United States v. Franklin Brown

 

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ȱ

ȱ

No.ȱ16Ȭ1216ȱ

UNITEDȱSTATESȱOFȱAMERICA,ȱ

PlaintiffȬAppellee,ȱ

v.ȱ

FRANKLINȱBROWN,ȱ

DefendantȬAppellant.ȱ

____________________ȱ

AppealȱfromȱtheȱUnitedȱStatesȱDistrictȱCourtȱforȱtheȱ

NorthernȱDistrictȱofȱIllinois,ȱEasternȱDivision.ȱ

No.ȱ09ȱCRȱ671ȱ—ȱJamesȱB.ȱZagel,ȱJudge.ȱ

____________________ȱ

ARGUEDȱAUGUSTȱ9,ȱ2016ȱ—ȱDECIDEDȱSEPTEMBERȱ8,ȱ2016ȱ

____________________ȱ

BeforeȱBAUER,ȱPOSNER,ȱandȱSYKES,ȱCircuitȱJudges.ȱ

BAUER,ȱCircuitȱJudge.ȱFranklinȱBrownȱseeksȱtoȱreduceȱhisȱ

292Ȭmonthȱ drugȬdistributionȱ sentenceȱ basedȱ onȱ theȱ retroacȬ

tiveȱapplicationȱofȱAmendmentȱ782ȱtoȱtheȱfederalȱsentencingȱ

guidelines.ȱSeeȱ18ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ3582(c).ȱTheȱdistrictȱcourtȱdeniedȱ

