Opinion

Scott Teutscher v. Riverside Sheriffs Assn

  • 835 F.3d 936
  • 2016 WL 4488008
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Aug 26, 2016
Status
Published
On the bench
Smith, Watford, Friedland
Nature of suit
Civil
Cited by
59 cases
Authority
More cited than 49.6%

explaining that trial judges must “follow the jury’s implicit or explicit factual determinations in deciding the equitable claims” in order to avoid contravening the Reexamination Clause

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that trial judges must “follow the jury’s implicit or explicit factual determinations in deciding the equitable claims” in order to avoid contravening the Reexamination Clause
  • holding that where “the basis for the jury’s verdict is open to multiple interpretations,” a trial court acting in equity may “reach any interpretation that is supported by the evidence”
  • holding that front pay is “money awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement” (citation and quotation marks omitted)
  • noting that “front pay is the functional equivalent of the equitable remedy of reinstatement. Future lost earnings, on the other hand, are compensatory damages calibrated to actual monetary losses after the date of judgment” and observing that while front pay “pays [the plaintiff] as if he had been reinstated,” lost future earnings “encompass reputational harms, loss of experience, and other forward- 8 looking aspects of the injury caused by the discriminatory conduct”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SCOTT TEUTSCHER, an individual, No. 13-56411

Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

and 5:06-cv-01208-

RHW-OP

RIVERSIDE SHERIFFS’ ASSOCIATION,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

RIVERSIDE SHERIFFS’ ASSOCIATION

LEGAL DEFENSE TRUST; TANYA

CONRAD, individually and as an

Agent of the Riverside Sheriffs

Association,

Defendants,

v.

WILLIAM NATHANIEL WOODSON, III,

Intervenor-Appellant.

2 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

SCOTT TEUTSCHER, an individual, No. 13-56659

Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v. 5:06-cv-01208-

RHW-OP

RIVERSIDE SHERIFFS’ ASSOCIATION,

Defendant-Appellant. OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Robert H. Whaley, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted January 5, 2016

Pasadena, California

Filed August 26, 2016

Before: Milan D. Smith, Jr., Paul J. Watford,

and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Friedland

Concurrence by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 3

SUMMARY *

Labor Law

The panel reversed the district court’s award of front pay

and reinstatement as equitable remedies under the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act for a retaliatory discharge

after the plaintiff had already sought and been awarded by a

jury front pay damages to compensate for the same harm.

The plaintiff went to trial against his former employer on

retaliatory discharge claims under both state law and ERISA.

The jury awarded him lump-sum damages on his state law

claims, and the district court then entered judgment on his

ERISA claim. Even though the jury had been instructed to

include front pay in its damages award, the district court

granted the plaintiff additional equitable remedies consisting

of reinstatement as well as front pay until reinstatement

occurred.

The panel held that the equitable front pay award

conflicted with the jury’s front pay award in violation of the

Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. In addition,

although the reinstatement remedy did not necessarily

conflict with the fact findings implicit in the jury’s verdict,

it nevertheless was improper because the plaintiff waived

that relief when he elected to seek the duplicative front pay

remedy from the jury.

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

4 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

Judge M. Smith concurred in the judgment. However,

he disagreed with the majority’s Seventh Amendment

analysis. Judge M. Smith would hold instead that the district

court’s equitable remedy was an abuse of discretion because

the district court did not give reasons why additional

equitable relief was appropriate after the jury had already

compensated the plaintiff for the monetary harm he suffered.

COUNSEL

Daniel P. Stevens (argued) and Heather K. McMillan,

Stevens & McMillan, Tustin, California, for Plaintiff-

Appellee.

Jon R. Williams (argued), Williams Iagmin LLP, San Diego,

California, for Defendant-Appellee.

William N. Woodson, III (argued), Law Offices of Wm. N.

Woodson, III APC, Fallbrook, California, pro se Intervenor-

Appellant.

OPINION

FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires us to examine the limits on a district

court’s authority to award front pay and reinstatement as

equitable remedies for a retaliatory discharge after a plaintiff

has already sought and been awarded by a jury front pay

damages to compensate for the same harm. Plaintiff-

Appellee Scott Teutscher went to trial against his former

employer, Riverside Sheriffs’ Association (“RSA”), on

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 5

retaliatory discharge claims under both state law and the

Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.

§§ 1001–1461 (“ERISA”). A jury awarded him lump-sum

damages on his state law claims, and the district court then

entered judgment in his favor on his ERISA claim. Even

though, at Teutscher’s request, the jury had been instructed

to include front pay in its damages award, the district court

granted Teutscher additional equitable remedies consisting

of reinstatement as well as front pay until reinstatement

occurred. RSA appeals these equitable remedies, arguing

that they conflict with the jury’s front pay award in violation

of the Seventh Amendment and improperly duplicate

Teutscher’s recovery from the jury.

Given the way in which the jury was instructed and the

evidence presented at trial, the jury’s verdict encompassed

an implicit factual determination as to the entire amount of

front pay to which Teutscher was entitled on account of his

retaliatory discharge. We hold that the district court’s grant

of an additional front pay remedy for the same harm

disregarded that determination in violation of the Seventh

Amendment right to a jury trial. In addition, although the

reinstatement remedy does not necessarily conflict with

factual findings implicit in the jury’s verdict, we hold that it

is nevertheless improper because Teutscher waived that

relief when he elected to seek the duplicative front pay

remedy from the jury. We accordingly reverse the district

court’s equitable awards.

I.

Defendant-Appellant RSA is an organization that

represents law enforcement employees in Riverside County,

6 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

California for collective bargaining purposes. RSA also

administers the RSA Legal Defense Trust (the “Trust”), an

ERISA-governed plan. The Trust provides legal defense

services to RSA members in civil and criminal actions

arising from incidents in the course of their employment.

From 2002 until his termination in 2005, Plaintiff-Appellee

Scott Teutscher worked on an at-will basis for RSA as the

Trust’s Legal Operations Manager. In that position,

Teutscher was responsible for the Trust’s day-to-day

operations, including directing the work of staff members

and investigating disciplinary violation claims against RSA

members.

During Teutscher’s tenure as Legal Operations Manager,

the Trust began covering legal expenses for Deputy Sheriff

Duane Winchell’s defense in criminal and civil proceedings

unrelated to Winchell’s employment. Teutscher eventually

started expressing concerns that the Trust’s coverage of

Winchell’s defense costs was unlawful because it was

disallowed by the Trust’s governing plan documents.

Teutscher later met with an officer in the Riverside Sheriff’s

Department and accused RSA’s president and its executive

director of improper coverage approvals. Shortly after

Teutscher revealed that he had contacted law enforcement

about the coverage issues, RSA’s executive director

terminated Teutscher’s employment.

Teutscher filed the instant lawsuit alleging that RSA

terminated him in retaliation for reporting his suspicions that

the Trust’s coverage of Winchell was illegal. In the

operative complaint, Teutscher asserted claims against RSA

under federal and California law arising out of his

termination, including retaliatory discharge in violation of

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 7

section 510 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1140; wrongful

discharge in violation of public policy under California

common law; and retaliatory discharge in violation of

California Labor Code §§ 98.6 and 1102.5. After this court

partially reversed an earlier grant of summary judgment in

favor of RSA, the case proceeded to a jury trial on the three

state law claims pursuant to Teutscher’s timely jury demand,

and to a simultaneous bench trial on his ERISA claim.

During trial, Teutscher presented evidence that RSA’s

executives threatened to terminate him if he “didn’t keep

[his] mouth shut” about the Winchell coverage issues. He

argued to the jury that the executives acted on that threat by

firing him after he reported to outside authorities his

suspicions that the coverage was illegal. RSA in turn

presented evidence that Teutscher had made repeated

mistakes in his job, which had led the Trust’s Board to assign

RSA’s executive director to supervise Teutscher’s work.

RSA also introduced evidence that Teutscher had been

investigated and disciplined for failing to follow Trust policy

in responding to an officer-involved shooting incident, and

that he was placed on administrative leave shortly before his

termination for, among other things, angrily throwing a work

file. Teutscher argued that these performance-related

grievances were merely pretext for retaliation, and that they

were belied by his consistently satisfactory job performance

ratings and by a raise he received shortly before his

termination.

Teutscher also put on testimony about wages he had lost

since his termination and wages he would have earned for

the remainder of his anticipated working life at RSA.

Teutscher testified that, at the time of his termination, he had

8 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

been earning an $86,000 annual salary plus annual bonuses

and the value of a company car. During closing arguments,

his counsel placed the total value of compensation at

$98,236 per year. Teutscher, who was 55 years old at the

time of trial, testified that had he not been wrongfully

terminated, he would have continued working at RSA until

his Social Security “would kick in, probably 65, 67.”

