Opinion

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission

  • 834 F.3d 562
  • 2016 WL 4435631
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Aug 22, 2016
Status
Published
Author
Elrod
On the bench
King, Jolly, Elrod
Nature of suit
Private Civil Federal
Cited by
54 cases
Authority
More cited than 86.0%

explaining that an interest for purposes of intervention “is sufficient if it is of the type the law deems worthy for protection, even if the intervenor does not have an enforceable legal entitlement or would not have standing to pursue her own claim.”

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that an interest for purposes of intervention “is sufficient if it is of the type the law deems worthy for protection, even if the intervenor does not have an enforceable legal entitlement or would not have standing to pursue her own claim.”
  • finding that intervention was timely because the intervenor “sought intervention before discovery progressed and because it did not seek to delay or reconsider phases of the litigation that had already concluded”
  • finding motion for intervention was timely filed because it was filed before discovery progressed and did not seek to delay or reconsider phases of the litigation that had already concluded
  • holding intervenor’s motion timely in part “because it did not seek to delay or reconsider phases of litigation that had already concluded” (internal citation omitted)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Case: 16-50041 Document: 00513645654 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/22/2016

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 22, 2016

No. 16-50041

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

WAL-MART STORES, INCORPORATED; WAL-MART STORES TEXAS,

L.L.C.; SAM’S EAST, INCORPORATED; QUALITY LICENSING

CORPORATION,

Plaintiffs—Appellees,

v.

TEXAS ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMMISSION, et al.,

Defendants,

TEXAS PACKAGE STORES ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED,

Movant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

Before KING, JOLLY, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:

The Texas Package Stores Association (“the Association”), a trade group

representing holders of permits allowing liquor retailing in the state of Texas,

seek to intervene in a lawsuit between Wal-Mart and the Texas Alcoholic

Beverage Commission (“the Commission”). Wal-Mart alleges that the

regulatory system administered by the Commission operates exclusively for

the benefit of the Association’s members in violation of the Equal Protection,

Commerce, and Comity Clauses of the United States Constitution. The

Case: 16-50041 Document: 00513645654 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/22/2016

No. 16-50041

Association seeks to intervene in defense of the regulatory system. Because the

Association satisfies the relevant requirements, we REVERSE and GRANT the

Association’s motion to intervene as of right.

I.

Texas has a comprehensive licensing and regulatory scheme governing

the sale of alcoholic beverages. See Tex. Alco. Bev. Code §§ 22.01–22.17. Only

holders of a package store permit are allowed to market liquor at retail prices

to consumers for off-premises consumption. Tex. Alco. Bev. Code § 22.01. Texas

severely restricts ownership of package store permits. No individual or

corporation may own more than five package store permits except that persons

“related within the first degree of consanguinity” may consolidate legal entities

under their control regardless of the number of permits held by those entities

and may continue to hold as many permits in the combined entity as were held

by the separate predecessor entities, Tex. Alco. Bev. Code §§ 22.04, 22.05.

Public corporations are prohibited from owning package store permits and

franchised businesses are effectively prohibited from holding permits. Tex.

Alco. Bev. Code §§ 22.15, 22.16.

Wal-Mart’s complaint alleges that this system is a protectionist scheme

enacted for the benefit of existing permit holders. After the district court

denied the Commission’s motion to dismiss, and three months after Wal-Mart

filed its Answer, the Association moved to intervene in the lawsuit. At the time

the Association moved for intervention, discovery had opened but Wal-Mart

had produced no documents and no depositions had been taken. The district

court denied the Association’s motion to intervene.

The Association appeals.

II.

Rule 24(a) permits a party to seek intervention as of right while Rule

24(b) allows a party to seek permissive intervention. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24. “A

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No. 16-50041

ruling denying intervention of right is reviewed de novo.” Texas v. United

States, 805 F.3d 653, 656 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Edwards v. City of Houston,

78 F.3d 983, 995 (5th Cir. 1996)). “Although the movant bears the burden of

establishing its right to intervene, Rule 24 is to be liberally construed.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Federal courts should allow intervention

when no one would be hurt and the greater justice could be attained.” Sierra

Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205 (5th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

To obtain intervention as of right, an intervenor must satisfy a four-

prong test:

(1) the application . . . must be timely; (2) the applicant must have

an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the

subject of the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the

disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or

impede his ability to protect that interest; (4) the applicant’s

interest must be inadequately represented by the existing parties

to the suit.

Texas, 805 F.3d at 657 (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas

Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 1984)).