theȱmotion,ȱdeterminingȱthatȱBrown’sȱoffenseȱlevelȱwasȱunȬ

affectedȱbyȱtheȱamendment.ȱWeȱaffirm.ȱ

2ȱ No.ȱ16Ȭ1216ȱ

Betweenȱ2003ȱandȱ2008,ȱBrownȱpurchasedȱandȱdistributȬ

edȱmillionsȱofȱdollar’sȱworthȱofȱcocaineȱinȱtheȱChicagoȱarea.ȱ

Unitedȱ Statesȱ v.ȱ Brown,ȱ 726ȱF.3dȱ 993,ȱ 995ȱ (7thȱCir.ȱ 2013).ȱ Heȱ

eventuallyȱwasȱarrestedȱbyȱfederalȱauthoritiesȱandȱconvictedȱ

byȱaȱjuryȱofȱconspiringȱtoȱdistributeȱatȱleastȱfiveȱkilogramsȱofȱ

cocaine,ȱ seeȱ 21ȱ U.S.C.ȱ §§ȱ 846,ȱ 841(a)(1).ȱ Brown,ȱ 726ȱF.3dȱ

atȱ995–96.ȱ

Atȱsentencingȱtheȱpartiesȱdisputedȱtheȱquantityȱofȱcocaineȱ

forȱ whichȱ Brownȱ wasȱ responsible.ȱ Brownȱ arguedȱ thatȱ heȱ

shouldȱ beȱ heldȱ responsibleȱ onlyȱ forȱ fiveȱ kilograms,ȱ asȱ theȱ

juryȱhadȱfound,ȱbecause,ȱheȱasserted,ȱthatȱwasȱtheȱmaximumȱ

establishedȱ byȱ reliableȱ evidence.ȱ Theȱ governmentȱ soughtȱ toȱ

holdȱhimȱresponsibleȱforȱnearlyȱ3000ȱkilograms,ȱbasedȱonȱtheȱ

trialȱ testimonyȱ ofȱ threeȱ cooperatingȱ witnessesȱ aboutȱ theȱ

numberȱ ofȱ Brown’sȱ transactionsȱ andȱ theȱ volumeȱ ofȱ drugsȱ

soldȱinȱeach.ȱTheȱdistrictȱcourtȱdeterminedȱwithoutȱelaboraȬ

tionȱ thatȱ 150ȱ kilogramsȱ wereȱ “withinȱ theȱ zoneȱ ofȱ thisȱ deȬ

fendant’sȱ responsibility,”ȱ andȱ thatȱ thisȱ quantityȱ hadȱ beenȱ

“provenȱandȱprobablyȱprovenȱtwiceȱover.”ȱTheȱquantityȱcorȬ

respondedȱtoȱaȱbaseȱoffenseȱlevelȱofȱ38—theȱtopȱbaseȱoffenseȱ

levelȱ providedȱ inȱ theȱ drugȱ quantityȱ table.ȱ Seeȱ U.S.S.G.ȱ

§ȱ2D1.1(c)(1)ȱ (2011)ȱ (baseȱ offenseȱ levelȱ ofȱ 38ȱ appliesȱ toȱ

“150ȱKGȱ orȱ moreȱ ofȱ Cocaine”).ȱ Theȱ courtȱ added,ȱ “Iȱ thinkȱ ifȱ

weȱ hadȱ aȱ levelȱ 40ȱ orȱ aȱ levelȱ 42ȱ onȱ topȱ ofȱ that,ȱ itȱ probablyȱ

makesȱ thatȱ figure,ȱ too.”ȱ Combinedȱ withȱ aȱ criminalȱ historyȱ

categoryȱofȱIII,ȱBrown’sȱtotalȱoffenseȱlevelȱofȱ38ȱ(heȱreceivedȱ

noȱ adjustments)ȱ yieldedȱ aȱ guidelinesȱ rangeȱ ofȱ 292ȱ toȱ 360ȱ

months.ȱ Theȱ courtȱ sentencedȱ himȱ toȱ theȱ bottomȱ ofȱ thatȱ

range.ȱ Brownȱ appealedȱ hisȱ conviction—butȱ notȱ theȱ court’sȱ

drugȱquantityȱcalculation—andȱweȱaffirmed.ȱBrown,ȱ726ȱF.3dȱ

993.ȱ

No.ȱ16Ȭ1216ȱ 3

Threeȱyearsȱafterȱheȱwasȱsentenced,ȱBrownȱfiledȱaȱmotionȱ

underȱ 18ȱ U.S.C.ȱ §ȱ3582(c)(2)ȱ toȱ reduceȱ hisȱ sentenceȱ underȱ

Amendmentȱ782.ȱThatȱamendmentȱraisedȱtheȱamountȱofȱcoȬ

caineȱnecessaryȱtoȱqualifyȱforȱaȱbaseȱoffenseȱlevelȱofȱ38ȱfromȱ

150ȱ kilogramsȱ toȱ 450ȱ kilograms.ȱ SeeȱU.S.S.G.ȱ §ȱ1B1.10(d)ȱ &ȱ

Supp.ȱ toȱ App.ȱ C,ȱ amends.ȱ782,ȱ 788ȱ (2014).ȱ Theȱ governmentȱ

maintainedȱ thatȱ Brown’sȱ baseȱ offenseȱ levelȱ wasȱ unchangedȱ

byȱtheȱamendmentȱbecauseȱheȱwasȱresponsibleȱforȱwellȱoverȱ

450ȱkilogramsȱ basedȱ onȱ witnessȱ testimonyȱ aboutȱ hisȱ drugȱ

