and

claimed that they had purchased the property. Sometime in October 2013, Appellees‟

daughter, Melanie DeAngelis, who manages Appellees‟ legal and financial affairs, increased

the insurance coverage on the contents of the home to $80,000.

On November 12, 2013, Appellees filed a forcible entry and detainer warrant in the

General Sessions Court for Fentress County (“general sessions court”), seeking a judgment of

possession.1 On January 10, 2014, the general sessions court entered an order awarding

Appellees possession of the property. Specifically, the general sessions court found that:

1. Plaintiff, Richard Hamilton[,] owns, along with his wife, Nell Hamilton[,]

the house and land [at issue];

2. In October 2010[,] Plaintiff agreed to rent this property to Defendants

Randy Holderman and Jennifer Holderman at a rate of $150.00 per month,

and defendants have occupied this property since that time;

3. Neither Richard Hamilton nor Nell Hamilton requested or authorized

defendants to make improvements or repairs to this property;

4. The parties did not enter into an oral contract for the sale of the property….

5. Even if the parties had entered into such a contract it would not be

enforceable under Tennessee law.

The judgment required Appellants to vacate the property on or before January 31, 2014. On

January 31, 2014, Appellants vacated the property, taking with them certain furnishings and

other personalty owned by Appellees. On February 6, 2014, the general sessions court held a

hearing on damages for conversion of property and found that Appellees were entitled to

$24,999.99 in damages.2 Appellants appealed the judgment of the general sessions court to

the Circuit Court for Fentress County (“trial court”).

Appellees filed a complaint in the trial court, which they amended on May 6, 2014.

Among other things, Appellees sought damages for conversion of property, allegedly valued

1

None of the general session court filings, with the exception of the December 12, 2013 judgment and

a memorandum of law filed on February 20, 2014, were included in the appellate record. Accordingly, our

review of the general sessions court proceedings is based on the undisputed statements of the parties.

2

Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 16-15-501(d)(1), the jurisdiction of general sessions

court is limited to the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00) in civil cases. Any party may appeal

from a decision of the general sessions court to the circuit court, with the appeal heard de novo in the circuit

court. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108.

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at $40,000.00, stating specifically that:

The Holdermans appropriated the Hamiltons‟ furnishings to the Holdermans‟

use and benefit;

The Holdermans intentionally exercised dominion over the Hamiltons‟

furnishings; [and]

The Holdermans‟ appropriation and exercise of dominion was in defiance of

the Hamiltons‟ rights to the furnishings.

On May 1, 2014, Appellants filed an answer to the amended complaint and, concurrent

therewith, a counter-complaint. In the counter-complaint, Appellants argued that they were

entitled to possession of the property because of an alleged agreement with Appellees to

purchase the property; Appellants averred that they had paid $32,100 towards the total sale

price. Appellants pled, among other things, that Appellees were unjustly enriched by

Appellants‟ improvements and repairs to the property, and Appellants also sought damages

for the alleged unjust enrichment. On April 3, 2014, Appellees filed an answer to the

counter-complaint, denying the material allegations thereof.

On June 2, 2015, the case was tried to a jury. Appellees‟ first witness introduced an

audio recording of Mrs. Hamilton‟s testimony from the February 6, 2014 general sessions

court hearing.3 As discussed infra, in her testimony, Mrs. Hamilton valued the items that

were taken by Appellants at $40,000.00.

At the close of proof, Appellees moved for directed verdict on Appellants‟

counterclaim for unjust enrichment. Appellants moved for directed verdict against Appellees

on their conversion claim, arguing that the amount of damages had not been sufficiently

proved and that the measure of damages should be market value at the time and place of

conversion, instead of the replacement value. The court denied both motions for directed

verdict.

After the jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellees, the trial court entered judgment

on the jury verdict. The order states, in relevant part:

1. Randy Holderman and Jennifer Holderman converted personal property

belonging to Richard and Nell Hamilton;

2. The value of the personal property converted is $40,000;

3. Richard and Nell Hamilton were not unjustly enriched by Randy and

3

Appellants raised an issue as to whether the trial court erred in permitting the testimony of Mrs.

Hamilton to be played for the jury in their motion for new trial. However, they did not pursue this issue on

appeal. Accordingly, we will not consider the questions of whether Mrs. Hamilton‟s general sessions

testimony was properly admitted in the trial court.

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Jennifer Holderman.

Therefore, the court orders a that judgment be entered in favor of Richard

Hamilton and Nell Hamilton, and that Richard and Nell Hamilton recover from

Randy Holderman and Jennifer Holderman $40,000. Randy and Jennifer

Holderman's counter-claim [for unjust enrichment] is dismissed in its entirety

with prejudice. Randy and Jennifer Holderman shall bear the costs of this

action.

On November 24, 2015, Appellants filed their notice of appeal.

