The opinion
/V7//5
IN THE
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS IGINAL
OF TEXAS
PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REl'IEbJ
WITH A PETITION
«8£gH©JS,
VINCENT PASCO,
DEC 02
Appellant pro se
V. ^belAcosta,Cterk
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
FILED iN
Trial Case No. F-1259DD1-Y
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
On Appeal From The Criminal
District Court No. 7
Dallas County Texas
C0A No: 05-14-D0413-CR
Abel Acosta, Clerk
In the Honorable Dudge
MIKE SHIPES
C
Parties:
Vincent Pasco, #192D73B The State Of Texas
Conn ally Unit
B99 FM 632
Kenedy, TX 78119
ORAL ARGUMENTS REQUESTED
Page 1 of 13
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Parties 3
Index of Authorities
Statement of the Case
Issues Presented:
Point of Error Number One
\louiDid the Court Df Appeals abuse its
discretion by claiming the appelant
did not show the evidence to be
legally insufficient in order to
sustain a conviction? H_d
Point of Error Number Two:
Did the Court of Appeals err by denying
the ground that the Court erred by
informing the jury about good conduct time- /*yj
Poin t of Error Number Three:
Did the Court of Appeals err by denying
the ground that the Trial Court did have
jurisdiction to hear the instant case
without a transferred order* JS_
Prayer
JL
Certificate of Service
11.
Inmate Unsworn Declaration 15
Page 2 of 13
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
Jackson v. Virginia
Fisher v. State
Narvaiz v. State
Guevara v. State s
Matson v. State s
Robertson v. State
Timothy Scott v. State 7
Dues v. State ?
King v . State r
Lazano v. Lozano
Louis v. State
t
Urbano v. State
Murray v. State
Navarro v. State
Moore v. State
x
Wilson v. State 9
Drovio v. State
1
Almanza v. State 10_
Rogers v. State
Daniell v. State
ML
Hoang v. State
Ex parte Seidel JA
Heath v. State JA
Marin v. State ZZ
Mills v . State 12
Garcia v. State
Wynn v. State
Page 3 of 13
STATEMENT QF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with murder by an indictment on or
about the 27th of July A.D. 2012. (CR p.10). The indictment
includes a second paragraph alleging the existence of a prior
felony conviction. (CR p.10). Appellant pled not guilty to the
indictment before the selected jury. (RR Vol.3, p.7). The jury
found appellant guilty of the indicted offense. (RR Vol.4, p.114).
The jury found the enhancement paragraph true and set sentence at
life in prison. (RR Vol.4, p .141 ) . Appellant's appeal was affirm
ed on October 26, 2015, from the Fifth District Court of Appeals
in Dallas, Texas.
Point of Error Number One:
Viou) Dicl tne CoLJI"t Qf Appeals abuse its discretion by claiming the
appellant did not show the evidence to be legally insufficient
in order to sustain a conviction?
Appellant humbly submits that the evidence is legally in
sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction. When conducting
a legal sufficiency review, the court assesses the evidence "in
the light most favorable to the prosecution" and must ask, whether
"any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt". Jackson v. Virginia, 44 3
U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). "If based on all the evidence, a reason
able doubt of the defendant's guilt, due process requires that
the court reverse and order a judgment of acquittal." Fisher, 851
SU2d at 302 (quoting Narvaiz v. State, 840 SU2d 415, 423 (Tex.
Crim.App. 1992); see also Guevara v. State, 152 SU3d 45, 49 (Tex.
Crim.App. 2004). The legal sufficiency of the evidence is a
Page 4 of 13
question of law. Matson v. State, 819 Sw2d B39, B46 (Tex.Crim.
App. 1991); Robertson v. State, 16 SW3d 156, 165 (Tex.App - Austin
2000 pet. ref'd).