The timeliness inquiry “is contextual; absolute measures of timelines

should be ignored.” Espy, 18 F.3d at 1205. Timeliness “is not limited to

chronological considerations but ‘is to be determined from all the

circumstances.’” Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 1977)

(quoting United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 548 F.2d 1232, 1235 (5th Cir. 1977)).

Because the Association sought intervention before discovery progressed and

because it did not seek to delay or reconsider phases of the litigation that had

already concluded, the Association’s motion was timely. 1 See Flying J. Inc. v.

1 Because the district court’s only discussion of timeliness took place as part of its

permissive intervention analysis, and because the standards for timeliness under the two

paths for intervention differ, we decide the question of timeliness de novo. See Stallworth,

3

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No. 16-50041

Van Hollen, 578 F.3d 569, 572 (7th Cir. 2009) (concluding intervention after

final judgment was timely because intervenor sought only to appeal and not to

re-litigate issues already resolved); Espy, 18 F.3d at 1205–06 (concluding

intervention to appeal after entrance of injunction was timely because

inadequacy of representation did not become apparent until then even though

intervenor had actual knowledge of suit).

We are also satisfied that the Association has an interest relating to the

subject of the action and that disposition of the action may impair or impede

the Association’s ability to protect that interest. The Association asserts that

the “property or transaction that is the subject of the action” in this case is the

regulatory system governing package stores including the licenses held by the

Association’s members. Wal-Mart’s case is premised on the argument that the

system exists solely and illegally for the benefit of the Association—the lawsuit

is premised on the assumption that the Association’s members are the

beneficiaries of this regulatory system.

Although “[t]here is not any clear definition of the nature of the

‘interest . . .’ that is required for intervention of right,” our precedent has set

guiding principles that dictate the outcome of this case. 7C Charles Alan

Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1908.1 (3d ed. 2007). 2 The

touchstone of the inquiry is whether the interest alleged is “legally

protectable.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co.

(NOPSI), 732 F.2d 452, 464 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). “[A]n interest is sufficient

if it is of the type that the law deems worthy of protection, even if the intervenor

558 F.2d at 263 (“[T]he district court should apply a more lenient standard of timeliness if

the would-be intervenor qualifies for intervention under section (a) than if he qualifies for

intervention under section (b).”).

2 “The ‘interest’ test is primarily is primarily a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits

by involving as many apparently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due

process.”Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

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No. 16-50041

does not have an enforceable legal entitlement or would not have standing to

pursue her own claim.” Texas, 805 F.3d at 659.

Because we must assess whether the Association has a “legally

protectable” interest, we find helpful a recent decision holding that the

Association—participating in a similar challenge to the regulatory system as

an intervenor—has standing to continue that lawsuit without the participation

of the Commission. Cooper v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 820 F.3d 730,

737 (5th Cir. 2016). Because the direct holding of Cooper is that the Association

can legally protect this regulatory system, it likely has an interest in the

subject matter of this litigation. 3

Even without the guidance provided by Cooper, our precedent dictates

that the Association has a legally protectable interest in the regulatory scheme

because, according to Wal-Mart, the Association is the scheme’s beneficiary.

This puts the Association in a position comparable to other successful

intervenors in our circuit. For example, in Texas, women who potentially

qualified for deferred action status sought to intervene in a lawsuit challenging

the federal government’s policies for granting deferred action. 805 F.3d at 660.

We permitted the intervention because the women were the “intended

beneficiaries” of the policy under challenge even though the intervenors had

neither applied for nor received the benefit. Id. We have also held that “public

spirited” civic organizations that successfully petition for adoption of a law may

intervene to vindicate their “particular interest” in protecting that law. City of

Houston v. Am. Traffic Solutions, Inc., 668 F.3d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 2012). Under

3 We have previously suggested that “a movant who shows standing is deemed to have

a sufficiently substantial interest to intervene.” LULAC v. City of Boerne, 659 F.3d 421, 434

n.17 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Meek v. Metro. Dade Cty., 985 F.2d 1471, 1480 (11th Cir. 1993),

abrogated on other grounds Dillar v. Chilton Cnty. Comm’n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1331–32 (11th

Cir. 2007))

5

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No. 16-50041

American Traffic Solutions and Texas, the Association has an interest in

protecting its legally prescribed market.

