Opinion

BROWN, CURTIS, PEOPLE v

Court
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
Filed
Jun 17, 2016
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 3.2%

The opinion

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

469

KA 14-01510

PRESENT: PERADOTTO, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CURTIS BROWN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

LINDA M. CAMPBELL, SYRACUSE, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (JAMES P. MAXWELL

OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Joseph E.

Fahey, J.), rendered April 14, 2014. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal sexual act in the second

degree (three counts), sexual abuse in the second degree (three

counts) and endangering the welfare of a child.

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him

after a jury trial of, inter alia, three counts of criminal sexual act

in the second degree (Penal Law § 130.45 [1]). The charges stemmed

from defendant’s sexual abuse of his daughter. Viewing the evidence

in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see

People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349), we reject defendant’s contention

that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence (see generally

People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). It is well settled that

“[r]esolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be

accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be

determined by the jury” (People v Witherspoon, 66 AD3d 1456, 1457, lv

denied 13 NY3d 942 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Contrary to

defendant’s contention, the trial testimony of the victim “was not so

inconsistent or unbelievable as to render it incredible as a matter of

law” (People v Black, 38 AD3d 1283, 1285, lv denied 8 NY3d 982), and

we see no basis for disturbing the jury’s credibility determinations

in this case.

Defendant further contends that testimony on the People’s direct

case regarding certain answers he provided during a police interview

constituted improper evidence of selective silence. We reject that

contention inasmuch as the testimony established that defendant did

not remain silent in response to police questioning (cf. People v

Williams, 25 NY3d 185, 193; People v Capers, 94 AD3d 1475, 1476, lv

-2- 469

KA 14-01510

denied 19 NY3d 971). Defendant’s contention that the People

improperly bolstered the victim’s testimony by introducing evidence of

her delayed disclosures of defendant’s actions is not preserved for

our review inasmuch as defendant did not object to that evidence at

trial (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Comerford, 70 AD3d 1305, 1306),

and we decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a

matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL

470.15 [6] [a]).

We reject defendant’s further contention that he was denied

effective assistance of counsel. Viewing the evidence, the law, and

the circumstances of this case, in totality and as of the time of the

representation, we conclude that defendant’s attorney provided

meaningful representation (see generally People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137,

147).

Finally, defendant contends that the People failed to comply with

the requirements of CPL 400.15 in sentencing him as a second violent

felony offender and thus, that the sentence is illegal. We conclude

that defendant’s contention, which is actually a challenge to the

adequacy of the procedures that County Court used in sentencing him

rather than to the legality of the sentence, is not preserved for our

review (see People v Butler, 96 AD3d 1367, 1368, lv denied 20 NY3d

931; cf. People v Samms, 95 NY2d 52, 58). In any event, the record

establishes that, prior to sentencing, both defendant and defense

counsel received and signed a copy of the second felony offender

statement and, at sentencing, the court asked defendant whether there

was “[a]nything . . . you want to say before I pronounce sentence.”

We therefore conclude that “there was substantial compliance with CPL

400.15 in this case . . . inasmuch as both defendant and defense

counsel ‘received adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard with

respect to the prior conviction’ ” (People v Myers, 52 AD3d 1229,

1230; see People v Hall, 82 AD3d 1619, 1620, lv denied 16 NY3d 895).

Entered: June 17, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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