2ina Shaw's testimony
The Court of Appeals claims that appellant "confessed the
murder" to Zina Shaw in a phone call shortly after the murder of
Brown. "A 'confession' is generally regarded as an acknowledgement
of all facts necessary to constitute guilt of the crime at issue."
41 George E. Dix & Robert 0. Dawson, Criminal Practice and Proced
ure § 13.02 (2nd ed. 2001). In Shaw's testimony she asked appell
ant, "Was that you running across the freeway?". Shaw then stated
that "Appellant was mumbling and did not reply to her question".
(RR Vol.3, p.279). Shaw testified that she began the conversation
by asking "Why would you put yourself in a situation like this?".
Shaw said appellant responded by saying "It was either me or him.
They tried to hoe me." (RR Vol 3, p.279). These statements
recalled by Shaw did not supply the who, where, when, or how of
the murder offense charged against appellant. Shaw's testimony
merely provides information describing a quote, "either'me or him"
situation and clearly, in the instant matter that is not the case.
(Id) .
Shannon Liright testimony
Included in the evidence relied upon is Shannon Wright's
testimony inferring that appellant and Brown were the only ones
in the apartment at the time Brown was shot with a firearm. How
ever, when viewing the evidence shows that: (1) Banks and his
people had motive in killing Brown, (2) Banks had a gun, (3) Banks
Page 5 of 13
attended, the drug house numerous times on the day of the murder,
(4) the apartment had a front door and a bock door, was access
ible to Banks and his people, (5) there was a spacious time gap
ample enough for Banks and his people to enter the back door in-
between the time Wright stepped out of the apartment and the time
Wright heard "rambling" and "gunshots", there also being a sign
ificant time gap in-between the time Wright stepped out of the
apartment and the time Wright finally kicked the door in, this,
giving the perpetrator plenty of time to flee the scene unnoticed,
and (6) the firearm that killed Brown was not discovered. It
could not be distinguished whether the bullets were fired from one
or more than one gun. According to Wright's testimony, Banks
told Wright and Brown, "I'm going to tell you like this, the people
I mess with, they ain't too happy that this dope came up missing."
(RR Vol.3, p.41-43, 77). Wright said that "Banks was more upset
than anyone else and he believed Banks was the one behind 'Man'
being shot". (RR Vol.3, p.7B). Wright stated that "Banks was the
main person causing difficulty". (RR Vol. 3, p.76) . Wright testi
fied "Banks was bickering about missing drugs throughout the day".
(RR Vol.3, p.78). Wright "said that "Banks left quite a few times
on the day of the murder." (RR Vol .3 , p.. B3) . Wright stated that
"appellant was a quiet person and was not arguing about the missing
drugs". (RR Vol.3,. p.. 76). Wr ight"-'.indicated that him and appellant
had a mutual relationship describing appellant as someone who, if
there was a problem, would talk about it and then figure it out.
(RR Vol.3, p.76). And finally, Ms. Thomas (a firearm and toolmark
examiner) was unable to determine whether the bullets were fired
from one or more than one gun. (RR Vol.3, p.245-46).
Page 6 of 13
In Wright's testimony he sits outside the front door for a
minute and smokes a cigarette, then hears the door close, then
hears "rambling", then tries the screen door but it's locked, then
yells out for appellant to open the door, still hears rambling,
yanks the screen door open, knocks on the door nine times, then
finally hears gunshots. Wright says that afterwards he goes to
his mother's apartment, asks for the phone, calls Iron, then fin
ally goes back to the apartment to kick the door down to find
4$
Brown deceased and appellant running out the back d
-fr^ass^
Wright's testimony, seemingly, incriminates appellant and
can only compel speculation. "Although a jury may accept or reject
any or all evidence adduced, a jury may not reach a verdict based
on speculation." "A jury's verdict must be supported by evidence
providing beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense
of which a defendant is convicted." Timothy Scott v. State, 946
SW2d 166; 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 2684.