Teutscher testified that he was instead forced to look

elsewhere for work. After about six months, he found his

first replacement job working at an auto business, earning

roughly $8,000 per year in 2006 and 2007. In 2008,

Teutscher began working at the San Bernardino County

Sheriff’s Department for an annual salary of roughly

$42,000, which had increased to $52,000 by 2012.

The district court adopted Teutscher’s proposed jury

instruction on damages, and, without objection, instructed

the jury on how to calculate Teutscher’s damages should it

find that he was wrongfully discharged. This instruction

provided:

If you decide that Plaintiff has proved that

Defendant wrongfully terminated him, then

you must decide the amount of damages that

Plaintiff has proven he is entitled to recover,

if any. To make that decision, you must:

1. Decide the amount that Plaintiff would

have earned up to today, including any

benefits and pay increases; and

2. Add the present cash value of any future

wages and benefits that he would have

earned for the length of time the

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 9

employment with Defendant was

reasonably certain to continue; and

3. Add damages for pain, suffering and

emotional distress if you find that

Defendant’s conduct was a substantial

factor in causing that harm.

In determining the period that Plaintiff’s

employment was reasonably certain to have

continued, you should consider such things

as:

(a) Plaintiff’s age, work performance,

and intent regarding continuing

employment with Defendant;

(b) Defendant’s prospects for continuing

the operations involving Plaintiff; and

(c) Any other factor that bears on how

long Plaintiff would have continued

to work.

The court also instructed the jury that “Plaintiff has a duty to

use reasonable efforts to mitigate damages” and that the

burden was on RSA to show that Teutscher had failed to do

so.

Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in

favor of Teutscher on his state law claims for wrongful and

retaliatory discharge. Using a general verdict form to which

neither party had objected, the jury awarded Teutscher lump-

10 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

sum damages of $457,250 and separately awarded punitive

damages of $357,500.

Based on the evidence presented at trial, the district court

adjudicated Teutscher’s ERISA claim, holding RSA liable

for retaliating against Teutscher in violation of section 510.

The district court then heard argument on an appropriate

ERISA remedy. Teutscher asked that his ERISA remedy

include back pay and reinstatement. RSA objected that back

pay was unavailable under ERISA as a form of

compensatory relief. RSA also objected that reinstatement

would conflict with the jury’s award of lost future earnings

and would constitute impermissible double recovery

because Teutscher was already made whole by the remedy

he elected to pursue from the jury. RSA further contended

that reinstatement was impossible because of continuing

acrimony between the parties.

The court issued a ruling denying back pay but ordering

RSA to reinstate Teutscher and to provide him interim front

pay at the rate of $98,235 per year until such reinstatement

occurred. RSA filed objections to the court’s ruling,

protesting that it would be impossible to reinstate Teutscher

because his position had by then been eliminated, and again

arguing that the equitable front pay and reinstatement awards

duplicated the relief Teutscher had obtained from the jury

and that Teutscher waived his right to those equitable awards

when he elected a make-whole remedy on his legal claims.

The district court nevertheless entered judgment in

accordance with its earlier ruling. RSA timely appealed the

district court’s remedy on the ERISA claim, arguing that it

violated both the Seventh Amendment and the prohibition

on double recovery.

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 11

II.

We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s

award of equitable relief, including its grant of reinstatement

and front pay. See Gotthardt v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,

191 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 1999). Under this framework,

we must determine whether the district court based its ruling

on an erroneous view of the law, United States v. Hinkson,

585 F.3d 1247, 1261–62 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), or on a

factual finding that was “illogical, implausible, or without

support in inferences that may be drawn from the record,”

id. at 1262–63. See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d

1195, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc), recognized as

abrogated on other grounds by Estate of Merchant v.

Comm’r, 947 F.2d 1390, 1392–93 (9th Cir. 1991).

III.

RSA’s central argument in this appeal is that the Seventh

Amendment barred the district court from granting

Teutscher equitable relief of reinstatement and interim front

pay on his ERISA claim once the jury had determined the

amount of front pay to which Teutscher was entitled on his

state law claims. We accordingly begin by examining the

strictures the Seventh Amendment imposes in cases tried

both to a jury and to the court.

The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n Suits at

common law, . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,

and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in

any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of

the common law.” U.S. Const. amend. VII. The Supreme

Court “has construed this language to require a jury trial on

12 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

the merits in those actions that are analogous to ‘Suits at

common law’” at the time of the Amendment’s ratification.

Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987); see also

Fleming James, Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions,

72 Yale L.J. 655, 655 (1963) (explaining that the

Constitution “do[es] not extend but preserve[s] the right of

jury trial as it existed . . . in 1791 when the seventh

amendment was adopted”). Prior to 1791, “a jury trial was

customary in suits brought in the English law courts” but not

in the courts of equity, Tull, 481 U.S. at 417, “unless the

chancellor in his discretion sent an issue to a jury for an

advisory verdict,” James, 72 Yale L.J. at 655. The Seventh

Amendment thus secures the right to a jury trial for “suits in

which legal rights [are] to be ascertained and determined, in

contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone [are]

recognized, and equitable remedies [are] administered.”

Chauffeurs, Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564 (1990)

(alterations in original) (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S.

433, 447 (1830)).

Teutscher went to trial claiming that RSA had discharged

him in retaliation for protected activity, in violation of

California law and in violation of section 510 of ERISA. To

determine whether a jury right exists on each of these causes

of action, we look first to whether that action is analogous to

one that was heard in English law courts “prior to the merger

of the courts of law and equity,” and second we “examine

the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or

equitable in nature.” Tull, 481 U.S. at 417–18. “The second

inquiry is the more important in our analysis.” Chauffeurs,

494 U.S. at 565; see also Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,

492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989).

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 13

Teutscher’s state law claims and his ERISA claim are

legal in nature with respect to the right they protect. See

Spinelli v. Gaughan, 12 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1993)

(categorizing retaliatory discharge—“a tort so widely

accepted in American jurisdictions today . . . that it has

become part of our evolving common law”—as legal in

nature and analogizing an ERISA section 510 claim to that

common law tort).

As to the more important factor—the nature of the

remedies—the state law claims are legal and the ERISA

claim is equitable. The actual and punitive damages

Teutscher seeks for his state law claims are indisputably

legal remedies because such damages are “the traditional

form[s] of relief offered in the courts of law.” Curtis v.

Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974). The remedies Teutscher

seeks under section 510 of ERISA, in contrast, are

exclusively equitable in nature. Section 510 is enforced

solely through the remedies provided under section

502(a)(3), which authorizes an aggrieved plan participant or

beneficiary to bring a civil action to enjoin an ERISA

violation or “to obtain other appropriate equitable relief,”

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). See 29 U.S.C. § 1140; Spinelli,

12 F.3d at 856; see also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S.

248, 256–58 (1993) (holding that relief under section

502(a)(3) is limited to remedies traditionally available in

equity, such as injunctions, mandamus, and restitution).

Because both the right in question and the remedies

sought make Teutscher’s state law claims legal in nature, and

because Teutscher made a timely jury demand on those

claims, he was entitled to have those claims tried to a jury.

See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 345 (1979)

14 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“If a jury would have been

impaneled in a particular kind of case in 1791, then the

Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial today, if either

party so desires.”). But because of the wholly equitable

nature of the available ERISA remedies, Teutscher’s ERISA

claim is categorized as equitable—meaning that he had no

right to a jury trial on that claim. See Spinelli, 12 F.3d at

858.

The Supreme Court has explained how to comport with

the Seventh Amendment when trying legal and equitable

claims in the same action. In Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,

369 U.S. 469 (1962), the Court held that in cases in which

legal and equitable claims turn on common issues of fact,

“any legal issues for which a trial by jury is timely and

properly demanded [must] be submitted to a jury,” id. at 473

(citing Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500,

510–11 (1959)), and the jury’s determination of the legal

claims must occur “prior to any final court determination of

[the] equitable claims,” id. at 479. Because the Seventh

Amendment’s second clause “prohibit[s] . . . the courts of

the United States to re-examine any facts tried by a jury”

except as permitted under the narrow “modes known to the

common law,” Parsons, 28 U.S. at 447–48, the court then

must abide by the jury’s findings of fact in making any

subsequent rulings. See Floyd v. Laws, 929 F.2d 1390, 1397

(9th Cir. 1991) (holding that “it would be a violation of the

seventh amendment right to jury trial for the court to

disregard a jury’s finding of fact”).