Our conclusion is in keeping with those of our sister circuits, which

recognize that associations representing licensed business owners have a right

to intervene in lawsuits challenging the regulatory scheme that governs the

profession. In one such lawsuit the Second Circuit concluded that “clearly the

[association] ha[s] an interest in the transaction which is the subject of the

action” because “[t]here can be no doubt that the challenged

prohibition . . . affects the economic interests of members of the pharmacy

profession. Pharmacists also have an interest in a regulation which they claim

is designed to encourage ‘the continued existence of independent local drugstores

by the prevention of destructive competition . . . .’” N.Y. Pub. Int. Research Grp,

Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 516 F.2d 350, 351–52 (2d. Cir. 1975)

(quoting Urowsky v. Board of Regents, 349 N.Y.S.2d 600, 603 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

1973)) (emphasis added). In another lawsuit challenging state liquor licensing

regulations, a federal court in Massachusetts concluded that the intervening

association’s had a sufficient interest in the litigation because

[e]limination of § 15’s three license limit will affect MassPack

members themselves, potentially enabling them to get licenses for

more than three stores, and, more importantly for them, may

change the number and nature of their competitors. MassPack’s

interest in this case is not a general one; the regulation in question

governs its members directly, and their interests are different from

those of the general public or of any business outside of the liquor

retail sector. Indeed ‘preserving the right of small, independent

liquor dealers to do business’ is one of the recognized purposes of

the three license restriction.

Mass. Food Ass’n v. Sullivan, 184 F.R.D. 217, 221–22 (D. Mass. 1999) (quoting

Johnson v. Martignetti, 375 N.E.2d 290, 297 (Mass. 1978)) (emphasis added).

Most recently, Judge Posner, writing for a unanimous Seventh Circuit panel,

permitted intervention by an association of independent gas station owners

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No. 16-50041

precisely because they sought to preserve legislation that limited competition.

Flying J., 578 F.3d at 572 (“Wisconsin’s ‘Unfair Sales Act’ is special-interest

legislation and the special interest is that of retailers who wish, naturally

enough, to limit price competition. They are the statute’s direct beneficiaries

. . . .”).

Wal-Mart argues that NOPSI forecloses the Association’s intervention,

but its argument misreads the law and facts of that case. NOPSI did not create

a bar preventing all intervention premised on “economic interests.” Such a rule

would be inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent permitting intervention

based on economic interests. See, e.g., Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 366–67

(1980) (allowing intervention by individuals who might be able buy land “at

prices below the market value for irrigated lands” depending on the outcome

of the underlying litigation); Cascade Nat. Gas Corp. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co.,

386 U.S. 129, 135–36 (1966) (allowing intervention by gas company into an

antitrust dispute between the government and the company’s supplier because

that dispute would affect its access to product). Our own cases applying NOPSI

have not imposed anything approaching the broad bar Wal-Mart advances.

Those cases have instead suggested that an economic interest is not

sufficiently direct when the intervenor’s interest will only be vindicated by a

separate legal action 4 or, as in NOPSI, when the intervenor’s relationship is

too removed from the dispute. After NOPSI, we have continued to hold that

economic interests can justify intervention when they are directly related to

See, e.g., Ross v. Marshall, 456 F.3d 442, 443 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing NOPSI to allow

4

intervention by insurer into lawsuit against insured because insurer’s interest was not

“contingent on the outcome of a subsequent lawsuit”); SEC v. Funding Res. Grp., 233 F.3d

575, *4 n.9 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing NOPSI to deny intervention to victims of a Ponzi scheme

that may become insolvent due to litigation); SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 429 F. App’x

379, 381–82 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing NOPSI to deny intervention to potential creditor because

interest “relate solely to the [defendant’s] ability to satisfy a judgment for claims that are not

related to the case”).

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the litigation. Espy, 18 F.3d at 1207 (allowing intervention by lumber

companies whose income may be affected by changes in federal land

management policy).

Our holding in NOPSI also dealt with a purely private dispute. Two

publicly-traded corporations—a supplier of natural gas and an energy

company that purchased the supplier’s gas—disagreed about the

interpretation of a contract. 732 F.2d at 454. NOPSI expressly did not involve

any state or federal regulations governing the market for gas sales. Id. at 456

n.3. A class of electrical customers including the mayor and city of New

Orleans 5 sought to intervene in the case, arguing that they were third-party

beneficiaries of the disputed contract. The court held against the intervenors

because it concluded they were not the real party in interest—the rights they

asserted were actually NOPSI’s rights and the contract was not actually a

third-party beneficiary contract entitling them to assert their own rights. 6 Id.

at 464–65.

5 The mayor and city intervened in their private capacities as electrical customers. At

the time NOPSI was decided, the city had no regulatory authority over electricity sales in

New Orleans. Id. at 462.