Intentional 1y _or_ knowinjgljy
"Intent may be inferred from acts, words, and the conduct of
the accused." Guevana . 152 SW3d at 50; Pa t_rick __y_._ St_a te , 906 SW2d
4B1, 4B7 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995); Dues v. State, 634 SW2d 304, 305
(Tex.Crim.App. 1982). The- use of a firearm to cause death would
establish that the perpetrator acted with intent to cause death.
In the instant case, the deficiency in the State's evidence is
that i '. did notestablish that appellant was the person who used
the firearm to kill Brown. Coupled with the fact of there being
a window of time enabling Banks and his people to enter through
the back door and murder Brown unnoticed by Wright, contrary to
Page 7 of 13
Banks, appellant was not arguing about missing drugs. Appellant
shows no animosity or any expressions of angsr, in fact, the record
shows the contrary. Wright--described appellant as someone who talk
ed his problems out. The State's evidence merely places appellant
at the scene of the crime. "Mere presence at the scene or in the
vicinity of a crime, or even flight from the scene, either standing
alone or combined, is insufficient to sustain a conviction. King v.
State, 63B SW2d 903, 904 (Tex.Crim.App. 19B2).
Jordan Price testimony
The testimony of Jordan Price describing a "bright" skinned
male running across the freeway cannot be overlooked. The State
claims that Price identified appellant as the person who ran across
the freeway. However, when going to the record, Price is asked to
identify appellant in trial and Price's answer is "I don't know"..
When Price admits to painting appellant out in a line-up it shows
that thephoto selected by Price is marked with the notation "I'm
not sure." (RR Vol 4. p .6B) .
Whether Evidence Presented uas Sufficient
The evidence in the instant case contains a number of infer
ences that do not by themselves constitute proof of guilt. "A
jury may not reasonably infer an ultimate fact from meager circum
stantial evidence that simply raises a number of inferences, none
more probable than another." Lozano v. Lozano, 52 SW3d 141, 142;
44 Tex.Sup. Ct .J . 499 (Tex. 2001).
When viewing the evidence as a whole in the scope of the
record, a rational trier of fact can only speculate about who did
the "rambling" and the shooting in apartment 204. "If circumstan
tial ,euidence ..provides .no ,morB.,;thBn .§-< iuapicion , the jury is not
Page 8 of 13
-6 <U
permitted to reach a speculative conclusion." Louis v. State, 159 *— ^
SW3d 236, 246 (Tex.App. Beaumont 2005, pet.ref'd). The evidence ^L^
as a whole in the instant case only causes a strong suspicion.
. .
"Proof „..-..
that amounts to only a strong suspicion of guilt or a mere
probability of guilt is insufficient to sustai n a conviction."
oh
all t i n -i a a
Urbano v. State, B37 SW2d 114, 116 (Tex.Crim.App . 1992);
|I_l„„„ ., r-4-~4-_ n / i i ^r / -r _ .. i^_i_ n
Murry v
State , 138 Tex.Crim, 53, 134 SW2d 286, 2B7 (Tex.Crim.App . 1939); <0
Wynn v. State, 847 SW2d 357, 359 (Tex.App.- Houston[1st Dist]),
aff'd, 864 SW2d 539 ( Tex.Crim.App. 1993); Navarro v. Stat 81 0 4-0
SW2d 432, 435 (Tex.A pp. - San Antonio 1991 pet.ref'd)(citing
fl'3
Moore v. Statte, 640 SWJ2d 300, 302 (Tex.Cri m. App. 19B7) ) . More
^^ 3
over, mere oopportunity to commit a crime does not tend t o establish o £—
the fact of the accused's commis
commission of th e crime. Wilson v. ^ ^
[214 5W3d 586] State/ 147 Tex. Crim. 653, 184 SW2d 141, 143 (T
e?l
Crim.App . 1944) . „ ,
v £
Finally, as the Supreme Court put it, criminal substantial I C
rf
A
due process "protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constit-
constit-
ute th e crime with which he is charged. Michelena -Orono, 702 F 2d
; see also Gollihar, 46 SW3d at 245-46. With th e evidence
in the instant case being legally insufficient, the Fourteenthh
Amendment guarantee of due process requires that the. Court rev e r s e
and order an acquittal.