It follows that “in a case where legal claims are tried by

a jury and equitable claims are tried by a judge, and [those]

claims are ‘based on the same facts,’” the trial judge must

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 15

“follow the jury’s implicit or explicit factual determinations”

“in deciding the equitable claims.” L.A. Police Protective

League v. Gates, 995 F.2d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1993)

(quoting Miller v. Fairchild Indus., 885 F.2d 498, 507 (9th

Cir. 1989)). The trial court must do so in determining both

liability and relief on the equitable claims. See Miller,

885 F.2d at 506–07 (holding that “the district court in

deciding the Title VII [equitable] claim will be bound by all

factual determinations made by the jury in deciding” the

plaintiff’s legal claims); see also Smith v. Diffee Ford-

Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 966 (10th Cir. 2002)

(holding that the trial judge impermissibly “disregarded the

jury’s implicit finding[s]” when the judge denied the

wrongfully discharged plaintiff equitable relief of front pay

for reasons inconsistent with the jury’s findings); EEOC v.

Century Broad. Corp., 957 F.2d 1446, 1463 (7th Cir. 1992)

(“[I]n deciding whether to grant equitable relief under Title

VII, the district court [is] prohibited from reconsidering any

issues necessarily and actually decided by the jury.” (second

alteration in original) (quoting Hussein v. Oshkosh Motor

Truck Co., 816 F.2d 348, 355 (7th Cir. 1987))). These

constraints are “consistent with . . . the respect that properly

is accorded to a jury verdict in our system of jurisprudence.”

Miller, 885 F.2d at 507.

IV.

To determine whether the district court contravened

these constitutional constraints, we evaluate whether

Teutscher’s state law and ERISA claims turn on common

questions of fact, and, if they do, whether the court

disregarded any factual determinations implicit in the jury’s

verdict when it awarded the equitable remedies.

16 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

A.

The parties do not dispute that common questions of fact

underlie the determination of liability on the state law and

ERISA claims. 1 Teutscher’s state law claims turn on his

proving that RSA terminated his employment for disclosing

suspected legal violations. See, e.g., Hager v. County of Los

Angeles, 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268, 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)

(“[S]ection 1102.5(b) protects an employee from retaliation

by his employer for making a good faith disclosure of a

violation of federal or state law.”); McVeigh v. Recology

S.F., 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 595, 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013)

(recognizing a viable common law tort claim against an

employer who violates the fundamental public policy

prohibiting retaliatory discharge of an employee for

whistleblowing). To establish a claim of retaliation under

section 510, Teutscher likewise had to show that: (1) he

1

The problem of conflicting legal and equitable awards (such as the

legal front pay award and equitable reinstatement and front pay awards

here) appears to arise rarely in the ERISA context because of ERISA’s

broad preemption provision. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (providing that

ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now

or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan”); Spinelli v. Gaughan,

12 F.3d 853, 857 n.4 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that ERISA preempts

a claim for retaliatory discharge under Nevada law). RSA waived any

preemption defense in this case by failing to assert preemption in the

district court or in this court, and we decline to consider the issue sua

sponte. See Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imps., Inc., 803 F.2d 1488, 1497

(9th Cir. 1986) (explaining that an ERISA preemption defense “does not

generally affect jurisdiction” and refusing to reach it for the first time on

appeal); see also Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hollander, 705 F.3d 339,

354 (8th Cir. 2013) (declining to consider ERISA preemption sua sponte

on appeal).

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 17

engaged in an activity protected under ERISA, (2) he

suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link

existed between his protected activity and RSA’s adverse

action. Kimbro v. Atl. Richfield Co., 889 F.2d 869, 881 (9th

Cir. 1989). One such ERISA-protected activity is protesting

a legal violation in connection with an ERISA-governed

plan. Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th

Cir. 1993); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (making it unlawful to

“discharge . . . any person because he has given information

or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or

proceeding relating to [ERISA]”). With respect to both the

state law and ERISA claims, Teutscher endeavored at trial

to show that his reporting the allegedly improper coverage

of Winchell’s legal expenses motivated his termination. By

finding RSA liable on the state law claims, the jury

implicitly found that Teutscher’s protected activity

motivated his discharge. Consistent with this finding, it was

appropriate for the district court to enter judgment for

Teutscher on his ERISA claim as well. Neither party

suggests otherwise.

The more difficult question—and the one at issue in this

case—is whether the court’s ERISA remedy shares common

questions of fact with the jury’s damages calculation. To

answer that question, we begin by evaluating the forms of

relief available for violations of Teutscher’s state law and

ERISA claims.

Under California law, “[a] wrongfully discharged

employee . . . is entitled to damages [that] tend to make him

whole” and that “represent just compensation for the loss . . .

sustained by the plaintiff.” Currieri v. City of Roseville,

123 Cal. Rptr. 314, 319 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); see also Cal.

18 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

Civ. Code § 3333 (“For the breach of an obligation not

arising from contract, the measure of damages . . . is the

amount which will compensate for all the detriment

proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been

anticipated or not.”). One key component of economic loss

is the income that the employee would have earned had she

not been wrongfully discharged. See Horsford v. Bd. of Trs.

of Cal. State Univ., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 666 (Cal. Ct. App.

2005). Compensatory damages under California law thus

may include as “backpay” an award of “lost-wages damages

through the time of trial,” id., and “as ‘front pay’ an award

of the salary and benefits a wrongfully demoted or

discharged plaintiff would have earned from employment

after the trial,” Mize-Kurzman v. Marin Cmty. Coll. Dist.,

136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 259, 294 n.17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 2

Because “California courts . . . treat[] front pay as a damage

issue for the trier of fact,” id., a wrongfully discharged

plaintiff is entitled to seek a front pay award from the jury to

compensate for future lost earnings. Pursuant to California’s

pattern jury instructions, this front pay award should consist

of “the present cash value of any future wages and benefits

that [the plaintiff] would have earned for the length of time

the employment with [the defendant] was reasonably certain

2

In their briefs, the parties use terms like “lost future earnings” and

“future lost earnings” interchangeably with “front pay.” This is

consistent with how front pay is defined by the California courts. See,

e.g., Horsford, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 665–66 (defining “front pay” as “a

measure of damages for loss of future income” and classifying “loss or

future loss of earnings” as a form of “economic damages”).

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 19

to continue.” CACI No. 2433 (“Wrongful Discharge in

Violation of Public Policy—Damages”).

Although ERISA section 510 does not provide

compensatory damages, Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493,

1504 (9th Cir. 1995), it does provide prospective relief for

an employee who suffered retaliatory discharge by giving

courts the equitable authority to reinstate the employee to her

former position. See McBride v. PLM Int’l, Inc., 179 F.3d

737, 744 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that an ERISA-plan

participant had standing to sue under section 510 for

reinstatement to his former position); see also McLeod v. Or.

Lithoprint Inc., 102 F.3d 376, 379 (9th Cir. 1996) (providing

that reinstatement is “equitable, not compensatory, relief”

for purposes of ERISA section 502(a)(3)). 3 There will be

times, however, when reinstatement, though deserved, is not

feasible, either because “it is impossible to reinstate the

plaintiff or [because] it would be inappropriate due to

excessive hostility or antagonism between the parties.”

Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir.

3

There is a circuit split on whether “back pay” is also available as an

equitable remedy under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA to restore a plaintiff

to the position she would have enjoyed but for the employer’s illegal

retaliation. Compare Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 368 F.3d

1246, 1259–60 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that back pay is unavailable for

employees discharged in violation of section 510 because it is legal

rather than equitable in nature), with Schwartz v. Gregori, 45 F.3d 1017,

1022–23 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that back pay is a restitutionary award

available under section 502(a)(3)). The district court in this case held

that back pay is unavailable under ERISA. Because Teutscher has not

appealed that decision, we do not reach that issue here.

20 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

1986). To account for such situations, we have held in other

employment-related statutory contexts that “front pay” may

be awarded in equity as a substitute when the preferred

remedy of reinstatement is unavailable or imprudent. 4 See,

e.g., Traxler v. Multnomah County, 596 F.3d 1007, 1011–12

(9th Cir. 2010) (providing in a Family Medical Leave Act

case that front pay is available only when “reinstatement is

inappropriate, such as where no position is available or the

employer-employee relationship has been so damaged by

animosity that reinstatement is impracticable”); Thorne,

802 F.2d at 1137 (recognizing that front pay may be

available as a remedy under Title VII in lieu of

reinstatement). 5

4

At least one of our sister circuits has held that section 502(a)(3) of

ERISA permits an award of front pay “when the preferred remedy of

reinstatement . . . is not appropriate or feasible.” Schwartz, 45 F.3d at

1023. Neither party to this action contests that front pay is an available

remedy for a violation of section 510 in a case asserting only such a

violation, and we therefore assume without deciding that front pay is an

equitable remedy authorized under section 502(a)(3).