II. Issues

Appellants raise two issues for review as stated in their brief:

1. Whether there is material evidence in the record to support the jury‟s verdict of

damages for $40,000; and

2. Whether the Court of Appeals should remand the case with the suggestion of

remittitur.4

III. Standard of Review

We review a judgment rendered by a jury by determining whether the record

contains “material evidence to support the [jury‟s] verdict.” Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d);

Poole v. Kroger Co., 604 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tenn. 1980). Accordingly, this Court‟s

review is

limited to determining whether there is material evidence to support the

verdict; and in determining whether there is material evidence to support the

verdict, the appellate court is required [1] to take the strongest legitimate view

of all the evidence in favor of the verdict, [2] to assume the truth of all that

tends to support it, allowing all reasonable inferences to sustain the verdict,

and [3] to disregard all to the contrary. Having thus examined the record, if

there be any material evidence to support the verdict, it must be affirmed; if it

were otherwise, the parties would be deprived of their constitutional right to

trial by jury.

Crabtree Masonry Co. v. C & R Constr., Inc., 575 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tenn. 1978). The appellate

4

As required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(e), these issues were raised by Appellees in

their motion for new trial.

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court decides only “whether the record reflects material evidence demonstrating that the

jury‟s award is „at or above the lower limit of the range of reasonableness, giving full faith

and credit to all of the evidence that tends to support that amount.‟” Miller v. Williams, 970

S.W.2d 497, 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Poole, 604 S.W.2d at 54). Material

evidence is defined as “evidence material to the question in controversy, which must

necessarily enter into the consideration of the controversy and by itself, or in connection with

the other evidence, be determinative of the case.” Knoxville Traction Co. v. Brown, 89 S.W.

319, 321 (Tenn. 1905). This Court is not to weigh the evidence or to consider the

preponderance of the proof of the evidence. “It matters not a whit where the weight or

preponderance of the evidence lies under a material evidence review.” Hohenberg Bros. Co.

v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 586 S.W.2d 117, 119-20 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

IV. Discussion

As noted above, Mrs. Hamilton‟s testimony from the general sessions court hearing

was admitted at the trial. In relevant part, Mrs. Hamilton testified that the property included

some of her “prized possessions,” and she described many of the items while referencing

photographs of the items (these photographs were admitted in the trial court). After

describing some of the items in detail, Mrs. Hamilton testified to the value of the missing

items as follows:

Q. Tell me the value that you place on those items—the total items?

A. I would say it would be a good $40,000.00 because when we furnished the

house we bought quality stuff.

Ms. DeAngelis, Appellees‟ daughter, testified that, in October 2010, she increased the

insurance coverage on the contents of the house from $3,000.00 to $80,000.00, due to her

concerns that “everything was going to be stolen and gone.” Tom Ford, who owns property

adjacent to Appellants, testified that he had visited the house, and it was “[v]ery neat, very

clean, decorated very nice. [Mrs. Hamilton] has good taste in furniture. She did a really

nice job. It was a very nice, clean house…. It was furnished real nice.” In addition, Marilyn

Hoegh, a former tenant at the property, from June 2010 to September 2010, testified as to

specific items of furniture in the house and items in the barn. Ms. Hoegh testified that the

property in the barn included: “[a] lot of articles in that barn. Like mowers, a large tool chest,

many, many tools. Many articles that I could never remember all of them.”

Contrary to Appellants‟ contention that Appellees have not shown sufficient proof

concerning the value of the converted property, this Court has long held that an owner of

personal property may provide opinion testimony to calculate the value of their own personal

property. See, e.g., Head v. Head, No. M2009-01351-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3853291, at

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*6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010) (holding that, in a disputed marital property division case,

“as owners of the personal property, each spouse was entitled to give an opinion as to the

value of his or her property”); Adams v. Duncan Transfer & Storage of Morristown, 757

S.W.2d 336, 339 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming a judgment based on an owner‟s valuation

of her own property and holding that “an owner is not required to prove, but is presumed to

know, the value of owned property”). “Where, as here, the articles lost were household

goods, furniture, wearing apparel, and other articles which had been acquired by the plaintiff

over the years[,] the value of such articles is not to be estimated by what each item would

bring if sold in the market, but by the more elastic standard of „value to the owner.‟” Crook

v. Mid-South Transfer & Storage Co., Inc., 499 S.W.2d 255, 260 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973)

(citing Clift v. Fulton Fire Insurance Company, 315 S.W.2d 9, 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958)).

From our review of the record and from the foregoing testimony, we conclude that there is

sufficient material evidence in the record to support the jury‟s verdict. Having determined

that there is material evidence to support the jury‟s award of $40,000.00 in damages, “[w]e

have a duty to uphold a jury‟s verdict….” Grandstaff v. Hawks, 36 S.W.3d 482, 497 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 2000). Accordingly, we decline Appellants‟ request to remand the case with a

suggestion of remittitur.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court‟s judgment on the jury verdict.

The case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary and are consistent

with this opinion. Costs of the appeal are assessed against the Appellants, Randy Holderman

and Jennifer Holderman, and their surety, for all of which execution may issue if necessary.

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KENNY ARMSTRONG, JUDGE

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