Point of Error Number Tuio
Did the Court of Appeals err by denying the ground that the Court
erred by informing the jury about good conduct time^
Page 9 of 13
Facts In The Record
Please look at the (C R p.7 2- 7 3) and (RR Vol.4, p.89).
This clearly shows that the State and Court of Appeals erred on
this ground.
Appellant contends the trial court comments amounted to
supplemental jury charge and we should therefore review the
egregious harm standard of Almanza v. State , 686 SW2d 157 (Tex.
Crim.App. 1984). In support, he relies on Rogers v. State, 38
SW3d 725 (Tex.App.- Texarkana 2001, pet.ref'd). During the
punishment phase in Rogers, the trial court did not provide a
jury instruction on the effect of a life sentence on parole
eligibility; Ijd ,at 729; see Tex.Code Crim.Proc. art. 37.07 § 4(a).
Then, during deliberations the trial court failed to provide a
full and complete instruction in response to the jury's question
on the same matter. Id.
The appellate court did not apply the Almanza standard
because substantive responses to jury questions during deliber
ations amount to supplemental jury charges. Id. (citing Daniell
v. State, 848 SW2d 145, 147 n.2 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993).
Unlike Rogers and the cases cited therein, the trial court's
comments in the present case occurred during jury deliberations.
This ground should be granted for relief.
Point of Error Number Three
Did the trial court lack jurisdiction to hear the instant case
a n.d render a judgment because the case, was not transferred to its
d o c k e t4*
Page 10 of 13
Summary Of Argument
Criminal District Court Number Seven had no jurisdiction over this
case. Its judgment is void.
Argument
The Texas Constitution provides that a court is vested with
jurisdiction over a criminal case by the presentment of an indict
ment or information. Tex.Const. art.V, sec.12(b). An indictment
is presented when it has been duly acted on by the grand jury and
received by the trial court. Tex.Code Crim.Proc. art.12.06. Statu
tory provisions also codify the necessary result, implied by Art.V
sec .12; above that the trial court lacks jurisdiction in the absence
of proper presentment. Tex.Code Crim.Proc. art.32/01 (requiring an
indictment to be dismissed if not presented to the trial court by
date certain). Once the indictment is presented jurisdiction is
exclusive in the receiving court unless it is transferred to another
court. Id. art. 4 .16.
The only mechanism for transferring the power to try a felony
is by an order of transfer combined with an order of receiving.
Combined, these constitute a written agreement between the two
courts involved. The transferring court issues an order formally
transferring jurisdiction over the case. The second court accepts
rt~he7:case by' issuing a formal order receiving. See Tex.Govt.Code,
sec.24.003/
The instant case was presented to- Criminal District Court
Number Three of Dallas County Texas. Jurisdiction was thus invest
ed in that court. The instant case later appeared on Criminal
Dis'trict Court; Number Seven where it remained through the entry
Page 11 of 13
of judgment. However, there is nothing in the record showing that
jurisdiction was ever transferred by Criminal District Court Number
Three to Criminal District Court Number Seven. Therefore, it
appears that the Criminal District Court Number Three "retains"
jurisdiction, just as art .4 .16 states. Appellant contends that
Criminal District Court Number Seven never acquired jurisdiction
in this matter.
Lack of jurisdiction over a case renders a trial court's
judgment void. Ex parte Seidel, 39 SW3d 221 (Tex.Crim.App . 2001);
Hoang v. State, B72 SW2d 694 (Tex. Crim.App . 1993). A defect which
renders a sentence void may be raised for the first time on appeal.
Heath v. State, B17 5W2d 335 (Tex.Crim.App . 1991).