5

Federal court decisions characterizing front pay as an equitable

remedy under several federal employment statutes have not altered its

characterization as a legal remedy under state law. California courts

have continued to classify front pay as a “damage issue for the trier of

fact” even while recognizing that front pay is treated as an equitable

remedy under certain federal statutes. Mize-Kurzman, 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d

at 294 n.17. And we have upheld jury awards of front pay where state

law provides for that remedy as a form of legal relief. See Passantino v.

Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 512 (9th Cir.

2000) (explaining that “[u]nder Washington law the jury has substantial

autonomy when awarding front pay”); Boehm v. Am. Broad. Co.,

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 21

The district court in this case crafted a hybrid remedy for

Teutscher’s section 510 claim, awarding reinstatement as

well as interim front pay at Teutscher’s full former salary

until reinstatement occurred. We must determine whether,

in granting either front pay or reinstatement, the district court

contravened the findings of fact implicit in the jury’s

damages verdict. We consider each remedy in turn.

B.

RSA argues that the jury’s determination of Teutscher’s

entitlement to front pay as a remedy for his state law claims

foreclosed the district court from granting front pay on

Teutscher’s ERISA claim. We agree.

Not only is front pay available both in law under

Teutscher’s state law claims and in equity under section 510

of ERISA, as explained above, but in order to obtain either

remedy, Teutscher needed to make the same factual showing

and to meet the same defenses. The district court

consequently should have viewed itself as bound under the

Seventh Amendment to respect the jury’s findings on front

pay when considering Teutscher’s request for a front pay

award under ERISA.

California law and federal law both treat “front pay [a]s

an award of future lost earnings to make a victim of

discrimination whole.” Cassino v. Reichhold Chems., Inc.,

817 F.2d 1338, 1346 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Horsford,

929 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming jury’s front pay award

under California wrongful discharge claims).

22 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

33 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 666 (defining front pay as “a measure of

damages for loss of future income”). And both require a

wrongfully discharged plaintiff to make reasonable efforts to

mitigate an employer’s damages by seeking suitable

alternative employment. See, e.g., Cassino, 817 F.2d at 1345

(“An [Age Discrimination in Employment Act] plaintiff

must attempt to mitigate damages by exercising reasonable

care and diligence in seeking reemployment after

termination.”); Cal. Sch. Emps. Ass’n v. Pers. Comm’n,

106 Cal. Rptr. 283, 286 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (“The

discharged employee . . . generally has a duty to mitigate his

damage[s] by seeking other employment through the

exercise of reasonable diligence.”). Thus, under both federal

and California law, front pay awards must be reduced by the

amount that the defendant shows the wrongfully discharged

employee “could earn using reasonable mitigation efforts.”

Cassino, 817 F.2d at 1347; see Parker v. Twentieth Century-

Fox Film Corp., 474 P.2d 689, 692 (Cal. 1970) (in bank)

(setting forth the “general rule” under California law that a

wrongfully discharged plaintiff’s recovery is subject to

mitigation). 6

6

In Cassino, the district court submitted the front pay issue to a jury.

817 F.2d at 1347. Discussing why this had occurred in Cassino, we

clarified in Traxler that “[a] trial court, sitting in equity, may . . . employ

an advisory jury” to determine the amount of front pay even though there

is no right to have a jury determine the issue. Traxler, 596 F.3d at 1013.

Neither Cassino nor Traxler addressed the limitations on a district

court’s discretion to award equitable relief where front pay is submitted

to the jury as of right, rather than in an advisory capacity.

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 23

It is clear then that a legal front pay award under

California law turns on the same issues of fact as an equitable

front pay award under section 510 of ERISA: the salary an

employee was reasonably certain to have earned but for his

wrongful discharge, the period over which he would have

earned that salary, and the amount by which the defendant

showed the employee could mitigate his losses by securing

suitable alternative employment. 7

Accordingly, the jury instruction on damages given in

this case directed the jury to determine the exact issues that

also would be relevant to the district court’s determination

of any equitable front pay award. Specifically, the district

court instructed the jury to include in its award “the present

cash value of any future wages and benefits that [Teutscher]

would have earned for the length of time the employment

7

The concurrence suggests that the Supreme Court in Pollard v. E.I.

du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001), set forth a “technical

distinction” between legal and equitable front pay, which governs here.

We disagree. Pollard answered the narrow question whether an award

of front pay in lieu of reinstatement was authorized under section 706(g)

of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1), or whether it “constitute[d] an

element of ‘compensatory damages’ under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a and thus

[was] subject to the statutory damages cap imposed by that section.”

532 U.S. at 846. The Court’s holding that front pay was excluded from

the statutory cap turned on the specific statutory language at issue and its

legislative history. Id. at 852–54. Nowhere in Pollard did the Supreme

Court hold that front pay cannot be awarded by a jury as a legal remedy

for a state-law cause of action. Nor did Pollard address Seventh

Amendment constraints on a district court’s award of front pay in equity

when a jury has determined the factual issues relevant to such an award.

24 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

with [RSA] was reasonably certain to continue,” discounted

by any amount that RSA affirmatively proved Teutscher

could earn through reasonable efforts. 8 This is precisely the

inquiry that a district court would conduct to determine an

appropriate award of front pay in equity under a federal

employment statute. 9

The district court also instructed the jury on the factors it

should take into account to determine the “period that

[Teutscher’s] employment was reasonably certain to have

continued,” such as his “age, work performance, and intent

regarding continuing employment with [RSA];” “[RSA’s]

prospects for continuing the operations involving

[Teutscher];” and “[a]ny other factor that bears on how long

[Teutscher] would have continued to work.” These are the

same factors considered by district courts acting in equity.

See Downey v. Strain, 510 F.3d 534, 544 (5th Cir. 2007)

(identifying factors to consider for determining an equitable

8

Although the district court’s mitigation instruction was not a model

of clarity, Teutscher concedes that it made sufficiently clear to the jury

that front pay was subject to mitigation such that the jury could have

awarded zero front pay on that basis alone.

9

The concurrence suggests that the qualifier “appropriate” in the

phrase “appropriate equitable relief” in ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3),

gives courts leeway to consider additional factors in determining whether

to grant an equitable front pay award and the size of any such award. But

the concurrence does not identify any factors that the district court here

would have considered beyond those it instructed the jury to consider.

Of course, neither the jury—which must follow its instructions on the

law in determining liability and damages, see Opper v. United States,

348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954)—nor the district court may award inappropriate

relief.

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 25

award of front pay as “(1) the length of prior employment,

(2) the permanency of the position held, (3) the nature of the

work, (4) the age and physical condition of the employee,

(5) possible consolidation of jobs, and (6) the myriad other

non-discriminatory factors which could validly affect the

employer/employee relationship”); see also Traxler,

596 F.3d at 1014 (approving of the district court’s

consideration of the plaintiff’s age, job skills, and work-life

expectancy to determine a front pay award); Schwartz,

45 F.3d at 1023 (“In determining the amount of front pay, a

district court is to consider a number of factors, including the

employee’s work life expectancy,” and it may also take into

account whether the employee was at-will.).

To prove up his front pay damages as required by the

jury instruction, Teutscher testified that he would have

continued working at RSA at his 2005 salary until retiring at

around age sixty-seven. Teutscher also presented mitigation

evidence about his efforts to obtain a replacement job after

his discharge (including that he “[w]ent on the Internet” to

find work), and about the salary that he earned through his

post-termination employment at an auto shop and at the San

Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department. The jury

additionally heard evidence that, almost a year before

Teutscher was discharged, RSA assigned an administrator to

“t[ake] over the legal operations” formerly handled by

Teutscher. The jury thus had all the tools it needed to

determine Teutscher’s entitlement to front pay, and it must

be presumed that the jury followed its instructions and

awarded Teutscher all the lost future income supported by

the evidence. See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234

(2000) (“A jury is presumed to follow its instructions.”).

The jury’s finding as to Teutscher’s entire entitlement to

26 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

front pay—taking into account his age, his work-life

expectancy, the likelihood of RSA’s maintaining his former

position, his reasonable mitigation ability, etc.—is implicit

in its award of $457,250 in compensatory damages. And the

district court was bound by this determination in crafting any

subsequent equitable relief. 10

It appears that the district court failed to consider,

however, the factual determinations implicit in the jury’s

verdict in awarding equitable front pay. When it ordered

RSA to pay Teutscher $98,235 per year in front pay until

reinstating him, the district court impermissibly concluded

that Teutscher was entitled to $98,235 per year more in front

pay than the jury had found and awarded. The Seventh

10

We agree with the concurrence that the jury’s award of other non-

economic damages—such as those compensating for injury to

Teutscher’s character and reputation—would not preclude the district

court from awarding equitable front pay. This occurred in Williams v.

Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1998), in which, as we discuss

in Part VI infra, the Seventh Circuit determined that the jury’s award of

“lost future earnings” to compensate for injury to a discharged

employee’s “professional standing,” “character[,] and reputation” did

not overlap with the district court’s award of front pay in equity under

Title VII. Id. at 952–54. If the jury here had been instructed to award

only the sort of “lost future earnings” at issue in Williams, we would

agree that there would be no Seventh Amendment obstacle to an award

of front pay in equity. But that is not what happened in this case. The

jury instead was instructed to award exactly the same relief that the

district court sought to award in equity: wages and benefits that

Teutscher would have earned at RSA during the time that he was

reasonably certain to have remained at RSA but for the retaliatory

termination, subject to mitigation. Once the jury made those factual

determinations, the district court could not disregard them by making

contrary determinations in equity.

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 27

Amendment does not permit the jury’s findings to be cast

aside in this manner. See L.A. Police Protective League v.

Gates, 995 F.2d 1469, 1475 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that

“the district court erred in engaging in factfinding contrary

to the implicit findings of the jury verdict” and reversing the

district court’s order on equitable relief for that reason).

Teutscher endeavors to overcome Seventh Amendment

barriers by attempting to parse the jury’s lump-sum award to

show that the jury did not actually grant him any front pay

damages, and then to argue based on this parsing that the

district court remained free to order those damages in equity.

Teutscher rests this argument on the fact that the $457,250

in total damages awarded by the jury was less than the

$491,339 in back pay damages that Teutscher sought. As

such, he contends that because the jury did not even award

him the entirety of his back pay demand, it could not

possibly have awarded him any amount in front pay.

We reject this argument for several reasons. First, the

lump-sum format of the jury’s verdict prevents us from

ascertaining the relative amounts of back pay and front pay

that the jury awarded. See Squires v. Bonser, 54 F.3d 168,

176 (3d Cir. 1995) (recognizing that “it may not be possible

. . . to isolate the front-pay award since the jury awarded a

lump-sum amount for compensatory damages”). Teutscher

asked the jury to award him back pay, front pay, and

emotional distress damages, and Teutscher did not object to

the lump-sum verdict form for doing so. The jury ruled in

his favor, and because the lump-sum format does not enable

us to parse which portion was front pay, we must assume that

the jury awarded all of the front pay to which it believed

Teutscher was entitled. Indeed, because he agreed to the

28 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

lump-sum verdict form, Teutscher waived any argument that

the jury’s verdict should or could be parsed between its

compensatory components, and because he did not appeal

the jury’s damages award, Teutscher waived any argument

that the verdict was flawed because it did not include front

pay. He also fails to provide any authority for the

proposition that the jury must award the entire amount of

back pay requested before it can grant front pay, and,

critically, the jury was not instructed here that it had to do

so. It is thus entirely possible that the damages award

included a substantial front pay component.

Moreover, even if we could parse the jury award—which

we cannot—it is irrelevant whether the jury actually

included any front pay within its damages award, because an

award of zero front pay would also bind the district court in

its determination of equitable relief. Whether the jury

awarded some amount in front pay or no front pay, it

necessarily made a finding, at Teutscher’s request, on the

total amount of front pay to which Teutscher was entitled.

Because “the verdict in [this] suit could not have been

rendered without deciding [this] matter,” the jury’s verdict

on Teutscher’s entire entitlement to front pay over the course

of his remaining working years was “conclusive.” Russell v.

Place, 94 U.S. 606, 608–09 (1876). The district court’s

decision to then award an additional front pay remedy

disregarded the jury’s finding as to the entire amount of

future compensation that would make Teutscher whole.

C.

The Seventh Amendment analysis leads to a different

conclusion with respect to the reinstatement award. Even

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 29

though reinstatement compensates for the same harm as

front pay, some of the factors that underlie an equitable

reinstatement determination differ from those that underlie a

legal front pay determination. Because these factors are only

partially overlapping, some interpretations of the jury’s

award here would conflict with a reinstatement award but

others would not. And because Seventh Amendment

doctrine allows a court to interpret a jury’s award in deciding

whether it would conflict with an equitable award, the

possibility of a non-conflicting interpretation means the

Seventh Amendment does not necessarily bar the

reinstatement award.

The factors that determine whether a reinstatement

award is appropriate include whether “excessive hostility or

antagonism between the parties” renders reinstatement

practically infeasible, Thorne, 802 F.2d at 1137, and whether

there is a position available to reinstate the employee to

without unfairly causing the displacement of another

employee. Cassino, 817 F.2d at 1346 (“Although

reinstatement is the preferred remedy [for discriminatory

discharge], it may not be feasible where the relationship is

hostile or no position is available due to a reduction in

force.”); see also Palasota v. Haggar Clothing Co., 499 F.3d

474, 489 (5th Cir. 2007) (Factors to be considered in

deciding the propriety of reinstatement include “whether

positions now exist comparable to the plaintiff’s former

position and whether reinstatement would require an

employer to displace an existing employee.”). The second

of these factors has a clear analog in the front pay calculus,

which turns in part on the permanency of the position that

was held by the plaintiff and the possibility that his position

would have been eliminated through consolidation for a non-

30 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

retaliatory reason. See Downey, 510 F.3d at 544. The jury

in this case was told to consider RSA’s “prospects for

continuing the operations involving [Teutscher].” And it

could have inferred from the increasing supervision and

reassignment of Teutscher’s work that his position would

eventually have been eliminated irrespective of his protected

activity, such as through consolidation or a reduction in the

work force, or through the reassignment of his duties to a

lawyer. 11 Had the jury expressly found that a position for

Teutscher would no longer exist at RSA by the time the trial

concluded, and therefore awarded zero front pay on that

basis, that finding could preclude the district court from

ordering reinstatement.

By contrast, other factors considered by the jury in

determining front pay have no bearing on the

appropriateness of reinstatement. For instance, in awarding

front pay, the jury was instructed to consider Teutscher’s

ability to mitigate his losses. But ability-to-mitigate is not a

defense to reinstatement. Thus, if the jury decided to award

no front pay on the basis that it believed Teutscher could

obtain a job that paid as much as his job at RSA, that finding

11

RSA’s executive director testified that Teutscher’s work needed to

be performed “by a lawyer” who could better understand the issues and

“make informed decision[s].” Teutscher is not a lawyer, and, indeed,

according to evidence submitted by RSA after trial, Teutscher’s position

was eliminated in 2009, with the duties formerly assigned to Teutscher

being transferred to outside counsel.

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 31

would not be incompatible with any finding necessary to

award equitable reinstatement.

Nothing in the evidence presented at trial allows us to

definitively rule out the possibility that the jury denied

Teutscher front pay because it believed Teutscher could have

obtained a job in the future that paid the same as his former

position at RSA.12 As a consequence, it is unclear in this

case whether the jury’s front pay decision turned on a

factor—such as the expected elimination of any position

Teutscher might fill—that would preclude a reinstatement

remedy, or instead on a factor—such as Teutscher’s failure

to fully mitigate—that would not. When, as in this case, the

basis for the jury’s verdict is open to multiple interpretations,

the Seventh Amendment permits the district court to reach

12

Although we cannot definitively rule it out, it seems highly unlikely

that the jury awarded Teutscher nothing in front pay due solely to his

failure to mitigate future losses. Failure to mitigate is also a defense to

a back pay claim. See Cordero-Sacks v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A.,

134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 883, 896–98 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming jury

instruction on plaintiff’s duty to mitigate her back pay damages). If the

jury believed Teutscher had the ability to mitigate by finding a job that

paid the same as his job at RSA, that should have caused the jury to

award zero back pay (or zero back pay from the time such a job was

available) as well as zero front pay. But of course the jury awarded

$457,250 in compensatory damages—not zero. Perhaps the jury did

award zero back pay and zero front pay because of failure to mitigate,

and the entire $457,250 was intended to compensate for emotional

distress. Even though this situation seems highly unlikely given that

Teutscher’s counsel argued to the jury that emotional distress damages

are ordinarily tethered to monetary loss, the fact that we cannot rule it

out precludes us from holding that the jury’s verdict necessarily conflicts

with a reinstatement award.

32 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

any interpretation that is supported by the evidence. See

Miles v. Indiana, 387 F.3d 591, 600 (7th Cir. 2004)

(explaining that “when several issues have been litigated,

and the jury may have supported its verdict by finding in the

plaintiff’s favor on any one of the issues but which one is not

clear, the court is free to determine the basis of the jury’s

verdict unless extrinsic evidence clearly resolves the issue”).