6 Wal-Mart puts great weight on NOPSI’s declaration that the intervenor’s had only

an “economic interest” in the lawsuit. Id. at 470. Properly put in context, this language in

NOPSI actually strengthens the Association’s claim. We held that the NOPSI intervenors’

interest was insufficient not because it was economic but because it could not be directly tied

to the contract dispute between NOPSI and its supplier. Id. (“The risk of economic harm to

the City essentially arises from the regulatory ‘gap’ which generally leaves NOPSI free to

contract as it wishes.”). All of the interests they asserted were derivative of NOPSI’s

contractual rights. Id. The Association, by contrast, asserts its own interest—its exclusive

enjoyment of a legally protected market

There is no regulatory gap in the present lawsuit—there is a directly and tightly

regulated market that will be significantly disrupted if Wal-Mart prevails. The NOPSI

intervenors were merely private consumers arguing that a private contract dispute might

change the price of a commodity they purchased. In the instant case, the underlying lawsuit

attacks not a private contract but a comprehensive system of state law and the intervenors

are threatened not with a minor change but with the threatened end of their viability.

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No. 16-50041

We conclude our “interest” analysis where we began. NOPSI and our

subsequent cases insist that the core of our interest analysis asks whether an

interest is “legally protectable.” NOPSI, 732 F.2d at 463–64. Often, this is a

tautological exercise—a party may intervene if its interest is legally

protectable and its interest is legally protectable if it can intervene—but in the

case at bar we need not speculate. Cooper strongly suggests that the

Association can legally protect its interest in defending the regulatory scheme.

732 F.2d at 464–465; see also LULAC 659 F.3d at 434 n.17. Our independent

analysis confirms that, even absent Cooper, the Association has a legally

protectable interest as the intended beneficiary of a government regulatory

system.

Having concluded that the Association has an interest that may be

impaired by the present lawsuit, we are also satisfied it has met its minimal

burden to demonstrate inadequate representation. Because intervention

necessarily occurs before the litigation has been resolved, the Association need

only show that “the representation may be inadequate.” Texas, 805 F.3d at 662.

The Association has satisfied its “minimal” burden to establish that its interest

is not adequately represented. Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 1005

(5th Cir. 1996). Our jurisprudence imposes two presumptions of adequate

representation, “when ‘the would-be intervenor has the same ultimate

objective as a party to the lawsuit’ [and] ‘when the putative representative is a

governmental body or officer charged by law with representing the interests of

the [intervenor].’” Texas, 805 F.3d at 661–62 (quoting Edwards, 78 F.3d at

1005) (first alteration added). Even assuming, arguendo, that either of the two

presumptions of adequate representation applies, the Association has shown

“adversity of interest” and “that its interest is in fact different from that of the

[governmental entity] and that the interest will not be represented by [it].”

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No. 16-50041

Texas, 805 F.3d at 661 (quoting Edwards, 78 F.3d at 1005). 7 The Association

has offered several reasons that the Commission’s representation may be

inadequate. The Commission seeks to defend all portions of the litigation,

which limits the range of arguments it can advance, while the Association does

not seek to defend the Hotel Exception. 8 The Association intends to seek a

declaratory judgment that the regulatory scheme is constitutionally valid; the

Commission merely seeks to defend the present suit and would accept a

procedural victory. The Association argues that its interests—protecting its

members’ businesses—are narrower than the Commission’s broad public

mission. It highlights arguments that the Commission cannot make given the

differences in the objectives of the Commission and the Association. 9 Given the

broad policy favoring intervention in our precedent, we are satisfied that the

Association has demonstrated that it may be inadequately represented in the

lawsuit.

III.

Because we conclude that the Association is entitled to intervention as

of right, we do not address the district court’s denial of permissive intervention.

Because the Association has a protectable interest that may be impaired or

injured by the outcome of the lawsuit between Wal-Mart and the Commission

7 After the district court denied the present motion, we clarified that the government-

representative presumption does not inherently apply whenever a state or federal agency is

a party. See Entergy Gulf States of La., L.L.C. v. EPA, 817 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 2016).

8 The hotel exception allows hotels owned by publicly traded corporations to hold

liquor permits. Tex. Alco. Bev. Code § 22.16. All other publicly traded corporations are

prohibited from owning liquor permits. Id.

9 Cf. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 539 (1972) (“[T]he

Secretary has an obligation to protect the vital public interest in assuring free and democratic

union elections that transcends the narrower interest of the complaining union member.”);

Texas, 805 F.3d at 663 (Jane Does’ personal interests are narrower than those of the federal

government); Brumfield, 749 F.3d at 346 (Louisiana had broader interest in maintaining “its

relationship with the federal government” not shared by intervenors); Espy, 18 F.3d at 1207

(“The government must represent the broad public interest, not just the economic concerns

of the timber industry.”).

10

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No. 16-50041

and because the Association has shown that the Commission may not

adequately represent its interests, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of

the Association’s motion to intervene.

11

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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