The right to be tried in a court that has properly acquired
jurisdiction over a case is absolute. See Marin v. State, 851 SW2d
275 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). Such a right to cannot be waived or
forfeited, even with consent. Id_. Implementation is not optional,
it is always required. _Id_. at 279. Error in this regard is not
subject to further analysis. Thus, a defendant may complain about
this violation of an absolute right on appeal without having raised
the question in the trial court. Id . at 2B0.
Appellant now complains that Criminal District Court Number
Seven never acquired jurisdiction over the instant case, but he
acknowledges that authority is against his position. See e.g.,
Mills V. 5tate, 742 SW2d B32, B35 (Tex.App.- Dallas 1987); Garcia
v. State, 901 SW2d 731, 732-33 (Tex.App.-Houston[14th Dist.] 1995).
These cases all hold that the present issue must be raised by the
trial counsel or it is waived. However, they simply cite to their
Page 12 of 13
antecedents without any constitutional or statutory authority for
the proposition that a jurisdictional defect can be cured by
procedural default.
PRAYER
Petitioner PRAYS for relief deem just.
DECLARATION
"I, Vincent Pasco, TDCJ # |4l-C>7J% , presently incarcer
ated in the TDCJ-CID at the Connally Unit in Karnes County
Texas, declare under penalty of perjury that the facts stated
in this PDR are true and correct and that I placed this docu
ment in the prison mailbox on this date."
"Executed on this the ol3CcA day of November 2015."
Vincent Pasco, prose
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this the <k-><& day of November 2015, I sent
the following parties a true and correct copy of this PDR by U.S.
mail thru the prison mail system in a postage paid package to the
addressed listed below:
Court of Criminal Appeals
"P.O.Box 12308, Capitol Station
Austin, TX 78711
Attn: Abel Acosta, Clerk
fate jPM&irS
'A
Vincent Pasco, pro se
Page 13 of 13
AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed October 26, 2015.
In The
GLauvt of Appeals
Mitty Btstrtct of (toaa at Dallas
No. 05-14-00413-CR
VINCENT PASCO, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1259001-Y
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang-Miers, Brown, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Schenck
Vincent Pasco appeals his conviction and life sentence for murder. In three issues,
appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to prove he was the person who committed the
offense, he was denied due process by an instruction in the punishment charge about good-time
credit and parole, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction. We affirm his conviction. Because all
issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
Background
Appellant (known as "Grinch") became acquainted with the victim, Derrick Brown, in
connection with the sale of drugs at an apartment located in southern Dallas. On July 26, 2012,
Brown was at the apartment with appellant, a man known as "Banks," Shannon Wright, and
Chadrick Kennedy. Appellant, Wright and Brown stayed overnight; Banks and Kennedy did not.
The next day, it was business as usual at the apartment. Customers arrived, and appellant,
Wright, and Brown sold them drugs. At some point appellant left to serve a customer. He left
behind a pack of drugs, and Brown took it. Brown left the apartment for a short period of time,
taking appellant's drugs with him. When Brown returned to the apartment, appellant and Wright
were there. Banks appeared shortly thereafter with more drugs. Banks argued with Wright
about the missing drugs, and then he left.
Wright's mother, who lived in the same complex in which the apartment was located,
came by to get some money from her son. At that time, only appellant, Wright, and Brown were
in the apartment. Wright stepped outside to talk to his mother. He gave her some money, and
she returned to her residence in the complex. While Wright stayed outside to smoke a cigarette,
he heard two gunshots. He tried to get into the apartment, but the door was locked. He looked
through the blinds and saw blood on the walls. Wright went to his mother's residence and told
her he thought Grinch had just shot Brown. Wright returned to the apartment and kicked in the
door. He found Brown on the couch, bleeding from ear to ear. He saw appellant running out of
the back door. Wright called out to appellant, but he did not stop.