The district court must then, of course, avoid contradicting

the findings implicit in its interpretation of the verdict when

it acts in equity, but it need not avoid conflicting with other

interpretations of the verdict.

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Miles is instructive on

the leeway that the Seventh Amendment provides a district

court when the jury’s verdict is ambiguous. In Miles, the

plaintiff filed suit alleging that the defendants retaliated

against him by transferring him to a position without

supervisory responsibilities and by refusing to promote him

to a managerial role. See 387 F.3d at 595–96. After the jury

returned a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor on the retaliation

claim generally, the plaintiff requested equitable relief of

promotion or front pay from the district court but was denied

both. See id. at 597–98. In considering on appeal whether

the denial of that equitable relief conflicted with the jury’s

verdict, the Seventh Circuit was faced with a situation, much

like that presented here, in which the jury’s verdict could be

interpreted in multiple fashions. Specifically, the jury had

answered in the affirmative a special verdict inquiry that

asked whether the plaintiff had “proven that his complaints

of discrimination were . . . a motivating factor in the decision

of the defendant . . . to transfer him . . . or fail to promote

him.” Id. at 600. In light of the phrasing of the inquiry, the

verdict could be read in one of three ways: the jury could

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 33

have found retaliation in the transfer, retaliation in the failure

to promote, or retaliation in both. Id. “Acknowledging the

ambiguity in the jury’s verdict,” the district court

determined, based on the evidence presented at trial, that the

retaliation suffered by the plaintiff was with respect to the

transfer and not the failure to promote. Id. at 600–01; see

also id. at 597–98. It then awarded equitable relief

consistent with that interpretation, ordering the defendants

to reassign the plaintiff to a position with supervisory duties

similar to what he held before the retaliatory transfer. Id. at

598.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed, explaining that the district

court did not contravene the jury’s findings of fact. Rather,

because “each of the potential theories supporting the verdict

[was] open to contention,” id. at 600, the district court was

free to select the one that it found to be best supported by the

evidence and to determine equitable relief in accord with that

theory. The Seventh Circuit explained that “if the jury had

found retaliation in failing to promote . . . , then the

provision of supervisory duties alone would not make [the

plaintiff] whole” and the district court’s denial of promotion

or front pay would have contravened the jury’s findings. Id.

But because retaliatory transfer was a permissible

interpretation of the jury’s verdict, the denial of these

remedies and the award of supervisory duties instead was

entirely in keeping with the jury’s factual findings. See id.

(“If the jury only found retaliation in the reassignment to a

position that lacked any supervisory responsibility then

providing equitable relief of supervisory responsibility

would make [the plaintiff] whole without the need for either

a promotion or front pay.”).

34 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

The district court in this case likewise could have

determined the basis of the jury’s verdict in order to shape

corresponding equitable relief. Had the district court

permissibly discerned that the jury’s verdict reflected a

finding that Teutscher failed to mitigate his future losses in

that Teutscher should have been able to obtain a job as

remunerative as his position at RSA by the time trial took

place, the district court would have committed no Seventh

Amendment error in proceeding to grant reinstatement.

However, unlike in Miles, 387 F.3d at 600–01, the district

court here did not explicitly determine the basis for the jury’s

verdict or how it comported with the equitable awards.

Instead, the district court cursorily awarded reinstatement,

stating only that it would “not assume an antagonistic

relationship between [Teutscher] and RSA merely because

of the protracted litigation.”

Because of this lack of explanation, a remand would

ordinarily be required to permit the district court to evaluate

the jury’s verdict in the first instance and to award

reinstatement only if it could explain why doing so did not

conflict with the district court’s interpretation of the theory

underlying the jury’s verdict. Cf. Bartee v. Michelin N. Am.,

Inc., 374 F.3d 906, 913 (10th Cir. 2004) (reversing and

remanding equitable award because the district court’s

“findings [we]re insufficient to enable . . . evaluat[ion] [of]

whether the [court] abused its discretion by basing its

equitable remedy on findings of fact that conflict with those

implied by [the] jury verdicts”). We decline to remand here,

however, because we conclude, as explained below, that

even if reinstatement does not strictly speaking conflict with

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 35

the jury’s implicit findings, the reinstatement remedy was

improper for other reasons. 13

V.

RSA argues that the district court erred in ordering

reinstatement because of its potential overlap with

Teutscher’s damages award and because Teutscher waived

reinstatement when he elected to seek front pay from the

jury. We agree.

The Seventh Amendment is not the only limit on a

district court’s discretion to shape appropriate equitable

relief: a district court must also avoid awarding a litigant

double recovery for the same harm. See Selgas v. Am.

Airlines, Inc., 104 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1997) (explaining that

a district court’s discretion to craft an equitable remedy is

limited by the need “to avoid duplication”). That is, even if

a district court when acting in equity avoids any direct

conflict with a jury’s factual findings, its award may still

overlap with the damages granted by the jury and so provide

the plaintiff a windfall. The doctrine of double recovery is

concerned with this latter problem. This doctrine “dictates

that ‘in the absence of punitive damages a plaintiff can

recover no more than the loss actually suffered.’ The

13

The concurrence suggests that we are reversing the reinstatement

remedy under the Seventh Amendment. We are not doing so. Rather,

after identifying an ambiguity that would require a remand to determine

whether there is a Seventh Amendment violation as to reinstatement, we

are reversing instead of remanding in order to avoid the double recovery

and election-of-remedies problems explained in the next Part of this

opinion.

36 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

animating principle is simple: when a plaintiff seeks

compensation for wrongs committed against him, he should

be made whole for his injuries, not enriched.” Medina v.

District of Columbia, 643 F.3d 323, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2011)

(citation omitted) (quoting Kassman v. Am. Univ., 546 F.2d

1029, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam)); see Dopp v. HTP

Corp., 947 F.2d 506, 517 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[T]he law abhors

duplicative recoveries. That is to say, a plaintiff who is

injured by reason of a defendant’s behavior is . . . entitled to

be made whole—not to be enriched.”). Thus, if a plaintiff

brings two causes of action—one state and one federal—that

arise from the same operative facts and seek relief for the

same harm, the trial court must assure that the plaintiff

recovers only once. Cf. Medina, 643 F.3d at 326 (explaining

that “a jury is not prohibited from allocating a single

damages award between two distinct theories of liability,”

only from awarding it twice).

The question here is whether Teutscher was unjustly

enriched by being granted reinstatement and compensatory

damages as relief for the same retaliatory discharge. To the

extent that the damages award included a front pay

component covering the same period during which

Teutscher would be reinstated, he clearly was.

Reinstatement and front pay are alternative remedies,

which cannot be awarded for the same period of time. See

Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846

(2001) (defining “front pay” as “money awarded for lost

compensation during the period between judgment and

reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement”); Smith v. World

Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1456, 1466 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Front pay may

be awarded in lieu of, but not in addition, to reinstatement.”);

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 37

Morgan v. Ark. Gazette, 897 F.2d 945, 954 (8th Cir. 1990)

(“Having been granted reinstatement, [the plaintiff] cannot

also receive an award of front pay.”); cf. Rogers v. Davis,

34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 716, 719 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (explaining

that under California law, a plaintiff may request alternative

remedies, “but may not be awarded both to the extent such

an award would constitute a double recovery”). This is

because front pay is the “monetary equivalent” of

reinstatement. Traxler v. Multnomah County, 596 F.3d

1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pollard, 532 U.S. at 853

n.3). A reinstated individual will earn the salary associated

with the job in question, so a plaintiff granted both front pay

(calculated based on the job’s salary) and reinstatement for

the same time period would essentially obtain his salary

twice over, earning an undue windfall.

Duplicative recovery is easily avoided when only

equitable relief is at issue—the district court may craft an

award comprising exclusively reinstatement, exclusively

front pay, or interim front pay until reinstatement occurs.

The same avoidance must be achieved when, as in this case,

front pay is submitted to the jury to determine. See Squires,

54 F.3d at 176 (“It is true that if front-pay was awarded [by

the jury], a grant of reinstatement would raise concerns

regarding double recovery.”); Selgas, 104 F.3d at 13–14

(recognizing that the district court may not award

reinstatement that overlaps with the jury’s front pay award).

Teutscher argues that there was no overlap in this case

because it is clear from the size of the jury’s verdict that it

did not grant him any front pay. Thus, in his view, the

district court could order reinstatement without duplicating

his recovery. But Teutscher again ignores the problem

38 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

created by his failure to object to the lump-sum verdict form

used by the jury, which prevents us from parsing the award.

