holding that Payne did not overrule Booth entirely and that courts remain “bound by Booth’s prohibition on characterizations and opinions from a victim’s family members about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence”
How later courts described this case
- holding that Payne did not overrule Booth entirely and that courts remain “bound by Booth’s prohibition on characterizations and opinions from a victim’s family members about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence”
- holding that in capital murder sentencing proceedings it violates Eighth Amendment to allow jury to consider testimony from murder victim’s family regarding “opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence”
- explaining that Supreme Court decisions “remain binding precedent . . . regardless of whether subsequent cases have raised doubts about their continuing vitality” (cleaned up)
- noting that U.S. Supreme Court has not extended to Fourth Amendment its holding that "a defendant's exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent may not be admitted to show evidence of guilt"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016) 1
Per Curiam
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
SHAUN MICHAEL BOSSE v. OKLAHOMA
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA
No. 15–9173. Decided October 11, 2016
PER CURIAM.
In Booth v. Maryland, 482 U. S. 496 (1987), this Court
held that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits a capital
sentencing jury from considering victim impact evidence”
that does not “relate directly to the circumstances of the
crime.” Id., at 501–502, 507, n. 10. Four years later, in
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808 (1991), the Court
granted certiorari to reconsider that ban on “ ‘victim impact’
evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the
victim and the emotional impact of the crimes on the
victim’s family.” Id., at 817. The Court held that Booth
was wrong to conclude that the Eighth Amendment re
quired such a ban. Payne, 501 U. S. at 827. That holding
was expressly “limited to” this particular type of victim
impact testimony. Id., at 830, n. 2. “Booth also held that
the admission of a victim’s family members’ characteriza
tions and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the
appropriate sentence violates the Eighth Amendment,”
but no such evidence was presented in Payne, so the Court
had no occasion to reconsider that aspect of the decision.
Ibid.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has held that
Payne “implicitly overruled that portion of Booth regard
ing characterizations of the defendant and opinions of the
sentence.” Conover v. State, 933 P. 2d 904, 920 (1997)
(emphasis added); see also Ledbetter v. State, 933 P. 2d
880, 890–891 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). The decision below
presents a straightforward application of that interpreta
tion of Payne. A jury convicted petitioner Shaun Michael
2 BOSSE v. OKLAHOMA
Per Curiam
Bosse of three counts of first-degree murder for the 2010
killing of Katrina Griffin and her two children. The State
of Oklahoma sought the death penalty. Over Bosse’s
objection, the State asked three of the victims’ relatives to
recommend a sentence to the jury. All three recommended
death, and the jury agreed. Bosse appealed, arguing that
this testimony about the appropriate sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment under Booth. The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed his sentence, concluding that
there was “no error.” 2015 OK CR 14, ¶¶ 57–58, 360 P. 3d
1203, 1226–1227. We grant certiorari and the motion for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and now vacate the
judgment of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.
“[I]t is this Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of
its precedents.” United States v. Hatter, 532 U. S. 557,
567 (2001) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 20
(1997); internal quotation marks omitted); see Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S.
477, 484 (1989). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap
peals has recognized that Payne “specifically acknowl
edged its holding did not affect” Booth’s prohibition on
opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appro
priate punishment. Ledbetter, 933 P. 2d at 890–891. That
should have ended its inquiry into whether the Eighth
Amendment bars such testimony; the court was wrong to
go further and conclude that Payne implicitly overruled
Booth in its entirety. “Our decisions remain binding prec
edent until we see fit to reconsider them, regardless of
whether subsequent cases have raised doubts about their
continuing vitality.” Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236,
252–253 (1998).
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals remains
bound by Booth’s prohibition on characterizations and
opinions from a victim’s family members about the crime,
the defendant, and the appropriate sentence unless this
Court reconsiders that ban. The state court erred in con
Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016) 3
Per Curiam
cluding otherwise.
The State argued in opposing certiorari that, even if the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals was wrong in its
victim impact ruling, that error did not affect the jury’s
sentencing determination, and the defendant’s rights were
in any event protected by the mandatory sentencing re
view in capital cases required under Oklahoma law. See
Brief in Opposition 14–15. Those contentions may be
addressed on remand to the extent the court below deems
appropriate.
The judgment of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap
peals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016) 1
THOMAS, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 15–9173
_________________
SHAUN MICHAEL BOSSE v. OKLAHOMA
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA
[October 11, 2016]
JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins,
concurring.
We held in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U. S. 496 (1987),
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a court from admit-
ting the opinions of the victim’s family members about the
appropriate sentence in a capital case. The Court today
correctly observes that our decision in Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U. S. 808 (1991), did not expressly overrule this aspect
of Booth. Because “it is this Court’s prerogative alone to
overrule one of its precedents,” State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522
U. S. 3, 20 (1997), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals erred in holding that Payne invalidated Booth in its
entirety. In vacating the decision below, this Court says
nothing about whether Booth was correctly decided or
whether Payne swept away its analytical foundations. I
join the Court’s opinion with this understanding.