Discussion
Identity of the Murderer
In his first issue, appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to prove he
was the gunman who shot Brown.
Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence
When conducting a legal-sufficiency review, a court must ask whether "any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). In so doing, we assess the evidence "in the
light most favorable to the prosecution." Id. This same standard applies equally to
circumstantial and direct evidence. Burden v. State, 55 S.W.3d 608, 613 (Tex. Crim. App.
-2-
2001). The jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be
given to their testimony. See Bonham v. State, 680 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
The jury is free to accept or reject all or any part of a witness's testimony. See id; Dumas v.
State, 812 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. refd). This Court is only to ensure
that the jury reached a rational conclusion, not to re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the
evidence. See Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Because appellant
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove identity, we examine the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in fact the person who shot the victim. See Cardenas v.
State, 971 S.W.2d 645, 648-49 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, pet. refd). Viewed through this lens,
we find ample evidence to support a reasonable juror's conclusion that appellant was the person
who shot Brown.
Wright, who was present at the apartment on the day of the shooting, testified that the
only people at the apartment at the time Brown was killed were Wright, Brown, and appellant.
Wright knew appellant as Grinch. Wright stepped outside the apartment before Brown was shot.
Wright heard two gunshots. He kicked in the door and found Brown on the couch bleeding from
ear to ear. Wright saw appellant running out of the back door. He called out to him, but
appellant did not stop or respond. Wright told the jury that he believed appellant shot and killed
Brown.
Wright's mother also testified she heard the gunshots and saw appellant fleeing from the
back of the apartment while holding a phone up to his ear. Wright's mother identified appellant
in open court as that person and testified she knew him as Grinch.
Jordan Price testified that he was at a family gathering at the same apartment complex
when the offense occurred. He heard the gunshots and saw a man with "bright" skin coming out
-3-
from the back of the complex through the parking lot. He testified the man had a gun tucked into
the back of his pants. Price described the man as having long hair and wearing a peach colored
shirt and baggy blue jeans. The man ran in front of Price and then across the freeway as he fled
the scene. Price identified appellant as the man he saw fleeing from the apartment complex in a
photo lineup.
Kennedy testified that he was not at the apartment on the day Brown was murdered. Cell
phone records associated with Kennedy's cell phone number were introduced into evidence and
showed that his phone made a call from a location in Irving, Texas, at the time of the offense.
The evidence further established that neither Banks nor Kennedy physically resemble appellant.
Zina Shaw testified that she started dating appellant in March or April of 2012. Shaw
stated appellant called her after Brown was murdered and talked to her about the offense. This
led her to ask him why he did this and he replied, "It was me or him." "They tried to hoe me."
Then Shaw asked appellant, "Was that you running across the freeway?" He said, "Yes."
In summary, three witnesses identified appellant and testified that they saw him flee from
the scene of the crime shortly after hearing the gunshots. One witness saw a gun in appellant's
waistband as appellant ran past him. Wright established a motive for the shooting, that being
retribution for the theft of drugs, and established appellant and Brown were the only people in
the apartment at the time of the shooting. Appellant told a girlfriend he shot Brown. From this
evidence, the jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant was the gunman
who shot Brown. We overrule appellant's first issue.
Instruction Concerning Good Conduct Time
In his second issue, appellant argues because he was ineligible for good conduct time, the
trial court erred by including a jury instruction about good conduct time.
The complained of instruction tracks the language in article 37.07, section 4(a) of the
-A-
code of criminal procedure. This instruction is mandated by the code of criminal procedure. See
Campbell v. State, No. 05-14-00563-CR, 2015 WL 4550678, at * 1-2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July
28, 2015, no pet), (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 4(a) (West Supp. 2014)).