As explained above, we have no way of knowing that

Teutscher is correct in assuming the jury awarded zero front

pay, and there are many possible explanations of the jury

verdict that would contain a front pay component. For

example, the jury may well have decided that, with

reasonable effort, Teutscher should have been able to find

more remunerative work than his two-year stint at an auto

business, and it may have declined to award him a

substantial portion of his back pay request, instead

apportioning damages across both back and front pay.

Simply stated, nothing about the jury instructions or the

evidence presented at trial permits us to conclude that the

jury’s damages award and the court’s reinstatement award

do not overlap. Cf. Selgas, 104 F.3d at 13–14 & n.9

(concluding that a reinstatement remedy did not overlap with

front pay awarded by the jury because it was clear from the

jury instructions and the evidence presented at trial that the

jury was only permitted to determine front pay for an interim

period until the point that the plaintiff could be reinstated).

The question remains what to do about this potential

overlap. Faced with a similar problem of potentially

duplicative legal and equitable awards, the Third and Eighth

Circuits decided to remand for a new determination of

remedies. See Squires, 54 F.3d at 176–77 & n.16 (vacating

the jury’s award in favor of a new trial on compensatory

damages with more precise instructions); Savarese v. Agriss,

883 F.2d 1194, 1205–06 (3d Cir. 1989) (vacating potentially

overlapping compensatory damages award and equitable

back pay award and remanding for a new trial and

recalculation of back pay by the district judge); Greminger

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 39

v. Seaborne, 584 F.2d 275, 278–79 (8th Cir. 1978) (vacating

the jury’s monetary judgment and remanding for the district

court to determine an award of back pay and out-of-pocket

expenses that would not conflict with its equitable

reinstatement remedy). We think the better course on this

record is to simply reverse the equitable reinstatement award

and permit Teutscher to keep the full amount of damages he

obtained from the jury.

Teutscher’s own litigation choices are what lead us to

this conclusion. On the record before us, it is evident that

Teutscher waived his right to a reinstatement award when he

affirmatively elected to seek front pay from the jury. The

election-of-remedies doctrine, which “refers to situations

where an individual pursues remedies that are legally or

factually inconsistent,” operates to “prevent[] a party from

obtaining double redress for a single wrong.” Latman v.

Burdette, 366 F.3d 774, 781–82 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974)),

abrogated on other grounds by Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct.

1188 (2014). A party is bound by his election of remedies if

three conditions are met: “(1) two or more remedies . . .

existed at the time of the election, (2) these remedies [are]

repugnant and inconsistent with each other, and (3) the party

to be bound . . . affirmatively chose[], or elected, between

the available remedies.” Id. at 782 (citing 25 Am. Jur. 2d

Election of Remedies § 8). 14

14

We have in the past cautioned against overreliance on the election-

of-remedies doctrine. See Haphey v. Linn County, 953 F.2d 549, 552

40 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

Each of these conditions is met here. As explained

above, reinstatement and front pay are alternative remedies

for retaliatory discharge, which cannot both be awarded for

the same period of time. See, e.g., Pollard, 532 U.S. at 846.

Teutscher proposed the damages instruction that required the

jury to determine the amount of compensation he would

have earned for the remainder of his working life at RSA,

and he did not object when the jury was charged to include

front pay damages in its lump-sum verdict. Teutscher

therefore elected to seek a make-whole remedy from the

jury, which necessarily included a front pay award for the

entire period covered by any potential reinstatement award.

In sum, having submitted front pay to the jury in the

manner that he did, Teutscher could not then take a second

bite at the apple by seeking a duplicative reinstatement

(9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (explaining that, rather than relying on election-

of-remedies principles, “state claim and issue preclusion rules should

normally be employed when courts are considering whether utilization

of state court proceedings prevents later utilization of federal

proceedings”). While we believe the procedural history of this case

squarely implicates the election-of-remedies doctrine, we do not intend

to suggest anything about the applicability of the doctrine in other

contexts. See Oubichon v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 572–

73 (9th Cir. 1973) (providing that election of remedies applies “only

where conflicting and inconsistent remedies are sought on the basis of

conflicting and inconsistent rights” and holding that the plaintiff’s use of

union arbitration did not bar his Title VII claim (quoting Newman v. Avco

Corp., 451 F.2d 743, 746 n.1 (6th Cir. 1971))).

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 41

award from the court. 15 See Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec.

Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1103 & n.17 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting in

support of its decision that reinstatement was inappropriate

that the plaintiff “failed to object when the trial judge

instructed the jury on front pay, even though he intended to

make a motion for reinstatement”). We therefore conclude

that Teutscher is entitled to keep the full amount of

compensatory (and punitive) damages the jury awarded, but

that the district court’s equitable reinstatement award must

be set aside.

VI.

As a final note, we emphasize that our holding that the

jury’s monetary award precluded the district court’s

equitable award in this case turns on the particular way in

which Teutscher chose to pursue his claims. As the

“‘master’ of his complaint,” Teutscher was entitled to decide

what law to rely on and what remedies to pursue. Ultramar

Am. Ltd. v. Dwelle, 900 F.2d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir. 1990).

There are several ways in which Teutscher likely could have

pursued legal and equitable relief at the same time. Among

them, he could have pursued only back pay from the jury and

15

RSA argues that the district court additionally erred by failing to

consider Teutscher’s duty to mitigate when it awarded him front pay at

Teutscher’s full former salary, and that it erred in ordering reinstatement

and interim front pay without making the requisite finding that it was

possible to return Teutscher to the same or a similar position. Because

we conclude that both the equitable reinstatement and front pay awards

must be vacated for other reasons, we do not reach these issues.

42 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

sought a forward-looking remedy only from the court in

equity. 16 Alternatively, Teutscher could have requested that

the jury be instructed to award only that prospective

compensatory relief that did not overlap with an equitable

reinstatement or front pay remedy.

Such was the case, for instance, in Williams v.

Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1998). There, the

jury was instructed to award “lost future earnings” to

compensate the plaintiff only for the reputational harms she

suffered as a result of the defendant’s discrimination, which

diminished her lifetime earnings capacity generally. Id. at

952 (explaining that the district court “characterized the

jury’s award for lost future earnings as ‘an intangible

nonpecuniary loss’” and “analogized lost future earnings to

an ‘injury to professional standing’ and to ‘injury to

character and reputation’”). To prove up this request, the

plaintiff presented expert testimony about the way in which

her undeservedly poor performance evaluations diminished

her future earnings capacity. See id. Rather than

compensating for this diminished capacity, an equitable

16

Had Teutscher done so, the question of equitable front pay could

perhaps have been tried to the district court with an advisory jury as long

as that choice was clear to the parties in advance, so that the district court

would be guided by the jury’s non-binding front pay finding should

reinstatement prove infeasible. See Traxler v. Multnomah County,

596 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that “[a] trial court,

sitting in equity, may nevertheless employ an advisory jury” though

“[t]he ultimate decision . . . rests with the court”); see also Pradier v.

Elespuru, 641 F.2d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 1981) (“The parties are entitled to

know at the outset of the trial whether the decision will be made by the

judge or the jury.”).

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 43

front pay award granted by the court compensated the

plaintiff for the immediate pecuniary “effects of [the

defendant’s] unlawful termination of her employment” in an

amount “approximat[ing] the benefit [the plaintiff] would

have received had she been able to return to her old job”—

an amount that was capped at a year of wages because her

position would have been eliminated after a year due to

merger. Id. at 953. As a consequence, the jury’s lost future

earnings award avoided overlap with the court’s equitable

remedy of one year of front pay, see id. at 954, and the jury’s

finding about the plaintiff’s lost future earnings capacity thus

did not preclude the district court from granting additional

relief to compensate her for lost wages during her period of

unemployment. 17 See id. at 953 (explaining that even if

17

To the extent the lost future wages award in Williams may also have

included some monetary component for the year in which the plaintiff

received front pay, this is explainable by the particular facts of that case.

In Williams, the plaintiff presented evidence—and the jury found—that

her employer “had engaged in sex discrimination and unlawful

retaliation . . . by [both] failing to promote her . . . and terminating her

employment.” 137 F.3d at 947; see also id. at 948–49. Because, as the

Seventh Circuit there explained, “front pay . . . affords the plaintiff the

same benefit . . . as the plaintiff would have received had she been

reinstated,” and because the salary the plaintiff would have received if

reinstated to her previous position was presumably lower than it should

have been as a result of the defendant’s unlawful failure to promote her,

front pay would not have made the plaintiff fully whole. Id. at 952; see

also id. at 953 (characterizing front pay as “compensat[ing] [the plaintiff]

for the immediate effects of [her] unlawful termination”). An additional

award of lost future earnings, which the Seventh Circuit characterized as

a recovery “for lost earning capacity,” would have compensated her for

being unfairly passed over for promotion. Id. at 952 (quoting McKnight

v. Gen. Motors Corp., 973 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1992)). Consistent

44 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

reinstatement had been awarded by the court in lieu of front

pay, the plaintiff “would still have been entitled to

compensation for her lost future earnings”).