transactions.ȱ Inȱ replyȱ Brownȱ notedȱ thatȱ theȱ courtȱ hadȱ notȱ

foundȱ himȱ accountableȱ forȱ aȱ quantityȱ moreȱ specificȱ thanȱ

150ȱkilogramsȱ orȱ moreȱ ofȱ cocaine,ȱ andȱ askedȱ theȱ courtȱ toȱ

makeȱaȱfindingȱaboutȱtheȱactualȱdrugȱweightȱinȱorderȱtoȱdeȬ

termineȱwhetherȱheȱqualifiedȱforȱaȱsentenceȱreductionȱunderȱ

Amendmentȱ782.ȱIfȱtheȱcourtȱfoundȱhimȱresponsibleȱforȱlessȱ

thanȱ450ȱkilograms,ȱtheȱamendedȱguidelineȱrangeȱwouldȱbeȱ

235ȱtoȱ293ȱmonthsȱ(downȱfromȱ292ȱtoȱ360)ȱandȱBrownȱaskedȱ

theȱcourtȱtoȱresentenceȱhimȱtoȱtheȱ240ȱmonthȱstatutoryȱminȬ

imum.ȱ

TheȱdistrictȱcourtȱdeclinedȱtoȱdisturbȱitsȱguidelineȱcalcuȬ

lationȱandȱdeniedȱtheȱmotion:ȱȱ

TheȱproblemȱforȱBrownȱisȱthatȱhisȱoffenseȱlevelȱ

isȱnot,ȱandȱhasȱnot,ȱbeenȱlowered.ȱHeȱhasȱanȱofȬ

fenseȱ levelȱ ofȱ 38,ȱ andȱ thisȱ levelȱ appliesȱ underȱ

bothȱ theȱ olderȱ andȱ theȱ newerȱ revisedȱ guideȬ

lines.ȱ Theȱ continuingȱ existenceȱ ofȱ theȱ levelȱ ofȱ

38ȱ isȱ theȱ resultȱ ofȱ theȱ veryȱ largeȱ quantitiesȱ ofȱ

cocaineȱ involved.ȱ Iȱ foundȱ thatȱ Brownȱ wasȱ

clearlyȱ responsibleȱ forȱ 150ȱ kilogramsȱ ofȱ coȬ

caine.ȱ Indeed,ȱ Iȱ thoughtȱ theȱ quantitiesȱ mightȱ

haveȱbeenȱhigher,ȱbutȱaȱlevelȱ40ȱorȱ42ȱwasȱapȬ

4ȱ No.ȱ16Ȭ1216ȱ

propriateȱasȱwellȱifȱtheȱ2012ȱguidelinesȱprovidȬ

edȱforȱlevelsȱofȱ40ȱtoȱ42.ȱIȱthoughtȱthereȱwasȱnoȱ

wayȱtoȱgoȱfurtherȱthanȱlevelȱ38.ȱThereȱwasȱeviȬ

denceȱ thatȱ moreȱ thanȱ 450ȱ kilogramsȱ wasȱ partȱ

ofȱhisȱresponsibility.ȱ

Asȱ anȱ alternativeȱ basisȱ forȱ denyingȱ Brown’sȱ motion,ȱ theȱ

courtȱaddedȱthatȱheȱwasȱsentencedȱunderȱtheȱcareerȱoffenderȱ

guidelineȱandȱthereforeȱineligibleȱforȱanyȱsentenceȱreductionȱ

underȱtheȱamendment.ȱ

Brownȱ arguesȱ thatȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ erredȱ inȱ concludingȱ

thatȱ Amendmentȱ 782ȱ doesȱ notȱ lowerȱ hisȱ offenseȱ level.ȱ Heȱ

contendsȱ thatȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ failedȱ toȱ makeȱ aȱ drugȬ

quantityȱfindingȱmoreȱspecificȱthanȱhisȱbeingȱresponsibleȱforȱ

“150ȱkilogramsȱorȱmore”ȱofȱcocaine,ȱandȱasȱaȱresultȱcouldȱnotȱ

haveȱ evaluatedȱ whetherȱ heȱ wasȱ eligibleȱ forȱ aȱ reductionȱ unȬ

derȱ§ȱ3582(c)(2).ȱ

Whenȱ aȱ retroactiveȱ amendmentȱ toȱ theȱ guidelinesȱ altersȱ

theȱ relevantȱ drugȬquantityȱ thresholdsȱ forȱ determiningȱ theȱ

baseȱoffenseȱlevel,ȱaȱdistrictȱcourtȱinȱrulingȱonȱaȱ§ȱ3582(c)ȱmoȬ

tionȱmayȱneedȱtoȱmakeȱnewȱfindings—findingsȱthatȱareȱsupȬ

portedȱ byȱ theȱ recordȱ andȱ notȱ inconsistentȱ withȱ thoseȱ madeȱ

inȱ theȱ originalȱ sentencingȱ determination.ȱ Unitedȱ Statesȱ v.ȱ

Hall,ȱ600ȱF.3dȱ872,ȱ876ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2010).ȱȱ

Theȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱorderȱisȱcursoryȱbutȱitȱdidȱnotȱcommitȱ

reversibleȱ errorȱ inȱ denyingȱ Brown’sȱ motion.ȱ Theȱ courtȱ deȬ

niedȱBrown’sȱmotionȱbecauseȱtheȱamendmentȱdidȱnotȱlowerȱ

hisȱoffenseȱlevel,ȱnotingȱthatȱ“thereȱwasȱevidenceȱthatȱmoreȱ

thanȱ 450ȱ kilogramsȱ wasȱ partȱ ofȱ hisȱ responsibility.”ȱ Thisȱ

statement—alongȱ withȱ theȱ court’sȱ commentȱ atȱ sentencingȱ

thatȱtheȱveryȱlargeȱquantitiesȱofȱ cocaineȱwarrantedȱaȱhigherȱ

No.ȱ16Ȭ1216ȱ 5

baseȱ offenseȱ levelȱ thanȱ whatȱ wasȱ authorizedȱ underȱ theȱ

guidelines—reflectsȱ theȱ court’sȱ determinationȱ thatȱ Brownȱ

wasȱresponsibleȱforȱ450ȱkilogramsȱorȱmoreȱofȱcocaine.ȱWhileȱ

theȱ districtȱ courtȱ couldȱ haveȱ expressedȱ itsȱ drugȬquantityȱ

findingȱ moreȱ clearly,ȱ remandȱ isȱ notȱ necessaryȱ becauseȱ theȱ

outcomeȱ ofȱ suchȱ proceedingsȱ wouldȱ beȱ clearȱ andȱ remandȱ

futile.ȱSeeȱUnitedȱStatesȱv.ȱHallahan,ȱ756ȱF.3dȱ962,ȱ971ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ

2014);ȱ Unitedȱ Statesȱ v.ȱ Purchess,ȱ 107ȱF.3dȱ 1261,ȱ 1269ȱ (7thȱ Cir.ȱ

1997).ȱ Asȱ theȱ governmentȱ pointsȱ out,ȱ theȱ recordȱ confirmsȱ

thatȱBrownȱwasȱresponsibleȱforȱ450ȱkilograms:ȱwitnessesȱtesȬ

tifiedȱ toȱ deliveringȱ thousandsȱ ofȱ kilogramsȱ ofȱ cocaineȱ andȱ

receivingȱ millionsȱ ofȱ dollarsȱ asȱ payments.ȱ Brown,ȱ 726ȱ F.3dȱ

atȱ996.ȱ

Weȱ closeȱ byȱ notingȱ thatȱ theȱ court’sȱ alternativeȱ basisȱ forȱ

denyingȱ theȱ motion—thatȱ Brownȱ wasȱ sentencedȱ underȱ theȱ

careerȱ offenderȱ guideline—wasȱ incorrect.ȱ Butȱ becauseȱ theȱ

courtȱ properlyȱ concludedȱ Brown’sȱ offenseȱ levelȱ wasȱ unȬ

changedȱ byȱ theȱ amendment,ȱ thisȱ errorȱ wasȱ harmless.ȱ

SeeȱUnitedȱ Statesȱ v.ȱ Clayton,ȱ 811ȱF.3dȱ 918,ȱ 921ȱ (7thȱ Cir.ȱ 2016)ȱ

(applyingȱharmlessȱerrorȱtoȱdecisionȱonȱ§ȱ3582(c)(2)ȱmotion).ȱ

AFFIRMED.ȱ

6                                                                          No. 16‐1216

POSNER,  Circuit  Judge,  dissenting.  In  2012  the

defendant  was  sentenced  to  292  months  in  prison  after

being  convicted  of  conspiring  to  distribute  five

kilograms  of  cocaine.  At  sentencing  the  government

argued that he had sold not five but  2942 kilograms; the

government  based  the  argument  on  testimony  from

three  cooperating  witnesses  about  the  number  of  the

defendant’s  sales  and  the  amount  of  drugs  in  each

sale.  The  district  judge  stated  summarily  that  150

kilograms  were  “within  the  zone  of  this  defendant’s

responsibility,”  this  quantity  having  been  “proven  and

probably  proven  twice  over.”  That  determination,

coupled  with  the  defendant’s  criminal  history,  made

his base offense level 38, yielding  a  guidelines  range  of

292  to  365  months;  the  sentence  imposed  was  thus  at

the bottom of the range.