The article sets out the exact language the trial courts are required to include. Id. As described
by the court of criminal appeals, the statutory parole charge instructs a jury in general terms
about the existence and possible grant of parole. Luquis v. State, 72 S.W.3d 355, 360 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2002). The instruction also refers to the concept of "good conduct time" and states
that a person sentenced to prison might earn some reduction in his period of incarceration
through the discretionary award of good-conduct time. Id. The instruction also warns the jury
that it cannot accurately predict how the concepts of good-conduct time and parole might be
applied to any particular person and thus it may not consider how those concepts might apply to
the defendant. Id. The overall purpose of the instruction is to generally inform jurors of good
conduct time and parole, but prohibit them from using the notions of these concepts in assessing
the appropriate punishment. Id.
Appellant maintains that because he is not eligible for good-conduct time, the parole
charge was unconstitutional as applied to him. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 508.149(a)(5)
(West Supp. 2014). In Luquis, the court of criminal appeals rejected the argument appellant
makes. Luquis, 72 S.W.3d at 365. In Luquis, and in this case, the jury was instructed not to
consider how good-conduct time or the parole law may be applied to the defendant. We assume
the jury followed these instructions, and we will not find constitutional error unless we conclude
that a reasonablejury probably was actually confused by this charge. See id. at 366-67.
Appellant did not object to the court's charge on punishment and thus bears the burden to
show that any error resulted in egregious harm such that he did not receive a fair and impartial
trial. See Jiminez v. State, 32 S.W.3d 233, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Atkinson v. State, 107
-5-
S.W.3d 856, 859-60 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). Appellant claims there is a reasonable
probability the parole charge mislead the jury. He does not elaborate on how or why the jury
was misled. As in Luquis, nothing in the record suggests the jurors discussed, considered, or
tried to apply what they were told about good-conduct time and parole. See id. at 367. For
example, the jury did not send out any notes on the subject and the prosecution did not mention
parole or good-conduct time during closing arguments. Appellant has not demonstrated a
reasonable likelihood that the jury was in fact misled by the instruction or that it assessed a
higher punishment based on any misconstruction of the parole law charge. See id. at 368. Under
these circumstances, the parole instruction did not violate appellant's right to due process, and
we cannot conclude that appellant suffered egregious harm. See id.; Atkinson, 107 S.W.3d at
860. We overrule appellant's second issue.
Trial Court's Jurisdiction
In his third issue, appellant argues Criminal District Court Number 7 lacked jurisdiction
over his case because the case was not transferred to its docket. More particularly, he claims that
the indictment was presented to Criminal District Court Number 3 and invested that court with
jurisdiction over the case. Based on the absence of a transfer order from Criminal District Court
Number 3 to Criminal District Court Number 7, appellant contends Criminal District Court
Number 7 never acquired jurisdiction.
The failure to file a written transfer order is a procedural error, not a jurisdictional one.
Lamasurier v. State, 91 S.W.3d 897, 899 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. refd). This
procedural error does not render the actions of the later court void, but merely makes them
subject to a timely plea identifying the issue. Garcia v. State, 901 S.W.2d 731, 732-33 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1995). As a result, a defendant who does not file a timely plea forfeits any complaint
-6-
about the lack of a written transfer order. Mills v. State, 742 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1987, no pet.).
In this case, appellant never filed a plea concerning the lack of a transfer order to the
Criminal District Court Number 7 nor in any other way challenged the competence of that court
over the indictment. In fact, he entered a plea of not guilty to the indictment in that court, and he
was tried, convicted, and sentenced in that court. By failing to raise the issue in the district court
and entering a plea and participating through counsel at trial, appellant forfeited his complaint
about the lack of a transfer order. Accordingly, appellant's third issue as to the trial court's
jurisdiction is without merit and is overruled.
Conclusion
Having resolved all of appellant's issues against him, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
/David J. Schenck/
DAVID J. SCHENCK
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
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JUDGMENT
VINCENT PASCO, Appellant On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
No. 7, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-14-00413-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F-1259001-Y.
Opinion delivered by Justice Schenck.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Lang-Miers and Brown
participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 26th day of October, 2015.
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