The legal and equitable awards in this case, however,

present the exact problem that Williams avoided: they were

designed to remedy precisely the same loss. The Seventh

Amendment instructs that it is the jury’s decision on the front

pay question that must be respected and the court’s

conflicting front pay award that must be set aside. Given the

potential for a windfall and in light of Teutscher’s

affirmative election to seek front pay from the jury, the

court’s reinstatement award must be set aside as well.

We therefore REVERSE the district court’s equitable

awards of reinstatement and front pay. 18

with the non-overlapping nature of these awards, the Seventh Circuit

explicitly recognized that, “[e]ven if [the plaintiff] had been able to

return to her old job, the jury could find that [she] suffered injury to her

future earning capacity even during her period of reinstatement.” Id. at

953 (emphasis added). Here, in contrast, the jury was instructed to

include in its award all of the “damages that [Teutscher] ha[d] proven he

is entitled to recover,” including damages for past and future economic

and non-economic injury.

18

We address the cross-appeal by Teutscher’s former counsel, William

N. Woodson, III, in which RSA and Teutscher are both appellees, in a

concurrently filed memorandum disposition.

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 45

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:

I concur in the judgment of the majority opinion.

However, I disagree with the majority’s Seventh

Amendment analysis in Part IV of the opinion. I disagree

that the district court “should have viewed itself as bound

under the Seventh Amendment” because “Teutscher needed

to make the same factual showing and to meet the same

defenses” in order to obtain both future lost earnings and

reinstatement. Maj. Op. at 21. Instead, I would hold that the

district court’s equitable remedy was an improper abuse of

discretion, because the district court did not give reasons

why additional equitable relief was appropriate after the jury

had already compensated Teutscher for the monetary harm

he suffered.

The district court’s equitable remedy took the form of

reinstatement, with front pay until reinstatement could

occur. In addition, the jury awarded Teutscher a lump sum

for compensatory damages that included future lost earnings.

In this case, the majority’s constitutional analysis is based on

a conclusion that the factual underpinnings of the jury’s

award for future lost earnings is identical to those supporting

the district court’s equitable award.

I disagree that this is necessarily the case. Future lost

earnings and front pay are different remedies designed to

address different wrongs, and should be analyzed using a

different analytical framework. As such, a plaintiff can be

awarded both without offending the Constitution.

As the majority notes, the jury was only empowered to

grant legal relief to Teutscher in the form of compensatory

46 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

and punitive damages on the state law claims. Maj. Op. at

13. The district court, in contrast, was only able to grant

“appropriate equitable relief” on the ERISA claim. 29 U.S.C

§ 1132(a)(3); Maj. Op. at 13. The district court was not

authorized to grant Teutscher any form of legal relief,

including compensatory money damages. Mertens v. Hewitt

Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993); see also McLeod v. Or.

Lithoprint Inc., 102 F.3d 376, 378 (9th Cir. 1996).

It could, however, reinstate Teutscher in his job.

“Reinstatement is equitable, not compensatory relief.”

McLeod, 102 F.3d at 379. Front pay is also equitable,

because it goes hand-in-hand with reinstatement and is to be

used “during the period between the judgment and

reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement.” Pollard v. E.I. du

Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846 (2001). Although

front pay may look very similar to compensatory damages

for future lost earnings, it is a distinct remedy. The Seventh

Circuit has upheld an award of both future lost earnings and

front pay, and concluded that such an award does not

necessarily constitute a double recovery. Williams v.

Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944, 953 (7th Cir. 1998). This is

so because front pay is the “functional equivalent” of the

equitable remedy of reinstatement. Id. at 952. Future lost

earnings, on the other hand, are compensatory damages

calibrated to actual “monetary losses after the date of

judgment.” Pollard, 532 U.S. at 852. The Supreme Court

confirmed this distinction in Pollard, when it held that

equitable front pay was separate from compensatory

damages (both past and future), and was therefore not

subject to the damages cap under Title VII. Id.

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 47

The Williams court also noted that a jury award for future

compensatory damages was not necessarily factually

inconsistent with an equitable front pay award because the

awards can “compensate the plaintiff for different injuries.”

Williams, 137 F.3d at 953. Reinstatement (and front pay)

puts the plaintiff back in his job, or at least pays him as if he

had been reinstated. Future compensatory damages can be

significantly broader than that, and encompass reputational

harms, loss of experience, and other “forward-looking

aspects of the injury caused by the discriminatory conduct.”

Id. Similarly, a compensatory damages award that only gives

the plaintiff the cash value of reasonably-certain future

earnings at a particular place of employment might still leave

the plaintiff suffering harms that might be appropriately

remedied with reinstatement, such as a restored track record

and job history, which could assist the plaintiff in future

employment searches.

In this way, each remedy can have some unique benefits,

even though the core of the harm (a lost paycheck) can be

remedied by either. In addition to this practical distinction,

the Supreme Court in Pollard made clear that there is a

technical distinction between compensatory damages for

future lost earnings and equitable front pay in lieu of

reinstatement. 532 U.S. at 852. For the two awards to be a

violation of the Seventh Amendment, moreover, the issues

underlying each must be “common to both the legal and

equitable claims.” Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469,

472 (1962). Again, although there is significant overlap

between the compensatory and equitable inquiries, they are

not identical.

48 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

The jury in this case was instructed to calculate “the

present cash value of any future wages and benefits that

[Teutscher] would have earned for the length of time the

employment with Defendant was reasonably certain to

continue,” to be awarded as a lump sum. The implied factual

questions to be decided by the jury were how long Teutscher

was “reasonably certain” to continue his employment with

RSA, and his rate of pay.

When deciding reinstatement and front pay, on the other

hand, the district court must first and foremost decide

whether any equitable relief is “appropriate . . . to redress”

the defendant’s ERISA violation. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(3).

As the majority notes, the district court should address

factors such as work-life expectancy in making this

determination, which is similar to the question posed to the

jury. Maj. Op. at 24–25. Moreover, it is certainly correct that

the jury’s monetary award is highly relevant in determining

what additional equitable relief, if any, is “appropriate” in a

given situation. But, in my view, the issues common to each

inquiry are not precisely the same such that giving both

awards would trigger a Seventh Amendment concern. The

jury was asked to consider the narrow question of the cash

value of the wages which Teutscher would have earned at

RSA with reasonable certainty. The district court has much

wider latitude when deciding whether reinstatement is

“appropriate,” and if so, whether it is feasible, and if not,

whether to award front pay. In Downey v. Strain, 510 F.3d

534 (5th Cir. 2007) the Fifth Circuit noted that “front pay

can only be calculated through intelligent guesswork, and we

recognize its speculative character by according wide

latitude in its determination to the district courts.” Id. at 544

(quoting Sellers v. Delgado Coll., 781 F.2d 503, 505 (5th

TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON 49

Cir. 1986)). The jury, which has considerably less latitude,

is necessarily engaging in a narrower inquiry than the one

the district court is empowered to undertake.

In sum, Pollard instructs us that although they may look

very similar, there is a distinction between future

compensatory damages and front pay that we must respect.

I believe that distinction should extend into the Seventh

Amendment context because it may often be perfectly

reasonable for a jury to award future compensatory damages

and for a district court to award reinstatement (with or

without front pay) in a way that is factually consistent with

the jury’s verdict. This indicates that the legal and factual

issues underpinning the awards are not the same. Here, the

jury’s verdict was general, and the district court provided

very little reasoning for its equitable award. Under these

circumstances, I do not think we can confidently draw the

implication that the district court unconstitutionally

disregarded the jury’s factual findings.

I concur in the judgment, however, because I believe the

district court abused its discretion in granting reinstatement

in this context. As the majority observes, the jury had been

asked to compensate Teutscher for the cash value of his

future paychecks with RSA. The district court’s analysis on

reinstatement is only a paragraph, and appears to assume that

additional equitable relief was “appropriate” to redress the

ERISA violation over and above the jury verdict. If the

district court had provided reasoning to explain why it

believed reinstatement was appropriate to redress non-

monetary wrongs inflicted on Teutscher, it might have

articulated a basis for reinstatement that was in harmony

with the damages award. On this thin record, however, it is

50 TEUTSCHER V. WOODSON

not apparent that is what happened. Therefore, I would

reverse the equitable award as an abuse of discretion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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