Judgment  and  sentence  were  affirmed  in  United

States  v.  Brown,  726  F.3d  993,  995  (7th  Cir.  2013).  But

three years after  the defendant was sentenced, he filed a

motion  to  reduce  his  sentence  in  reliance  on

Amendment  782  to  the  guidelines,  which  had  raised

the  amount  of  cocaine  required  for  a  base  offense level

of 38 from 150 to 450 kilograms. He pointed out  that the

judge  had  not  found  him  accountable  for  any  quantity

of  cocaine  other  than  150  kilograms,  and  he  asked  the

judge  to  make  a  finding  about  the  actual  drug  weight

in  order  to  determine  whether  his  guideline  range  had

been  reduced  by  Amendment  782.  For  unless  the

weight  was  at  least  450  kilograms,  his  guideline  range

would fall from 292  to 365 months to 235 to 293 months

(actually  240  months,  the  statutory  minimum,  to  293).

He  asked  that  he  be  resentenced  to  240  months.  The

judge  refused,  adhering  to  his  original  sentence  of  292

months,  primarily  on  the  ground  that  “there  was

No. 16‐1216    7

evidence  that  more  than  450  kilograms  was  part  of  his

responsibility.”  But  he  offered  no  substantiation  for  this

conclusion.  He  described  neither  the  evidence  he

relied  on  to  support  that  finding  nor  the  method  he’d

used  to  calculate  the  weight  of  the  drugs  from  that

evidence.

It would be one thing had the cooperating witnesses’

testimony  about  the  tons  of  cocaine  that  the  defendant

allegedly  had  distributed  been  uncontradicted,  but  it

wasn’t;  the  defendant’s lawyer argued to the judge that

“when  you  look  at  ...  the  two  [cooperating  witnesses]

that  had  testified  to  giving  drugs  to  my  client,  there’s

really only one deal that had  any specifics, and that was

…  the  last  deal  of  the  conspiracy  and  that  was  57

kilos.”  The  judge  did  not  engage  the  lawyers,  or

indeed  so  much  as  mention  their  argument  or  the

evidence  concerning  those  two  cooperating  witnesses

on  which  the  argument  rested.  As  a  result  we  have  no

indication  of  the  judge’s  thought  process  in  finding  the

defendant  responsible  for  more  than  450  kilograms  of

cocaine.

A  sentencing  judge  must  “provide  ‘some

description  of  the  reliable  evidence  used  to  support

the  finding  and  the  method  used  to  calculate  it,’”

United  States  v.  Garrett,  757  F.3d  560,  572–73  (7th  Cir.

2014), quoting United States v. Clay‐  brooks,  729  F.3d  699,

707  (7th  Cir.  2013).  These  cases  involve  original

sentencing,  but  the  principle  they  enunciate  is,  as held

in  such  cases  as  United  States  v.  Goings,  407  F.  App’x

967,  969  (7th  Cir.  2011),  and  United  States  v.  Marion,  590

F.3d  475,  477–78  (7th  Cir.  2009),  equally  applicable  to  a

resentencing, as in this case.

We are mindful that the judge offered an alternative,

unrelated  basis  for  denying  the  defendant’s  motion:

8                                                                          No. 16‐1216

that  the  defendant  had  been  properly  sentenced

under  a  different  guideline,  the  guideline  for  career

offenders.  But  as  the  government  concedes,  the

defendant  was  not  sentenced  under that  guideline.  So

the  judge  had  no  alternative  to  the  450  kilogram

finding  as  a  basis  for  the  defendant’s  motion.  But  he

didn’t  know  that,  and  for  all  we  know  his  mistaken

belief  in  an  alternative  ground  for  adhering  to  his

original  sentence  made  him  all  the  more  casual  in

estimating drug levels.