Matthew Jordan, Sr. v. City of Memphis

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

June 21, 2016 Session

MATTHEW JORDAN, SR. v. CITY OF MEMPHIS

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Shelby County

No. CH062107 Kenny W. Armstrong, Chancellor

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No. W2015-01994-COA-R3-CV – Filed July 27, 2016

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At its scheduled meeting, the City of Memphis Pension Board denied by voice vote a

Memphis police officer‟s request for benefits. At some point in time, which is unclear from

the record, the Board approved minutes from its meeting, which reflected the denial of the

police officer‟s request. The police officer filed a petition for writ of certiorari, seeking

judicial review of the Board‟s decision. The police officer supported his petition with an

oath but failed to include a recitation indicating that the petition was his first application for

the writ. The City of Memphis moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction on the basis of the missing recitation. The trial court granted the motion. On

appeal, the police officer argues that the missing recitation did not deprive the trial court of

subject matter jurisdiction. In addition to the missing recitation, the City argues that the trial

court also lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the petition was not filed within sixty

days from the Board‟s decision on the request for benefits. We vacate the judgment of

dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Vacated

and Remanded

W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN STAFFORD,

P.J.,W.S., and DAVID R. FARMER, SP. J., joined.

John R. Johnson III, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Matthew Jordan, Sr.

Andre B. Mathis, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, City of Memphis.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

On February 22, 2006, Mathew Jordan, Sr. filed an application for line-of-duty

disability retirement benefits with the City of Memphis Pension Board. The Board conducted

a hearing on the application on July 27, 2006, at which Mr. Jordan appeared along with a

representative of the Memphis Police Association. At the hearing, the Board voted

unanimously to deny Mr. Jordan benefits.

On October 27, 2006, Mr. Jordan filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the

Chancery Court for Shelby County, Tennessee, seeking review of the Board‟s decision.

Mr. Jordan supported his petition with an oath sworn to before a notary public. However, the

petition did not state it was “the first application for the writ.”

As required by the writ issued by the court, the Board filed the administrative record.

The administrative record did not include an order or judgment of the Board denying

Mr. Jordan‟s application. Instead, the record included “Minutes of the Retirement and

Pension Board System” for its Thursday, July 27, 2006 meeting. With respect to

Mr. Jordan‟s application, the minutes provided as follows:

The acting chairman and acting secretary of the Board and the assistant city attorney each

signed the minutes. Although reflecting that they were of the July 27, 2006 meeting, the

minutes were otherwise undated. The record did not indicate when the minutes were

approved by the Board.

For reasons not revealed by the record, the City of Memphis did not file an answer to

the petition until June 15, 2011. Over two months later, the City filed a motion to dismiss.

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The rules of our Court provide as follows:

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or

modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion would

have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall be

designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not be cited or

relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.

Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10.

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The City, noting that Mr. Jordan “failed to state in his Petition that this was his first

application for the writ as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-106,”2 requested dismissal for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.

Again for reasons not revealed by the record, Mr. Jordan did not file a response to the

motion to dismiss until April 25, 2014. That same day, Mr. Jordan also filed a motion to

amend his petition to add the omitted recitation that this was “the first application for the

writ.”

On May 23, 2014, the trial court entered an order dismissing the petition for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, citing the missing recitation. The court also concluded it lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to consider Mr. Jordan‟s motion to amend his petition to cure any

defects.

Mr. Jordan appeals, arguing, among other things, that the statutory requirement

requiring the petition to recite it was “the first application for the writ” was not jurisdictional.

The City argues that the requirement was jurisdictional. In addition, for the first time, the

City claims that the petition was untimely.

DISCUSSION

Without subject matter jurisdiction a court lacks the “power to adjudicate a particular

type of controversy,” and any resulting order is void. Dishmon v. Shelby State Cmty. Coll.,

15 S.W.3d 477, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). “The lack of subject matter jurisdiction is so

fundamental that it requires dismissal whenever it is raised and demonstrated.” Id. “Thus,

when an appellate court determines that a trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, it

must vacate the judgment and dismiss the case without reaching the merits of the appeal.”

First Am. Trust Co. v. Franklin-Murray Dev. Co., 59 S.W.3d 135, 141 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2001). Because “a determination of whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of

law, our standard of review is de novo, without a presumption of correctness.” Northland

Ins. Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000).

The trial court dismissed the case based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to

Mr. Jordan‟s failure to comply with the recitation requirement found in Tennessee Code

Annotated § 27-8-106. The City additionally asserts that the trial court also lacked subject

matter jurisdiction because the petition was not timely filed. See Blair v. Tenn. Bd. of Prob.

& Parole, 246 S.W.3d 38, 40-41 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). In this instance and based on Talley

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The statute provides as follows: “The petition for certiorari may be sworn to before the clerk of the

circuit court, the judge, any judge of the court of general sessions, or a notary public, and shall state that it is

the first application for the writ.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-106 (2000).

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v. Board of Professional Responsibility, 358 S.W.3d 185 (Tenn. 2011), we conclude that the

timeliness of the petition should be addressed before reaching the other issues raised by the

parties. If the petition was untimely, we lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider whether

the recitation requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-8-106 is jurisdictional. See

Blair, 246 S.W.3d at 40-41.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the parties cannot agree3 on when the City of Memphis

Pension Board entered its decision denying Mr. Jordan‟s application for line-of-duty

disability retirement benefits. Mr. Jordan argues that the decision was entered when the

minutes from the July 27, 2006 Board meeting were approved. The City, on the other hand,

argues that the decision was entered at the July 27, 2006 Board meeting.

Our courts have recognized that there is a distinction between the rendition of a

judgment and the entry of a judgment. Jackson v. Jarratt, 52 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tenn. 1932).

“„Rendered‟ means expressed or announced in a conclusive manner and with decisive effect

. . . .” Id. “The „entry‟ of judgment is the ministerial act by which enduring evidence of the

judicial act of rendition of judgment is afforded.” Carter v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 377

S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tenn. 1964). In the context of Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-9-102, we

have held “that something more than simply a vote taking place is required before a judgment

or order will be considered as having been entered.” Grigsby v. City of Plainview, 194

S.W.3d 408, 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

In Grigsby v. City of Plainview, we confronted a situation similar to the one presented

to us here. Id. at 408-09. A city beer board voted to revoke a beer permit on February 20,

2003, and disgruntled parties filed a petition for writ of certiorari on July 3, 2003. Id. at 410.

The city filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the

petition was time barred. Id. The disgruntled parties responded that the time period never

began to run because the beer board never entered an order or judgment. Id. The trial court

agreed with the city and dismissed the case. Id.

On appeal, we vacated the decision of the trial court because we were unable to

determine from the record when the beer board‟s decision was entered and, therefore, when

the time for filing began to run. Id. at 414.

[A]ll we are able to glean from the sparse record is that the Board voted to

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The parties also cannot agree on whether Mr. Jordan‟s petition for writ of certiorari was in fact a

petition for writ of certiorari or actually a petition for review under the Uniform Administrative Procedures

Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-114 (Supp. 2015). In either event, however, Mr. Jordan had sixty days from

the entry of the decision to file his petition. See id. §§ 27-9-102 (2000), 27-9-114(a)(1), 4-5-322(b)(1)(A)

(2015); see also Davis v. Tenn. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 23 S.W.3d 304, 309 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (“[T]he time

for seeking judicial review of an agency‟s decision runs from the date of the entry of the agency‟s final order

. . . .”).

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revoke Evans‟ beer permit on February 20, 2003. While this certainly would

qualify as the “rendition” of the Board‟s judgment, it falls short of qualifying

as the “entry” of that judgment. The record contains no proof establishing

whether anything else happened on February 20th which would be sufficient to

properly characterize the Board‟s judgment as having been entered on that day.

There is no “something more” in addition to the vote of the Board and,

therefore, no “enduring evidence” of the Board‟s rendition of judgment.

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Trial Court which held that the

Board‟s judgment was entered on February 20, 2003, and that Plaintiffs‟

complaint was time barred.

Id. at 413-14 (citations omitted). We did not hold that the filing of the minutes necessarily

constituted the entry of the order or decision, but we did require “something more” than just a

vote. Id. at 414.

[T]he record contains no proof showing when the minutes were filed. Without

this critical fact, and even though the filing of the minutes would be sufficient

to trigger the sixty day period in this case, we cannot determine whether

Plaintiffs‟ complaint was filed timely because we have no way of knowing

when the sixty day period started to run. We likewise do not know whether

anything occurred after the vote to revoke Evans‟ permit but before the

minutes were filed, if and when they were, which could properly be considered

as the entry of the Board‟s judgment . . . .

Id.

Although the Pension Board‟s vote to deny Mr. Jordan‟s application would qualify as

the “rendition” of the Board‟s judgment, it also falls short of qualifying as the “entry” of that

judgment. Approval of the minutes or some other act may have constituted entry of the

judgment, but we cannot make that determination from the sparse record before us.

Accordingly, we follow the same approach we took in Grigsby v. City of Plainview.

CONCLUSION

We vacate the judgment of dismissal and remand this case to the trial court to

determine when and if the City of Memphis Pension Board‟s judgment ever was entered by

the filing or approval of minutes or some other act other than just the Pension Board‟s vote,

and if so, whether Mr. Jordan‟s petition was filed within sixty days from that date.

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W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JUDGE

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